Garza et al v. Marvin et al

Filing 21

ORDER that plaintiff's 14 MOTION for clarity, and 15 16 MOTIONS to Stay be Denied. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION that defendants' 3 5 7 9 12 MOTIONS to Dismiss be Granted, and further, that plaintiff's claims against defendants Schmidt, Hanna, Duarte, Villegas, Cano, Medrano, and Judge Isgur be Dismissed. ( Objections to R&R due by 2/14/2013). Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen L. Litkovitz on 1/28/2013. (art)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

ISRAEL GARZA,
Plaintiff,
VS.

HONORABLE MARVIN ISGURE, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 1:12-cv-332
Dlott, J.
Litkovitz, M.J.
ORDER AND REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Israel Garza, 1 proceeding pro se, brings this action against defendants Honorable
Marvin Isgur, Michael B. Schmidt, Kevin Hanna, Heriberto Medrano, Albert V. Villegas,
Baldemar Cano, and Demetrios Duarte, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. This
matter is before the Court on: (1) defendants Michael B. Schmidt, Kevin P. Hanna, and Demetrio
Duarte's motion to dismiss (Doc. 3) and plaintiffs response in opposition (Doc. 11)2 ; (2)
defendant Albert Villegas' motion to dismiss (Doc. 5); (3) defendant Baldemar Cano's motions
to dismiss (Docs. 7, 9); (4) defendant Judge Isgur's motion to dismiss (Doc. 12) and plaintiffs

1

Although plaintiff Israel Garza purports to submit the complaint on behalf of himself and Anita Garza, a
review of the complaint reflects that it was signed by Israel Garza only. See Doc. 1 at 10, 12. See also Doc. 1, Ex. 2
(Civil Cover Sheet signed by Israel Garza). Plaintiff is not a lawyer and may not represent Anita Garza in this
matter. See Bonacci v. Kindt, 868 F.2d 1442, 1443 (5th Cir. 1989); Lewis v. Lenc-Smith Mfg. Co., 784 F.2d 829,
830-31 (7th Cir. 1986); Herrera-Venegas v. Sanchez-Rivera, 681 F.2d 41,42 (1st Cir. 1982). See also Smith v.
Dukes, 21 F. App'x 344,2001 WL 1177855 (6th Cir. 2001); Harrison v. Seay, 856 F. Supp. 1275, 1279 (W.D.
Tenn. 1994). By law, an individual may appear in federal court only prose or through legal counsel. 28 U.S.C. §
1654. In addition, Rule II ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that "[e]very pleading, written motion,
and other paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is
not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party." Fed. R. Civ. P. ll(a). Pleadings not signed on behalf
of a party or licensed attorney are subject to dismissal. See, e.g., Keyway Leasing Trust v. US., 1999 WL 810386, at
*2 (W.D. Mich. 1999); Lawton v. Medevac Mid-America, Inc., 138 F.R.D. 586,588 (D. Kan. 1991). Accordingly,
plaintiff, Israel Garza, may not represent any other plaintiff in this matter and the Court construes the complaint as
being brought solely by Israel Garza.
2
Plaintiffs response in opposition is titled "Motion to Strike Motion to Dismiss Filed June 08, 2012."
(Doc. 11). A review of the docket in this matter reveals that no motion to dismiss was filed on June 8, 2012.
Rather, on June 8, 2012, the Clerk of Court sent a notice to plaintiff about his obligation to file a response to
defendant Cano's amended motion to dismiss (Doc. 9). See Doc. 10. Plaintiffs response contains no specific
reference to defendant Cano but, rather, appears to be directed at defendants Schmidt, Hanna, and Duarte's motion
to dismiss as it includes arguments directed at defenses raised only by these defendants. See Doc. 11 at 7.
Plaintiffs response also addresses arguments raised by Judge Isgur's in his motion to dismiss. !d. at 3.
Accordingly, the Court will construe plaintiffs motion to strike (Doc. 11) as a response to the motions to dismiss of
defendants Schmidt, Hanna, Duarte, and Judge Isgur.

response in opposition (Doc. 11); (5) plaintiffs motion for clarity (Doc. 14); (6) plaintiffs
motions for "injunctions on all cases filed with the Appeal Assigned to the Honorable Judge
Micaela Alvarez" (Docs. 15, 16); and (7) plaintiffs "Answer to Hon. Susan Dlott on proposed
dismissal" (Doc. 18)3 and Judge Isgur's response thereto. (Doc. 19).

I. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed his complaint in this action on April26, 2012, claiming that defendants
violated his constitutional rights. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff appears to allege that his due process and
equal protection rights were violated during bankruptcy court proceedings in the case of In re

Anita C. Ramirez, et al., No. 09-70051 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011). As relief, plaintiff seeks
damages in the amount of $70,000,000 from Judge Isgur and $36,000,000 from the remaining
defendants, jointly and severally, and a federal injunction to stay proceedings as to the sale or
auction of the property at issue in the bankruptcy proceedings. (Doc. 1 at 10). Defendants
Schmidt, Hanna, Duarte, Villegas, Cano, and Isgur have filed motions to dismiss plaintiffs
complaint against them pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Docs. 3, 5, 7, 9, 12). The Court
will address the pending motions to dismiss before reaching plaintiffs motions.

II. Standard of Review for Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 3, 5, 7, 9, 12)
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
plaintiffs complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (quoting Bell

3

Plaintiffs "Answer" contains allegations similar to those raised in the complaint. The Court takes
judicial notice that plaintiff Israel Garza filed an identical "Answer" in the case of Garza v. Isgur, No. 12-cv-301
(S.D. Ohio 2012) as an objection to Magistrate Judge Bowman's Report and Recommendation that plaintiffs
lawsuit be dismissed. See id. at Doc. 19. See also Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 615 F.2d 736, 738 (6th
Cir. 1980) ("Federal courts may take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts of record.") (internal citations and
quotations omitted). As best the Court can discern, it appears that plaintiff seeks to have this "Answer" serve as a

2

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." !d. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Furthermore, the plaintiff must provide in the claim "more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation." !d. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
It is well-settled that a document filed prose is "to be liberally construed" and that a pro

se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers .... " Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). However, the Sixth Circuit has recognized the Supreme

Court's "liberal construction" case law has not had the effect of"abrogat[ing] basic pleading
essentials" in prose suits. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). Courts are not
required to devote time to a case when the nature of a pro se plaintiff's claim "defies
comprehension." Roper v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:09cv427, 2010 WL 2670827, at *3 (S.D. Ohio
April6, 2010) (Report & Recommendation), adopted, 2010 WL 2670697 (S.D. Ohio July 1,
2010) (citing Jones v. Ravitz, No. 07-10128, 2007 WL 2004755, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 6,
2007)).
A. Plaintiff's claims against defendants Schmidt, Hanna, and Duarte should be
dismissed.
Defendants Schmidt, Hanna, and Duarte move for dismissal of plaintiff's claims under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), asserting that plaintiff's complaint fails to state any legally cognizable
claims against them. These defendants further argue that plaintiff's claims against them should
be dismissed pursuant to the Barton doctrine which provides that court appointed trustees and
their attorneys cannot be sued for actions taken in the trustee's official capacity, unless leave is

response to defendants' various motions to dismiss. Accordingly, the Court will consider plaintiffs "Answer" as a

3

first obtained from the court that appointed the trustee. See In re DeLorean Motor Co., 991 F.2d
1236, 1240-41 (6th Cir. 1993). Defendant Michael B. Schmidt was the Chapter 7 Trustee in the
underlying bankruptcy proceeding. See In re Anita C. Ramirez, et al., No. 09-70051, 2011 WL
30973, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2011). Defendants Duarte and Hanna acted as counsel for
defendant Schmidt in his role as Trustee. (Doc. 3 at 6). Defendants contend that plaintiff seeks
to hold the Trustee and his attorneys liable for conduct which was authorized and directed by the
Texas Bankruptcy Court; thus, plaintiff's claims are official capacity claims and are precluded by
the Barton doctrine.
To the extent plaintiff has filed a response in opposition, his argument is as follows:
A motion to dismiss was entered by the defendants Michael B. Schmidt, Kevin
Hanna and Demetrio Duarte stating the Barton Doctrine as a defense. This
defense would have been a valid defense if the court appointed trustee had not
done such a miserable job in handling the estate. The bank trustee has notified the
Ramirez family to keep off the property under penalty of law. In doing so, the
trustee has taken control of the property and therefore falls under the Barton
Doctrine. However, the Barton Doctrine makes an exception in 959(a).
(Doc. 11 at 7). Plaintiff appears to be citing to 28 U.S.C. § 959(a) which provides that
"[t]rustees, receivers or managers of any property, including debtors in possession, may be sued,
without leave of the court appointing them, with respect to any of their acts or transactions in
carrying on business connected with such property." Section 959(b) imposes a duty on the
trustee to manage property in his possession as a trustee in the same manner that the owner
would. 28 U.S.C. 959(b). Plaintiff contends his claims against these defendants regard the
trustee's failure to conduct business as usual, asserting that he has failed to maintain the
property and, consequently, the Barton doctrine does not protect defendants from liability under
28 U.S.C. § 959(a) and (b). For the following reasons, the undersigned finds that plaintiffs
arguments are not well-taken.

response in opposition to all defendants' motions to dismiss.

4

"It is well settled that leave of the appointing forum must be obtained by any party
wishing to institute an action in a non-appointing forum against a trustee, for acts done in the
trustee's official capacity and within the trustee's authority as an officer ofthe court." In re
DeLorean, 991 F.2d at 1240. Section 959 ofthe Bankruptcy Code "serves as a limited exception

to ... the Barton [d]octrine, allowing suits against the trustees for actions taken while 'carrying
on business."' !d. at 1241 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 959(a)). Here, plaintiffs claims against
defendants Schmidt, Hanna, and Duarte are relate only to defendants' conduct during the
underlying bankruptcy proceedings, such as defendant Duarte's legal arguments made in court
records and defendant Schmidt's actions as Trustee in filing to take possession of property held
in part by plaintiff. See Doc. 1 at 3. Notably, the complaint contains no allegations whatsoever
against defendant Hanna. The claims identified in plaintiffs complaint relate only to the
defendants' administration of the estate and not actions taken while "carrying on business."
Consequently, the§ 959 exception does not apply. See In re DeLorean, 991 F.2d at 1241.
As the undersigned finds that defendants are protected from plaintiffs lawsuit under the
Barton doctrine, defendants Schmidt, Hanna, and Duarte's motion to dismiss (Doc. 3) should be

granted. Further, as the complaint contains no allegations against defendant Hanna, dismissal is
appropriate with respect to defendant Hanna under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a

B. Plaintiffs claims against defendants Villegas and Cano should be dismissed.
Defendant Villegas was the attorney for Anita Garza in the underlying
bankruptcy case. Plaintiffs complaint alleges that defendant Villegas "corrupted" his clients,
including Anita Garza, by having them make misrepresentations in writing with respect to how
4

This is not to say that plaintiffs complaint states legally cognizable claims against defendants Schmidt
and Duarte. Rather, as addressed below, the undersigned finds that plaintiffs complaint is wholly deficient as to all

5

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they paid for his legal services. Plaintiff further asserts that defendant Villegas did not put up a
proper defense during the bankruptcy proceedings and conspired with opposing counsel.
Defendant Villegas has filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) asserting that plaintiffs complaint fails to state claims entitling them to relief.
Defendant Cano was also an attorney for plaintiff Anita Garza in the bankruptcy
proceedings. Plaintiffs complaint contains no allegations whatsoever against defendant Cano.
Defendant Cano's motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) raise the same
argument as that of defendant Villegas. 5 For the following reasons, the Court recommends that
defendant Villegas and Cano's respective motions to dismiss (Docs. 5, 7, 9) be granted for
failure to state a claim for relief.
Plaintiffs allegations against defendant Villegas are insufficient to state a claim for
violations of his rights as guaranteed by the Constitution ofthe United States or under any
federal statute. To the extent plaintiffs claims involve alleged violations of his constitutional
rights, he may not bring such claims against defendant Villegas or defendant Cano, attorneys in
private practice, as they are not state actors and were not acting under color of law during their
representation of Anita Garza. See Flanary v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 2010) (to state a
claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "a plaintiff must allege a violation of a right secured by
the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the violation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law.") (citations omitted). See also Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279,
289 (6th Cir. 1998) (attorneys working in private practice are not acting under color oflaw);
Guitierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987) (conclusory allegations of conspiracy

with state actors are insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Moreover, plaintiff

defendants.
5
The Court notes that defendant Cano' s amended motion to dismiss was amended only to alter the caption

6

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has not articulated a coherent claim against defendant Villegas as best the Court can discern for
violation of a federal right. Plaintiffs conclusory and vague allegations that defendant Villegas
somehow "corrupted" plaintiff Anita Garza are insufficient to state a claim for relief. Guitierrez,
826 F.2d at 1538. Defendant Villegas' motion to dismiss (Doc. 5) should be granted.
Regarding defendant Cano, plaintiffs complaint simply names Cano as a defendant but
contains no allegations whatsoever against him sufficient to state any cognizable claim. Even
under the liberal construction afforded to a pro se plaintiff, his failure to include any allegations
regarding defendant Cano requires dismissal of plaintiffs claims against Cano. See Dugan v.

Martin Marietta Aerospace, 760 F.2d 397, 399 (2d Cir. 1985) (failure to include any factual
allegations supporting claims is sufficient basis for dismissing prose plaintiffs claims).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that defendant Cano's motions to dismiss (Docs. 7, 9)
be granted.
C. Plaintiffs claims against Judge Isgur should be dismissed.
Plaintiff has named United States Bankruptcy Judge Marvin Isgur, the judge in the
underlying bankruptcy proceedings, as a defendant in this case alleging, inter alia, that Judge
Isgur lied in the court record and was biased during those proceedings. See Doc. 1 at 3. Judge
Isgur moves to dismiss plaintiffs claims under the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity.
Insofar as plaintiffs motion to strike (Doc. 11) and "Answer" (Doc. 18) are responsive to
Judge Isgur' s motion, plaintiff asserts that the claim of judicial immunity only applies where a
judge is acting within his judicial and jurisdictional capacity and that "Judge Isgur was not acting
in his judicial capacity in regards to Israel Garza, since Israel Garza was not a party to the
bankruptcy proceedings .... " (Doc. 11 at 3). Plaintiff also contends that Judge Isgur was not

from "United States Bankruptcy Court" to "United States District Court." See Docs. 7, 9.

7

acting within his jurisdictional capacity. See Doc. 18 at 2-3. Plaintiffs arguments are not welltaken.
Judges acting in their official judicial duties are immune from suit, unless those actions
were taken in the complete absence of any jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10
(1991). Plaintiffs allegations against Judge Isgur are related entirely to actions he undertook in
his capacity as a federal bankruptcy judge during the underlying bankruptcy proceedings.
Further, plaintiffs unsupported and cursory arguments that Judge Isgur was not acting within his
judicial or jurisdictional capacities are unpersuasive given plaintiffs allegations that Judge
Isgur's purportedly unconstitutional conduct occurred as a result ofhis acts as a judge during the
bankruptcy case. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Judge Isgur is entitled to absolute
immunity from plaintiffs claims and recommends that Judge Isgur's motion to dismiss (Doc. 12)
be granted. See also Garza v. Jsgur, No. 12-cv-301, 2012 WL 3696480 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 27,
20 12) (Report & Recommendation that plaintiff Israel Garza's claims against Judge Isgur be
dismissed on the basis of judicial immunity), affirmed, Docket No. 21, (S.D. Ohio Jan. 18, 2013)
(Spiegel, J.) ("There is absolutely nothing in this case to show that Defendant Judge Isgur is not
entitled to judicial immunity.").
D. Plaintiff's claims against defendant Medrano should be dismissed.
The Court notes that defendant Medrano, who was ostensibly an attorney involved in
taking depositions in the bankruptcy matter, see Doc. 1 at 3, has not filed an appearance or
responsive pleading. Regardless, the Court recommends that plaintiffs claims against defendant
Medrano be dismissed as ( 1) plaintiff lacks standing to raise any ostensible claims on behalf of
Anita or Alicia Ramirez, and (2) defendant Medrano was a private attorney who was not acting
under color of state law.

8

The Court's authority "to screen and sua sponte dismiss complaints under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) is limited to those complaints filed in forma pauperis." Price-II v. Ragan, No. 0814472-BC, 2008 WL 5381600, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2008) (citing Benson v. O'Brian, 179
F.3d 1014, 1015 (6th Cir. 1999)). Section 1915 deals specifically with complaints brought by in
forma pauperis litigants. Here, however, plaintiffhas paid the filing fee. See Doc. 1, Ex. 3

(filing fee receipt). "Generally, a district court may not sua sponte dismiss a complaint where the
filing fee has been paid unless the court gives the plaintiff the opportunity to amend the
complaint." Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 478 (6th Cir. 1999). Where, however, a plaintiff's
complaint consists of allegations that "are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial,
frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion[,]" the district court may sua sponte
dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). !d. at
479 (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528,536-37 (1974). In the case of such meritless
allegations, a plaintiff need not be given the opportunity to amend his complaint.
The undersigned recommends that plaintiffs frivolous and meritless claims against
defendant Medrano be dismissed sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs
claims are directed at conduct defendant Medrano engaged in while taking depositions of Alicia
and Anita Ramirez during the underlying bankruptcy proceedings. See Doc. 1 at 3. Specifically,
plaintiff alleges that defendant Medrano slammed his hand on the table and refused to allow a
break during questioning. !d. Plaintiffs allegations are limited to conduct by defendant
Medrano which was directed at non-parties Alicia and Anita Ramirez. Plaintiff lacks standing to
raise claims on behalf of these individuals. See Owens v. Voorhies, No. 3:07-cv-1644, 2007 WL
2381975, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 17, 2007) (citing Shepard v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 970 (6th
Cir. 2003)) (claims of constitutional violations raised under§ 1983, such as alleged due process

9

violations, are personal to the injured party and cannot be raised by a pro se plaintiff who lacks
legal authority to represent the allegedly injured individual). Accordingly, plaintiffs claims
against defendant Medrano should be dismissed for lack of standing.
Further, plaintiffs claims against defendant Medrano regarding the manner in which he
conducted a deposition are frivolous and without merit. Plaintiff claims defendant Medrano
violated his constitutional rights. As discussed above, a § 1983 claim "must allege a violation of
a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the violation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law." Flanary, 604 F.3d at 253. Taking as
true plaintiffs allegations, defendant Medrano is a private attorney who was engaged in
deposing witnesses and parties in the underlying bankruptcy case. As a private attorney,
defendant Medrano is not a person acting under color of state law. Catz, 142 F .3d at 289.
Consequently, defendant Medrano is not subject to liability under§ 1983 and plaintiffs claims
against him should be dismissed.

III. Plaintiff's Motions (Docs. 14, 15, 16)
A. Plaintiffs motion for clarity (Doc. 14) is denied.

In his motion, plaintiff simply requests "clarity" regarding lawsuits filed in
the Texas bankruptcy court, this case, and plaintiffs previously pending lawsuit in this District
which has recently been dismissed as noted above. Plaintiff seeks clarity on how filings in the
bankruptcy case will affect "appeals and complaints" filed by him. (Doc. 14 at 2). It appears
that plaintiff seeks to have the undersigned provide him legal advice with respect to the
interaction of the above named lawsuits. Such a request is improper. Judges may not advise
litigants on their legal rights. To the extent plaintiff seeks legal advice and counsel, he must
solicit the services of an attorney. Accordingly, plaintiffs motion for clarity (Doc. 14) is denied.

10

B. Plaintiffs motions to stay (Docs. 15, 16) are denied.
Plaintiff seeks to have this court stay the instant litigation, the case of Garza v. Jsgur, No.
12-cv-301 (S.D. Ohio 2012), and the Texas bankruptcy court cases. As an initial matter, the
undersigned notes that this Court has no jurisdiction to issue a stay in the ongoing bankruptcy
proceedings in Texas. Further, the matter of Garza v. Isgur, No. 12-cv-301 (S.D. Ohio 2012) is
closed. !d. at Docket No. 21. As for the instant case, plaintiff has raised no arguments which
would provide a valid basis for issuing a stay in this matter. Consequently, plaintiffs motions to
stay (Docs. 15, 16) are denied.

IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT defendants' motions to
dismiss (Docs. 3, 5, 7, 9, 12) be GRANTED and, further, that plaintiffs claims against
defendants Schmidt, Hanna, Duarte, Villegas, Cano, Medrano, and Judge Isgur be DISMISSED.
Further, plaintiffs motion for clarity (Doc. 14) and motions to stay (Docs. 15, 16) are
DENIED.

Date:

~~~d----~

~If,/;3

Karen L. Litkovitz ~a
United States Magistrate Judge

11

--------------------------------

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

Case No. 1:12-cv-332

ISRAEL GARZA,
Plaintiff,

Dlott, J.
Litkovitz, M.J.

vs.
HONORABLE MARVIN ISGURE, et al.,
Defendants.
NOTICE

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of
the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on
timely motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected
to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report
and Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral
hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such
portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the
assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party's objections
WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in

accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

12

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