Thrash v. Miami University et al
Filing
35
OPINION AND ORDER granting 13 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court further FINDS Dr. Shashi Lalvani is entitled to qualified immunity. Signed by Judge S Arthur Spiegel on 4/9/2013. (km1)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
MARVIN THRASH,
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
v.
MIAMI UNIVERSITY, et al.,
Defendants.
NO. 1:11-CV-00915
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (doc. 13), Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition
(doc. 25), and Defendants’ Reply (doc. 30).
indicated herein, the Court GRANTS Defendants’
For the reasons
Motion for Summary
Judgment.
I.
Background
In 2004, Defendant Miami University (“Miami”) sought a
tenure-track
sciences
assistant
and
professor
engineering,
applications (doc. 25).
and
for
its
department
considered
some
of
paper
fifty-eight
Miami chose Lei Kerr as its first pick,
and further hired Plaintiff Dr. Martin Thrash as an “opportunity
hire,” that is, pursuant to a policy that created a financial
incentive for academic divisions to increase the number of underrepresented
minorities
among
the
faculty
(Id.).
Dr.
Shashi
Lalvani, chairperson of the department, accepted the recommendation
of the hiring committee, offered Plaintiff a tenure-track position,
and advised Plaintiff that if he completed the required six-year
probationary period, he would be eligible for consideration for
tenure during the 2010-2011 academic year (Id.).
In order to gain
tenure, faculty members are evaluated annually as to their 1)
teaching, 2) research, 3) service, and 4) collegiality (Id.).
The
evaluation is conducted by a tenure committee, who in turn submits
its findings to the department chairperson, who conducts his or her
own evaluation that is ultimately forwarded to the Dean (Id.).
During the third, fourth, and fifth years the evaluation becomes
more of an assessment and involves an extensive review by the Dean
(Id.).
Plaintiff ultimately did not obtain tenure, and his
employment ended on May 6, 2012.
Plaintiff contends Dr. Lalvani
worked against his eligibility for tenure, critiquing Plaintiff’s
research
and
refusing
to
consider
outside
evaluators
historically black colleges and universities (doc. 25).
from
Plaintiff
brought this lawsuit raising claims for racial discrimination
pursuant to Title VII and Sections 1981 and 1983.
Defendants deny
racial discrimination and contend that Plaintiff was evaluated
fairly
by
some
twenty-five
faculty
members,
and
Plaintiff’s
research simply did not meet the university’s standards (docs. 13,
30).
Defendants contend Plaintiff cannot show such reason to be
pretextual, and therefore, move for summary judgment (Id.).
Plaintiff submitted his response in opposition (doc. 25), and
Defendants their reply such that this matter is ripe for the
2
Court’s consideration.
II. Applicable Legal Standard
Although a grant of summary judgment is not a substitute
for trial, it is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also, e.g.,
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962);
LaPointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir.
1993); Osborn v. Ashland County Bd. of Alcohol, Drug Addiction and
Mental Health Servs., 979 F.2d 1131, 1133 (6th Cir. 1992) (per
curiam).
In reviewing the instant motion, “this Court must
determine whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement
to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that
one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
Patton v. Bearden, 8
F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1993), quoting in part Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-252 (1986) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The process of moving for and evaluating a motion for
summary judgment and the respective burdens it imposes upon the
movant and the non-movant are well settled.
First, “a party
seeking summary judgment ... bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
3
identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact [.]”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also
LaPointe, 8 F.3d at 378; Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees,
980 F.2d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 1992); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co.,
886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989).
The movant may do so by
merely identifying that the non-moving party lacks evidence to
support an essential element of its case. See Barnhart v. Pickrel,
Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., L.P.A., 12 F.3d 1382, 1389 (6th Cir.
1993).
Faced
with
such
a
motion,
the
non-movant,
after
completion of sufficient discovery, must submit evidence in support
of any material element of a claim or defense at issue in the
motion on which it would bear the burden of proof at trial, even if
the moving party has not submitted evidence to negate the existence
of that material fact.
See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317; Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
As the “requirement [of
the Rule] is that there be no genuine issue of material fact,” an
“alleged factual dispute between the parties” as to some ancillary
matter “will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-248 (emphasis added);
see generally Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., Inc., 879
F.2d
1304,
1310
(6th
Cir.
1989).
Furthermore,
“[t]he
mere
existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non4
movant’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on
which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant].”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see also Gregory v. Hunt, 24 F.3d 781,
784 (6th Cir. 1994).
Accordingly, the non-movant must present
“significant probative evidence” demonstrating that “there is [more
than] some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts” to survive
summary judgment and proceed to trial on the merits.
Moore v.
Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 339-340 (6th Cir. 1993); see
also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Guarino, 980 F.2d at 405.
Although the non-movant need not cite specific page
numbers of the record in support of its claims or defenses, “the
designated portions of the record must be presented with enough
specificity that the district court can readily identify the facts
upon which the non-moving party relies.” Guarino, 980 F.2d at 405,
quoting Inter-Royal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th
Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In contrast, mere
conclusory allegations are patently insufficient to defeat a motion
for summary judgment.
See McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 898 F.2d
1155, 1162 (6th Cir. 1990).
evidence,
facts,
and
The Court must view all submitted
reasonable
inferences
in
a
light
most
favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); United States v. Diebold, Inc.,
369 U.S. 654 (1962). Furthermore, the district court may not weigh
5
evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses in deciding the
motion.
See Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 378 (6th Cir. 1994).
Ultimately, the movant bears the burden of demonstrating
that no material facts are in dispute. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
587.
The fact that the non-moving party fails to respond to the
motion does not lessen the burden on either the moving party or the
Court to demonstrate that summary judgment is appropriate.
See
Guarino, 980 F.2d at 410; Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 454-455
(6th Cir. 1991).
III. Analysis
Defendants assume that if Plaintiff, as a member of a
protected class, can establish a prima
facie
case of racial
discrimination, under McDonnell Douglas,1 they need to articulate
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for denial of promotion and
tenure.
They proffer as their reason that Plaintiff’s research
simply did not meet the university’s standards.
The burden shifts
back to Plaintiff, therefore, to demonstrate that such reason is
pretext for unlawful discrimination.
Plaintiff can do so by
demonstrating “1) that the proffered reasons had no basis in fact,
2) that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate his
discharge;
or
3)
that
they
were
1
insufficient
to
motivate
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
The same analysis applies to Plaintiff’s Section 1981 and 1983
claims. Canady v. Klaiber, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1419, at *18
(N.D. Ohio 2007).
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discharge.”
Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d
1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994).
Because after a review of the record
the Court concludes no reasonable jury could find pretext in
Defendants’ proffered reason, Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for racial discrimination.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment demonstrates an
extensive
review
process
involving
numerous
individuals
considered Plaintiff’s candidacy for tenure (doc. 13).
who
Plaintiff
obtained six reviews from faculty at outside universities: several
were positive, several were lukewarm, and several were negative
(Id.).
There is no dispute that in October 2010 the tenure
committee at Miami found Plaintiff’s application “a very marginal
case”
that
reservations
“could
go
(Id.).
either
way,
Chairperson
and
all
the
Lalvani,
members
who
had
initially
recommended that Plaintiff be hired, concluded as to Plaintiff’s
research: “I cannot assign a high quality ranking in this category.
Similarly, the prospects of high quality research are also not
high, in my opinion.
This is based upon Dr. Thrash’s lack of
establishment of a robust research program at Miami” (Id.).
The next step of the process was review by Dean Marek
Dollár.
and
The Dean reviewed feedback from the school of engineering
applied
sciences
(“SEAS”)
promotion
and
tenure
advisory
committee, which raised concerns about the quality of Plaintiff’s
application (Id.).
The Dean reviewed Plaintiff’s dossier, the
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external reference letters, department committee and Lalvani’s
recommendation,
Lalvani’s
Plaintiff’s
recommendation,
request
Lalvani’s
for
reconsideration
response,
second through fifth year evaluations (Id.).
and
of
Plaintiff’s
The Dean found
Plaintiff’s research insufficient, and upon Plaintiff’s request for
reconsideration again reviewed the record, concluding the second
review “reaffirmed my conviction that your publication record is
not strong enough to justify my positive recommendation” (Id.).
The next step of the process involved the thirteen
members of the university promotion and tenure committee (Id.).
This committee examined the record as a whole and declined to
recommend Plaintiff for tenure (Id).
The committee critiqued the
quality of Plaintiff’s research, found insufficient published
research in peer-reviewed journals, found the outside reviews mixed
at best, and noted that Plaintiff had been urged in his annual
evaluations to develop a strong record of publication (Id.).
The
committee noted, however, that Plaintiff’s record in the areas of
teaching, advising, service and collegiality passed muster (Id.).
Plaintiff sought reconsideration which the committee
granted.
It again concluded that Plaintiff’s application “had not
met the criteria for tenure or promotion in the area of research,
scholarship and creative work” (Id.).
Plaintiff contends that Dr. Lalvani “poisoned the well”
such that his application did not have a chance in the review
8
process.
Plaintiff contends Lalvani did not permit him to use all
of the outside evaluators of his choice, although the record shows
choice of external reviewers is within the province of the chair
and the Dean.
The record further shows Lalvani accepted without
question three African or African-American reviewers proposed by
Plaintiff, Lalvani rejected three reviewers from non-historically
black colleges and universities for lack of qualification to
review, and agreed not to use a reviewer that Plaintiff contended
was biased.
There is no dispute that the Dean conducted a review
independent
of
Lalvani,
as
did
the
thirteen-member
tenure
committee. Under these circumstances no reasonable jury could find
merit to Plaintiff’s “cat’s paw” theory that Lalvani’s alleged
animus caused the ultimate decision. Indeed, the Court agrees that
Lalvani’s decision was supported by evidence, and that Lalvani is
entitled to qualified immunity because there is no genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Lalvani violated a constitutional
right.
Lalvani did not.
Finally, although Plaintiff contends he is as or more
qualified than two Caucasion professors who were granted tenure,
Defendants proffer evidence that both had far more significant
research published and obtained grants that dwarfed Plaintiff’s
contribution to the university.
The Court again concludes that no
reasonable jury would find Defendants’ decision to refuse Plaintiff
tenure was based on race, but rather it was based on Plaintiff’s
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overall record, which was subjected to an extensive review.
IV.
Conclusion
Having reviewed this matter, the Court finds Defendants’
motion for summary judgment well-taken.
Although Plaintiff
demonstrated talent as an instructor in the areas of teaching,
advising, service and collegiality, the record shows Defendants had
a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the decision not to
grant tenure.
Plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of
material fact as to his research, such that a reasonable jury could
find Defendants’ reason was mere pretext for discrimination.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (doc. 13), and further FINDS Dr. Shashi Lalvani
entitled to qualified immunity.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 9, 2013
s/S. Arthur Spiegel
S. Arthur Spiegel
United States Senior District Judge
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