Guardian Insurance & Annuity Company, Inc. v. White et al

Filing 59

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT LANCE M. WHITE'S MOTION FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING AN INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION TO CERTIFY QUESTIONTO THE OHIO SUPREME COURT (Doc. 49 ). Signed by Judge Timothy S. Black on 4/29/2014. (mr1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
THE GUARDIAN INSURANCE &
ANNUITY COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff-Interpleader,
vs.
LANCE M. WHITE, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 1:13-cv-360
Judge Timothy S. Black

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT LANCE M. WHITE’S MOTION
FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING AN INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION TO CERTIFY QUESTION
TO THE OHIO SUPREME COURT (Doc. 49)
This civil action is before the Court on Defendant Lance M. White’s Motion for an
Order Authorizing an Interlocutory Appeal or, in the Alternative, Motion to Certify
Question to the Ohio Supreme Court (Doc. 49) and the parties’ responsive memoranda
(Docs. 53 and 56).
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
Defendants Lance M. White and Kathryn Ann Bransom have each made
conflicting claims to life insurance benefits under an insurance policy issued by Plaintiff
The Guardian Insurance & Annuity Company, Inc. (Doc. 1). Accordingly, Plaintiff filed
this interpleader action, and moved to deposit the insurance proceeds with the Court,
which motion the Court has granted. (Doc. 38).

On February 26, 2014, the Court denied Defendant White’s Motion for Summary
Judgment on the bases that:
(1) Plaintiff waived its policy procedures as to how a beneficiary designation can
be changed when it filed an action in interpleader;
(2) the relevant inquiry is therefore what was the clearly expressed intent of
Reagan Bransom (“Decedent”);
(3) regardless of whether the power of attorney executed by Decedent complied
with O.R.C. §1337.42 (which statute requires powers of attorney to expressly grant the
authority to change beneficiary designations), Defendant Rob Bransom alleges that he
acted to give effect to Decedent’s clearly expressed intent in changing the beneficiary
designation from Defendant White to Defendant Bransom; and
(4) a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to the identity of Decedent’s
intended beneficiary. (Doc. 39 at 8).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final appealable order.
Rather, a party seeking to appeal the denial of a motion for summary judgment must
request the district court to authorize an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1292(b). White by Swafford v. Gerbitz, 860 F.2d 661, 662 n.1 (6th Cir. 1988) (“Since
absent certification for an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) or Fed. R. Civ.
P. 54(b), an order disposing of fewer than all of the parties or claims in an action is not
appealable”).
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Section 1292(b) provides as follows:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he
shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would
have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its
discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order.
Federal courts are also authorized to certify questions to the state supreme court.
Pennington v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 553 F.3d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 2009). Under
the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio, the Supreme Court of Ohio may
answer questions of law certified to it by federal courts:
The Supreme Court may answer a question of law certified to it by a court
of the United States. This rule is invoked if the certifying court, in a
proceeding before it, issues a certification order finding there is a question
of Ohio law that may be determinative of the proceeding and for which
there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of this Supreme Court.
S.Ct.Prac.R. 18.1.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Interlocutory Appeal
Defendant White argues that application of Ohio’s power of attorney statutes is

determinative of the case. Defendant White further claims that this Court misapplied
Ohio case law by allowing it to “trump” Ohio’s power of attorney statutes and that the
denial of his summary judgment motion “abrogates” the same statutes. (Doc. 49 at 1, 7).

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Defendant White misses the point of power of attorney statutes, however. A
power of attorney dictates who must be recognized as the principal, and in the context of
life insurance, a valid grant of power of attorney status statutorily requires an insurer to
recognize the agent as the principal. The question of how policy changes may be made,
on the other hand, is governed by the policy requirements. See, e.g., Colonial Life & Acc.
v. Leitch, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24263, 2008-Ohio-6616, ¶ 9. When filing as an
interpleader, an insurer waives all such policy requirements. LeBlanc v. Wells Fargo, 134
Ohio St.3d 250, 981 N.E.2d 839 (2012) (syllabus).
The determination of whether Plaintiff was required to recognize Rob Bransom as
the principal for purposes of changing the beneficiary designation is therefore not a
controlling issue. Instead, Plaintiff filed this action as an interpleader and thus waived its
policy requirements, leaving the Court to determine the question of who is entitled to the
benefits using Ohio’s “clearly expressed intent” standard. Where the facts show that the
Where … the facts in an action in which the insurer interpleads indicate that
the insured did not communicate to the insurer, or to those who cared for
such matters, his clearly expressed intention to name a new beneficiary, the
claimant alleging to be the new beneficiary must show: (1) that the insured
communicated, to some other person, his clearly expressed intention to name
a new beneficiary, and (2) that the insured took, or directed someone to take
on his behalf, sufficient steps to notify the insurer or to carry out his intent.
Donahue v. Carpenter, 6th Dist. Wood No. 91WD057, 1992 WL 66564, at *5 (Mar. 31,
1992) (citing Rindlaub v. Traveler’s Ins. Co., 175 Ohio St. 303, 306, 194 N.E.2d 577
(1963)).

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Based on the foregoing, whether or not the power of attorney executed by
Decedent was sufficient to grant Rob Bransom the legal authority to change the
beneficiary designation as if he were Decedent himself is not “a controlling question
of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion,” and, therefore,
Defendant White has failed to demonstrate that the standard for a discretionary
interlocutory appeal has been met. See 28 U.S.C. §1292(b) (emphasis added).
B.

Certification to The Supreme Court of Ohio
For the reasons discussed above, the issue of law raised by Defendant White also

is not “determinative of the proceeding,” and there is controlling Supreme Court of Ohio
precedent elucidating the application of the “clearly expressed intent” standard.
S.Ct.Prac.R. 18.1; LeBlanc, 134 Ohio St.3d 250, 981 N.E.2d 839. As a result,
Defendant White has also failed to demonstrate that the standard for the certification
of a question to the Supreme Court of Ohio has been met.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, Defendant Lance M. White’s Motion for
an Order Authorizing an Interlocutory Appeal or, in the Alternative, Motion to Certify
Question to the … Supreme Court [of Ohio] (Doc. 49) is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 4/29/14

s/ Timothy S. Black
Timothy S. Black
United States District Judge

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