NorCal Tea Party Patriots v. Internal Revenue Service et al

Filing 102

ORDER that the Management Defendants Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Class Action Complaint (Doc. 77) is GRANTED, the Line-Level Employee Defendants Motion to Dismiss Count 2 of the Second Amended Class Action Complaint (Doc. 78) is GRANTED, and the Motion to Dismiss Individual Defendant Carter Hull (Doc. 79) is GRANTED. The Motion to Dismiss Claims against the Federal Defendants (Doc. 73) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Count One against Federal Defendants is dismissed, but Counts Two and Three against the Federal Defendants are not dismissed. Finally, Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited Discovery Related to Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. 83) is DENIED AS MOOT.. Signed by Chief Judge Susan J. Dlott. (wam1)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
NorCal Tea Party Patriots, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
The Internal Revenue Service, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 1:13-cv-341
Chief Judge Susan J. Dlott
Order Granting Dismissal Motions of
Management Defendants, Line-Level
Employee Defendants, and Carter Hull;
Granting in Part Dismissal Motion of
Federal Defendants; and Denying as
Moot Motion for Leave to Conduct
Limited Discovery

This matter is before the Court on four dismissal motions and one discovery motion:
(1) Motion to Dismiss Claims against Federal Defendants (Doc. 73); (2) Management
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Class Action Complaint (Doc. 77);
(3) Line-Level Employee Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count 2 of the Second Amended Class
Action Complaint (Doc. 78); (4) Motion to Dismiss of Individual Defendant Carter Hull (Doc.
79); and (5) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited Discovery Related to Personal
Jurisdiction (Doc. 83). For the reasons that follow, the Motions to Dismiss filed by Management
Defendants, Line-Level Employee Defendants, and Carter Hull will be granted and the Motion to
Dismiss filed by Federal Defendants will be granted in part. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to
Conduct Limited Discovery will be denied as moot.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

Factual Allegations
Because the pending dismissal motions raise primarily questions of law, and because the

Court need not address the disputed factual issues concerning personal jurisdiction, the well-

1

pleaded facts in the 272-paragraph Second Amended Class Action Complaint (“SACAC”) (Doc.
71) can be briefly summarized.
This lawsuit was filed by ten Plaintiff Groups,1 organizations “comprised of individual
citizens who have joined together to exercise their rights to freedom of speech and expression”
and who share a philosophy of “dissent from the policies or ideology of the Executive Branch of
the United States Government under its current Administration.” (Doc. 71 at PageID 981.)
Plaintiff Groups refer to themselves, and the members of the class which they seek to represent,
as “dissenting groups.” Plaintiff Groups are suing four sets of defendants: Federal Defendants,
consisting of the Department of the Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), and IRS
employees sued in their official capacities; Management Defendants of the IRS sued in their
individual capacity;2 Line-Level Employee Defendants of the IRS sued in their individual
capacities;3 and Defendant Carter Hull, an IRS attorney sued in his individual capacity.
Beginning in 2010, nine of the Plaintiff Groups applied to the IRS for exemption from
federal taxation pursuant to Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4). (Id. at PageID 990.)4
Plaintiff Groups applied for § 501(c)(4) status to avoid the burden of double taxation. (Id. at
PageID 989–90.)5 Each Plaintiff Group sought advanced recognition of their tax-exempt status

1

Plaintiff Groups are NorCal Tea Party Patriots, Faith and Freedom Coalition of Ohio, Simi Valley Moorpark Tea
Party, Tampa 9-12 Project, South Dakota Citizens for Liberty, Inc., Texas Patriots Tea Party, Americans against
Oppressive Laws, Inc., San Angelo Tea Party, Prescott Tea Party, and the Texas Public Policy Foundation.
2

Management Defendants include Steven F. Bowling, Bonnie Esrig, Joseph Grant, Sarah Hall Ingram, Lois Lerner,
Brenda Melahn, Steven Miller, Holly Paz, Douglas Shulman, Cindy Thomas, and William Wilkins.
3

Line-Level Employee Defendants include Joseph Herr, Grant Herring, Elizabeth Hofacre, Stephen Seok, Mitchell
Steele, and Carly Young.
4

At the oral arguments held on June 30, 2014, Defendants asserted, and Plaintiff Groups appeared to concede, that
Plaintiff Texas Public Policy Foundation applied for and received a tax-exempt status from the IRS years before the
targeting activities alleged in this lawsuit.

5

Plaintiff Groups suggest in other paragraphs of the SACAC that Plaintiff Groups, or at least other dissenting
groups, also sought recognition as tax-exempt entities under § 501(c)(3). (Doc. 71 at PageID 981, 1038.)
2

from the IRS, instead of acting as a self-declared tax-exempt organization, to avoid the risk of
facing a “crippling and unexpected tax and penalty” if the IRS determined upon an audit that the
organization was not operating under the tax exemption guidelines. (Id. at PageID 990.)
Plaintiff Groups allege that Defendants subjected them and other dissenting groups, on
the basis of their beliefs, to delays and intrusive scrutiny during the tax-exempt status application
process. (Id.) Plaintiff Groups allege that Defendants targeted dissenting groups by selecting
groups whose names included terms such as “Tea Party,” “Patriots,” or “912 Project” or by
selecting groups focused on issues such as government spending, limited government, or
educating the public about the Constitution. (Id. at PageID 991.) Plaintiff Groups allege that
Defendants subjected their tax-exempt status applications to “unreasonable delays and often
harassing, illegal, and discriminatory demands for private information.” (Id. at PageID 982,
994.) Plaintiff Groups allege that Defendants demanded that they disclose “information not
authorized by the Internal Revenue Code or any other federal law.” (Id. at PageID 1010, 1032.)
Plaintiff Groups allege that as a result of the Defendants’ conduct they suffered an invasion of
their privacy, the administrative costs of responding to burdensome and unlawful requests for
information, and the loss of donations and membership fees. (Id. at PageID 982, 1037, 1044.)
B.

Procedural History
Plaintiff Groups filed the Second Amended Class Action Complaint on January 23, 2014.

Plaintiff Groups assert three causes of action:
Count One: Violation of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552;
Count Two: Violations of the First and Fifth Amendments to the United States
Constitution; and
Count Three: Violation of 26 U.S.C. § 6103, a statute which protects the
confidentiality of tax return information.

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(Doc. 71 at PageID 1032–46.) Plaintiff Groups also seek to certify a class that would include
generally “all dissenting groups targeted for additional scrutiny by the IRS from January 20,
2009 through July 15, 2013.” (Id. at PageID 1047.)
Four sets of Defendants have filed Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 73, 77, 78, 79). All
Defendants assert pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) that Plaintiff Groups
have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Certain Defendants, each a nonOhio resident, also assert that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. Plaintiff Groups
oppose dismissal of their claims and also have filed a Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited
Discovery Related to Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. 83). The Motions are ripe for adjudication.
II.

STANDARDS GOVERNING MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to move to dismiss a complaint

for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A
district court “must read all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true.” Weiner v. Klais
and Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 88 (6th Cir. 1997). However, this tenet is inapplicable to legal
conclusions, or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, which are not entitled to an
assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). To withstand a dismissal motion, a complaint
“does not need detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain “more than labels and
conclusions [or] a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]he complaint must contain either direct or inferential
allegations respecting all material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal
theory.” Harvard v. Wayne Cty., 436 F. App’x 451, 457 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation and

4

citation omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.6 The Court does not require “heightened fact
pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
III.

ANALYSIS

A.

Count One: Privacy Act Claim
In Count One of the SACAC, Plaintiff Groups allege that Federal Defendants violated the

Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(e)(1), 552a(e)(3)(A)-(D), 552a(e)(4), 552a(e)(5), 552a(e)(7), and
552a(e)(10). (Doc. 71 at PageID 1032–37.) The Privacy Act “delineates duties and
responsibilities for federal agencies that collect, store, and disseminate personal information
about individuals.” Butler v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 368 F. Supp. 2d 776, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
The Privacy Act creates a private cause of action in favor of “the individual” when an agency
“fails to comply with any other provision of this section, or any rule promulgated thereunder, in
such a way as to have an adverse effect on [the] individual.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D)
(emphasis added).
Federal Defendants move to dismiss this claim on the grounds that the United States has
not waived its sovereign immunity as to claims by the Plaintiff Groups because they are not
individuals. The United States is immune from suit except to the extent that Congress has
waived the immunity by specific statute. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160–61 (1981);
6

In accordance with this standard, the Supreme Court also specifically repudiated the pleading standard articulated
in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957), that a complaint fails to state a claim when it “appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” See
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562–63. The Court in Twombly said the “no set of facts” language from Conley had “earned
its retirement” and was “best forgotten.” Id. at 563.
5

Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City of Springboro, 477 F.3d 807, 819–20 (6th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff Groups concede that only “individuals” can sue under the Privacy Act, but they assert
that Plaintiff Groups can bring the claims of their individual members pursuant to the doctrine of
associational standing. (Doc. 84 at PageID 1433.)
Under the doctrine of associational standing, “an association has standing to bring suit on
behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own
right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and
(c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual
members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343
(1977). At least one federal district court, the District of Columbia, has refused to allow Privacy
Act claims on the basis of associational standing because the statutory language in § 552a(g)
creates a cause of action only for individuals, not for groups representing individuals. Committee
in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador v. Sessions, 738 F. Supp. 544, 547 (D.D.C. 1990)
(“[T]he Privacy Act does not confer standing upon organizations on their own or purporting to
sue on behalf of their members.”), aff’d, 929 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also In re Dep’t of
Veterans Affairs Data Theft Lit., MDL Docket No. 1796, 2007 WL 7621261, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov.
16, 2007) (adopting Sessions); but see Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. U.S. Postal Serv., 604 F.
Supp. 2d 665, 670–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (allowing Privacy Act claim based on associational
standing). This Court need not decide in this case whether associational standing could allow
representative groups to brings Privacy Act claims on behalf of individuals, because Plaintiff
Groups here do not meet the third prong of the test for associational standing.
The third prong of the associational standing test is not jurisdictional, but rather is
focused on matters of administrative convenience and efficiency. United Food and Commercial

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Workers Union Loc. 751 v. Brown Group, 517 U.S. 544, 557 (1996). Under the third prong of
the associational standing test, an association lacks standing when “the fact and extent of the
injury that gives rise to the claims for injunctive relief would require individualized proof or
where the relief requested would require the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”
Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 670 (citation omitted). For example, the
adjudication of a pure question of law that does not require consideration of individualized
circumstances is appropriate for associational standing. Id.
The third prong of the test has been recognized to allow organizational standing in suits
for declarative and injunctive relief, but to preclude suits for damages. Brown Group, 517 U.S.
at 553–54. A Southern District of New York court permitted a plaintiff union to assert a Privacy
Act claim based on associational standing in National Association of Letter Carriers, but the
case is distinguishable insofar as the plaintiff union sought only injunctive relief. 604 F. Supp.
2d at 667. Here, Plaintiff Groups seek damages on behalf of their individual members. (Doc. 71
at PageID 1037.)
Plaintiff Groups contend that their request for damages does not preclude associational
standing because Plaintiff Groups would seek only statutory minimum damages. (Doc. 84 at
PageID 1438–39.) The Privacy Act provides for damages in the minimum amount of $1,000 per
individual. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(A). However, proof of a statutory violation is not sufficient to
qualify for statutory damages under the Privacy Act. Plaintiff Groups asserting Privacy Act
claims must first prove actual damages before statutory damages can be awarded. Doe v. Chao,
540 U.S. 614, 620 (2004).
Plaintiff Groups assert that damages can be apportioned without individual members of
the groups needing to participate or testify in the suit. In Count One of the SACAC, Plaintiff

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Groups alleged that the IRS targeted privacy interests of individual members “by making blanket
disclosure demands” to the Groups, that the Groups then “provided [responsive] information on
their individual members[,]” and that the costs of the Groups’ “member-specific responses were
equally borne by all members whose information was disclosed.” (Doc. 71 at PageID 1036–
37.)7 The last part of the Count One allegation—that all costs would be borne equally by
members whose information was disclosed—is conclusory and need not be accepted as true
without specific supporting facts. For example, Plaintiff Groups allege that the IRS asked the
NorCal Tea Party to provide the amount of time that members spent at events, the names of
members who would distribute materials from other organizations, and the duties and work hours
of its board members. (Doc. 71 at PageID 1013–15, 1035.) It is not plausible that Plaintiff
Groups would have records of all of that information without needing to consult with individual
members. Additionally, rather than costs being borne equally, it is more plausible that the costs
borne by each member whose information was disclosed would be dependent upon the type and
extent of his or her participation in activities requiring disclosure. The Court concludes that the
Plaintiff Groups’ claim for damages would require individual members to participate in this suit.
The Privacy Act claim fails the third prong of the test for associational standing.
Accordingly, the Court holds that the Plaintiff Groups did not have associational standing
to assert a Privacy Act claim on behalf of their members. The Court will dismiss Count One of
the SACAC.

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To the extent that the Plaintiff Groups suggested a different means by which damages could be calculated at the
June 30, 2014 oral argument, the Court will not consider that argument. Plaintiff Groups have had three
opportunities to plead their claims for relief in the Complaint (Doc. 1), the Amended Complaint (Doc. 14) and the
SACAC. The Court will not allow them to amend their claim again by virtue of their oral argument.

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B.

Count Two: First and Fifth Amendment Claims
Plaintiff Groups allege in Count Two that Defendants engaged in viewpoint-based

discrimination and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fifth Amendment by subjecting them and other dissenting groups to “(1) delayed
and extended processing[,] and (2) intrusive and public disclosure of their confidential political
speech and association.” (Doc. 71 at PageID 1037–45.)
1.

Subclaim against Individual Defendants

Management Defendants, Line-Level Employee Defendants, and Carter Hull
(collectively, “Individual Defendants”) move for dismissal of Count Two on several grounds.
First, they assert that no cause of action for damages can be asserted against IRS employees or
officials pursuant to the doctrine articulated in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Second, they assert that they would be
entitled to qualified immunity from liability even if a Bivens cause of action could be filed
against IRS employees and officials. Third, Individual Defendants Joseph Grant, Sarah Hall
Ingram, Lois Lerner, Steven Miller, Holly Paz, Douglas Shulman, William Wilkins, and Carter
Hull assert that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction against them. Because the Court finds that a
Bivens cause of action cannot be stated against IRS employees and officials for a violation of
Plaintiff Groups’ First and Fifth Amendment rights in these circumstances, the Court will not
address the qualified immunity and the personal jurisdiction issues.8

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Plaintiff Groups concede that they did not assert a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction against Defendants
Grant, Ingram, Miller, Shulman, or Wilkins and they have requested the right to take discovery to establish
jurisdiction. (Doc. 84 at PageID at 1426 n.36.) The doctrine of qualified immunity is intended to shield defendants
from the burden of discovery where no claim can be stated. See Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 490 (6th Cir. 2009).
In this case, the finding that there is no Bivens cause of action available to Plaintiff Groups against Individual
Defendants precludes the need to enquire further into the asserted defense of qualified immunity. Wilkie v. Robbins,
551 U.S. 537, 567 (2007). Plaintiff Groups are entitled to an immediate appeal of the Bivens finding. Id. at 550 n.4
(stating that “the recognition of an entire cause of action” pursuant to Bivens is implicated by the defense of
qualified immunity and subject to interlocutory appeal).
9

The Supreme Court in Bivens recognized that a damages cause of action against federal
officials for violations of certain constitutional rights is implicit in the U.S. Constitution. See
Downie v. City of Middleburg Hghts., 301 F.3d 688, 693 (6th Cir. 2002). “Bivens actions do not
cover every constitutional right and do not apply in every context.” Krafsur v. Davenport, 736
F.3d 1032, 1035 (6th Cir. 2013). The Supreme Court has recognized a Bivens remedy in only
three contexts: Fourth Amendment deprivation in Bivens; violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1979); and Eighth
Amendment violation against prison officials in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 16–17 (1980).
The Supreme Court has declined multiple times since the Carlson decision in 1980 to recognize
a Bivens remedy in a new context. See Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 622–23 (2012). “[A]
Bivens remedy will not be implied where: (1) there are special factors counseling hesitation in
the absence of affirmative action by Congress; or (2) Congress has provided an alternative
remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the constitution
and viewed as equally effective.” Downie, 301 F.3d at 694 (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
The existence of a comprehensive statutory scheme can be a special factor counseling
hesitation against expanding Bivens. See Bush, 462 U.S. 381–90; see also Jones v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 948 F.2d 258, 263–64 (6th Cir. 1991) (denying a Bivens remedy for an alleged First
Amendment violation where Congress provided a scheme of civil services remedies under the
Civil Service Reform Act and the Energy Reorganization Act). Courts are reluctant to imply a
remedy where Congress could have acted to provide a remedy in a statutory scheme, but did not.
See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 414, 423 (1988). The special factors analysis should
focus “on the comprehensive nature of the administrative system protecting the rights of the

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plaintiff, as well as Congress’ expertise and authority on the field in question.” Jones, 948 F.2d
at 264. Courts should ask “whether an elaborate remedial system that has been constructed step
by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations, should be augmented by the
creation of a new judicial remedy for the constitutional violation at issue.” Bush, 462 U.S. at
388.
The Internal Revenue Code is a comprehensive statutory scheme. Applicants can seek
tax-exempt status pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4). Statutory remedies are
provided for § 501(c)(3) applicants pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7428 and § 7433. Section 7428
provides a declaratory judgment action for § 5103(c)(3) applicants who have received an adverse
determination of their § 5103(c)(3) status or applicants for whom the Secretary failed to make a
determination. 26 U.S.C. § 7428(a)(1) & (2). The applicants must first exhaust their
administrative remedies by waiting for 270 days “after the date on which the request for such
determination was made if the organization has taken, in a timely manner, all reasonable steps to
secure such determination.” 26 U.S.C. § 7428(b)(2).
Section 7433 creates a damages remedy for the wrongful collection of federal tax. “If, in
connection with any collection of Federal tax with respect to a taxpayer, any officer or employee
of the Internal Revenue Service recklessly or intentionally, or by reason of negligence,
disregards any provision of this title, or any regulation promulgated under this title, such
taxpayer may bring a civil action for damages against the United States.” 26 U.S.C. § 7433(a).
Applicants seeking § 501(c)(4) status can proceed in a different manner. Section
501(c)(4) applicants are not required to submit applications and can hold themselves out as
exempt. See 26 U.S.C. § 508(a) and Treas. Reg. 1.6033-1. Organizations can challenge a
determination that they do not qualify for § 501(c)(4) status when a tax deficiency notice is

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issued pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 6212, 6213. See People’s Edu. Camp. Soc’y Inc. v. C.I.R., 331
F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1964); see also In re Vision Service Plan Tax Litigation, No. 2:07-md-1829,
2010 WL 2572076 (S.D. Ohio June 22, 2010) (involving related entities seeking to recover taxes
because they should have been considered tax exempt). Other statutorily-created remedies for
taxpayers included in Title 26 of the United States Code are § 7422 (civil action for refund);
§ 7425 (discharge of liens); § 7431 (disclosure of returns and return information); and § 7432
(civil damages for failure to release lien).
Additionally, oversight of the IRS is conducted by the Treasury Inspector General for
Tax Administration (“TIGTA”) and the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate. The Office of the
Taxpayer Advocate was created, in part, “to assist taxpayers in resolving problems with the
[IRS.]” 26 U.S.C. § 7803(c)(2)(A)(i). The TIGTA was created pursuant 26 U.S.C. § 7803(d).
The TIGTA and the Officer of the Taxpayer Advocate both issued reports on the subject of the
wrongdoing alleged in the SACAC. (Docs. 71-1, 71-2.)
The parties agree that the Internal Revenue Code provisions cited herein do not provide a
direct remedy for the wrong alleged here—viewpoint discrimination against § 501(c)(4)
applicants effectuated by unnecessary delays and improper requests for information. However,
recognition of a Bivens remedy “does not turn on whether Congress has provided complete
relief, considerable relief, or little relief.” Krafsur, 736 F.3d at 1036. A Bivens remedy “is not
an automatic entitlement no matter what other means there may be to vindicate a protected
interest.” Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 549 (2007). Stated differently, a Bivens remedy
should not be implied “simply for want of any other means for challenging a constitutional
deprivation in federal court.” Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001).

12

Plaintiff Groups state that a Bivens cause of action should be permitted against IRS
agents to remedy the constitutional violations alleged here because the Sixth Circuit has allowed
Bivens claims to remedy violations of First Amendment rights in some circumstances. Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (Rule 12(b)(6) motion denied as to prisoner’s First
Amendment retaliation claim against prison officials); Downie, 301 F.3d at 696 n.7 (6th Cir.
2002) (First Amendment claims generally). However, the Supreme Court stated in 2012 that it
had not determined whether Bivens extends to First Amendment claims. Reichle v. Howards,
132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 n.4 (2012). Also, the First Amendment claims in Hill and Downie were
not brought against IRS agents.
Courts in the Sixth Circuit have not recognized a Bivens cause of action in the context of
federal taxation. See, e.g., Sachs v. U.S. ex rel. I.R.S., 59 F. App’x 116, 120 (6th Cir. 2003);
Fishburn v. Brown, 125 F.3d 979, 982 (6th Cir. 1997); McIntosh v. U.S., 82 Am. Fed. Tax
Report 2d 98-6501, 1998 WL 762344 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 17, 1998).9 In Fishburn, the Sixth Circuit
stated that the plaintiffs had no Bivens remedy against IRS officials for constitutional violations
arising from tax collections because Congress provided a scheme of statutory remedies. 125
F.3d at 982–83. The “carefully crafted legislative remedies [in the Internal Revenue Code]
confirm that, in the politically sensitive realm of taxation, Congress’s refusal to permit
unrestricted damage actions by taxpayers has not been inadvertent.” Id. at 983 (citation omitted).
“Federal statutory remedies, including the right to sue the government for a refund of taxes
improperly collected, preclude a damages action under Bivens for the alleged unconstitutional
collection of taxes and satisfy the dictates of due process.” McIntosh, 1998 WL 762344.

9

The Westlaw publication of the McIntosh case does not provide page numbers so no pinpoint citation can be
given.
13

The trend in other Circuits also has been to not recognize Bivens actions against IRS
agents. See, e.g., Kim v. U.S., 632 F.3d 713, 714, 718 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (dismissing tax
protesters’ due process claims based on alleged failure to maintain required information and
perform duties required by law); Hudson Valley Black Press v. IRS, 409 F.3d 106, 112–13 (2d
Cir. 2005) (“Bivens relief is not available to taxpayers who allege First Amendment violations
based on retaliatory tax audits.”); Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1184–86 (9th Cir. 2004)
(finding no Bivens remedy for constitutional violations in the assessment and collection of
taxes); Judicial Watch v. Rossotti, 317 F.3d 401, 412–13 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding no Bivens
remedy for damages arising from a retaliatory audit); Vennes v. An Unknown Number of
Unidentified Agents of U.S., 26 F.3d 1448, 1453–54 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding no Bivens remedy
for tax assessment and collection activities); McMillen v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 960 F.2d 187,
190–91 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that statutory remedies “may not be perfectly comprehensive,”
but that “Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for
constitutional violations that may occur in the administration of the tax laws”) (internal
quotations and citations omitted); Cameron v. IRS, 773 F.2d 126, 129 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Congress
has given taxpayers all sorts of rights against an overzealous officialdom . . . and it would make
the collection of taxes chaotic if a taxpayer could bypass the remedies provided by Congress
simply by bringing a damage action against Treasury employees.”). The Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, to the contrary, allowed First and Fourth Amendment claims against IRS agents for
alleged harassment through a Bivens action. Nat’l Commodity and Barter Ass’n v. Archer, 31
F.3d 1521, 1527, 1532 (10th Cir. 1994); but see Dahn v. U.S., 127 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir.
1997) (“[I]n light of the comprehensive administrative scheme created by Congress to resolve
tax-related disputes, individual agents of the IRS are also not subject to Bivens actions.”).

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This Court will follow the majority position. Congress has authored a complex,
comprehensive remedial scheme in the Internal Revenue Code. Plaintiff Groups’ constitutional
claim here is most factually analogous to the claims in Judicial Watch and Hudson Valley Black
Press. A retaliatory delay of tax-exemption status, like a retaliatory tax audit, has no direct,
complete remedy in the Code. However, the Court agrees with the Second and Fourth Circuit
Courts of Appeal that it would be inappropriate to recognize a Bivens cause of action to remedy
these alleged wrongs. Hudson Valley Black Press, 409 F.3d at 112–13; Judicial Watch, 317 F.3d
at 412–13. It is for Congress, not the Courts, to create any new causes of action relative to the
administration of the federal taxation laws. For these reasons, the Court will dismiss Count Two
insofar as it is asserted against Individual Defendants.10
2.

Subclaim against Federal Defendants

Plaintiff Groups Texas Tea Party Patriots and Americans against Oppressive Laws, Inc.
assert a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief against Federal Defendants asking the Court to
“declar[e] that the Defendants’ discriminatory conduct is unlawful” and to “enjoin[ Defendants]
from using tax exemption applicants’ political viewpoints to target them and subject them to
unnecessary requests for information.” (Doc. 71 at PageID 1045.)11 Federal Defendants move
to dismiss on the grounds that the relief which Plaintiff Groups seek is barred by the Declaratory

10

By dismissing the claims against Individual Defendants, the Court does not intend to express an opinion on the
propriety of their alleged conduct in processing of the Plaintiff Groups’ applications for tax-exempt status.
11

The claim for declaratory and injunctive relief cannot be brought by the other Plaintiff Groups who have either
had their applications for tax exempt status ruled upon or have withdrawn their applications. NorCal Tea Party
Patriots received their exemption in August 2012. (Doc. 71 at PageID 1017.) Faith and Freedom Coalition of Ohio
was recognized as exempt in September 2012. (Id. at PageID 1020.) Simi Valley Moorpark Tea Party was
recognized as exempt in November 2012. (Id. at PageID 1024.) Tampa 912 Project, Inc. was recognized as exempt
in January 2011. (Id. at PageID 1025.) South Dakota Citizens for Liberty was recognized as exempt in June 2012.
(Id.at PageID 1025.) San Angelo Tea Party and Prescott Tea Party withdrew their applications. (Id. at PageID
1031.) Plaintiff Groups did not provide information about the application of Texas Public Policy Foundation. (Id. at
PageID 1031–32.)
15

Judgment Act (“DJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and the Anti-Injunction Act (“AIA”), 26 U.S.C.
§ 7421.
The DJA provides that a district court “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its
jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes other than actions brought under section 7428
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, . . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28
U.S.C. § 2201. The AIA provides that, with the exception of specified statutory provisions, “no
suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in
any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was
assessed.” 26 U.S.C. § 7421. Courts apply the same analysis to both the DJA and the AIA, and
if relief is barred under the AIA, then it also is barred under the DJA. See Ecclesiastical Order
of the ISM of AM, Inc. v. I.R.S., 725 F.2d 398, 402 (6th Cir. 1984); Dickens v. U.S., 671 F.2d
969, 972 (6th Cir. 1982).
The AIA has an “almost literal effect.” Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 737
(1974). The “principal purpose” of the AIA is to “protect[ ]the Government’s need to assess and
collect taxes as expeditiously as possible with a minimum of preenforcement judicial
interference, and to require that the legal right to the disputed sums be determined in a suit for
refund.” Id. at 736 (citation omitted). The AIA reflects “a policy preference that those
aggrieved by taxation pay the tax first, and then sue for a refund.” RYO Mach., LLC v. U.S.
Dep’t of Treasury, 696 F.3d 467, 470 (6th Cir. 2012). The AIA is “is equally applicable to
activities which are intended to or may culminate in the assessment or collection of taxes.”
Dickens, 671 F.2d at 971 (citation omitted) (dismissing suit that sought to prohibit the IRS from
using particular information to calculate a tax assessment). The Court must apply a two-step

16

process to determine if an injunction can be issued despite the AIA. See RYO Mach., 696 F.3d at
471. First, the Court must determine if the claim is within the purview of the AIA as a “suit for
the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C.
§ 7421). Second, the Court must ask whether an exception to the AIA applies. See id.12
Regarding the first step of the analysis, the Sixth Circuit has interpreted the AIA
“broadly” stating that it “encompass[es] almost all premature interference with the assessment or
collection of any federal tax.” Id. Federal Defendants rely on RYO Machine, Inc. and Bob Jones
University to support their argument that the AIA precludes Plaintiff Groups’ First and Fifth
Amendment claim in this suit. In RYO Machine, Inc., the plaintiff had moved to enjoin the
Government from enforcing a ruling which had the effect of subjecting retailers of roll-your-own
cigarette machines to an excise tax applied to manufactures of tobacco products. Id. at 468–69.
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the complaint for injunctive relief was directed at the
assessment and collection of taxes, and therefore, was barred by the AIA. Id. at 471. In Bob
Jones University, the university sought to enjoin the Government from continuing administrative
proceedings which likely would have led to the revocation of the university’s § 501(c)(3) status.
416 U.S. at 735–36. The Supreme Court concluded that the lawsuit fell within “the literal scope
and purposes of the Act” because the purpose of the university in bringing the suit was to ensure
that its donors not have to pay taxes on their donations. Id. at 739.
The factual scenarios presented in RYO Machine, Inc. and Bob Jones University fell
squarely into the parameters of a claim interfering with the “assessment or collection” of taxes.
12

Courts have recognized two exceptions to the AIA. First, the AIA has a judicially-created exception whereby it
will not prohibit the exercise of jurisdiction when “(i) the government’s position has no chance of success on the
merits, and (ii) equity jurisdiction otherwise exists.” Boggs v. U.S., 109 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836 (S.D. Ohio 2000)
(citing Enochs v. Williams Packing and Nav. Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962)). “[D]eclaratory or injunctive relief is available
if the plaintiff establishes irreparable harm and certainty of success on the merits.” Dominion Nat’l Bank v. Olsen,
771 F.2d 108, 116 (6th Cir. 1985). Second, “a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief may proceed where
Congress has provided no alternative method of challenging the constitutionality of a federal tax.” Dominion Nat’l
Bank, 771 F.2d at 116 (citing S.C. v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367 (1984)).
17

The cases, therefore, provide little guidance on how “broadly” the AIA should be interpreted. In
another Sixth Circuit case, an income tax preparer sought the court to enjoin an IRS criminal
investigation into his tax preparation services. Daulton v. U.S., 76 F. App’x 652, 653 (6th Cir.
2003). The Court found that suit was barred by the AIA because “[t]he IRS’s investigation may
lead to the assessment and collection of taxes.” Id. The earlier district court opinion had
explained that the criminal investigation could have led to the assessment of taxes against other
taxpayers. Daulton v. U.S., No. C-1-02-590, 2003 WL 352621, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 6, 2003).
The Daulton decision might be viewed as a broader application of the AIA to the extent that
neither the district court nor the appellate court stated whether the “purpose” of the suit had been
to enjoin the assessment of taxes, as opposed to that being an incidental result of the suit.
Plaintiff Groups, on the other hand, analogize this case to Cohen v. U.S., 650 F.3d 717
(D.C. Cir. 2011), and Z Street v. Koskinen, No. 12-cv-0401, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, 2014 WL
2195492 (D.D.C. May 27, 2014). In Cohen, taxpayers objected to the refund process created to
allow them to recoup an illegally-collected excise tax. Id. at 719. The D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals stated that the AIA “prohibits only those suits seeking to restrain the assessment or
collection of taxes.” Id. at 724 (citation omitted). It further stated that the AIA does not “reach
all disputes tangentially related to taxes.” Id. at 727. To apply the AIA, the court required “a
careful inquiry into the remedy sought, the statutory basis for that remedy, and any implication
the remedy may have on assessment and collection.” Id. at 727. The court concluded that the
AIA did not bar a refund process suit because the tax had been previously assessed and collected
and the legality of the tax already had been determined. Id. at 725, 727.
Similarly, in Z Street, the court allowed a suit to proceed where a non-profit group sought
declaratory and injunctive relief against the IRS for subjecting it to a rigorous review of its

18

§ 501(c)(3) application because the group had the purpose of educating the public about Israel
and Zionism. 2014 WL 2195492 at *1–2. The court determined that the suit was not a “tax
collection claim couched in constitutional terms” because Z Street did not allege that the “IRS
unlawfully denied it a preferred tax status.” Id. at *7 (citation omitted). The court found that
because Z Street alleged “only that the IRS subjected it to unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination in considering its application for that [preferred tax] status[,]” a successful claim
would not result in a determination of Z Street’s tax status and would not directly affect the
assessment or collection of taxes. Id.; see also Church of Scientology of Celebrity Centre, Los
Angeles v. Egger, 539 F. Supp. 491, 494 (D.D.C. 1982) (finding that the AIA did not bar
mandamus suit requesting that the court order the defendants to rule on the ministers’
applications for exemption from the self-employment tax).
This case is factually analogous to Z Street. Plaintiff Groups Texas Tea Party Patriots
and Americans against Oppressive Laws, Inc. do not seek a determination that they are entitled
to § 501(c)(4) status. They are not suing to directly enjoin the assessment or collection of any
tax. Instead, they seek only to enjoin Federal Defendants from subjecting them to viewpoint
discrimination during the application process for tax-exempt status with unnecessary delays and
intrusive requests for information. The purpose of the AIA as stated in RYO Machines, Inc.—to
ensure that “those aggrieved by taxation pay the tax first, and then sue for a refund” —is not
implicated by Plaintiff Groups’ constitutional claim. 696 F.3d at 470. As in Z Street, a
successful claim by the Texas Tea Party Patriots and Americans against Oppressive Laws, Inc.
will not result in a determination in their respective tax statuses nor of their liability for taxes.
The Court concludes that the AIA and DJA do not preclude Plaintiff Groups’
constitutional claims against Federal Defendants because the “purpose” of the suit is not to

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“restrain[ ] the assessment or collection” of any tax. 26 U.S.C. § 7421. The Court will not
dismiss Count Two of the SACAC insofar as it is stated against Federal Defendants.
C.

Count Three: Inspection of Return Information Claim
Plaintiff Groups allege in Count Three that Federal Defendants violated 26 U.S.C.

§ 6103. (Doc. 71 at PageID 1045–47.) Section 6013 requires that tax “returns and return
information shall be confidential.” 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a). Federal Defendants had a duty to keep
confidential the information provided by Plaintiff Groups in furtherance of their application for
tax-exempt status. Return information is defined to include the following:
a taxpayer’s identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments,
receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability,
tax withheld, deficiencies, overassessments, or tax payments, whether the
taxpayer’s return was, is being, or will be examined or subject to other
investigation or processing, or any other data, received by, recorded by, prepared
by, furnished to, or collected by the Secretary with respect to a return or with
respect to the determination of the existence, or possible existence, of liability (or
the amount thereof) of any person under this title for any tax, penalty, interest,
fine, forfeiture, or other imposition, or offense.
26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2)(A). The documents the IRS “receives or creates during the initial
investigation of an organization seeking tax-exempt status constitute[s] ‘return information’
within the meaning of § 6103.” Lehrfeld v. Richardson, 132 F.3d 1463, 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Accordingly, Plaintiff Groups’ tax-exempt status application materials had to be kept
confidential.
Taxpayers can assert a private cause of action against the Government for violations of
§ 6103 pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7431. “If any officer or employee of the United States
knowingly, or by reason of negligence, inspects or discloses any return or return information
with respect to a taxpayer in violation of any provision of section 6103, such taxpayer may bring
a civil action for damages against the United States.” 26 U.S.C. § 7431(a)(1). To prevail on a

20

§ 7431 claim, the plaintiff “must prove that (1) the disclosure was unauthorized, (2) the
disclosure was made ‘knowingly or by reason of negligence’, and (3) the disclosure was a
violation of section 6103.” McIntosh, 1998 WL 762344.
Sections 6103 and 7431 contain statutory exceptions which might be relevant in this case.
Section 6103 permits “inspection by or disclosure to officers and employees of the Department
of the Treasury whose official duties require such inspection or disclosure for tax administration
purposes.” 26 U.S.C. § 6103(h). Tax administration is broadly defined to mean “the
administration, management, conduct, direction, and supervision of the execution and application
of the internal revenue laws or related statutes (or equivalent laws and statutes of a State) and tax
conventions to which the United States is a party” and includes “assessment, collection,
enforcement, litigation, publication, and statistical gathering functions under such laws, statutes,
or conventions.” 26 U.C.S. § 6103(b)(4). Additionally, no liability for a violation of § 6103
arises under § 7431 for any inspection or disclosure which (1) results from “a good faith, but
erroneous, interpretation of section 6103,” or (2) which is “requested by the taxpayer.” 26
U.S.C. § 7431(b).
Plaintiff Groups allege that § 6103 was violated in two respects. First, all Plaintiff
Groups, except the Texas Public Policy Foundation, assert that “Defendants inspected Plaintiffs’
information and shared it amongst themselves even though they knew it was unnecessary for
making a decision on Plaintiffs’ tax-exempt status, and even though they knew it had been
sought based on Plaintiffs’ political viewpoint.” (Doc. 71 at PageID 1046.) Federal Defendants
respond that Plaintiff Groups cannot impose liability upon them under §§ 6103 and 7431 based
solely on allegations that the IRS made improper requests for information during the
§ 5103(c)(4) application process.

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Federal Defendants analogize the allegations here to § 7431 claims arising from the
allegedly improper collection of tax levies. A sister court in the Southern District of Ohio stated
that “[t]he majority of federal courts have held that the authority to disclose return information
during the collection process is not premised on the procedural propriety of the underlying
collection action.” McIntosh, 1998 WL 762344 (listing cases in support). Applying that
majority standard, the court held that “procedural defects in the underlying collection action,
standing alone, do not give rise to liability under section 7431 for disclosures made in connection
with the levy, seizure or sale of assets.” Id. The court further stated that § 7431 liability should
be based on “the improper handling and disclosure of information,” not on “improper collection
procedures.” Id.13 Federal Defendants argue that, likewise, here liability cannot be based on
improper requests for information.
The McIntosh case does not compel dismissal of the Plaintiff Groups’ claim. McIntosh
was a summary judgment case. The court granted summary judgment to the Government
because the plaintiff premised liability solely upon the defects in the underlying collection
action. Id. The court cited the § 7431(b)(1) exception to liability and stated that the plaintiff did
not “come forward with additional evidence” that the IRS agents had not acted in good faith in
disclosing the tax return information. Id. (emphasis added). This case is only at the Rule
12(b)(6) stage. Moreover, Plaintiff Groups deny that their claim is based solely upon the
improper requests for information.
Plaintiff Groups allege that Defendants inspected and shared information which they
knew was irrelevant to the determination of each group’s tax-exempt status. (Doc. 71 at PageID

13

Courts are not unanimous in this analysis. Some courts have held that the disclosure of return information in
pursuit of the improper collection of a levy is a violation of § 6103. See e.g., Rorex v. Traynor, 771 F.2d 383, 386
(8th Cir. 1985); Schipper v. U.S., No. CV-94-4049, 1998 WL 786451, at *9 (E.D. N.Y. Sept. 15, 1998); Husby v.
U.S., 672 F. Supp. 442, 444–45 (N.D. Cal. 1987) .
22

1046.) Plaintiff Groups will have to establish that the IRS officials who inspected or disclosed
the return information did so knowing that the information was not necessary for tax
administration purposes, regardless of whether the IRS officials who requested the information
knew or believed it was necessary for the § 501(c)(4) application. Plaintiff Groups will be given
the opportunity to establish with evidence that IRS officials inspected or disclosed the Plaintiff
Groups’ return information for improper purposes. The Court anticipates that this will be a
difficult burden for Plaintiff Groups to meet. Additionally, Federal Defendants, likewise, will
have the opportunity to establish with evidence that a statutory exception precludes liability
under § 7431. Federal Defendants can submit evidence that the inspections or disclosures were
allowed for tax administration purposes pursuant to § 6103(h), that they acted on a good faith
interpretation of § 6103 such that the § 7431(b)(1) exception applied, or that the inspections were
requested by the Plaintiff Groups such that the § 7431(b)(2) exception applied. Any
determination on the merits of the claim or on the defenses is more appropriate at the summary
judgment stage than at the pleadings stage.
Turning to the second subclaim, Plaintiff Texas Public Policy Foundation asserts that
“[i]n or around the spring of 2012, the IRS illegally released TPPF’s 990 form with the donor
information un-redacted [and s]ubsequently, this highly confidential information was widely
circulated in the media.” (Doc. 71 at 1031, 1046.) Federal Defendants argue that Texas Public
Policy Foundation has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (explaining dismissal standard). The Court disagrees. Plaintiff
did not need to plead detailed facts and its allegations are sufficient to meet the Rule 8(a)
standard.

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For these reasons, the Court will not dismiss Count Three of the Second Amended Class
Action Complaint against Federal Defendants.
IV.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited Discovery
Plaintiffs moved to conduct limited discovery on the issue of the Court’s personal

jurisdiction over Defendants Joseph Grant, Sarah Hall Ingram, Lois Lerner, Steven Miller, Holly
Paz, Douglas Shulman, Carter Hull, and William Wilkins. (Doc. 83 at PageID 1347.) That
discovery is unnecessary because the Court will dismiss Count Two insofar as it is stated against
Individual Defendants. Accordingly, the Court will deny the discovery motion as moot.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Management Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second

Amended Class Action Complaint (Doc. 77) is GRANTED, the Line-Level Employee
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count 2 of the Second Amended Class Action Complaint (Doc.
78) is GRANTED, and the Motion to Dismiss Individual Defendant Carter Hull (Doc. 79) is
GRANTED. The Motion to Dismiss Claims against the Federal Defendants (Doc. 73) is
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Count One against Federal Defendants is
dismissed, but Counts Two and Three against the Federal Defendants are not dismissed. Finally,
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited Discovery Related to Personal Jurisdiction
(Doc. 83) is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

S/Susan J. Dlott_________________
Chief Judge Susan J. Dlott
United States District Court

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