Colbert v. Towne Properties Inc et al

Filing 16

OPINION AND ORDER denying 9 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and STAYING Plaintiff's action pending resolution of the state case in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. Signed by Judge S Arthur Spiegel on 4/9/2013. (km1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

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DENISE COLBERT,
Plaintiff,

v.

TOWNE PROPERTIES, INC., et
al.,

NO. 1:12-CV-00952

OPINION & ORDER

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion
to

Dismiss

First

Amended

Complaint

(doc.

9),

Plaintiff’s

response in opposition thereto (doc. 12), and Defendants’ reply
in support thereof (doc. 13).

For the following reasons, the

Court DENIES Defendant’s motion but STAYS this matter pending
resolution of the state proceeding.
I.

Background
Plaintiff,

condominium

managed

a
by

disabled
Defendant

woman,
Towne

rented

a

unit

Properties

in

(doc.

a

5).

After she moved in, she realized that the building’s parking lot
was

available

to

all

frequently full (Id.).

residents

and

visitors,

and

it

was

Plaintiff thus often had to park her car

far from the entrance to the building, sometimes on the street

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(Id.).

Because of her disabilities, the walk from her car to

the front door was often dangerous, tiring, uncomfortable, and
humiliating (Id.).

Plaintiff and her landlords made repeated

requests to both Defendant Towne Properties and Defendant Husman
House Condominium Owners’ Association for a designate parking
spot close to the front entrance (Id.).

Defendants refused to

do so (Id.).
In
complaint
“OCRC”)

April

with
and

Development,

2011,

both
the

the

U.S.

alleging

Plaintiff
Ohio

Civil

Department

that

filed

an

Rights
of

Defendants’

administrative
Commission

Housing
refusal

and
to

(the
Urban

make

a

reasonable accommodation for her disability was impermissibly
discriminatory (Id.).

Approximately one year later, the OCRC

found that probable cause existed to believe that Defendants
engaged in unlawful discrimination, and on March 15, 2012, the
OCRC denied Defendants’ request for reconsideration (Id.).
On June 13, 2012, the OCRC filed its Complaint, Notice
of Election, and Notice of Hearing with the Ohio Civil Rights
Commission, and on December 13, 2012, the OCRC filed a complaint
against Defendants in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas.
On December 11, 2012, Plaintiff filed her complaint with this
Court, and on January 31, 2013, she filed her amended complaint,
alleging violations of both the Federal Fair Housing Act and the

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Ohio Fair Housing Law.
Defendants

move

the

Court

to

dismiss

Plaintiff’s

complaint on two bases (doc. 9).

First, Defendants assert that

the

this

Court

should

abstain

theories:

pursuant

Defendants

argue

to

that

from
the

the

matter

Younger

on

one

abstention

currently-pending

state

of

two

doctrine,
court

case

filed by the OCRC creates a situation in which this Court should
refrain from interfering; and pursuant to the Colorado River
abstention

doctrine,

Defendants

argue

that

the

Court

should

exercise its discretion and abstain from this case because it is
parallel to the state case (Id.).
Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

Second, pursuant to Federal

12(b)(6),

Defendants

argue

that

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief because (i)
Defendant Husman House does not own the parking lot property in
question and has no authority to grant exclusive use to a common
element parking space, and (ii) Defendant Towne Properties does
not

own

the

authority

to

parking
grant

lot

use

property

of

a

common

in

question

element

and

and

has

no

is

not

in

contractual privity with Plaintiff (Id.).
II.

Applicable Standard
Rule 12(b)(1) provides that an action may be dismissed

for

“lack

12(b)(1).

of

subject-matter

Plaintiffs

bear

the

jurisdiction.”
burden

-3-

of

proving

Fed.R.Civ.P.
jurisdiction

when challenged by a Rule 12(b)(1) motion.
Cleveland

Reg’l

Transit

Auth.,

895

F.2d

Moir v. Greater

266,

269

(6th

Cir.

1990)(citing Rogers v. Stratton Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 913, 915
(6th Cir. 1986)).
alleges

a

claim

substantial.”
Rail

“[T]he plaintiff must show that the complaint

Users

under

federal

law,

and

that

the

claim

is

Mich. S. R.R. Co. v. Branch & St. Joseph Counties

Ass’n,

Inc.,

287

F.3d

568,

573

(6th

Cir.

2002)

(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Musson Theatrical, Inc.
v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1248 (6th Cir. 1996)).
“The plaintiff will survive the motion to dismiss by showing
‘any arguable basis in law’ for the claims set forth in the
complaint.” Id. (quoting Musson Theatrical, 89 F.3d at 1248).
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) requires the Court to determine whether a
cognizable claim has been pled in the complaint.

The basic

federal pleading requirement is contained in Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a), which requires that a pleading "contain . . . a short and
plain

statement

of

entitled to relief."

the

claim

showing

that

the

pleader

is

Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 858 (6th

Cir. 1976); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007).

In its

scrutiny of the complaint, the Court must construe all wellpleaded
motion.

facts

liberally

Scheuer

v.

in

favor

Rhodes,

416

-4-

of

the

U.S.

party

232,

236

opposing

the

(1974).

A

complaint

survives

a

motion

to

dismiss

if

it

“contain[s]

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”

Courie v. Alcoa Wheel &

Forged Products, 577 F.3d 625, 629-30 (6th Cir. 2009), quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
A motion to dismiss is therefore a vehicle to screen
out those cases that are impossible as well as those that are
implausible.

Courie, 577 F.3d at 629-30, citing Robert G. Bone,

Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94
IOWA L. REV. 873, 887-90 (2009).

A claim is facially plausible

when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to draw the
reasonable

inference

conduct alleged.
somewhere

between

that

the

defendant

is

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.
probability

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.

and

liable

for

the

Plausibility falls

possibility.

Id.,

citing

As the Supreme Court explained,

In keeping with these principles a court considering a
motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying
pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of
truth. While legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded
factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at 1950.
The

admonishment

to

construe

-5-

the

plaintiff's

claim

liberally when evaluating a motion to dismiss does not relieve a
plaintiff of his obligation to satisfy federal notice pleading
requirements

and

conclusions.

allege

Wright,

more

Miller

than
&

Procedure: § 1357 at 596 (1969).

bare

Cooper,

assertions
Federal

of

legal

Practice

and

"In practice, a complaint…must

contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all
of the material elements [in order] to sustain a recovery under
some viable legal theory."

Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor

Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984), quoting In Re: Plywood
Antitrust Litigation, 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. 1981); Wright,
Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1216 at 12123 (1969).
Circuit

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth

clarified

the

threshold

set

for

a

Rule

12(b)(6)

dismissal:
[W]e are not holding the pleader to an impossibly high
standard; we recognize the policies behind Rule 8 and
the concept of notice pleading. A plaintiff will not
be thrown out of court for failing to plead facts in
support of every arcane element of his claim.
But
when a complaint omits facts that, if they existed,
would clearly dominate the case, it seems fair to
assume that those facts do not exist.

Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d
434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988).
III. Discussion
Pursuant

to

the

Younger

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doctrine,

Plaintiff’s

complaint must be dismissed.

Under the abstention doctrine

announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27
L.Ed.2d

669

(1971),

when

state

proceedings

are

pending,

principles of federalism dictate that the federal claims should
be raised and decided in state court without interference by the
federal courts.

See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1,

17, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987).

Three requirements

must be met for Younger abstention to be appropriate: (1) there
must be an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the proceeding
must implicate important state interests; and (3) there must be
an adequate opportunity in the state proceeding to raise the
federal questions. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State
Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116
(1982); Tindall v. Wayne County Friend of the Court, 269 F.3d
533, 538 (6th Cir. 2001).
“federal-state
decision
policy.”

comity,

would

disrupt

Abstention is designed to promote

[and]
the

is

required

establishment

when
of

to

render

coherent

a

state

Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704–05, 112

S.Ct. 2206, 119 L.Ed.2d 468 (1992).
No

one

disputes

that

there

is

an

ongoing

state

judicial proceeding that implicates important state interests,
the

first

two

Younger

factors.

The

only

real

question

here

involves the third factor, whether Plaintiff had an adequate

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opportunity in the state proceeding to raise her federal-law
claim.1

Plaintiff argues that the third factor is not present

here because she is not a party to the state proceeding, and the
OCRC asserted only state-law claims in its state case (doc. 12).
Plaintiff has not met her burden here.

See Pennzoil Co. v.

Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1
(1987)(“The burden on this point rests on the federal plaintiff
to show that state procedural law barred presentation of [its]
claims.'”).
party

to

state-law
anything

First, apart from merely noting that she is not a

the

state

claims
that

presentation

of

in

shows
her

proceeding
its
that

suit,

that

OCRC

Plaintiff

Ohio’s

federal

nothing in its own review.

and

has

procedural

claim,

and

presented

the

not

only

presented

law

barred

Court

has

the

found

Second, while the duty of OCRC may,

as Plaintiff notes, be to enforce Ohio’s civil rights statutes,

1

The Court notes that Plaintiff also argues that Younger simply
doesn’t apply to this case because her case does not implicate
the Younger principles, implying that Younger applies only when
the case before the federal court could require it to enjoin the
pending state proceeding (doc. 12, quoting Hayes v. Wethington,
110 F.3d 18, 20 (6th Cir. 1997)). However, “the federal
plaintiff does not have to seek injunctive relief against an
ongoing state proceeding for a federal court to abstain.
Younger abstention also applies in federal declaratory judgment
actions because they involve ‘precisely the same interference
with and disruption of state proceedings’ as an injunction.”
Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072, 1074 (6th Cir.
1998). The Court thus rejects Plaintiff’s narrow
characterization of the doctrine’s application.
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and the Attorney General’s office represents the OCRC and not
Plaintiff, Plaintiff nonetheless could have raised the federal
claim in her case before the OCRC and could have intervened in
the state case in order to ensure that her federal claim would
be

heard.

See,

e.g.,

Peebles

v.

F.Supp.2d 814 (S.D. Ohio 2005).

University

of

Dayton,

412

See also Carroll v. City of

Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072, 1075 (6th Cir. 1998)(plaintiff’s
federal action for damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the Fair
Housing Act was a “textbook case for Younger abstention”).
The three Younger factors are present here, and the
Court finds that the application of the doctrine is necessary to
avoid

duplication

of

principles of comity.
dismiss

Plaintiff’s

legal

proceedings

and

to

equitable
Id.

and

the

Now, the Court must determine whether to
complaint

without

prejudice

matter pending resolution of the state proceeding.
139 F.3d at 1075.

respect

or

stay

the

See Carroll,

Given that Plaintiff’s complaint seeks both

economic

relief,

dismissal

is

not

appropriate.

See also Brindley v. McCullen, 61 F.3d 507, 509 (6th Cir.

1995).
IV.

Conclusion
Having determined that the Younger abstention doctrine

applies

to

this

matter,

and

because

Plaintiff

seeks

both

economic and equitable relief, the proper course for this Court

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is to STAY Plaintiff’s action, pending resolution of the state
case in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas.

The Court

declines to reach the additional bases for dismissal set forth
in Defendants’ motion.
SO ORDERED.

Dated:

April 9, 2013

s/S. Arthur Spiegel________________
S. Arthur Spiegel
United States Senior District Judge

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