Yantis v. State of Ohio SOCF et al

Filing 18

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 10 ). Signed by Judge Timothy S. Black on 7/23/12. (mr1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
TARA YANTIS.

Case No. 1:11-cv-35

Plaintiff,

Judge Timothy S. Black

vs.
STATE OF OHIO, SOUTHERN OHIO
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. 10)
This civil case is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment of
Defendants State of Ohio Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF) and Donald
Morgan (Doc. 10) and the parties’ responsive memoranda (Docs. 15 & 17).
For the reasons stated here, the Motion is GRANTED.
I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Undisputed Facts
1.

Plaintiff Tara Yantis was hired as a Corrections Officer at the Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) at SOCF on
January 3, 2006. (Doc. 8 at 25; Doc. 10 at ¶ 1).

2.

Yantis received and signed for ODRC’s Standards of Employee
Conduct on November 1, 2009. (Doc. 8 at 17 and 28; Doc. 8, Ex. C;
Doc. 10 at ¶3).

3.

ODRC Rule 46(B) and (D) prohibit unauthorized personal
relationships, or residing with any individuals within six months
following their release from custody or supervision of ODRC.
(Doc. 8, Ex. D at 22).

4.

Corrections officers who violate ODRC Rule 46 are subject to
discipline up to and including termination for the first offense.
(Doc. 8, Ex. D at ¶ 46(B) and (D)).

5.

During the early months of 2010, Yantis worked the day shift on the
J-4 North section of the prison, where inmate John Dean worked as a
porter under her supervision. (Doc. 8 at 25; Doc. 10 at ¶ 1).

6.

Inmate Dean was released from prison on February 13, 2010. (Doc.
10 at ¶ 6).

7.

Sometime in February or March 2010, Yantis encountered Dean at a
gas station two miles from her home. Yantis offered to have Dean
stay on her property. (Doc 8 at 24-25; Doc. 10 at ¶ 7).

8.

Dean stayed on Yantis’s property in a camper outsider her home for
two days. (Doc 8 at 27; Doc. 10 at ¶ 8).

9.

Prior to the investigation into her actions, Yantis did not inform
SOCF personnel that she had any contact with Dean or that he had
stayed on her property. Yantis did not complete a staff nexus form.
(Doc. 9 at 19-21, 27-30).

10.

In March 2010, Captain Bell and Lieutenant Joseph counseled Yantis
for allowing an inmate access to her personal belongings and to take
a doughnut from her lunch box. (Doc. 8 at 46-48).

11.

In early April, Yantis’s ex-husband informed prison officials that
Dean had stayed on her property. Warden Morgan contacted Ohio
State Highway Patrol Trooper Ball to investigate. (Doc. 8 at 38;
Doc. 10, Ex. 1 at ¶ 7).

12.

On April 8, 2010, Yantis was interviewed by Trooper Ball in relation
to her contact with Dean. Ball determined that there was no
evidence of criminal activity occurring on state property and reported
to Warden Morgan that the allegations indicated this was an
administrative matter. (Doc. 8, Ex. G).

13.

Yantis was placed on administrative leave on April 8, 2010
following Ball’s interview. (Doc. 8, Ex. N at 8).
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14.

15.

On April 15, 2010, Yantis was interviewed by SOCF Investigator
David See. (Doc. 8, Ex. F). Yantis was represented at the interview
by her attorney, James Banks, and assisted by a union representative.
(Doc. 8 at 30).

16.

Yantis admitted to Investigator See that Dean stayed on her property.
On advice of counsel, she then declined to answer further questions.
(Doc. 8 at 30; Doc. 8 , Ex. F).

17.

Investigator See informed Yantis that failing to cooperate in an
investigation is a separate ODRC rule violation. (Doc. 8 at 34-35).

18.

ODRC Rule 24 prohibits employees from failing to cooperate in an
official investigation or inquiry. (Doc. 8, Ex. D). Corrections
officers who violate ODRC Rule 24 are subject to discipline up to
and including termination for the first offense. (Id. at 24).

19.

On June 14, 2010, Lieutenant Nate Miller met with Yantis to review
her June 2009 – June 2010 performance evaluation wherein Yantis
received four “Does Not Meet” ratings out of twelve performance
dimensions with an overall rating of “Unsatisfactory.” Miller was
not Yantis’s supervisor. (Doc. 8 at. 41-42, 44-45; Doc. 8, Ex. K).

20.

Yantis was terminated effective June 17, 2010. (Doc. 8, Ex. J).

21.

B.

On April 13, 2010, Yantis filed a charge of discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)/Ohio Civil
Rights Commission (OCRC). (Doc. 8, Ex. P).

Yantis filed her second EEOC/OCRC charge on July 7, 2010. (Doc.
8, Ex. O).

Procedural History

Plaintiff filed her first EEOC Complaint on April 13, 2010, alleging that SOCF
Warden Donald Morgan had discriminated against her when he threatened disciplinary
action on April 8, 2010, asserting that male corrections officers did not receive similar

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discipline. (See Doc. 1, Ex. A). Yantis was subsequently terminated on June 17, 2010.
(See Doc. 1, Ex. B.). She filed a second EEOC complaint on July 12, 2010, alleging that
she was terminated on the basis of gender discrimination and in retaliation for filing her
first EEOC complaint. (Id.). On October 21, 2010, the EEOC denied Plaintiff’s claims
and notified Yantis of her right to sue within 90 days. (See Doc. 1, Ex. C).
Plaintiff filed her Complaint (Doc. 1) on January 17, 2011 against SOCF and
Warden Donald Morgan in both his official and individual capacities. Yantis alleges
five counts: (1) gender discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S. C. § 2000e, et
seq.; (2) retaliation for engaging in protected activity, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e et seq.; (3) gender discrimination in the form of a hostile workplace, in violation
of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; (4) gender discrimination in violation of Ohio
law, Ohio Rev. Code § 4112; and (5) retaliation for engaging in protected activity in
violation of Ohio law, Ohio Rev. Code § 4112. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 9, 20). Plaintiff seeks
damages in excess of $75,000, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at 9).
On March 1, 2012, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 10);
Plaintiff subsequently filed a Memorandum in Opposition (Doc. 15) and Defendants filed
a Reply (Doc. 17). The matter is now fully briefed and ripe for review.

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II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the evidence submitted to

the Court demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of genuine
disputes over facts that, under the substantive law governing the issue, might affect the
outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. All facts and inferences must be
construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
A party opposing a motion for summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
III.

ANALYSIS
Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state law claims on the basis of

sovereign immunity. Defendants also seek summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff’s
Title VII claims for (1) gender discrimination; (2) hostile work environment; and
(3) unlawful retaliation. (Doc. 10 at 1).

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A.

Immunity

Plaintiff brings claims against Defendant SOCF and against Defendant Morgan
acting in both his official and individual capacities under Ohio Rev. Code. § 4112, which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender. Claims against both SOCF and
Defendant Morgan acting in his official capacity are akin to claims against the state.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930-931 (1997); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the states
with a sovereign immunity from civil claims: “The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another state, or by Citizens or subjects of
any Foreign States.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. Beyond the literal text of the Amendment,
“an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own
citizens.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 622-23 (1974). However, Congress may
subject nonconsenting States to suit in federal court when it does so pursuant to a valid
exercise of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456
(1976). The Defendants do not dispute that Title VII claims fall within this exception to
sovereign immunity. However, Defendants assert that they are entitled to sovereign
immunity with regard to Plaintiff’s state law claims. (Doc. 10 at 22).

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Ohio has waived its right to sovereign immunity only with respect to the Court of
Claims and has not consented to suit by its citizens in federal court. See Manning v. Ohio
State Library Bd., 577 N.E.2d 650, 654 (Ohio 1991). Plaintiff’s state law claims against
SOCF and Defendant Morgan in his official capacity are therefore barred.
Plaintiff also brings claims arising under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
against Defendant Morgan in his individual capacity. However, an individual supervisor
may not be held personally liable under Title VII. Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F.3d
400, 405. Therefore, Defendant Morgan is granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title
VII claims against him in his individual capacity.
B.

Plaintiff’s Title VII Claims

Each of Plaintiff’s claims is evaluated under the three-part burden shifting
framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).1
Under the first step, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case
by a preponderance of the evidence. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 at 802; White v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 391 (6th Cir. 2008). By establishing a prima
facie case, the plaintiff creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer unlawfully
discriminated against her. EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 838, 861 (6th Cir.
1997).

1

See Texas Dept. Of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-253 (1981) (Title
VII discrimination claims); Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 515 (6th Cir. 2009) (Title
VII hostile work place claims); EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 862 (6th Cir.
1997) (Title VII retaliation claims).
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Once a plaintiff has made a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendants to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision. McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the defendants meet this burden, then the presumption
created from the prima facie case drops out and plaintiff has "an opportunity to prove . . .
that the proffered reasons were not the true reason for the employment decision, but were
a pretext for discrimination." Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 248
(1981).
“On a motion for summary judgment, a district court considers whether there is
sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute at each stage of the McDonnell Douglas
inquiry.” Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 661 (6th Cir. 2000). While
the burden of production may shift during the stages of the inquiry, the burden of
persuasion remains with the Plaintiff throughout the analysis. Macy v. Hopkins County
Sch. Bd. of Educ., 484 F.3d 357, 364 (6th Cir. 2007).
1.

Gender discrimination claims
a.

Prima Facie Case

Plaintiff argues that both her June 2010 performance evaluation and her
termination resulted from unlawful gender discrimination. To establish a prima facie
case of gender discrimination, Plaintiff must prove: (1) she was female; (2) she was
qualified for the job she held; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) she
was replaced by a male employee or was treated differently than similarly situated male
employees. O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996).

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Defendants do not dispute that Yantis is female or that she was qualified for the
job. The parties therefore focus their arguments on whether Plaintiff suffered adverse
employment actions or was treated differently than similarly situated male employees.
(Doc. 10 at 8).
Plaintiff argues that her June 2010 employment evaluation constituted an adverse
employment action. Under Sixth Circuit precedent, negative performance evaluations are
generally not considered adverse employment actions unless they adversely impact wages
or salaries. See Hollins v. Atlantic Co., Inc., 188 F.3d 652, 662-63 (6th Cir. 1999); see
also Tuttle v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville, 474 F.3d 307, 322 (6th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff
argues that the fact that she was terminated a mere three days after receiving her negative
employment evaluation demonstrates its adverse effects on her job. However, the record
is devoid of any evidence concerning how employment evaluations are used in
termination decisions, and the Court is unable to conclude, on temporal proximity alone,
that her evaluation led to her termination. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that Plaintiff’s
termination constituted an adverse employment action, and Yantis has therefore satisfied
the third prong of the prima facie test.
With respect to the fourth prong of the prima facie test, Defendants argue that
Plaintiff cannot establish that she was treated differently than male employees because
she has no similarly situated comparators. (Doc. 10 at 13). To show than an employee is
an applicable comparator, Plaintiff must demonstrate that they are similarly situated in all
relevant aspects. Clayton v. Meijer, Inc., 281 F.3d 605, 611 (6th Cir. 2002). However,
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Plaintiff is not required to demonstrate “exact correlation.” Id.
Yantis has identified three male corrections officers that she believes had similar
contact with former inmates and yet received no disciplinary action. First, Plaintiff
asserts that Corrections Officer Adam Slusher “partied with an ex-inmate because his
neighbors were the ex-inmate’s parents.” (Doc. 8 at 51). Yantis also alleges that
Corrections Officer Home Yates’s stepson is a former inmate. (Id. at 52). Finally, Yantis
asserts that Deputy Warden Cadogen’s wife runs a homeless shelter frequented by former
SOCF inmates. (Id. at 53-54). However, all three of Plaintiff’s asserted comparators
differ from Plaintiff in significant respects. Both Slusher and Yates filled out the required
staff nexus form and therefore complied with ODRC policy. (Doc. 10 at 13-14). With
respect to Cadogen, Plaintiff alleges that his wife has contact with former inmates, which
is not prohibited by ODRC policy. (Id.). The Court finds that adherence to the
employer’s policy is a substantial difference, and Yantis has therefore failed to
demonstrate that she was treated differently than a similarly situated male employee.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff also alleges that she was replaced by a male corrections
officer (see Doc. 15 a t 12; Doc. 15, Ex. 3 at ¶ 3), and Defendants provide no evidence in
response to this allegation. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has therefore
established a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the fourth prong of the prima
facie test.

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b.

Defendants’ Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reason

Because Plaintiff has set forth a prima facie case for gender discrimination, the
burden shifts to the Defendants to offer evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the adverse employment action. Bryson v. Regis-Corp., 498 F.3d 561, 570 (6th
Cir. 2007). Defendants must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible
evidence, reasons for their actions, which if believed by the trier of fact, would support a
finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action. St.
Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993). Nevertheless, this is merely a
burden of production, not of persuasion, and the employer’s burden is satisfied if it
simply explains what it has done or produces evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons. Upshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 576 F.3d 576, 585 (6th Cir. 2009); Bd. Of Trs. Of
Keene State Coll. v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25, n.2 (1978).
Defendants have satisfied their burden. SOCF and Morgan assert that Yantis was
terminated for violating ODRC policies prohibiting unauthorized relationships with
former inmates and requiring cooperation with internal ODRC investigations. (Doc. 10 at
14).
c.

Plaintiff’s Evidence of Pretext

Once Defendant has set forth a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action, the burden then shifts back to Plaintiff to provide evidence that
Defendant’s reason is a pretext for discrimination. Bryson v. Regis Corp., 498 F.3d 561,

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570 (6th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff must produce evidence “tending to show” that Defendant’s
proffered reason for the adverse employment action was false. Skrjanc. v. Great Lakes
Power Serv. Co., 272 F.3d 309, 315 (6th Cir. 2001). Such a showing of pretext may be
accomplished by showing that the articulated reason (1) has no basis in fact; (2) did not
actually motivate Defendant’s conduct; or (3) was insufficient to warrant the challenged
conduct. Dewes v. A.B. Dick Co., 231 F.3d 1016, 1021 (6th Cir. 2000). The Sixth Circuit
has cautioned, however, that the courts should “avoid formalism” in the application of this
test, “lest one lose the forest for the trees.” Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400, n.
4 (6th Cir. 2009). Pretext is a “commonsense inquiry” and at the summary judgment stage
Plaintiff need only produce evidence from which the jury could reasonably doubt the
employer’s explanation. Id. Here, while Plaintiff admits that she violated the ODRC rules
at issue (Doc. 8), she argues that her rule violations did not actually motivate her dismissal
and the infractions were insufficient to warrant a dismissal. (Doc. 15 at 15).
Yantis argues that the real reason for her dismissal was her gender, her refusal to
engage in sexual activity with her superiors, and her complaints of sexual harassment.
(Doc. 15 at 13; Doc. 15, Ex. 1 at ¶ 30). However, Plaintiff has failed to provide any
evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact on that issue. Yantis makes assertions that
“male co-workers were treated more favorably than the Plaintiff . . .” and that “male
employees whose lunches are bothered by inmates are not accused of fraternization as she
was.” (Doc. 15 at 8, 13). But Yantis does not point to a single affidavit or exhibit to

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support her assertions. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment “may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . .must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Plaintiff has
failed to meet her burden and has not established a genuine issue of material fact regarding
her assertion that she was truly terminated because of her gender and Defendants’ sexual
harassment.
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that because the ODRC rule prohibiting unauthorized
conduct with inmates includes progressive discipline, her first offense did not warrant
termination. (Doc. 15 at 13). However, ODRC Rule 46 plainly states that removal is a
possible sanction for a first offense. (Doc. 8, Ex. at D at 22). The ODRC Standards of
Conduct also state that the appropriate discipline for each violation turns on the particular
facts and conduct at issue, including aggravating or mitigating circumstances. (Id. at 9).
Yantis has not set forth any evidence that the circumstances in this case did not warrant the
discipline imposed. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff is unable to establish a
genuine issue of material fact concerning whether her action was insufficient to warrant
termination.
3.

Hostile Workplace
a.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

An employee alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII must
first file an administrative charge with the EEOC within a certain time after the alleged

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wrongful act or acts. Younis v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 610 F.3d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 2010)
“The charge must be sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally
the action or practices complained of. As a general rule, a Title VII plaintiff cannot bring
claims in a lawsuit that were not included in his EEOC charge.” Id. (internal citations
omitted). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
In her Complaint, Plaintiff asserts two different time frames for her hostile work
environment claims. Plaintiff first states that she has been subject to a hostile work
environment “since or in March 2010 up until the present time” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 20); and
Plaintiff then goes on to state that “During her employment with defendants plaintiff has
further been subjected to sexual harassment and other embarrassing and humiliating terms
and conditions of employment based upon her sex, including but not limited to being
called derogatory language and vulgar epithets by male employees based upon plaintiff’s
sex and being threatened with the loss of employment for her complaints of
discrimination.” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 21(B)).
Plaintiff’s first EEOC charge, filed April 13, 2010, makes allegations that Warden
Morgan’s conduct created a hostile work environment from “April 8, 2010 and
continuing”; there is no mention of any conduct occurring prior to that date. (Doc. 8, Ex.
P). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies regarding claims of a hostile work environment regarding conduct occurring
prior to April 8, 2010.

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b.

Merits of the Hostile Work Environment Claim

To establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment based on sex, Yantis
must demonstrate that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to
unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on sex; (4) the
charged sexual harassment created a hostile work environment; and (5) the employer is
vicariously liable. See Clark v. UPS, 400 F.3d 341, 347 (6th Cir. 2005).
The Court finds that Plaintiff is unable to establish a genuine issue of material fact
with regard to the prima facie case for a hostile work environment claim. Plaintiff can
point to no evidence, other than her own inferences, that Warden Morgan’s comments to
her were based on her sex. However, assuming arguendo, that Plaintiff could establish
such, Plaintiff is also unable to demonstrate that his comments created a hostile work
environment.
A hostile work environment exits where workplace discrimination is “sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an
abusive working environment.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523, U.S.
75, 78 (1998). The hostility must be demonstrated both objectively and subjectively. In
making an objective assessment, the Court must look to the totality of the circumstances,
including the frequency of the conduct, its severity, whether it was physically threatening
or humiliating, and whether it unreasonably interfered with the employee’s work
performance. Id. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993). To show

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that an environment is subjectively hostile, the employee must demonstrate that the
harassment made it more difficult to do her job. Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d
345, 349 (6th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff has failed to satisfy either component. Yantis was placed on
administrative leave immediately following her conversation with the warden. She never
returned to work after April 8, and is therefore unable to show that Morgan’s comments
made subjectively it more difficult for her to perform her job. Additionally, there is no
evidence that Warden Morgan’s comments were objectively severe or pervasive; Morgan
simply informed Plaintiff that he was initiating disciplinary action. .
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff is unable to establish a genuine issue of
material fact regarding her hostile work environment claims, and Defendant is entitled to
summary judgment.
3.

Retaliation Claims

Plaintiff makes two allegations with regard to retaliatory activity: (1) that her
unfavorable June 2010 performance review was in retaliation for her first EEOC
complaint alleging gender discrimination; and (2) that she was fired in retaliation for her
EEOC complaint. To establish a claim of retaliation for engaging in protected activity
under Title VII, Plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) her
exercise of civil rights was known to the Defendant; (3) she was the subject of adverse
employment action; and (4) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the
adverse action. Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 500 (6th Cir. 1987). Defendants do not
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dispute that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity by filing two EEOC complaints, nor
that Defendant was aware of those complaints, nor that her termination constituted an
adverse employment action.
To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, Plaintiff must demonstrate that she
suffered an adverse employment action. While Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff’s
termination constituted an adverse employment action, Plaintiff also contends that her
negative performance evaluation constituted an adverse employment action, which
Defendants deny.
Actions constitute “adverse employment actions” for retaliation claims if they
would have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.” Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68
(2006). The Sixth Circuit has held that as with discrimination claims, performance
evaluations constitute adverse employment actions only if they have an effect on wages or
salary. See Halfacre v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 221 Fed. App’x 424, 433 (6th Cir.
2007). As discussed, supra, the mere temporal proximity between the evaluation and
Plaintiff’s termination is insufficient to establish an adverse effect.
However, Plaintiff may still establish a prima facie case if she is able to
demonstrate that there was a causal link between her EEOC complaints and her
termination. To show a causal connection, Yantis must “proffer evidence to raise the
inference that [her] protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse action.”

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Zanders v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 898 F.2d 1127, 1135 (6th Cir. 1990); see also
Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2000) (“a plaintiff must produce
sufficient evidence from which an inference could be drawn that an adverse action would
not have been taken had the plaintiff not filed a discrimination action”). Temporal
proximity alone is not sufficient to establish causation; such proximity must be “coupled
with other indicia of retaliatory conduct” to give rise to a causal inference. Dixon v.
Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir. 2007).
Defendants had expressed concern with Yantis’s conduct prior to the filing of the
EEOC complaint. Plaintiff was first counseled regarding her behavior around inmates in
March 2010. (Doc. 8 at 46-48). She was placed on administrative leave on April 8, 2010
due to the allegations of misconduct involving inmate Dean. (Doc. 8, Ex. N at 8). She
filed her first EEOC complaint five days later, on April 13, 2010. (Doc. 8, Ex. P).
Because the Defendants began the disciplinary process prior to Yantis filing the EEOC
complaint, her termination after the filing of the complaint does not support an inference
of a retaliatory motive. See Vereecke v. Huron Valley Sch. Dist., 609 F.3d 392, 402 (6th
Cir. 2010). Plaintiff has offered no other evidence that her termination was in retaliation
for her April 2010 EEOC complaint, and the Court therefore finds that she has failed to
establish a prima facie case with respect to her retaliation claims.
Because Plaintiff is unable to set forth a genuine issue of fact concerning her prima
facie case, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims of retaliation.

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IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 10) is hereby
GRANTED, the Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly by separate entry, and this case
is CLOSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Timothy S. Black
Timothy S. Black
United States District Judge

Date: 7/23/12

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