Pearson v. Ford Motor Company

Filing 114

OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 107 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, only to the extent that it dismisses Count Two of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as preempted by ERISA. The Court further DENIES Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration 107 . Signed by Judge S Arthur Spiegel on 5/22/2012. (km1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
TIMOTHY PEARSON,

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Plaintiff,
v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
Defendant.

NO. 1:08-CV-00881

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint Or, in the Alternative,
Motion to Reconsider (doc. 107), Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition
(doc. 108), and Defendant’s Reply (doc. 109).

For the reasons

indicated herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART
Defendant’s Motion.
I.

Background
This case is about a long-term African-American employee

of Defendant, who shortly after taking leave, was fired. Plaintiff
contends he was wrongfully terminated in retaliation for having
filed three discrimination complaints, and after he took Family and
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) leave.

Defendant contends it fired

Plaintiff rather for expressing homicidal thoughts to a companyretained doctor, to the effect that he felt like taking a gun to
work and shooting some one.
tolerance”

policy

termination

was

for

based

Defendant claims to have a “zero-

workplace
on

such

violence,

policy.

At

and
the

Plaintiff’s
time

of

his

discharge, Plaintiff was two years short of vesting in optimal
retirement benefits.
Plaintiff originally filed his Complaint in the Hamilton
County Court of Common Pleas (doc. 2); Defendant removed the action
to this Court in December 2008 (doc. 1).

Plaintiff went through

two attorneys, one of whom was disbarred, before being represented
by current counsel (doc. 27).
The

Court

denied

Defendant

summary

judgment

as

to

Plaintiff’s retaliation and Family Medical and Leave Act (“FMLA”)
claims on October 5, 2010 (doc. 40).

The Court further denied

Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, that was premised
on the theory that Plaintiff’s case should be dismissed after three
witnesses recanted their testimony (doc. 101).

The Court denied

such motion, finding it a jury question to evaluate the credibility
of the testimony of the witnesses (Id.).

The Court set this

matter for final pretrial conference in January 2012 (Id.).
At the January 6, 2012 conference, Plaintiff requested
the Court for leave to amend the Complaint to add a disability
claim

(doc.

103).

The

Court

granted

such

leave

finding

it

appropriate to allow an amendment of the pleadings “to conform them
to the evidence and raise an unpleaded issue” (Id. quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(b)).

Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint (doc.

105), adding a disability claim, but also adding a claim for
“Wrongful Retaliatory Denial of Retirement Benefits in Violation of

2

Ohio

Law,”

Ohio

Revised

Code

Chapter

4112.02(I).

Defendant

subsequently filed the instant motion to dismiss, which is ripe for
the Court’s consideration.
II.

The Applicable Standard
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) requires the Court to determine whether a
cognizable claim has been pled in the complaint. The basic federal
pleading requirement is contained in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), which
requires that a pleading "contain . . . a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 858 (6th
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007).

Cir. 1976); Erickson v.

In its scrutiny of the complaint, the

Court must construe all well-pleaded facts liberally in favor of
the party opposing the motion.
236 (1974).

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

A complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it

“contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Courie v. Alcoa

Wheel & Forged Products, 577 F.3d 625, 629-30 (6th Cir. 2009),
quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
A motion to dismiss is therefore a vehicle to screen out
those

cases

implausible.

that

are

impossible

as

well

as

those

that

are

Courie, 577 F.3d at 629-30, citing Robert G. Bone,

Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94

3

IOWA L. REV. 873, 887-90 (2009).

A claim is facially plausible

when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct
alleged.

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.

Plausibility falls somewhere

between probability and possibility. Id., citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 557.

As the Supreme Court explained,

“In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion
to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to
the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide
the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief.” Id. at 1950.
The

admonishment

to

construe

the

plaintiff's

claim

liberally when evaluating a motion to dismiss does not relieve a
plaintiff of his obligation to satisfy federal notice pleading
requirements
conclusions.

and

allege

Wright,

more

Miller

than
&

Procedure: § 1357 at 596 (1969).

bare

Cooper,

assertions
Federal

of

legal

Practice

and

"In practice, a complaint . . .

must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting
all of the material elements [in order] to sustain a recovery under
some viable legal theory."

Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,

745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984), quoting In Re: Plywood
Antitrust Litigation, 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. 1981); Wright,
Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1216 at 121-23
(1969).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

4

clarified the threshold set for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal:
[W]e are not holding the pleader to an impossibly high
standard; we recognize the policies behind Rule 8 and the
concept of notice pleading.
A plaintiff will not be
thrown out of court for failing to plead facts in support
of every arcane element of his claim.
But when a
complaint omits facts that, if they existed, would
clearly dominate the case, it seems fair to assume that
those facts do not exist.
Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th
Cir. 1988).
III.

The Parties’ Arguments
Defendant contends in its motion that all of Plaintiff’s

state law claims are related to the allegation that Ford wrongfully
denied him retirement benefits, and as such, all of his state law
claims are preempted by the Employee Income Security Act (“ERISA”),
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (doc. 107).

Defendant further contends it was

clear error for the Court to allow Plaintiff to amend his Complaint
at the “eve of trial” to add a disability claim, that Plaintiff’s
motion to amend was made in bad faith, and in any event, when an
employee makes a threat of violence, he loses all protection of
disability discrimination statutes (Id. citing Green v. Burton
Rubber Processing, Inc., 30 Fed. Appx. 466 (6th Cir. 2002)).
Plaintiff responds that Defendant’s motion is simply a
reversion to “its usual scorched earth tactic of asking the court
to again reverse its previous decision,” and that because the trial
was postponed to allow for further discovery, Ford suffers no
prejudice from the addition of the disability claim (doc. 108).
5

Plaintiff further contends that its state law claims are the same
claims pending from the onset of this litigation, some five years
ago (Id.).
that

he

Plaintiff argues Count One of his Complaint
was

retaliated

against

for

filing

alleges

discrimination

complaints, and that retirement benefits are only mentioned in a
recital of his damages resulting from such retaliation (Id.).
Plaintiff expresses no intent to file an ERISA case which would
involve a burden of proof he acknowledges he cannot meet (Id.). As
for Count Two of his Complaint, “Wrongful Retaliatory Denial of
Retirement Benefits in Violation of Ohio Law,” Ohio Revised Code
Chapter 4112.02(I), Plaintiff contends all discrimination claims
brought under such section would be preempted by ERISA if “a facet
of damages claimed by the terminated employee was entitlement to
retirement benefits” (Id.).
As for his disability claim, Plaintiff responds that his
claim under Ohio law is not precluded as his situation is different
from that in Green.

(Id.).

Unlike the employee in such case

Plaintiff’s doctor did not see Plaintiff’s expression of homocidal
ideation as a credible threat requiring the attention of police,
Plaintiff did not go to work after making the threat (as he was on
leave), and Plaintiff owned no guns (Id.).
Finally,

Plaintiff

contends

Defendant’s

alternative

motion for reconsideration should be denied (Id.). Citing Blair v.
Board of Trustees of Sugarcreek Twp., No. 3:07-CV-056, 2008 WL

6

4372665 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 22, 2008), Plaintiff argues motions for
reconsideration are extraordinary in nature and, because they run
against notions of formality, should be discouraged (Id.).
In Reply, Defendant reiterates its view that all of
Plaintiff’s state law claims relate to an ERISA benefits plan, and
therefore are preempted (doc. 109). Defendant contends there is no
question that Plaintiff’s second claim for relief relates to a
retirement

plan,

and

it

is

thus

“disingenuous

at

best”

for

Plaintiff to argue his Amended Complaint has nothing to do with
ERISA (Id.).

Defendant further contends its citation to Green was

correct such that Plaintiff’s disability claim should be barred,
and that Plaintiff’s “underhanded tactics” of potentially seeking
to amend his complaint at trial to add a discrimination claim
should not be rewarded (Id.).
IV.

Discussion
As an initial matter, the Court finds the hyperbole used

by both sides in their briefing bordering on shrill.

There is no

need for counsel to accuse one another of lack of good faith,
underhanded tactics, or of “tortured logic,” and “bluster.”

The

Court appreciates the efforts of counsel to advance the interests
of their respective parties, but finds such language unhelpful.
Having reviewed this matter, the Court finds well-taken
Defendant’s position that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint includes a
second count, which explicitly references “wrongful denial of

7

retirement benefits” that is preempted by ERISA.

However, the

Court also agrees with Plaintiff’s position that it would be
overreaching to consider Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims as
similarly preempted.

Plaintiff’s first claim remains a claim for

retaliation for having made civil rights complaints. The fact that
he allegedly suffered various damages, including among such damages
reduced retirement benefits, does not convert his civil rights
claim into an ERISA claim.
The

Court

has

already

issued

a

ruling

regarding

Plaintiff’s expression to his doctor, and in its view, it is
clearly in question whether Plaintiff’s words constituted a bona
fide threat.

His doctor did not appear to think so, as she

recommended more time off, and she did not contact the authorities.
The Court disagrees with Defendant that Green bars Plaintiff from
advancing his claim for disability discrimination.

This case is

different. Plaintiff’s allegations show he was on disability leave
for mental stress related to discrimination.

Such allegations are

plausible, and can support a claim for disability discrimination.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
As a final matter, the Court sees no real prejudice that
has accrued to Defendant by allowing Plaintiff to amend his
Complaint.

The trial has been postponed, and Defendant has had

time to conduct any necessary discovery.

As such, the Court finds

no basis to reconsider its ruling granting Plaintiff leave to amend

8

his Complaint.
V.

Conclusion
The Court finds that Count Two of Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint is preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).

However, the Court rejects Defendant’s

contention that the remaining state law claims in Plaintiff’s
complaint

are

similarly

barred,

as

such

claims

retaliation for filing civil rights complaints.

relate

to

The Court further

finds no basis to dismiss Plaintiff’s disability claim, as such
claim is plausible under the facts alleged in this case.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint Or, in
the Alternative, Motion to Reconsider (doc. 107), only to the
extent that it dismisses Count Two of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
as preempted by ERISA.

The Court further DENIES Defendant’s

Alternate Motion for Reconsideration (doc. 107).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 22, 2012

s/S. Arthur Spiegel
S. Arthur Spiegel
United States Senior District Judge

9