Easley v. Haywood et al

Filing 256

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE (Docs. 229 , 230 , 231 ). Signed by Judge Timothy S. Black on 4/28/2015. (mr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
DAVID EASLEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
GARY HAYWOOD, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 1:08-cv-601
Judge Timothy S. Black

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS IN LIMINE (Docs. 229, 230, 231)
This civil action is before the Court on Defendants’ motions in limine (Docs. 229,
230, 231) and the parties’ responsive memoranda (Docs. 237, 238, 239, 246, 247, 248). 1
Defendants move the Court to prohibit: (1) Plaintiff from offering non-expert medical
opinions and from arguing inadequate medical care claims; (2) the introduction of
protected evidence; and (3) the introduction of portions of the use of force reports.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A ruling on a motion in limine is no more than a preliminary, or advisory,
opinion that falls entirely within the discretion of the district court.” United States v.
Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir. 1994). Courts may properly deny or defer ruling on
motions in limine where issues such as foundation, relevance, and potential prejudice
require the context of the trial for resolution. Indiana Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F.
Supp.2d 844 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004). Moreover, because in limine rulings are advisory in
1

In this civil rights case, Plaintiff alleges that correctional officers at the Southern Ohio Correctional
Facility (“SOCF”) used excessive force against him on July 3, 2008, in violation of his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

nature, a court may alter its ruling during the course of the trial. Luce v. United States,
469 U.S. 38, 41–42 (1984).
II.
A.

ANALYSIS

Medical Opinions and Care

In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts that his injuries are more extensive than those
reflected in his medical records—to wit, extensive bleeding, knots on the head, a
dislocated shoulder, and bilateral lacerations to his ankles. (Doc. 10 at 6). Plaintiff also
claims that the medical treatment he received was inadequate. (Id. at 6–7). Defendants
move the Court to prohibit Plaintiff from offering non-expert medical opinions and from
arguing his inadequate medical care claims. (Doc. 229).
While Federal Rule of Evidence 701(c) specifically precludes a lay witness from
“testifying as to opinions or inferences which are not based on scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge within the score of rule 702,” it also provides that
“testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the
witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to
determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”
1.

Claimed Injuries

Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff may offer testimony as to his impression of
subjective physical pain as well as any medical treatment he received. (Doc. 229 at 1).

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However, they argue that Plaintiff should not be permitted to testify as to medical
diagnoses, as his testimony would not be based on scientific, technical, or specialized
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. Plaintiff argues that he is permitted to testify as
to injuries that a lay person could identify and explains that his testimony will be limited
to his personal perception of the pain and limitations he experienced during and after the
July 3, 2008 incident, as compared to the pain and limitations he experienced prior to the
incident.
This Court recently decided a similar motion in limine in Lovett v. Cole, No. 1:11cv-277, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157755 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2014). Therein, the Court
determined that the plaintiff was permitted to testify about the subjective physical and
mental pain he experienced during and as a result of the alleged use of force incident, as
well as any medical procedures and testing he underwent as a result of the incident. Id.
The Court finds that those same parameters are appropriate here. Pursuant to Rule
701(c), Plaintiff may testify as to injuries that a lay person could identify, but he may not
testify as to medical diagnoses which require the application of specialized knowledge.
2.

Adequacy of Medical Treatment Provided

On March 2, 2011, the Court adopted Magistrate Judge Timothy S. Hogan’s
Report and Recommendation on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding no
basis for Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. (Doc. 81
at 3). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims for inadequate medical care and/or failure to
address undiagnosed conditions were dismissed. (Id. at 11). Defendants move the Court

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to prohibit Plaintiff from attempting to relitigate these claims or to taint the jury. (Doc.
229). 2
Plaintiff acknowledges that the Court dismissed his inadequate medical care claim
and does not intend to argue that he is entitled to damages as a result of inadequate
medical care. (Doc. 237 at 2). However, Plaintiff argues that he must be permitted to
testify about the medical care he received following the July 3, 2008 incident because the
treatment he received (or did not receive) is relevant to the accuracy of his medical
records. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the jury should be able to consider:
(1) his opinion as to whether his medical records accurately reflect his injuries, because
only he has the knowledge as to his symptoms; and (2) any requests he made for
treatment, and whether he received such treatment.
The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s opinion as to whether his medical records
accurately reflect his injuries this testimony must be permitted so that the jury can
determine the scope of Plaintiff’s injuries (and the credibility to be afforded to the
medical records).
Whether Plaintiff may introduce evidence of his requests for treatment, and the
receptiveness of staff to those requests, is a closer question. Defendants argue that
Plaintiff is attempting to confuse, mislead, or draw sympathy from the jury in claiming
that non-parties allowed him to purportedly suffer in pain. The Court finds that the trial

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The law of the case doctrine provides that “when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should
continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.” Scott v. Churchill, 377 F.3d
565, 569–70 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983).

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context is necessary to determine the extent to which this testimony is relevant and/or
prejudicial, and therefore defers a determination on this issue until trial.
B.

Protected Evidence

Defendants move the Court to prohibit the introduction of protected evidence at
trial. (Doc. 230). Specifically, and as a precaution, Defendants ask the Court to prohibit
the disclosure of confidential information unless the parties have entered into an
agreement authorizing the same, as contemplated by the parties’ stipulated protective
order (“Protective Order”) (Doc. 223).
Plaintiff agrees that the Protective Order requires the parties to “work to enter into
a written agreement as to the use of documents or information to which the Stipulated
Protective Order applies.” (Doc. 223 at 6). Plaintiff advises that he has identified certain
documents that he intends to introduce at trial and that fall under the Protective Order.
Plaintiff is attempting to enter into an agreement with Defendants regarding the use of
those documents.
For the foregoing reasons, the introduction of protected evidence at trial is
prohibited, absent (1) agreement by the parties; or (2) Court order. To the extent the
parties are unable to reach an agreement as to protected evidence, the party seeking to
introduce the evidence should petition the Court for assistance.
C.

Use of Force Reports

Pursuant to Ohio Administrative Code §§ 5120-9-01 and 5120-9-02, investigations
into the July 3, 2008 incident were conducted and use of force reports dated August 1,

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2008 and September 15, 2008 were issued. Defendants move the Court to prohibit the
introduction of the cover pages of these use of force reports (Bates Nos. 000001 and
000053) at trial. 3 Specifically, Defendants argue that the cover pages are irrelevant and
that any probative value is outweighed by risks of unfair prejudice and confusion.
Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 4 Even
relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 403. “Unfair
prejudice does not mean the damage to a [party’s] case that results from the legitimate
probative force of the evidence; rather it refers to evidence which tends to suggest [a]
decision on an improper basis.” United States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 603 (6th Cir.
2006). A district court has broad discretion in making a Rule 403 determination. U.S. v.
Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 567 (1993).
The Sixth Circuit has previously concluded that use of force reports are relevant to
an inmate plaintiff’s excessive force claims. Combs v. Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 555 (6th
3

In their motion, Defendants appeared to seek the exclusion of the cover page of the September 15, 2008
report only. (Doc. 231). In their Reply, Defendants explain that they seek the exclusion of both cover
pages. (Doc. 246). The Court notes that Defendants characterizes the pages at issue as “cover pages,”
whereas Plaintiff characterizes them as “first pages.” The Court will refer to the pages at issue as “cover
pages,” though it has no opinion as to which characterization is more appropriate.

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See also Advisory Committee Notes to 1972 Proposed Rules (“The fact to be proved may be ultimate,
intermediate, or evidentiary; it matters not, so long as it is of consequence in the determination of the
action. . . . The fact to which the evidence is directed need not be in dispute. . . . Evidence which is
essentially background in nature can scarcely be said to involve disputed matter, yet it is universally
offered and admitted as an aid to understanding.”).

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Cir. 2002). At issue in this case is whether the force used by Defendants Haywood and
Brannigan on July 3, 2008 was excessive under the Eighth Amendment. Thus, the fact
that the SOCF investigated this use of force—and the SOCF’s ultimate conclusions—are
relevant to the jury’s inquiry into whether the force used violated Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. Accordingly, the cover pages are relevant to the claims at issue in this case. 5
Defendants’ primary argument is in support of the exclusion of the cover pages it
that the cover page of the September 15, 2008 report poses a risk of unfair prejudice and
confusion. In the September 15, 2008 report, investigators found that, as to Defendant
Haywood, “although the force [he used] was justified in the situation, the force, as
applied, was inappropriate.” (Doc. 176-13 at 8). On the cover page, in response to the
question “Was the force inappropriate and/or excessive ___ Yes or ___ No,” the
investigator marked “Yes,” because of the construction of the question. Defendants
argue that this sends a potential prejudicial impression to the jury that administrators
found excessive force and that jurors may confuse the standard for an administrative
finding with the standard for an Eighth Amendment violation. Defendants are also
concerned that the words “Refer for Discipline,” which are handwritten on the cover
page, are vague and may confuse the jury, because there is no indication of which staff
members are being referred for discipline or the reason for the discipline.

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Defendants argue that Plaintiff points to no evidence that suggests that the cover pages are part of the
use of force investigations and/or committee reports. Defendants explain that testimony at trial will
demonstrate at trial that the use of force committee does not complete, author, or include these cover
pages in its reports and attachments. Plaintiff argues that exclusion of the cover pages could prejudice
and confuse the jury because they would not be able to consider the reports in their entirety. Whether the
cover pages are part of the use of force reports is a foundational issue best resolved at trial.

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However, the cover page to the September 15, 2008 report is consistent with the
factual findings contained within the narrative section of the report, in that the committee
concluded that the force used was “inappropriate and/or excessive.” (Doc. 176-13 at 1)
(emphasis added). The addition of the word “excessive” does not transform the cover
page into an unfairly prejudicial document. Nor do the cover pages suggest that the jury
reach their conclusion on an improper basis—like an emotional one. Defendants will
have the opportunity to introduce testimony to explain the conclusion and the reference to
discipline contained on the cover page. Additionally, this Court will advise the jury as to
the legal standard Plaintiff must satisfy to prove a violation of his Eighth Amendment
rights.
For the reasons set forth above, the court declines to prohibit the introduction of
the cover pages at this juncture. 6
III.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motions in limine (Docs. 229,
230, 231) are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, as set forth in this
Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 4/28/15

s/ Timothy S. Black
Timothy S. Black
United States District Judge

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In the alternative, Defendants seek redaction of the excessive use of force and disciplinary referral
language on the cover page to the September 15, 2008 report. Because the Court finds that this cover
page is relevant, and that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice or jury confusion, the Court declines to redact the cover page.

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