Young et al v. Owens et al
Filing
47
OPINION AND ORDER granting 26 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 25 Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 37 Defendants' Motion in Limine; denying 38 Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions; denying 42 Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions for Spoliation of Evidence. This matter is DISMISSED on the Court's docket. Signed by Judge S Arthur Spiegel on 5/7/2013. (km1)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
TYLER YOUNG, et al.,
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Plaintiffs,
v.
SCOTT OWENS, et al.,
Defendants.
NO:
1:11-CV-00853
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the cross motions of
the parties:
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 25),
Defendants’ Response in Opposition (doc. 32), and Plaintiffs’ Reply
(doc. 34); Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 26),
Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition (doc. 33), and Defendants’ Reply
(doc. 36).
Also before the Court, Defendants’ Motion in Limine
(doc. 37), Plaintiffs’ Response (doc. 41), and Defendants’ Reply
(doc. 44); Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions (doc. 38), Defendants’
Response (doc. 39), and Plaintiffs’ Reply (doc. 43); as well as
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions for Spoliation of Evidence (doc.
42), and Defendants’ Response in Opposition (doc. 45).
For the reasons indicated herein, the Court DENIES all of
Plaintiffs’
Judgment,
motions,
DENIES
GRANTS
Defendants’
Defendants’
Motion
in
Motion
Limine
for
as
Summary
moot,
and
DISMISSES this matter from the Court’s docket.
I.
Background
The following background is gleaned from the pleadings
and briefing in this matter.
Plaintiffs Tyler Young and Django
Hendrix, both African-American, operated a retail business “swap
shop” in Colerain Township, Ohio, using the business name Ohio
Trading Company (“OTC”).
Defendants all worked for Colerain
Township Police Department: Scott Owens, as a Sergeant; Mark Denney
as a Lieutenant; and Joseph Hendricks as a Detective.
When Plaintiffs first opened their business in Colerain
Township, in 2009, both the Mason and Fairfield Police Departments
called Sergeant Owens to warn him they suspected individuals were
stealing televisions for Plaintiff Young to sell at OTC and local
flea
markets.
purchased
a
In
stolen
May
GPS
2010,
Defendants
unit,
and
determined
decided
to
that
commence
OTC
an
investigation of OTC.
As part of their investigation, Defendants conducted a
surveillance of OTC, that revealed OTC clientele was a “who’s who
of
criminals,”
including
burglars,
heroin
addicts,
suspects, who would sell items regularly to OTC.
and
theft
After nearly a
month of such surveillance, Defendants set up a meeting with the
Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office to determine the steps to
establish controlled sales at OTC.
The prosecutor informed them
that the totality of the circumstances would have to establish a
basis where any prudent person would know an item was stolen, for
example if the theft deterrent system on the item was still intact.
Defendants found a confidential informant, Randy Earls,
2
who they had used in the past, and who informed them that “his
understanding from the streets” was that OTC brought stolen goods.
Defendants hired Earls to conduct six controlled sales at OTC in
summer 2010 with property provided to the police department by Home
Depot.
All of the property sold to OTC by Earls was unopened in
original store packaging, and a tool set was sold with a Home Depot
security
alarm
still
attached.
Every
sale
was
made
for
considerably less than retail value: two tool sets valued at
$549.00 sold for $150.00 each, a generator valued at $599.00 sold
for $150.00, a weed-eater valued at $159.00 sold for $40.00, a push
mower valued at $599.99 sold for $100.00, and five more generators
valued at $2,995.00 sold for $1,550.00.
Earls never received a
receipt for any of his sales, but he was asked to produce a
driver’s license as identification, and asked to sign a “release of
purchase” form to certify the items were not stolen.
Earls wore
a wire and was recorded telling an OTC employee, Joe Kist, the
items he was selling were hot, but he never made such statement to
either of Plaintiffs.
In fact, Plaintiffs contend, Plaintiff
Young confronted Earls about the tool set with the alarm attached,
and Earl denied it was stolen, repeating that Earls’ brother worked
at Home Depot so Earls could purchase items wholesale.
Defendants consulted again with the prosecuting attorney,
and made the decision to seek a search warrant for OTC and
Plaintiff Young’s residence.
The search warrants were approved by
3
the appropriate courts, and the police conducted raids on both OTC
and Young’s residence.
Defendants arrested Plaintiff Young and
Joe Kist. Young’s landlord, Mark Capodagli, arrived the day of the
OTC
raid.
According
to
Officer
Jennifer
Sharp’s
deposition
testimony, Capodagli stated it worked out funny that he showed up
the day of the raid because he was there “to cancel their lease any
way,” which was due to expire at the end of the month (doc. 21).
In contrast, in Capodagli’s deposition, he stated Sharp consulted
with her superiors and instructed him to cancel the lease, as he
was there to renew it (doc. 24).
Police confiscated property during the raids.
In what
Plaintiffs characterize as a “media blitz,” the police announced to
the public they had seized thousands of items from OTC, and set up
pages on the Colerain Township website displaying possibly stolen
items.
Twenty-three items were eventually claimed by owners as
having been stolen.
Following
the
raid,
Defendants
issued
a
criminal
complaint against Young, which prosecutors took to a Grand Jury.
The Grand Jury issued a five-count indictment against Young, but
the
charges
were
ultimately
dropped
by
the
prosecutor,
who
concluded there was insufficient evidence to prove the case beyond
a reasonable doubt.
The remaining confiscated property was
ultimately released back to Young.
Plaintiffs brought this civil action in December 2011,
4
bringing claims for 1) illegal arrest under the theory that
Defendants had no probable cause to support their actions, 2)
malicious
prosecution,
3)
illegal
seizure
of
property,
4)
impairment of contracts under the theory that Defendants interfered
with
the
OTC
lease
agreement
with
Capodagli,
and
5)
civil
conspiracy under the theory that Defendants conspired to force OTC
out of business because Defendants were against African-American
businesses in the area (doc. 3).
Plaintiffs seek compensatory and
punitive damages, costs, and reasonable attorney fees (Id).
Defendants filed their summary judgment in October 2012,
contending there is no dispute as to any material fact and they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of a law (doc. 26).
Defendants
essentially contend they had probable cause to support the raid on
OTC and Young’s arrest, such that the arrest and seizure were
proper (Id.).
As in their view their actions were reasonable,
they contend they are entitled to qualified immunity (Id.).
Defendants
further
Plaintiffs’
claim
contend
for
there
malicious
are
no
facts
prosecution,
supporting
impairment
of
contracts, or civil conspiracy (Id.).
Plaintiffs similarly contend they are entitled to summary
judgment.
They argue Defendants did not have probable cause
supporting the arrests and seizures because the property used in
the investigation was not stolen and there were no explicit
representations at the time of sale that it was stolen (doc. 25).
5
They
further
contend
Capodogli’s
testimony
shows
the
police
conspired to interfere with the OTC lease contract (Id.).
these
circumstances,
they
claim
they
should
prevail
Under
against
Defendants (Id.).
In addition to the dispositive motions, Defendants filed
a motion in limine regarding evidence related to damages (doc. 37),
and Plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions (doc. 38) under the
theory
that
Defendants
briefings.
have
misrepresented
the
law
in
their
Plaintiffs further have filed a motion regarding
alleged spoliation of evidence, contending Defendants confiscated
business documents during the raid which were never returned to
Plaintiffs but rather, were destroyed (doc. 42).
These
consideration.
various
matters
are
ripe
for
the
Court’s
The Court will commence with the dispositive
motions.
II.
A.
The Parties’ Cross Motions for Summary Judgment
Applicable Legal Standard
Although a grant of summary judgment is not a substitute
for trial, it is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also, e.g.,
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962);
6
LaPointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir.
1993); Osborn v. Ashland County Bd. of Alcohol, Drug Addiction and
Mental Health Servs., 979 F.2d 1131, 1133 (6th Cir. 1992) (per
curiam).
In reviewing the instant motion, “this Court must
determine whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement
to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that
one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
Patton v. Bearden, 8
F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1993), quoting in part Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-252 (1986) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The process of moving for and evaluating a motion for
summary judgment and the respective burdens it imposes upon the
movant and the non-movant are well settled.
First, “a party
seeking summary judgment ... bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact [.]”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also
LaPointe, 8 F.3d at 378; Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees,
980 F.2d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 1992); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co.,
886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989).
The movant may do so by
merely identifying that the non-moving party lacks evidence to
support an essential element of its case. See Barnhart v. Pickrel,
Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., L.P.A., 12 F.3d 1382, 1389 (6th Cir.
7
1993).
Faced
with
such
a
motion,
the
non-movant,
after
completion of sufficient discovery, must submit evidence in support
of any material element of a claim or defense at issue in the
motion on which it would bear the burden of proof at trial, even if
the moving party has not submitted evidence to negate the existence
of that material fact.
See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317; Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
As the “requirement [of
the Rule] is that there be no genuine issue of material fact,” an
“alleged factual dispute between the parties” as to some ancillary
matter “will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-248 (emphasis added);
see generally Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., Inc., 879
F.2d
1304,
1310
(6th
Cir.
1989).
Furthermore,
“[t]he
mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on
which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see also Gregory v. Hunt, 24 F.3d 781,
784 (6th Cir. 1994).
Accordingly, the non-movant must present
“significant probative evidence” demonstrating that “there is [more
than] some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” to survive
summary judgment and proceed to trial on the merits.
Moore v.
Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 339-340 (6th Cir. 1993); see
also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Guarino, 980 F.2d at 405.
8
Although the non-movant need not cite specific page
numbers of the record in support of its claims or defenses, “the
designated portions of the record must be presented with enough
specificity that the district court can readily identify the facts
upon which the non-moving party relies.” Guarino, 980 F.2d at 405,
quoting Inter-Royal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th
Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In contrast, mere
conclusory allegations are patently insufficient to defeat a motion
for summary judgment.
See McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 898 F.2d
1155, 1162 (6th Cir. 1990).
evidence,
facts,
and
The Court must view all submitted
reasonable
inferences
in
a
light
most
favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); United States v. Diebold, Inc.,
369 U.S. 654 (1962). Furthermore, the district court may not weigh
evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses in deciding the
motion.
See Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 378 (6th Cir. 1994).
Ultimately, the movant bears the burden of demonstrating
that no material facts are in dispute. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
587.
The fact that the non-moving party fails to respond to the
motion does not lessen the burden on either the moving party or the
Court to demonstrate that summary judgment is appropriate.
See
Guarino, 980 F.2d at 410; Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 454-455
(6th Cir. 1991).
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B.
Discussion
Having reviewed this matter, the Court finds no question
that Defendants’ actions in seizing Plaintiffs’ property and in
arresting Plaintiff Young were supported by probable cause that
Young and OTC were engaged in the business of receiving stolen
property.
A police officer is permitted to make an arrest when
there is probable cause that an individual committed a crime.
“A
finding of probable cause does not require an actual showing of
criminal activity, but rather ‘requires’ only a probability or
substantial chance of criminal activity.” United States v. Harris,
255 F.3d 288, at 292 (6th Cir. 2001).
Probable cause is defined by
asking “whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within
[the
officers’]
knowledge
and
of
which
they
had
reasonably
trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the [defendant] had committed or was committing an
offense.”
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
Here the officers knew that a stolen GPS had turned up at
OTC, they had been warned by two other jurisdictions that Plaintiff
Young was suspected of selling stolen televisions at OTC and local
flea
markets,
their
surveillance
showed
a
host
of
suspect
characters selling items at the store, and they knew from their own
informant that “word on the street” was that OTC bought stolen
goods.
These facts and circumstances gave rise to probable cause
the OTC received stolen property, even independent of any alleged
10
deficiencies with the controlled sales of goods.
Moreover, “[i]t has long been settled that the finding of
an indictment, fair upon its face, by a properly constituted grand
jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause for
the purpose of holding the accused to answer.”
Barnes v. Wright,
449 F.3d 709, 716 (6th Cir. 2006). Here there is no factual dispute
that the Grand Jury returned a five-count indictment against Young
for receiving stolen property.
As such, there was probable cause,
as a matter of law, supporting
Young’s arrest and the seizure of
his property.
Having so concluded, the Court finds Defendants’
motion well-taken as to Plaintiffs’ claims for illegal arrest and
illegal seizure of property.
Such claims lack merit as a matter
of law and are dismissed.
Similarly, a malicious prosecution claim fails when there
was probable cause to prosecute, as there was here. Fox v. DeSoto,
489 F.3d 227, 237 (6th Cir. 2007).
The Court grants Defendants’
motion as to Plaintiffs’ claim for malicious prosecution, which is
dismissed.
Defendants are further entitled to summary judgment as to
Plaintiffs’ claims that Defendants interfered with Young’s contract
rights, that is, his lease with Capodagli.
Even taking the
evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, that is,
accepting as true Capodagli’s testimony that Officer Sharp told him
to not renew the lease, such claim fails.
11
There is no evidence
that any of the named Defendants told Capodagli to not renew the
lease.
The evidence shows Defendant Denney was not present at OTC
during the raid, and that Defendants Owen and Hendricks do not even
know who Capodagli is.
Furthermore, there is no evidence in the
record showing racial animus on the part of any of the Defendants.
Amini v. Oberlin College, 440 F.3d 350, 358 (6th Cir. 2006).
The
evidence does not establish that Defendants did anything other than
to take legitimate action based on probable cause that Plaintiffs
were engaging in receiving stolen property.
Finally, for essentially the same reasons, Plaintiffs’
claim fails that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to interfere
with Plaintiffs’ civil rights.
There simply is no record evidence
to support a conspiracy claim.
Plaintiffs’ claims are vague and
conclusory.
In any event, Defendants’ arguments are unopposed
that a civil conspiracy claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1985(a) cannot be based on a deprivation rights guaranteed by 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a), (doc. 36, citing Stewart v. Commercial Vehicles
of South Florida, Inc., 366 Fed. Appx. 41, 42 (11th Cir. 2010), and
that the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine bars such claim (Id.
citing Brunson v. City of Dayton, 163 F.Supp.2d 919, 927 (S.D. Ohio
2001).
The Court grants summary judgment to Defendants as to such
claim as well.
The Court’s review of the parties’ cross-motions also
leads it to conclude that Defendant officers are each entitled to
12
qualified immunity, as their actions were reasonable, did not
violate any constitutional rights, and were premised on probable
cause.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).
To the extent
Plaintiffs claim Defendants acted in their official capacities,
there is no evidence of a custom or policy on the part of Colerain
Township that violated Plaintiffs’ rights.
Miller v. Sanilac
County, 606 F.3d 240, 254-55 (6th Cir. 2010).
III.
The Remaining Motions
As the Court has found Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment lacking in merit and has concluded Defendants are entitled
to summary judgment, it is unnecessary to reach the remaining
motion in limine and the motions for sanctions.
For the sake of
clarity, in any event, the Court normally would not reach a liminal
motion until the time of trial.
However, the Court has reviewed
the motions for sanctions and finds them lacking in merit.
There
is no basis to sanction Defendants here for misrepresentations of
the law, and no factual basis for Plaintiffs’ claims regarding
spoliation of evidence.
IV.
Conclusion
The Court understands Plaintiffs’ view in this case: they
were subjected to arrests, their property was confiscated.
The
charges were ultimately dropped against them, but they nonetheless
lost their business. In their view, there was no more evidence they
engaged in receiving stolen property than any other pawn shop in the
13
Township.
In Plaintiffs’ view Defendants made a public spectacle
with overblown statements to the media that “thousands of items were
seized,” and “drug users knew if they stole something, this was the
place to bring it.”
However,
a
review
of
the
record
demonstrates
the
Defendants in this case had a reasonable basis to support the
arrests and the seizure of property.
ultimately
dismissed
probable cause.
the
charges,
Even though the prosecutor
such
charges
were
based
on
Ultimately the record shows a number of stolen
items were recovered from Plaintiffs’ confiscated inventory, even
if they did not amount to thousands of items. Even if this were not
the case, however, and nothing had been recovered, the law accepts
the risk that in some cases officers may arrest the innocent.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000).
So long as the
arrest or seizure is based on probable cause, it passes muster.
Finally there is no evidence Defendants interfered with
the OTC lease, and no record evidence that they engaged in a civil
conspiracy.
The
Court
sees
no
basis
here
for
a
claim
that
Plaintiffs’ business was singled out by virtue that it was operated
by African-Americans.
Accordingly, for the reasons indicated herein, the Court
GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 26), DENIES
Plaintiffs’
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment
(doc.
25),
DENIES
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Sanctions (doc. 38), and DENIES Plaintiffs’
14
Motion for Sanctions for Spoliation of Evidence (doc. 42).
Court further DENIES
moot.
The
Defendants’ Motion in Limine (doc. 37) as
This matter is DISMISSED from the Court’s docket.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 7, 2013
s/S. Arthur Spiegel
S. Arthur Spiegel
United States Senior District Judge
15
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