Briggs v. Village of Greenhills Ohio

Filing 82

ORDER ADOPTING 70 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS; Plaintiff's 78 Moton for Summary Judgment and 80 Motion to Stay Motion for Summary Judgment are denied as moot. Signed by Judge Michael R. Barrett on 7/23/2007. (Attachments: # 1 Certified Mail Receipt) (ba, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
Joel Briggs,
CASE NO. 1:05cv44
Plaintiff,
Judge Michael R. Barrett
v.
The Village of Greenhills Ohio,
Defendant.
ORDER
This

matter

is

before

the

court

upon

the

Magistrate’s

Report

and

Recommendation (Doc. 70) that the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment be
granted (Doc. 20), Plaintiff’s pro se motion for summary judgment (Doc. 19) be denied,
that Defendant’s motion for sanctions be denied (Docs. 29, 51), Defendant’s motion to
amend scheduling order (Doc. 37) be denied as moot, Plaintiff’s many motions (Docs.
13, 18, 38, 50, 54, 55, 57, 61, 63, 68) filed subsequent to Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment be denied as moot and Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of
his appeal (Doc. 59) be denied.
Plaintiff objects to the Report and Recommendation and requests for Plaintiff’s
summary judgment be granted (Doc. 73).

Defendant filed a response to Plaintiff’s

objections (Doc. 76) to which Plaintiff replied (Doc. 77).
For the reasons set forth below, the Report and Recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge is hereby ADOPTED. Plaintiff’s subsequent Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 78) and Defendant’s Motion to Stay the Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 80) are denied as MOOT.

I.

Background

On May 18, 2004, Mr. Briggs was observed by a Village of Greenhills Police
Officer to be traveling 52 mph in a 35 mph hour zone within the jurisdiction of the Village
of Greenhills. Mr. Briggs was stopped within a short distance but within the Springfield
Township, not within the jurisdictional limits of the Village of Greenhills. Mr. Briggs was
cited for a violation of Section 333.03 of the Village of Greenhills Municipal Code. (Doc.
20, Aff. of Off. Dean, Exh. 1).
On June 22, 2004, Mr. Briggs appeared in the Village of Greenhills Mayor’s
Court. Mr. Briggs contested the speeding ticket because he was pulled over outside of
the jurisdictional limits of the Village of Greenhills. The Mayor’s Court found this
argument to be without merit and found Mr. Briggs guilty of speeding in violation of
Section 333.03 and ordered him to pay $120. (Doc. 20, Aff. of Forbes, Exh. 2). Mr.
Briggs signed a Review, Waiver & Release memorializing the conviction. (Doc. 1, Exh.
A).
On or about July 1, 2004, the Village of Greenhills sent a letter to Mr. Briggs
reminding him of his right to appeal and that his $120 fine was due by July 27, 2004.
The letter also stated that if the fine was not paid a warrant would be issued for Mr.
Briggs arrest. (Doc. 20, Aff. of Forbes, Exh. 2).
Mr. Briggs failed to appeal or pay the fine by July 27, 2004 and on August 5,
2004 a warrant was issued for Mr. Briggs arrest for failure to pay the fine. The clerk of
court sent Mr. Briggs a letter advising him of the warrant. (Doc. 20, Aff. Of Forbes, Exh.
2; see also Doc. 1, Exh. C).

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On or about October 1, 2004, Mr. Briggs sent and the Village of Greenhills
counsel received a letter requesting the Village of Greenhills to “erase” his name and
conviction from the Village of Greenhills’ records. (Doc. 1; see also Doc. 20, Exh. 2-E).
On December 15, 2004, Mr. Briggs was arrested by a Sharonville police officer
on the capias issued by the Mayor’s Court. On the date of arrest, Mr. Briggs paid the
fine of $120 and was immediately released. (Doc. 20, Aff. of Forbes, Exh. 2; see also
Doc. 1, Exh. D).
Mr. Briggs brings this action alleging defamation, slander, pain and suffering, a
violation of his constitutional right of privacy and that he was unconstitutionally arrested
(Doc. 1 at 3). Mr. Briggs seeks $5 million in damages.
II.

Arguments

Mr. Briggs argues that because the Review, Waiver and Release states that he
was convicted of the offense of ‘speed’ rather than ‘speeding’ and the offense does not
include the ordinance section title and the exact miles per hour that he was traveling
over the speed limit that he did not violate any ordinance of the Village of Greenhills.
He further argues that because he was pulled over outside the jurisdictional limits of the
Village of Greenhills that the Village of Greenhills lacks any authority to issue the
speeding citation. Finally, he argues he was unconstitutionally arrested, handcuffed
and searched, because he alleges the Review, Waiver and Release is evidence that he
did not violate an ordinance of the Village of Greenhills. Plaintiff also asserts that there
is diversity jurisdiction because the amount in controversy is over $75,000 and the
plaintiff and defendant are both ‘citizens.’

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In response, the Village of Greenhills argues that because the court does not
have jurisdiction over the unlawful citation claim or the defamation claim that it should
not review those issues. However, if the Court does find jurisdiction, the Village of
Greenhills argues that because the Plaintiff was originally observed by the Village of
Greenhills Police Officer within the Village of Greenhills jurisdiction that the Village of
Greenhills had the authority to issue the citation, that Plaintiff was properly convicted in
Mayor’s Court of violating ordinance section 333.03, that the offense was properly
indicated on the citation issued to the Plaintiff and that the Review, Waiver and Release
is verification of the Plaintiff’s conviction. (Doc. 21). The Village of Greenhills also
argues that because the Plaintiff simply reiterates his arguments and alleges no
additional specific facts in support of unconstitutional arrest claim or for a 42 U.S.C. sec.
1938 claim that the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation should stand. Finally,
The Village of Greenhills argues that the court does not have jurisdiction over the
Plaintiff’s state law claims of unlawful citation or defamation because (1) the court does
not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s state law claims; (2) they do not
involve a federal claim over which the court has original jurisdiction; (3) Plaintiff fails to
establish a claim for relief under section 1983; and (4) Plaintiff failed to present facts or
evidence sufficient to establish a violation of his constitutional rights. Additionally, the
Village of Greenhills argues that the court does not have diversity jurisdiction as both
the Plaintiff and Defendant are citizens of the same state.

Finally, the Village of

Greenhills argues the court does not pendent jurisdiction over the citation and
defamation claims, because the Plaintiff’s claim of an unconstitutional arrest does not
have substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on to the court.
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III.
When

Analysis
objections

are

received

to

a

magistrate

judge’s

Report

and

Recommendation on a dispositive matter, the assigned district judge “shall make a de
novo determination...of any portion of the magistrate judge’s disposition to which
specific written objection has been made....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). After review, the
district judge “may accept, reject or modify the recommended decision, receive further
evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id; see also
28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B). General objections are insufficient to preserve any issues for
review; “[a] general objection to the entirety of the magistrate’s report has the same
effects as would a failure to object.”

Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human

Services, 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). Once the movant has met this initial burden, the non-movant cannot
rest on its pleadings, but must show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
A.

42 U.S.C. Section 1983

The Plaintiff has failed to present any facts or evidence sufficient to establish a
claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C.§
1983 against a municipality requires the, “allegation that official policy is responsible for
a deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 690 (1978), see also Bd. of the County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403
5

(1997) (The claimant must, “identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the
plaintiff's injury,” and the claimant must demonstrate that the must also demonstrate
that the municipality,”through its deliberate conduct... was the ‘moving force’ behind the
injury alleged.)
The Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts or present evidence that any injuries he
suffered were the result of unconstitutional policies or customs of the Defendant. The
Plaintiff was arrested for failure to pay a fine for which he was convicted and was
released immediately after he was processed and payment was made.
B.

Constitutional Violation Claim

The Plaintiff alleges that his right of privacy was invaded due to an
unconstitutional arrest, but fails to present any evidence whatsoever in support of his
claims. (Doc. 1 at 3) (“unconstitutionally handcuffed!, arrested!... and mugshotted!”). In a
summary judgement motion the movant is required to present some significant
probative evidence to support their claims. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(U.S. 1986) (The moving party is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" because the
nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her
case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.); Sixty Ivy Street Corp. v.
Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432 (6th Cir. 1987). Unsupported allegations are not sufficient to
establish Plaintiff’s claims of unconstitutional conduct. Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy
Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988) (unsupported assertions of legal
conclusions are insufficient allegations of this material element); Williams v. Ford Motor
Co., 187 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 1999).
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The Plaintiff has failed to present any significant probative evidence that his
constitutional rights are violated. The Plaintiff failed to pay a fine for speeding after
letters had been sent from the Defendant and from the Clerk of Courts reminding him to
do so. The Plaintiff was warned by the clerk of courts that a warrant was issued for his
arrest. The Plaintiff was arrested for failure to pay and was released immediately after
he was processed and payment was made. The Plaintiff has failed to present any
probative evidence that he was, “unconstitutionally handcuffed!, arrested!... and
mugshotted!”
C.

Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims

The Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s state law
claims alleging an unlawful speeding citation or resulting defamation, because the
claims do not involve a federal claim over which the court has original jurisdiction.
The Court does not have diversity jurisdiction, because the Plaintiff and
Defendant are citizens of the same state. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), federal court has
jurisdiction, “over cases in which the citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the
citizenship of each defendant.,” thereby ensuring “complete diversity.” Caterpillar Inc. v.
Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996), citing State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386
U.S. 523, 531 (1967). Also the amount in controversy needs to exceed $75,000. 28
U.S.C. Section 1332(a). In the absence of both of these requirements the court lacks
diversity jurisdiction. Caterpillar Inc., 519 U.S. at 68.
Finally, the Court declines to exercise pendant jurisdiction over the state law
claims, because the Plaintiff’s federal law claim of an unconstitutional arrest does not
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have substance sufficient to warrant the court to exercise pendent jurisdiction on the
state law claims. In order for a court to exercise pendent jurisdiction the “federal claim
must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court.” United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966), citing Levering & Garrigues Co. v.
Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933); see also 28 U.S.C § 1367(a) (“In any civil action of which
the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III
of the United States Constitution.”); see also City of Chi. v. Int'l College of Surgeons,
522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (Depending on a host of factors... the nature of the state law
claims, the character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the state
and federal claims -- district courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over
supplemental state law claims.) Plaintiff is unable to allege any facts or present any
evidence sufficient to support his claim of an unconstitutional arrest.
IV.

Conclusion

Thus, for the reasons set forth above the Report and Recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge is hereby ADOPTED, in its entirety. Plaintiff’s subsequent Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 78) and Defendant’s Motion to Stay the Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 80) are denied as MOOT. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this
case and remove it from the docket of this Court.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Michael R. Barrett
Michael R. Barrett, Judge
United States District Court

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