McCoy v. Cintas, Inc.

Filing 11

ORDER granting 2 Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration. The Court STAYS the proceedings before this Court pending arbitration. Signed by Judge S Arthur Spiegel on 6/11/2013. (km1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

VERONICA MCCOY,

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Plaintiff,

v.

CINTAS, INC.,
Defendant.

NO. 1:13-CV-134
ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion
to

Compel

Arbitration

(doc.

2),

Plaintiff’s

response

in

opposition thereto (doc. 9), and Defendant’s reply in support
thereof (doc. 10).
On February 25, 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint with
this Court claiming that the termination of her employment by
Defendant

was

Disabilities

done

Act,

the

in

violation

Age

of

Discrimination

the

Americans

in

with

Employment

Act,

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and corresponding
state

laws

arbitration

(doc.
of

1).

Defendant

Plaintiff’s

moves

claims

the

pursuant

Court
to

an

to

compel

Employment

Agreement Plaintiff signed on November 1, 2011, which contained
an arbitration clause (doc. 2).

Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s

motion, arguing that the clause is invalid because Plaintiff has
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“low

to

mid-level

experience,

background

arbitration

provision

of

the

Employment

stand-alone

document

and

did

not

and

education”;

Agreement

contain

was

language

the

not

a

expressly

waiving Plaintiff’s right to a jury trial; and Defendant did not
offer a seminar for employees in which the arbitration provision
was explained (doc. 9).
Under

the

Federal

Arbitration

Act

(the

“FAA”),

a

written agreement to arbitrate disputes that arise out of a
contract involving transactions in interstate commerce “shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”
Stout v. J.D. Byrider, 228 F.3d 709, 714 (6th Cir. 2000)( citing
9

U.S.C.

§

2).

The

FAA

was

designed

to

override

judicial

reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements, to relieve court
congestion, and to provide parties with a speedier and less
costly alternative to litigation. Id.
engages

in

interstate

commerce,

Because Defendant clearly

there

is

no

dispute

about

whether the employment agreement at issue here falls within the
scope of the FAA, which applies whenever there is an agreement
to arbitrate contained in “a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 2.
When asked by a party to compel arbitration under a
contract, a federal court must determine whether the parties

2

agreed to arbitrate the dispute at issue. Stout, 228 F.3d at
719.

Courts are to examine the language of the contract in

light of the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration.
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24,

103

S.Ct.

927,

74

L.Ed.2d

765

(1983)

(the

FAA

“is

a

congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or
procedural policies to the contrary”).1 Any ambiguities in the
contract

or

doubts

as

to

the

parties'

intentions

should

be

resolved in favor of arbitration. Stout, 228 F.3d at 714. The
“primary

purpose”

of

the

FAA

is

to

ensure

“that

private

agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.”
Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford, Jr.
Univ.,

489

U.S.

468,

479,

109

S.Ct.

1248,

103

L.Ed.2d

488

(1989).
Section 3 of the FAA provides as follows:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of
the courts of the United States upon any issue
referable to arbitration under an agreement in
writing for such arbitration, the court in which
1

The Court notes that Ohio also has a strong policy
favoring arbitration and that Ohio’s Arbitration Act mirrors the
federal act in many ways, including that any doubts should be
resolved in favor of arbitration and that arbitration clauses
should be effectuated unless the clause is not susceptible to an
interpretation that covers the dispute. See, e.g., Ohio R. Code
§2711.01(A); Gibbons-Grable Co. v. Gilbane Building Co., 517
N.E.2d 559 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986); Smith v. Whitlatch & Co., 739
N.E.2d 857 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
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such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that
the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is
referable to arbitration under such agreement,
shall on application of one of the parties, stay
the trial of the action until such arbitration
has been had in accordance with the terms of the
Agreement, provided the applicant for the stay is
not
in
default
in
proceeding
with
such
arbitration.

9 U.S.C. § 3. Section 3 thus “requires” a court in which suit
has been brought “‘upon any issue referable to arbitration under
an agreement in writing for such arbitration’ to stay the court
action pending arbitration once it is satisfied that the issue
is arbitrable under the agreement.”

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood

& Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 400, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 18 L.Ed.2d
1270 (1967). See also Santos v. Am. Broad. Co., 866 F.2d 892,
894 (6th Cir.1989) (“[w]here the parties to a contract that
provides

for

arbitration

have

an

arbitrable

dispute,

it

is

crystal clear that Congress has mandated that federal courts
defer to contractual arbitration”).
When considering a motion to compel arbitration under
the FAA, a court has four tasks: (1) it must determine whether
the parties agreed to arbitrate; (2) it must determine the scope
of the arbitration agreement; (3) if federal statutory claims
are asserted, it must consider whether Congress intended those
claims to be nonarbitrable; and (4) if the court concludes that
some, but not all, of the claims in the action are subject to
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arbitration, it must determine whether to stay the remainder of
the proceedings pending arbitration.

Stout, 228 F.3d at 714.

The Sixth Circuit applies “the cardinal rule that, in
the absence of fraud or willful deceit, one who signs a contract
which he has had an opportunity to read and understand, is bound
by its provisions.”

Allied Steel & Conveyors, Inc. v. Ford

Motor Co., 277 F.2d 907, 913 (6th Cir. 1960).

Doubt regarding

the applicability of an arbitration clause should be resolved in
favor of arbitration. Id. Indeed, “any doubts are to be resolved
in favor of arbitration unless it may be said with positive
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.”

Nestle Waters

North America, Inc. v. Hollman, 505 F.3d 498, 504 (6th Cir.
2007).

If

parties

contract

to

resolve

their

disputes

in

arbitration rather than in the courts, a party may not renege on
that

contract

absent

the

most

extreme

circumstances.

Allied

Steel & Conveyors, Inc., 277 F.2d at 913.
Here,
enforceability

Plaintiff’s
of

the

arguments

arbitration

employment agreement are unavailing.

clause

regarding
contained

the
in

the

First, as Defendant notes,

there is no dispute about whether the parties entered into an
employment agreement that contained a provision that mandates
that all disputes arising out of Plaintiff’s employment with

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Defendant—expressly including the very types of claims raised by
Plaintiff in this matter-be arbitrated as the exclusive method
of dispute resolution.

The parties agreed to arbitrate not one

time but as many as six times over the course of Plaintiff’s
employment with Defendant, as she signed at least six employment
agreements over the course of fourteen years, each of which
contained an arbitration provision.

This is not an ambiguous

case where the employee did not sign the agreement but instead
simply

continued

to

work

Plaintiff

repeatedly

provision

in

the

after

was

receiving

presented

employment

with

agreements

notice.
the
and

Instead,
arbitration
repeatedly

acknowledged her awareness of and acquiescence to the provision
with

her

signature

to

the

agreement.

Plaintiff’s

repeated

execution of these employment agreements, absent any evidence
that she was not in possession of her faculties or was unable to
read or write, is evidence enough that there was a meeting of
the minds as to the agreement to arbitrate.

See, e.g., Garcia

v. Wayne Homes, LLC, 2002 WL 628619 (Ohio Ct. App., April 19,
2002)(noting that Ohio law presumes that an adult with full
faculties who can read and write who signs a contract has read
it and should be bound by its terms).
Plaintiff’s arguments that she should not now be bound
by the terms of the agreement she made because she has “low to

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mid-level

experience,

background

and

education”

or

because

Defendant did not offer a seminar for employees in which the
arbitration provision was explained simply do not rise anywhere
near to the level of “the most extreme circumstances.”
Steel & Conveyors, Inc., 277 F.2d at 913.
no

legal

requirement

document,

and

the

that
Sixth

the

In addition, there is

provision

Circuit

Allied

has

be

a

stand-alone

expressly

rejected

Plaintiff’s argument that an arbitration agreement that does not
include an express jury-trial waiver is invalid.

See Cooper v.

MRM Inv. Co., 376 F3d 493, 506 (6th Cir. 2004)(“This Court…has
flatly rejected the claim that an arbitration agreement must
contain a provision expressly waiving the employee’s right to a
jury

trial.”).

Simply

put,

the

parties

here

agreed

to

arbitration.
As to the scope of the agreement, the Court finds that
it is clear in its terms: the parties’ agreement to arbitrate
encompasses

all

relationship,

disputes

including

arising

those

out

raised

of

by

the

employment

Plaintiff

in

her

complaint here, and Congress has not indicated that it intended
the federal statutory claims she asserts be nonarbitrable.
Thus,
arbitration
GRANTED.

the

Court

well-taken,

finds

and

it

Defendant’s
should

be,

motion
and

to

compel

hereby

is,

The Court thus STAYS the proceedings here pending

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arbitration.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

June 11, 2013

s/S. Arthur Spiegel________________
S. Arthur Spiegel
United States Senior District Judge

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