Chaney v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 19

ORDER THAT: (1) THE ALJ'S NON-DISABILITY FINDING IS FOUND SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND AFFIRMED; AND (2) THIS CASE IS CLOSED. Signed by Judge Timothy S. Black on 1/21/2014. (mr1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL CHANEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

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Case No. 1:13-cv-199
Judge Timothy S. Black

ORDER THAT: (1) THE ALJ’S NON-DISABILITY FINDING IS FOUND
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND AFFIRMED;
AND (2) THIS CASE IS CLOSED
This is a Social Security disability benefits appeal. At issue is whether the
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in finding the Plaintiff “not disabled” and
therefore unentitled to supplemental security income (“SSI”). (See Administrative
Transcript (“Tr.”) (Tr. 15-25) (ALJ’s decision)).
I.
Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on February 27, 2009, alleging disability as
of September 1, 2007 due to residual effects of cancer and chemotherapy treatment. 1
(Tr. 15, 19, 150-152). The state agency denied Plaintiff’s application initially and upon
reconsideration, and Plaintiff timely requested a hearing. (Tr. 15, 95-97, 101-106). In
April 2011, Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified at a hearing before an ALJ. (Tr. 15,
These included nausea, vomiting, fatigue, and upper and lower extremity peripheral
neuropathy. (Tr. 15, 19, 150-152). Peripheral neuropathy is damage or disease affecting nerves,
which may affect sensation, movement, gland or organ function, and other aspects of health
depending on the type of nerves affected.

1

31-88). In June 2011, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not entitled to SSI benefits
during the relevant period (from the date of the SSI application on February 27, 2009
through the date of the ALJ’s decision on June 7, 2011). (Tr. 15-25). Specifically, the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 2 to perform a
range of medium work 3 in that he: (a) could frequently climb ramps and/or stairs,
balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, and/or crawl; (b) could never climb ladders, ropes, and/or
scaffolds; (c) should avoid all workplace exposure to unprotected heights or use of
moving machinery; and (d) could perform work free of fast-paces production
requirements and work that involved only simple work-related decisions and few (if any)
workplace changes. (Tr. 18).
In February 2013, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review.
(Tr. 1-3). The ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.1481. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ’s decision pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).

A claimant’s RFC is an assessment of “the most [she] can still do despite [her] limitations.”
20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1).
2

Medium work involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or
carrying of objects weighting up to 25 pounds. If someone can do medium work, we determine
that he or she can also do sedentary and light work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c).
3

2

Plaintiff was born on January 16, 1983 and was 26 years old when his application
was filed. (Tr. 23). Plaintiff has an eleventh grade education. (Tr. 38). The ALJ found
that Plaintiff has no past relevant work experience. 4 (Tr. 23).
The ALJ’s “Findings,” which represent the rationale of his decision, were as
follows:
1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 1,
2007, the claimant’s alleged onset date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.).
2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: pericardial effusion;
nodular sclerosing Hodgkin’s lymphoma; and a deep vein thrombosis (20 CFR
416.920(c)).
3. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work as
defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c) except as follows: the claimant could frequently
climb ramps and/or stairs, balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, and/or crawl, but
never climb ladders, ropes, and/or scaffolds. Further, he should avoid all
workplace exposure to unprotected heights or use of moving machinery.
Finally, due to complaints of fatigue, the claimant’s work should be free of
fast-paced production requirements, involve only simple work-related
decisions, and few, if any, work place changes.
5. The claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR 416.965).

Past relevant work experience is defined as work that the claimant has “done within the last 15
years, [that] lasted long enough for [the claimant] to learn to do it, and was substantial gainful
activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.965(a). Plaintiff worked at McSwain Manufacturing in the shipping
and receiving department from 2004-2005, but quit because he had a personal problem with
someone who was working there. (Tr. 40-41). The ALJ did not consider this employment to be
“past relevant work experience.” (Tr. 23).
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6. The claimant was born on January 16, 1983 and was 26 years old, which is
defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the date the application was filed
(20 CFR 416.963).
7. The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate in English
(20 CFR 416.964).
8. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant does not have
past relevant work (20 CFR 416.968).
9. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 416.969 and
416.969(a)).
10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security
Act, since February 27, 2009, the date the application was filed (20 CFR
416.920(g)).
(Tr. 17-24).
In sum, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined by
the Social Security Regulations, and was therefore not entitled to SSI. (Tr. 25).
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that: (1) the ALJ erred in not finding chronic active
peripheral neuropathy to be a severe impairment; (2) the ALJ erred in not considering
whether he meets, alone or in combination with other impairments, Listing 11.14;
(3) the ALJ erred in interpreting the raw data from an EMG and nerve conduction study
and formulating a residual functional capacity without the assistance of a consultative
examination, medial interrogatories, or a medical advisor; and (4) the ALJ erred in
finding the claimant was not entirely credible. The Court will address each error in turn.

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II.
The Court’s inquiry on appeal is to determine whether the ALJ’s non-disability
finding is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). In performing this
review, the Court considers the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359,
362 (6th Cir. 1978). If substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s denial of benefits, that
finding must be affirmed, even if substantial evidence also exists in the record upon
which the ALJ could have found plaintiff disabled. As the Sixth Circuit has explained:
“The Commissioner’s findings are not subject to reversal
merely because substantial evidence exists in the record to
support a different conclusion. The substantial evidence
standard presupposes that there is a “zone of choice” within
which the Commissioner may proceed without interference
from the courts. If the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court must
affirm.”
Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994).
The claimant bears the ultimate burden to prove by sufficient evidence that he is
entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). That is, he must present
sufficient evidence to show that, during the relevant time period, he suffered an
impairment, or combination of impairments, expected to last at least twelve months, that
left him unable to perform any job in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

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A.
The record reflects that: 5
In September 2007, Plaintiff presented to Mercy Hospital with complaints of
shortness of breath. (Tr. 17). Upon admission, an echocardiogram revealed a large
pericardial effusion 6 and possible tamponade. 7 (Id.) Subsequently, Plaintiff underwent a
pericardiocentesis with fluid removal. (Id.) Plaintiff reported breathing well in all
positions with no associated dyspnea. 8 (Tr. 20). Plaintiff’s pericardial fluid was negative
for malignancy; however a contemporaneously obtained CR scan of Plaintiff’s chest
showed a large lobulated medistinal mass with compression of the trachea and the veins,
thought to be lymphoma. (Tr. 17). On September 7, 2007, a needle-guided biopsy of the
mass was non-diagnostic, but a second biopsy confirmed the diagnosis of nodular
sclerosing Hodgkin’s lymphoma, stage III, B-cell type. 9 (Id.) During this same period,

Neither party recounted Plaintiff’s medical history, so the Court adopts the evidence as
presented by the ALJ.
5

Pericardial effusion is the normal accumulation of fluid in the pericardial cavity which can
negatively affect heart function.
6

A pericardial effusion with enough pressure to adversely affect heart function is called cardiac
tamponade.
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Dyspnea is the subjective symptom of breathlessness.

Hodgkin’s disease is a type of lymphoma, which is cancer originating from white blood cells.
Hodgkin’s has four stages. If a person has B symptoms (loss of more than 10% of body weight
over previous 6 months, unexplained fever of at least 100.4 degrees Fahrenheit, drenching night
sweats), it usually means the disease is more advanced.
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Plaintiff was also diagnosed with a left upper extremity deep vein thrombosis, 10 which
was treated with anticoagulation medication. (Id.)
Plaintiff started his first cycle of chemotherapy on September 14, 2007, and ended
treatment in December 2007. (Id.) Plaintiff tolerated chemotherapy well and had a
complete response. (Id.) He did complain of intermittent lower extremity pain, but noted
it did not cause any functional limitation. (Id.) In January 2008, when Plaintiff was
receiving radiation treatment, Dr. Wright reported that he was doing well and
experienced no significant complications. (Tr. 21). Dr. Essell’s reports were not simply
silent as to reported complaints, but instead affirmatively noted that Plaintiff had no
significant complaints, including residual side effects from treatment. (Id.) Dr. Wright
consistently reported “absolutely no complaints.” (Id.) In fact, Plaintiff acknowledged in
February 2008, that he felt he had sufficiently recovered. (Id.)
Subsequent CT scans of the claimant’s chest, neck, abdomen, and pelvis showed
continued decrease in size of the conglomerate lymphadenopathy in the anterior
mediastinum. (Tr. 20). Moreover, repeated physical examinations continued to show no
extremity edema, 11 or indication of cervical or supraclavicular lymphadenopathy. (Id.)
In March 2009, a CT scan was negative for adenopathy 12 and there was no palpable
adenopathy. (Id.) Similarly, routine follow-up CT scans showed no evidence of
10

Deep vein thrombosis is the formation of a blood clot (thrombus) in a deep vein.

Edema is abnormal accumulation of fluid in the interstitium, which are locations beneath the
skin in one or more cavities of the body.
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Adenopathy is any disease or enlargement involving glandular tissue.
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recurrent disease. (Id.) Plaintiff’s treatment course also decreased to every six months
beginning in November 2009. (Id.)
Plaintiff testified that he experiences daily nausea and vomiting. (Tr. 21).
However, in August 2009, Dr. Essell noted complaints of early morning nausea and
several episodes of vomiting over the previous few months, but not to the extent alleged
by Plaintiff. (Id.) In November 2010 and March 2011, when Plaintiff alleged fatigue,
exercise intolerance, and muscle weakness, he provided no particular complaint of
ongoing nausea or vomiting. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff did not require anti-nausea
medication, and instead opted for over-the-counter medication. (Id.) Plaintiff testified
that he lost approximately forty to fifty pounds during his cancer treatment, but the record
contradicts this allegation. (Id.) The record indicates that Plaintiff lost weight during the
time leading up to his diagnosis in September 2007, but that he reported a normal appetite
and significant weight gain while undergoing treatment. (Id.)
In November 2010, Dr. Essell noted fatigue and exercise intolerance, but
Plaintiff’s treatment course remained benign and unchanged. (Tr. 20). When the
Plaintiff returned in March 2011, he did not report continued fatigue or exercise
intolerance, but he did allege muscle weakness that prevented usual daily activities.
(Id.) However, physical examination showed no difficulty walking on his toes and heels.
(Id.) Still, Dr. Essell referred Plaintiff to Dr. Kanabar, a neurologist, who conducted an
electro-diagnostic study and neurological examination that showed some abnormalities.
(Id.)
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B.
First, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in not finding chronic active peripheral
neuropathy to be a severe impairment.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: pericardial
effusion, modular sclerosing Hodgkin’s Lymphoma, and deep vein thrombosis. (Tr. 17).
The ALJ did not find Plaintiff’s chronic active peripheral neuropathy to be a severe
impairment. 13 In fact, the ALJ failed to mention the words chronic active peripheral
neuropathy in his decision. Plaintiff maintains that this is plain error.

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Plaintiff testified at the hearing that he experienced fatigue in almost all of the muscles in
his entire body. He had significant numbness and tingling in his hands immediately post
chemotherapy with the inability to write. He testified that he still had a significant problem with
weakness in his hands resulting in problems with squeezing and gripping which resulted in him
dropping things. He further stated that the symptoms had not improved and he has difficulty
standing, walking, bending, sitting, and with balance which has resulted in many falls. He
testified that he cannot drive because he could not apply his foot to the brake due to weakness in
his legs. (Tr. 6-12, 16, 22-25, 38-44, 48, 54-57). His testimony was supported by his mother
whom he lives with and witnessed his difficulties. She described his problems with fatigue, lack
of strength, inability to walk, difficulty writing, falling, and difficulties with his hands, feet, and
legs. (Tr. 36-42, 68-74). Dr. Essell’s records reflect severe side effects from his chemotherapy
and radiation including upper and lower extremity complaints. On March 1, 2011, Plaintiff
reported muscle weakness to Dr. Essell. On examination Dr. Essell found decreased strength
and absent reflexes in the upper extremities and decreased reflexes in the lower extremities. (Tr.
626). These complaints led Dr. Essell to refer Plaintiff to a neurologist to further explore and
evaluate his complaints. (Tr. 626).
On May 4, 2011, Plaintiff saw Dr. Kanabar in consultation. Plaintiff reported, almost
immediately after finishing chemotherapy, that he noted balance problems, some instability of
his limbs, difficulty grasping things with his hands, and numbness and tingling in both the hands
and feet. He reported intermittent numbness and tingling in his feet which comes and goes every
few minutes. He indicated that it is more noticeable when he sits and within 10-15 minutes he
notices the symptoms below his knees bilaterally. He reported that when he stands for 10-15
minutes he feels like he has bruised the soles of his feet. He reported sensory symptoms in his
hands with some fine motor difficulties. On examination Dr. Kanabar noted upper and lower
limb weakness, decreased reflexes in the upper and lower extremities, and reduced sensory
findings in the upper and lower extremities. He diagnosed Plaintiff with peripheral neuropathy.
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In this case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had three severe impairments and then he
proceeded with the five-step evaluation. (Tr. 17-25). Because the ALJ continued with
his analysis beyond step two, his alleged failure to find an additional severe impairment,
standing alone, is not reversible error. Anthony v. Astrue, 266 F. App’x 451, 457 (6th
Cir. 2008) (“The ALJ specifically found that Anthony’s…qualified as severe
impairments…The fact that some of Anthony’s impairments were not deemed to be
severe at step two is therefore legally irrelevant.”). Moreover, the ALJ is not required to
explicitly reference Plaintiff’s “chronic active peripheral neuropathy.” Evidence not
cited by an administrative law judge may be relied upon as substantial evidence in
support of the ALJ’s decision. Queen City Home Health Care Co. v. Sullivan, 978 F.2d
236, 243 (6th Cir. 1992). Even if the ALJ cited the medical diagnosis, it, by itself, is not
conclusive evidence of disability because it does not reflect the limitations, if any, that it
imposes upon an individual. Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir. 1988) (“The
mere diagnosis…of course, says nothing about the severity of the condition.”). In fact,
the ALJ addressed the May 2011 post-hearing evidence from neurologist Dr. Kanabar
(Tr. 641, 642). On May 7, 2011, Dr. Kanabar performed EMG and Nerve Conductions testing
which revealed:
EMG and Nerve Conduction of the left leg, nerve conduction of the right leg and
right arm are consistent with chronic active generalized motor neuropathic
changes in the lower extremities. Reduced amplitudes of three of the four motor
nerves and borderline amplitude of the right peroneal nerve were found.
(Tr. 639, 640). Dr. Kanabar’s diagnosis of peripheral neuropathy, based on Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints and his clinical exam findings, was confirmed by the EMG and Nerve Conduction
studies on May 7, 2011. On May 7, 2011, Dr. Kanabar recommended a work up to explore
possible treatment options for Plaintiff’s peripheral neuropathy.
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which pertained specifically to Plaintiff’s peripheral neuropathy. (Tr. 20-21, 638-642).
Plaintiff failed to establish that the record supported greater functional limitations
stemming from Plaintiff’s alleged peripheral neuropathy or any other impairment than
those set forth in the ALJ’s RFC determination.
Therefore, the ALJ did not err in declining to find chronic peripheral neuropathy
to be a severe impairment.
C.
Next, Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ erred in not considering whether he meets
Listing 11.14. 14
For a claimant to show that his impairment matches an impairment in the Listings,
he must meet all of the specified medical criteria. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530
(1990). Additionally, the claimant must prove that the disability lasted for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months to meet the Listing. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). “[I]t is
the claimant’s burden to show that he meets or medically equals an impairment in the
Listings.” Todd v. Astrue, No. 1:11cv1099, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91992, at *9 (N.D.
Ohio May 15, 2012). “In order to be found disabled based upon a listed impairment, the
claimant must exhibit all the elements of the listing. It is insufficient that a claimant

Listing 11.14 requires a showing of peripheral neuropathy “with disorganization of motor
function as described in section 11.04B, in spite of prescribed treatment.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,
Subpt. P, App. 1, Listing 11.14. Section 11.04B describes disorganization of motor function as
“[s]ignificant and persistent disorganization of motor function in two extremities, resulting in
sustained disturbance of gross and dexterous movements, or gait and station (see 11.00C).”
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Listing 11.04B.

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comes close to meeting the requirements of a listed impairment.” Elam ex rel. Golay v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 348 F.3d 124, 125 (6th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ “did not even consider” whether his impairment(s)
met Listing 11.14. However, the ALJ explicitly found that Plaintiff’s impairment(s) did
not meet or medically equal any impairment in the Listings. (Tr. 18). The ALJ
specifically discussed the May 2011 post-hearing evidence from Dr. Kanabar relating to
Plaintiff’s peripheral neuropathy. (Tr. 20-21). The ALJ explained that Dr. Kanabar
conducted an electro-diagnostic study and neurological examination that did show some
abnormalities, but that Dr. Kanabar’s findings were “not of disabling severity” and “did
not warrant limitations greater than those set forth in [his] decision.” (Tr. 20).
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff’s contends that the ALJ failed to explain his
listings determination, an ALJ has a minimal articulation requirement at step three. Price
v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 281, 284 (6th Cir. 1985). See also Bledsoe v. Barnhart, 165 F.
App’x 408, 411 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The ALJ did not err by not spelling out every
consideration that went into the step three determination. The language of 20 C.F.R.
Section 404.1526 does not state that the ALJ must articulate, at length, the analysis of the
medical equivalency issue.”).
There is evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s impairments or
combination of impairments do not satisfy Listing 11.14. Thus, reversal is not warranted.
Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003) (“if substantial evidence,
or even a preponderance of the evidence, supports the claimant’s position, so long as
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substantial evidence also supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ,” the
Commissioner’s decision cannot be overturned).
D.
Next, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in interpreting the raw data from the
EMG and nerve conduction study and formulating a residual functional capacity without
the assistance of a consultative examination, medical interrogatories, or a medical
advisor.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff “has the residual functional capacity to perform
medium work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c) expert as follows: the claimant could
frequently climb ramps and/or stairs, balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, and/or crawl, but
never climb ladders, ropes, and/or scaffolds. Further, he should avoid all workplace
exposure to unprotected heights or use of moving machinery.” (Tr. 18).
It is well established that Plaintiff, not the ALJ, holds the burden to produce
evidence in support of a disability claim. Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 280 Fed. Appx.
456, 459 (6th Cir. 2008). Moreover, an ALJ holds the discretion to determine whether
further evidence, such as additional testimony or a consultative examination, is necessary.
Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 355 (6th Cir. 2001). “[T]he regulations do not require an
ALJ to refer a claimant to a consultative specialist, but simply grant him the authority to
do so if the existing medical sources do not contain sufficient evidence to make a
determination.” Landsaw v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 214 (6th
Cir. 1986). In this case, the ALJ appropriately used his discretion in concluding that
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obtaining further evidence was unnecessary in light of the record as a whole because
there was clear and sufficient evidence to make a determination. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(e)(2)(iii), 416.927(e)(2)(iii) (An ALJ “may…ask for and consider opinions
from medical experts on the nature and severity of [a claimant’s] impairment.”).
E.
Finally, Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ erred in finding that he was not entirely
credible.
The ALJ, not the reviewing court, has the responsibility to evaluate the credibility
of witnesses, including that of the claimant. Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d
525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). An ALJ’s credibility determinations about the claimant are to
be given great weight. Cruse v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 542 (6th Cir. 2007).
In assessing a claimant’s credibility, an ALJ is required to consider a number of
factors including objective medical evidence, inconsistent statements, and work history.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929. First, the ALJ concluded that the medical evidence did not
support disabling pain. Specifically, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff “tolerated chemotherapy
well.” (Tr. 20). Moreover, while Plaintiff complained of intermittent lower extremity
pain, the ALJ noted that it did not cause functional limitations. (Id.) The ALJ explained
that the CT scans showed no evidence of recurrent disease. (Id.) A 2011 physical exam
showed four out of five strength throughout and no difficulty walking on toes and heels.
(Id.) In fact, Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Essell, frequently reported that Plaintiff

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was doing well and had no significant complaints/complaints after his treatment. (Tr.
21).
Next, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s statements were inconsistent. The ALJ
noted that Plaintiff reported he had no feeling in his fingers for over a year after his initial
diagnosis, such that he could not complete paperwork or sign his name. (Tr. 21).
However, in November 2007, Plaintiff wrote and signed a Symptoms Report in
connection with a prior benefits application. 15 (Id.) Also, Plaintiff maintained that he
lost approximately 40 to 50 pounds during his cancer treatment, but the record shows that
Plaintiff lost weight during the time leading up to his diagnosis and that he reported a
normal appetite and significant weight gain while undergoing treatment. (Tr. 21).
Additionally, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “poor work history” diminished his
credibility. (Tr. 21). Plaintiff acknowledged that he stopped working for reasons that
were not related to his medical problems. (Id.)
Plaintiff failed to establish that it was unreasonable for the ALJ to consider these
facts in rendering his credibility finding. Rutherford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
2:10cv260, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10946, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 4, 2011) (“the
Commissioner has some leeway in making reasonable inferences from the record”).
The ALJ properly found that Plaintiff was not entirely credible based on the objective
evidence which does not confirm the severity of the alleged functional limitations.

While Plaintiff’s mother testified that she completed things like paperwork (Tr. 70), she did
not testify that she completed the Symptoms Report at issue.

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III.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s assignments of error are unavailing. The
ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and is affirmed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the decision of the Commissioner, that
Michael Chaney was not entitled to supplemental security income is found
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, and AFFIRMED. The Clerk shall
enter judgment accordingly, and, as no further matters remain pending for the Court’s
review, this case is CLOSED.
Date: 1/21/14

/s/ Timothy S. Black
Timothy S. Black
United States District Judge

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