Mitchell v. Craft et al

Filing 50

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 40 ). Signed by Judge Timothy S. Black on 8/10/2015. (mr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
DARREN MITCHELL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ANDREW P. CRAFT, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 1:12-cv-943
Judge Timothy S. Black

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 40)
This civil action is before the Court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
(Doc. 40) and the parties’ responsive memoranda (Docs. 47, 49). 1
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Darren Mitchell brought this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
that Defendants, former Ohio Department of Youth Services (“DYS”) employees, used
excessive force against him while he was an inmate in the custody of the Ohio River
Valley Juvenile Correctional Facility (“ORVJCF”). (Doc. 3). Specifically, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants physically assaulted him on February 8, 2011—three days after
he had a verbal altercation with Defendant Craft. (Id.)
Following the incident, Plaintiff was charged with two DYS rule violations:
assault and creating a health, safety, or fire hazard. (Doc. 40, Ex. A at 56-57). A
disciplinary hearing was held and Plaintiff was found guilty of both violations. (Doc. 40,

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Defendants include Andrew Craft, Roger Frye, John Haberthy, and Robert Thurman.
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Ex. D). Plaintiff’s rule violation convictions resulted in the extension of his
incarceration. (Doc. 40, Ex. E). 2
Defendants move for summary judgment, alleging that Plaintiff’s claim is barred
under the Supreme Court’s holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), as
success on the merits would call into question Plaintiff’s disciplinary conviction for
assault. (Doc. 40 at 2). Defendants also argue that there is no evidence to support
Plaintiff’s allegations, and that they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Id.)
II. UNDISPUTED FACTS 3
1. At the time of the incident giving rise to this lawsuit, Plaintiff was a juvenile
offender in the custody of the DYS at the Ohio River Valley Juvenile Correctional
Facility (“ORVJCF”). (Doc. 40, Ex. A at 3; Doc. 36 at 8).
2. Defendants were employed by DYS as Youth Specialists. (Doc. 40, Ex. A at 4;
Doc. 37 at 7; Doc. 38 at 8).
3. On Saturday February 5, 2011, Plaintiff and Defendant Craft had a verbal
altercation. (Doc. 36 at 15-16; Doc. 37 at 21-22).
4. On Tuesday February 8, 2011, Defendants Craft, Thurman, and Frye were giving
juvenile inmates in Plaintiff’s unit the opportunity to clean their rooms. (Doc. 37
at 24-25; Doc. 38 at 15).
5. Plaintiff was asked if he wanted to clean his room and he said yes. (Doc. 36 at 2425; Doc. 38 at 17-18).
6. Defendants Craft and Frye entered Plaintiff’s room. (Doc. 40, Ex. A at 24). 4
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The Release Authority Records reflect that the decision not to release Plaintiff was based upon
multiple rule violations, not merely those at issue in this instant case. (Doc. 40, Ex. E at 2, 5).
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See Defendants’ Proposed Undisputed Facts (Doc. 40 at 3-6); Plaintiff’s Response and
Proposed Disputed Facts (Doc. 47, Ex. A).
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Plaintiff agrees with this statement “to the extent that at some point during the incident, Craft
and Frye entered Mitchell’s room.” (Doc. 47, Ex. A, ¶ 6).
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7. Either Defendant Craft or Defendant Frye handed Plaintiff a broom. (Doc. 40, Ex.
A at 13, 17).
8. Defendant Frye left the room and joined Defendant Thurman outside the room.
(Doc. 40, Ex. A at 24).
9. A physical altercation occurred, involving Plaintiff and the four Defendants.
(Docs. 40 & 47).
10. Defendant Thurman attempted to pull Plaintiff off of Defendant Craft using a
handcuff technique. (Doc. 38 at 21). 5
11. During the struggle between Plaintiff and Defendants Thurman and Frye, Plaintiff
was eventually brought to the ground. (Doc. 36 at 26-27; Doc. 38 at 21-22). 6
12. After Plaintiff’s hands were placed behind his back, Defendant Haberthy placed
handcuffs on him. (Doc. 40, Ex. A at 13; Doc. 38 at 24).
13. Plaintiff was injured during the incident. His injuries included: a laceration on his
left outer eyelid; edema on the second, third, and forth knuckles of his right hand;
an abrasion and edema behind his right ear; an abrasion and edema on the top of
his head; and superficial scratches on the right side of his neck. (Doc. 40, Ex. A at
8-9).
14. Plaintiff is right handed. (Doc. 39 at 46).
15. Defendant Craft was also injured during the incident, suffering a contusion on his
forehead and a concussion. (Doc. 40, Ex. B at 11; Doc. 37 at 12). 7
16. Plaintiff was charged with a rule violation for assault and creating a health, safety,
or fire hazard. (Doc. 40, Ex. A at 56-57; Doc. 36 at 36).

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Plaintiff denies this statement “to the extent Defendant Frye contends he is the one who
attempted to pull Plaintiff off of Defendant Craft using a ‘bear hug’.” (Doc. 47, Ex. A,¶ 11).
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Plaintiff denies “to the extent that this paragraph suggests that Mitchell was struggling with
Defendants as opposed to attempting to protect himself by leaving the room.” (Doc. 47, Ex. A,
¶ 12).
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Plaintiff agrees with this statement “to the extent that is what the medical records conclude.”
(Doc. 47, Ex. A, ¶ 19).
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17. An Intervention Hearing was held on February 10, 2011. Plaintiff was found
guilty of rule violations for assault and for creating a health, safety, or fire hazard.
(Doc. 40, Ex. C at 11; Ex. D at ORVJCF 0115 – 0120; Doc. 36 at 38).
18. As a result of being found guilty, Plaintiff’s time in the custody of DYS was
extended. (Doc. 40, Ex. C at 11; Ex. E at ORVJCF 0016-0019, 248-249).
19. After the incident, Plaintiff filed a grievance alleging that he was assaulted by
Defendants. (Doc. 36 at 34-36; Doc 3, Ex. 1 at 1-4).
20. During the investigation of Plaintiff’s grievance, the investigator talked to fourteen
individuals, including Plaintiff, Defendants, other DYS staff and juvenile inmates.
(Doc. 40, Ex. A at 4).
21. During the investigation of Plaintiff’s grievance, the investigator interviewed
Plaintiff on two separate occasions. (Doc. 40, Ex. A at 65-67, 102-104).
22. Plaintiff’s version of the incident changed between his first and second interview.
(Doc. 40, Ex. A at 65-67, 102-104; Doc. 36 at 45-46).
23. The investigator concluded that Plaintiff’s allegations of assault and retaliation
were unsubstantiated. (Doc. 40, Ex. A at 27).
24. The investigator also concluded that the allegation Plaintiff assaulted Defendant
Craft was substantiated. (Doc. 40, Ex. A at 27-28). 8
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the evidence submitted to the
Court demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of genuine
disputes over facts which, under the substantive law governing the issue, might affect the
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Plaintiff failed to admit or deny this statement, so the statement is deemed admitted pursuant to
this Court’s Standing Order. See Standing Order Governing Civil Motions for Summary
Judgment at (A)(1), available at http://www.ohsd.uscourts.gov/FPBlack.
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outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. All facts and inferences must be
construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
A party opposing a motion for summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading, but … must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (1986).
IV. ANALYSIS
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment for three reasons.
(Doc. 40). First, Defendants allege that Plaintiff’s claim is barred under the Supreme
Court’s holding in Heck v. Humphrey “because it would call into question his related
disciplinary conviction, which lengthened his period of incarceration.” (Id. at 7).
Second, Defendants assert that “there is no evidence to support Plaintiff’s allegation[s],”
and that “Defendants’ use of force on Plaintiff was a good-faith effort to restore
discipline.” (Id. at 2, 9). Third, Defendants argue that even if they “used more force
than necessary in hindsight to restore discipline to the situation, they are still entitled to
qualified immunity.” (Id. at 12).
A. Plaintiff’s Claim is Not Barred under Heck v. Humphrey
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff’s claim for damages
for a prior unconstitutional conviction or sentence, or other harm arising therefrom, is not
cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” unless the plaintiff can
show that the underlying conviction or sentence was overturned. 512 U.S. at 486-87.
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However, if “the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity
of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed
to proceed.” Id. at 487. (Emphasis in original). This holding is equally applicable to
prison disciplinary hearings, the outcome of which affected the duration of a plaintiff’s
term of incarceration. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997); Muhammad v.
Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751-52 (2004).
To determine whether a plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is barred by Heck, “the court must
look both to the claims raised under § 1983 and to the specific offenses for which the
§ 1983 claimant was convicted.” Schreiber v. Moe, 596 F.3d 323, 334 (6th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Generally speaking, ‘a claim of
excessive force does not necessarily relate to the validity of the underlying conviction
and therefore may be immediately cognizable.’” Id. (quoting Swiecicki v. Delgado, 463
F.3d 489, 493 (6th Cir. 2006)). However, there are two circumstances in which a claim
of excessive force may invalidate the underlying conviction: (1) “when the criminal
provision makes the lack of excessive force an element of the crime”; and (2) “when
excessive force is an affirmative defense to the crime.” Schreiber, 596 F.3d at 334 (citing
Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676, 684 (6th Cir. 2005)). Where the record is
unclear as to the factual basis for the underlying conviction, the court cannot conclude
that the plaintiff’s claim would necessarily invalidate the conviction or sentence. See
Lucier v. City of Ecorse, 601 F. App’x. 372, 377 (6th Cir. 2015).
In the instant case, a finding in Plaintiff’s favor would not necessarily invalidate
his underlying disciplinary conviction. Following the incident that gave rise to this
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action, DYS commenced an investigation and, upon completion, issued a report of its
findings. (Doc. 40, Ex. A). Concurrently, Plaintiff was charged with, and ultimately
convicted of, two rule violations: (1) creating a health, safety, or fire hazard; and
(2) assault. (Doc. 40, Ex. A at 56-57). An Intervention Hearing was held on February
10, 2011, during which an Intervention Hearing Officer determined that both violations
had been “proven.” (Doc. 40, Ex. D). As a result of this determination, Plaintiff was
given “180 days intervention time.” (Doc. 40, Ex. A at 58). The Intervention Hearing
Officer also prepared a Hearing Report, dated February 10, 2011, detailing the factual
findings underlying Plaintiff’s convictions. (Doc. 40, Ex. D). The entirety of the factual
findings set forth in the Hearing Report is as follows:
Youth [Mitchell] did assault staff based on witness statements from staff
and youth. Youth [REDACTED] who’s [sic] room is directly across from
the room where the incident [sic] stated Youth Mitchell assaulted staff.
Youth Mitchell had stated Youth [REDACTED] should have seen what
happened. Therefore [both rule violations are] found proven. Note: staff
injury to head due to being struck by handle.
Id. at 4.
Defendants argue that “[a]lthough Plaintiff alleges that Defendants attacked him,
that is contrary to the disciplinary hearing’s conclusion.” (Doc. 40 at 8). However, while
the Hearing Report’s factual findings assert that there was sufficient witness
corroboration to find Plaintiff had violated DYS rules, it makes no reference to Plaintiff’s
allegations of excessive force or to Defendants’ conduct. (Doc. 40, Ex. D at 4). Indeed,
the only mention of Plaintiff’s allegations is found in a summary of Plaintiff’s oral
statement regarding the incident. Id. Accordingly, Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiff’s
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allegations are “contrary to the disciplinary hearing’s conclusion” is unavailing.
The Court notes that the DYS Investigation Report did conclude that Plaintiff’s
allegations were unsubstantiated. (Doc. 40, Ex. A at 27). However, the Investigation
Report is distinct from the Hearing Report. The Investigation Report sets forth the
findings of the DYS investigation (Doc. 40, Ex. A), whereas the Hearing Report includes
the results of the Intervention Hearing and provides the factual findings which underlie
Plaintiff’s convictions (Doc. 40, Ex. D). Additionally, findings in the Investigation
Report could not have served as the factual basis for Plaintiff’s conviction, as the
Investigation Report is dated March 23, 2011 (i.e., nearly six weeks after Plaintiff’s
February 10, 2011 Intervention Hearing and conviction). (Doc 40, Ex. A at 28).
Additionally, Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s claim is barred under Heck
because Plaintiff was found to be the ‘aggressor’ is likewise unavailing. First, even if
Plaintiff were the aggressor in the incident, Heck does not bar a § 1983 claim alleging
that excessive force was used after the apparent need for force had subsided. See, e.g.,
Matheney v. City of Cookeville, 461 F. App’x. 427, 431 (6th Cir. 2012) (“an excessive
force claim is not barred when the alleged use of force occurred after the suspect was
handcuffed and brought under control”); Ridley v. Leavitt, 631 F.2d 358, 359 (4th Cir.
1980) (“[e]ven if [plaintiff] were the original aggressor, that fact does not necessarily
entail the further conclusion that his jailers did not respond with excessive force”);
Williams v. Liberty, 461 F.2d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1972) (“we are unable to see why an
officer who is attacked by a prisoner could not use more force than reasonably necessary

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in defending himself, and be subject to liability for the excessive force”). 9
Here, Plaintiff states that “the gravamen of [his] excessive force claim is that
Defendants, especially Haberthy, went too far in using force to restrain him,” and that
Defendants continued to physically assault him “as [he] lay defenseless on the floor.”
(Doc. 47 at 5). Plaintiff alleges that he was kneed in the groin, choked, thrown to the
floor repeatedly, and kicked in the face, even after he was incapacitated. (Doc. 3 at 4).
However, none of Plaintiff’s allegations “necessarily imply” that Plaintiff did not also
assault Defendant Craft. And “that the act to which [Defendants] responded was a
criminal act does not foreclose the possibility that [Defendants’] response also was
illegal.” Vasquez v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 968 F.2d 1101, 1108 (11th Cir. 1992).
Here, in due course, the proof will tell.
B. Disputed Facts Exist Regarding the Use of Force
Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show that the force used against him
constituted a violation of his Constitutional rights. (Doc. 40 at 9).
Claims of excessive force inflicted during a term of incarceration are analyzed
under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034, 1036-37 (6th Cir. 1995). “[T]he maintenance of
prison security and discipline may often require that prisoners be subjected to physical
contact which at common law would be actionable as an assault.” Id. at 1037 (citing
Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604 (6th Cir. 1986)). For physical contact “to

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The Court notes that Ridley and Williams, while on point, were both decided prior to Heck, and
they address the issue of a bar within the context of collateral estoppel.
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constitute a claim under the Eighth Amendment, the offending conduct must reflect an
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 700 (6th
Cir. 1993) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977)).
“[T]he core judicial inquiry is … whether force was applied in a good-faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson
v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (internal citations omitted). The factors relevant to this
determination include: (1) the extent of injury suffered by the inmate; (2) the need for the
application of force; (3) the relationship between the need and the amount of force used;
(4) the perceived threat to which the defendant was responding; and (5) any effort made
to mitigate the severity of the forceful response. Id. “The absence of serious injury is
therefore relevant,” but it is not determinative as to whether excessive force was used. Id.
Indeed, “[w]hen prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm,
contemporary standards of decency are always violated … whether or not significant
injury is evident.” Id. at 9.
Here, Defendants assert that their “use of force on Plaintiff was not done
sadistically to cause harm, but rather to restore discipline … in response to Plaintiff’s
assault on Defendant Craft.” (Doc. 40 at 11). Specifically, Defendants state that “[a]fter
Plaintiff permitted Defendant Craft to enter his room, [Plaintiff] struck Defendant Craft
in the head with a broom handle and then punched him in the face.” (Id.) Defendants
claim that “[t]hese facts are established by the contusion and concussion documented in
Defendant Craft’s medical records as well as the edema on Plaintiff’s right hand.” (Id.)

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Accordingly, Defendants argue that their “use of force on Plaintiff was justified because
they were protecting Defendant Craft and attempting to regain control of Plaintiff.” (Id.)
Conversely, Plaintiff asserts that, three days before the incident, he became
Defendant Craft’s “new target.” (Doc. 47 at 2). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Craft
spit in Plaintiff’s food and then threatened him with physical violence after Plaintiff
confronted him for “being a bully.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that this verbal altercation led
to him being physically assaulted in his room on February 8, 2011, during a scheduled
“clean up” day. (Id. at 3). According to Plaintiff, Defendant Craft “grabbed [him] by the
shoulders and kneed him in the groin.” (Doc. 3 at 4). Plaintiff states that when “he tried
to run from the room to protect himself, [Defendant] Frye jumped on his back causing
[Plaintiff] to fall and strike the back of his head violently on the toilet … [and] Frye then
began choking him.” (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts that “[Defendant] Haberthy kicked
[him] in the head as [he] lay defenseless on the floor,” resulting in a gash above
Plaintiff’s left eye, which required stitches. (Id. at 3, 5).
On summary judgment, the Court must construe all facts and inferences in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, which “usually means adopting the
plaintiff’s version of the facts.” Coble v. City of White House, Tenn., 634 F.3d 865, 868
(6th Cir. 2011). However, here, Defendants argue that the Court should not adopt
Plaintiff’s “version of events [as they are] ‘blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe it.’” (Doc. 49 at 6-7) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.

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372, 380 (2007)). 10 The Court disagrees.
First, mere inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s allegations do not amount to ‘blatant
contradictions’ so as to justify discrediting his facts entirely. See Coble, 634 F.3d at 870
(“[w]e allow cases to proceed to trial even though a party’s evidence is inconsistent,
because ‘[i]n reviewing a summary judgment motion, credibility judgments and weighing
of the evidence are prohibited’”). Further, “[t]his is not a case where [Defendants']
evidence is so objectively compelling that no reasonable juror could believe [Plaintiff].”
Shreve v. Jessamine Cnty. Fiscal Court, 453 F.3d 681, 688 (6th Cir. 2006).
Accordingly, the Court finds that there are genuine disputes as to material facts in
this case, which cannot be resolved on summary judgment.
C. Defendants Are Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity
Finally, Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 40 at
11). Specifically, Defendants argue that “[i]n protecting Defendant Craft from Plaintiff’s
assault, Defendants were well within established law when they used force on Plaintiff
and are therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on qualified immunity.”
(Id. at 13).
Qualified immunity “protects government officials and employees performing
discretionary functions ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.’” Roth v. Guzman, 650 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting

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Defendants further note that Plaintiff has provided inconsistent versions of the incident over time.
(Doc. 49 at 6).

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Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In evaluating a claim of qualified
immunity, a court must determine: (1) whether the facts alleged by plaintiff can show that
a constitutional right has been violated; and (2) whether defendant’s alleged transgression
“clearly violated” that constitutional right. Id. However, “summary judgment would not
be appropriate if there is a factual dispute (i.e., a genuine issue of material fact) involving
an issue on which the question of immunity turns, such that one cannot determine before
trial whether the defendant did acts that violate clearly established rights.” Poe v.
Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 426 (6th Cir. 1988).
Here, genuine issues of material facts exist with respect to the core issue of
whether Defendants acted maliciously and sadistically to injure Plaintiff, or whether they
acted in a good faith effort to maintain and restore discipline. Due to the factual disputes,
Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity upon summary judgment. See Poe, 853
F.2d at 426.
V. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 40) is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 8/10/15

s/ Timothy S. Black
Timothy S. Black
United States District Judge

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