Stephens et al v. Hamilton County Jobs And Family Services et al
Filing
33
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 28 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Judge Michael R. Barrett on 8/29/14. (ba1)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
Clarence Stephens, Jr.,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:12cv603
v.
Judge Michael R. Barrett
Hamilton County Jobs and
Family Services, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER & OPINION
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant Eryn Hunt’s Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings. (Doc. 28.) Plaintiff has filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. 30) and
Defendant has filed a Reply (Doc. 31).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Clarence and Kimberly Stephens brought this action in their individual
capacity and as next friends of their natural children, O.S. and C.S. (Doc. 25).
According to the Second Amended Complaint, on the morning of August 9, 2011,
Plaintiffs were both arrested at their home on charges of domestic violence. O.S. and
C.S. were taken to their nearest relatives’ home, which was their grandfather. However,
their grandfather is elderly and was not able to provide long-term care for the children.
It is further alleged in the Second Amended Complaint that because both parents
were arrested, Hamilton County Ohio’s Department of Jobs and Family Services
(“HCJFS”) was notified. Defendant Eryn Hunt was employed by HCJFS and assigned
to the case. Hunt went to the Hamilton County jail to speak with Mrs. Stephens about
family members who could watch O.S. and C.S. Mrs. Stephens informed Hunt that
there were several relatives who were able to care for the children, and also advised
Hunt that C.S. is severely disabled and requires special attention and particularized
care. However, Hunt did not process these relatives in an effort to clear them to receive
the children. Instead, Hunt approached Hamilton County Juvenile Court prosecutors or
other HCJFS personnel and provided false information to them about the case. Hunt
also falsely obtained an “on duty” magistrate’s permission to seize the children by
providing false information through a “telephone EO” or telephone emergency order.
(See Doc. 29-1, PAGEID # 145). The false information included a statement that there
were no relatives who could watch the children, the amount of time Plaintiffs would be
detained and that an emergency situation existed.
On the morning of August 9, 2011, the Hamilton County Juvenile Court ordered
the children into the custody of HCJFS. That same morning, Plaintiffs were released
from jail. Plaintiffs did not reacquire custody of the children until August 12, 2011.
Plaintiffs bring their claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs bring an
unreasonable seizure claim under the Fourth Amendment on behalf of O.S. and C.S.;
and a claim for violation of the right to familial association under the Fourteenth
Amendment on behalf of themselves and O.S. and C.S.
II.
ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review for a Rule 12(c) motion is the same as for a motion under
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fritz v.
Charter Tp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010). “For purposes of a motion
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for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of
the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the
moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.”
Id. (quoting JPMorgan
Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007)).
“The factual
allegations in the complaint need to be sufficient to give notice to the defendant as to
what claims are alleged, and the plaintiff must plead ‘sufficient factual matter’ to render
the legal claim plausible, i.e., more than merely possible.” Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-950 (2009)). Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent
to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 556 (2007)).
Hunt also argues that she is entitled to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) because this Court does not have jurisdiction over decisions made
by the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. “A Rule 12(b)(1)
motion can either attack the claim of jurisdiction on its face, in which case all allegations
of the plaintiff must be considered as true, or it can attack the factual basis for
jurisdiction, in which case the trial court must weigh the evidence and the plaintiff bears
the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists.” DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 516
(6th Cir. 2004). “A motion to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction must be considered before a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Pritchard v. Dent Wizard Int'l Corp.,
210 F.R.D. 591, 592 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (citing Moir v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit
Authority, 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990)); see also Hutcherson v. Lauderdale Cnty.,
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Tennessee, 326 F.3d 747, 755 (6th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine and res judicata “‘are not coextensive,’” and Rooker–Feldman should be
considered first since its application strips federal courts of jurisdiction and the ability to
hear a res judicata, or other affirmative, defense.”) (quoting Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d
1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996)). Therefore, the Court will first address Hunt’s arguments
related to jurisdiction.
B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Hunt argues that this Court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims under
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This doctrine derives its name from the Supreme Court
decisions in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) and
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
Rooker–Feldman is a narrow
doctrine, “confined to ‘cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’” Lance
v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). “If the source of the injury is the state court
decision, then the Rooker–Feldman doctrine would prevent the district court from
asserting jurisdiction. If there is some other source of injury, such as a third party's
actions, then the plaintiff asserts an independent claim.” McCormick v. Braverman, 451
F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006).
In Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., a mother
brought claims on behalf of herself and her minor children alleging that the defendants
violated their constitutional rights when they entered her home by force and removed
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her two children. 606 F.3d 301 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2696 (U.S.
2014). The Sixth Circuit held that Rooker-Feldman did not bar the claims because the
plaintiffs did not seek review or reversal of the juvenile court's decision, but instead
focused on the conduct of the defendants “that led up to” the juvenile court's decision to
award temporary custody to the county. Id. at 310. The Sixth Circuit noted that the
plaintiffs were seeking “compensatory damages for alleged unconstitutional conduct by
a government agency, not injunctive or other equitable relief, because any action
concerning their return to their mother's custody became moot when they were reunited
with their mother in January 2003 and the Juvenile Court complaint was dismissed in
2005.” Id.
As Kovacic makes clear, Rooker-Feldman does not apply in this case. Plaintiffs
are not seeking to reverse the Hamilton County Juvenile Court’s decision to order the
children into the custody of HCJFS. Instead, Plaintiffs are challenging the conduct of
Hunt that led up to the Juvenile Court’s decision. Therefore, Hunt’s motion is denied to
the extent that it argues that this Court does not have jurisdiction based on the RookerFeldman doctrine.
C. Res judicata
Hunt also argues that res judicata bars Plaintiffs’ claims. Hunt explains that all
the issues concerning the initiation of the action in Juvenile Court were necessarily
litigated in that court. Hunt points out that the magistrate found that there were no
relatives who were willing or able to provide care for the children.
A federal court hearing a case based on diversity jurisdiction applies the law of
the state in which it sits in determining the application of res judicata. Ventas, Inc. v.
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HCP, Inc., 647 F.3d 291, 303 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767,
783 (6th Cir. 2007)). Under Ohio’s rules of civil procedure, the defense of res judicata
may not be raised by a motion to dismiss. Jim's Steak House, Inc. v. City of Cleveland,
688 N.E.2d 506, 508 (Ohio 1998). However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to
the contrary.
See Apseloff v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 1:06-CV-133, 2006 WL
1881283 (S.D. Ohio July 6, 2006) (citing DeNune v. Consolidated Capital of North
America, Inc., 288 F.Supp.2d 844 (N.D.Ohio 2003)).
The Sixth Circuit has interpreted Ohio's doctrine of claim preclusion as having
four elements:
(1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies,
as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have
been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous
action.
Ohio ex rel. Boggs v. City of Cleveland, 655 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Hapgood v. City of Warren, 127 F.3d 490, 493 (6th Cir. 1997)).
The Court finds that res judicata is not applicable here.
As one court has
explained, social workers are not parties to custody proceedings under Ohio Revised
Code § 2151.31. Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 809 F.
Supp. 2d 754, 773 (N.D. Ohio 2011), aff'd and remanded, 724 F.3d 687 (6th Cir. 2013).
Instead, it is the county, acting as an arm of the State of Ohio which brings the custody
action. Id. In addition, there is no privity between a social worker involved in a custody
proceeding and the county because there is no identity of interest. Id. Therefore, Hunt
cannot rely on the doctrine of res judicata as a basis for dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims.
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C. Absolute immunity
Hunt argues that she is entitled to absolute immunity for any action she took in
initiating judicial proceedings. The Sixth Circuit has explained:
“[U]nder certain circumstances, social workers are entitled to absolute
immunity.” Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 774 (6th Cir. 2000) (en
banc). The scope of this immunity is akin to the scope of absolute
prosecutorial immunity, id., which applies to conduct “intimately associated
with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976).
Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 724 (6th
Cir. 2011). “The analytical key to prosecutorial immunity . . . is advocacy—whether the
actions in question are those of an advocate.” Id. (quoting Holloway, 220 F.3d at 775).
Therefore, “social workers are absolutely immune only when they are acting in their
capacity as legal advocates—initiating court actions or testifying under oath—not when
they are performing administrative, investigative, or other functions.” Id.
Plaintiffs allege that Hunt took the following actions:
12. Defendant Hunt never processed any of the Plaintiffs relatives in
an effort to clear them to receive the children.
13. Instead, defendant Hunt approached Juvenile Court prosecutors or
other HCJFS personnel and provided false information to them regarding
her work on the children’s case. Hunt also falsely obtained an “on duty”
magistrate’s permission to seize the children by providing false information
to said magistrate via a “telephone EO” or telephone emergency order.
14. Specifically, she falsely advised that there were no relatives who
could watch the children while Mr. and Mrs. Stephens were detained in jail
as well as falsely reported the expected length of time the parents would
be detained at the local jail.
15. Further, Hunt falsely advised that an emergency situation existed
regarding the children even though they were perfectly safe (prior to Hunt
seizing them) and in a familiar environment with their grandfather.
16. The lack of acceptable relatives or an emergency situation was a
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necessary factual predicate to obtaining a court order or otherwise having
legal cause for temporary removal of the children from their family.
17. Had defendant Hunt told the truth to her supervisors or the relevant
prosecutors or the “on duty” magistrate the children would not have been
seized from their family as no Juvenile Court action could have properly
been filed. Moreover HCJFS policy prohibits an emergency seizure of the
children under the circumstances that existed when defendant sought
emergency custody of the children.
(Doc. 25). For the most part, the actions described fit squarely within those of a legal
advocate, and are not administrative, investigative or other functions. However, as the
Sixth Circuit has recently instructed:
To determine whether absolute immunity applies, the court must precisely
identify the wrongful acts alleged and classify them according to their
function. Pittman, 640 F.3d at 724–25; Rippy [v. Hattaway], 270 F.3d
[416], 421–22 [(6th Cir. 2001)]. Because the claims are focused on the ex
parte orders entered September 28, it is Vega's conduct in connection with
the initial Petition that must be examined. The district court was certainly
correct in concluding that Vega acted in her capacity as a legal advocate
in filing the Petition on behalf of DCS, and making statements, sworn or
not, reflecting her professional judgment and opinion (including statements
regarding the immediacy of the threat of harm to the children and the best
interest of the children). As Kalina explained, absolute immunity applies to
acts involving the exercise of professional judgment such as “her
determination that the evidence was sufficiently strong to justify a probable
cause finding, . . . her presentation of the information and the motion to
the court” and “even the selection of particular facts to include in the
certification to provide the evidentiary support for the finding of probable
cause[.]” Kalina [v. Fletcher], 522 U.S. [118], 130 [(1997)].
However, the exercise of professional judgment “could not affect the truth
or falsity of the factual statements themselves.” Id. Absolute immunity will
not bar Young's claims to the extent he has limited the wrongful acts
complained of to Vega's swearing to the truth of the facts that provided the
evidentiary basis for the juvenile court's probable cause determination.
See Humphrey, 462 F. App'x 532–33; Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435,
1447 (6th Cir. 1997) (when “official switches from presenting the charging
document to vouching personally for the truth of the contents of the
document . . . absolute immunity must give way to a qualified immunity
inquiry”).
Young v. Vega, 13-6487, 2014 WL 3733599, *3-4 (6th Cir. July 30, 2014). Therefore, to
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the extent that Plaintiffs allege that Hunt testified falsely that there was a lack of
acceptable relatives or that an emergency situation existed, Hunt is not entitled to
absolute immunity.
D. Qualified immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects “government officials performing
discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (citing
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978)).
In order to determine whether
qualified immunity applies, courts employ a two-part test: (1) whether, considering the
allegations in a light most favorable to the party injured, a constitutional right has been
violated, and (2) “whether that constitutional right was clearly established such that a
‘reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’”
Simmonds v. Genesee Cnty., 682 F.3d 438, 443–44 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)).
Plaintiffs claim that the children were unreasonably seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment and their right to familial association under the Fourteenth
Amendment was violated.
1. Fourth Amendment
The Sixth Circuit has outlined Fourth Amendment requirements applicable to
social workers:
“[A] social worker, like other state officers, is governed by the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement.” Andrews v. Hickman Cnty., 700 F.3d
845, 859 (6th Cir. 2012). “This would simply mean that social workers
would have to obtain consent, have sufficient grounds to believe that
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exigent circumstances exist, or qualify under another recognized
exception to the warrant requirement before engaging in warrantless
entries and searches of homes.” Id. at 859-60.
Kovacic, 724 F.3d at 695. The Sixth Circuit has held that it was clearly established in
2002 that Fourth Amendment warrant requirements applied to the removal of children
from their homes by social workers. Id. at 699.
Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim is based on the unreasonable seizure of the
children, not a warrantless entry or search. As one federal court has observed: “In the
context of removing a child from his home and family, a seizure is reasonable if it is
pursuant to a court order, if it is supported by probable cause, or if it is justified by
exigent circumstances, meaning that state officers ‘have reason to believe that life or
limb is in immediate jeopardy.’ ” Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Foster, 657 F.3d 463,
474 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1010 (quoting
Tenenbaum v. Williams, 193 F.3d 581, 605 (2d Cir. 1999)); see also Riehm v.
Engelking, 538 F.3d 952, 965 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment
requires that the protective seizure of children occur pursuant to a court order, or, in the
absence of a court order, pursuant to probable cause or exigent circumstances). In this
instance, Hunt took custody of the children pursuant to a court order under Ohio
Revised Code 2151.31(A)(1). 1
However, Plaintiffs allege that Hunt provided false
information to the magistrate in order to obtain the order.
1
The statute provides:
(A) A child may be taken into custody in any of the following ways:
(1) Pursuant to an order of the court under this chapter or pursuant to an order of
the court upon a motion filed pursuant to division (B) of section 2930.05 of the
Revised Code . . .
Ohio Revised Code 2151.31(A)(1).
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In an analogous case, the Sixth Circuit has explained that “an investigator may
be held liable under § 1983 for making material false statements either knowingly or in
reckless disregard for the truth to establish probable cause for an arrest.” Vakilian v.
Shaw, 335 F.3d 509, 517 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 373
(6th Cir. 1999)). The Sixth Circuit explained further:
To overcome an officer's entitlement to qualified immunity, however, a
plaintiff must establish: (1) a substantial showing that the defendant stated
a deliberate falsehood or showed reckless disregard for the truth and (2)
that the allegedly false or omitted information was material to the finding of
probable cause. See Hill [v. McIntyre], 884 F.2d [271,] 275 [(6th Cir.
1989)] (applying test set forth in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98
S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1973), to evaluate a § 1983 claim); see also
Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786–87 (3d Cir. 2000); Hervey v. Estes,
65 F.3d 784, 789 (9th Cir. 1995); Packer v. City of Toledo, 1 Fed.Appx.
430, 433–342 (6th Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion) (noting that the
materiality of the false information used to procure a search warrant was a
key issue in deciding whether to grant qualified immunity).
Id.; see also Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 698 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976
(1990) (analogizing the information provided by a social worker to obtain orders for
placement or entry to the standards for probable cause for a warrant articulated in
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)).
Taking the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint as true, Plaintiffs state
that Hunt obtained a magistrate’s permission to seize the children by providing false
information. According to Plaintiffs, Hunt told the magistrate that there were no relatives
who could watch the children. Hunt also falsely reported the expected length of time
that the parents would be detained, and falsely advised the magistrate that an
emergency situation existed, even though the children were perfectly safe. Plaintiffs
claim that the lack of acceptable relatives or an emergency situation was a necessary
factual predicate to obtaining the order, and if Hunt had told the truth, the children would
11
not have been seized from their family. These allegations support a claim that Hunt
stated a deliberate falsehood which was material to the finding of probable cause for the
magistrate’s order. Therefore, at this stage of the proceedings, Hunt is not entitled to
qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ claim of unreasonable seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. Accord Snell, 920 F.2d at 676 (social workers who obtained a court order
to remove children by deliberately providing false information are not entitled to qualified
immunity). Therefore, at this time, Hunt is not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’
Fourth Amendment claim.
2. Fourteenth Amendment
Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim is based on a violation of their children’s
right to familial association. The Sixth Circuit has recently explained:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that:
“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.” Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in family
integrity—including the right to the care, custody and control of their
children—that is protected by the substantive and procedural due process
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kottmyer v. Maas, 436
F.3d 684, 689–90 (6th Cir. 2006); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66
(2000); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
Young, 2014 WL 3733599, at *4. Plaintiffs do not appear to bring a procedural due
process claim, and instead only base their claim on a deprivation of their fundamental
liberty interest in family integrity.
However, where a juvenile court has the ultimate decision making authority with
respect to placement and custody of a child, the substantive deprivation is effected by
the court, and not the social worker petitioning for such relief. Id. at *4-5 (citing Pittman
v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 728-29 (6th Cir.
2011)). Here, the magistrate issued an order under Ohio Revised Code 2151.31(A)(1).
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Therefore, any substantive due process violation was perpetrated by the court, and not
Hunt. Because Plaintiffs fail to state a claim that Hunt violated Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth
Amendment rights, Hunt is entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim against Hunt is DISMISSED.
E. Standing
Hunt makes an additional argument with regard to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment
claim: Plaintiffs’ lack standing to bring a claim based on a seizure which occurred out of
their physical presence.
“A Fourth Amendment child-seizure claim belongs only to the child, not to the
parent, although a parent has standing to assert it on the child's behalf.” Southerland v.
City of New York, 680 F.3d 127, 143 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 980 (2013)
(citing Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 601, n. 13); see also Reguli v. Guffee, No. 08–CV–
0774, 2009 WL 425020, at *10 (M.D.Tenn. Feb. 19, 2009) (dismissing pro se plaintiff’s
Fourth Amendment claim based on the removal and interrogation her child from her
public school because the child was not a plaintiff or purportedly represented by the
plaintiff), aff'd, 371 Fed.Appx. 590 (6th Cir. 2010).
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs state that they are bringing their
claims “in their individual capacity and as next friends of their natural children.” (Doc.
25, PAGEID #110). To the extent that Plaintiffs bring their Fourth Amendment claims in
their individual capacity, those claims are DISMISSED. However, to the extent that
Plaintiffs bring their Fourth Amendment claims on behalf of their children, Plaintiffs have
standing to bring those claims.
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III.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant Eryn Hunt’s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 28) is DENIED in PART and GRANTED in
PART.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Michael R. Barrett
JUDGE MICHAEL R. BARRETT
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