Crutchfield v. Warden Correctional Reception Center
Filing
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ORDER granting 8 Motion to Dismiss; adopting Report and Recommendation 14 ; dismissing the petitioner. A certificate of appealability will not issue. Petitioner is denied leave to appeal IFP. Signed by Judge Sandra S Beckwith on 8/11/14. (mb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
Michael D. Crutchfield,
Petitioner,
vs.
Warden, Correctional Reception Center,
Respondent.
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Case No. 1:13-cv-438
ORDER
Before the Court are Petitioner’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation. The Magistrate Judge recommends that the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus be dismissed with prejudice because Crutchfield’s claims are
procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 14) Crutchfield argues that he has established good
cause and actual prejudice sufficient to excuse any default. (Doc. 19)
For the following reasons, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation, and adopts the Report in full.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
As set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s Report, Michael Crutchfield was indicted on
a variety of charges, including murder, attempted murder, felonious assault, and having
weapons while under disability. He pled not guilty to all charges. A jury acquitted him
on two counts of attempted murder, but found him guilty of all other charges. On
October 19, 2010, Crutchfield was sentenced to a term of 49 years to life. Crutchfield
timely appealed his conviction and sentence, and the Ohio Court of Appeals rejected all
of his claims and affirmed the judgment in a written decision dated October 21, 2011.
On December 1, 2011, Crutchfield submitted a pro se notice of appeal to the
Ohio Supreme Court. His papers were returned to him with a December 6, 2011 letter
from the Clerk. The letter explained that he failed to attach a copy of the Ohio Court of
Appeals’ decision, which is required by the Supreme Court’s rules. The letter also
instructed Crutchfield to file a motion for leave to file a delayed appeal with an affidavit
of facts in support of his motion, if he wanted to pursue his appeal. Crutchfield mailed
his notice and a motion for leave to file a delayed appeal, which was received by the
Supreme Court on December 16, 2011. These papers were also returned to him by the
court because he did not submit an affidavit in support of his motion. Finally, on
February 8, 2012, his subsequent notice and motion was determined to be in
compliance with the Supreme Court’s rules and it was filed on that day. On March 21,
2012, the Supreme Court summarily denied his motion and dismissed his case. (Doc.
8, Ex. 14)
Crutchfield’s pro se habeas petition, which he signed on June 1, 2013 and which
was filed in this Court on June 21, raises seven grounds for relief, all of which he raised
in his direct appeal:
1.
The jury erred to the prejudice of the Defendant-Appellant by
finding him guilty of murder, attempted murder, felonious assault,
and having weapons under disability, as those findings were not
supported by sufficient evidence.
2.
Jury erred to the prejudice of the Defendant-Appellant by finding
him guilty of murder, attempted murder, felonious assault, and
having weapons under disability, as those findings were contrary to
law.
3.
The trial court erred to the prejudice of the Defendant-Appellant by
overruling Motion for Acquittal.
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4.
The trial court erred to the prejudice of the Defendant-Appellant by
imposing a sentence that is an abuse of discretion.
5.
Defendant-Appellant was prejudiced by the state’s misconduct.
6.
The trial court erred to the prejudice of the Defendant-Appellant by
not granting his motion to suppress [his] statement.
7.
The trial court erred to the prejudice of the Defendant-Appellant by
not granting his motion [for] suppression of identification.
(Doc. 1)
The Warden filed a motion to dismiss Crutchfield’s petition. (Doc. 8) She
argues that the petition was untimely under the one-year statute of limitations set forth
in 28 U.S.C. §2244(d). She alternatively argues that all of Crutchfield’s claims were
procedurally defaulted, because Crutchfield did not timely pursue his appeal to the Ohio
Supreme Court, and that court enforced its procedural rule against him. Crutchfield
opposes the motion to dismiss, contending that he did not default his claims because he
was incarcerated and was diligent in attempting to comply with the Ohio Supreme
Court’s filing requirements. He also argues that his petition is timely under the AEDPA.
If it is not, he suggests that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the one-year statute.
The Magistrate Judge concluded that the doctrine of procedural default bars
review of Crutchfield’s claims. Citing Bonilla v. Hurley, 370 F.3d 494, 497 (6th Cir.
2004), she found that the Ohio Supreme Court’s summary denial of Crutchfield’s motion
to file a delayed appeal is a procedural ruling, and not a ruling on the merits of his
claims. The Magistrate Judge further concluded that Crutchfield failed to show cause
for his procedural default, or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if his
claims are not considered on the merits. The Magistrate Judge did not determine
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whether or not Crutchfield’s petition was timely filed under the AEDPA, given her
conclusions and recommendations on procedural default.
Crutchfield objects. He contends that he was extremely diligent in pursuing an
appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, and that the circumstances of his incarceration
posed great obstacles to securing a timely filing. He also contends that he has
demonstrated good cause to excuse his default, and that he has established prejudice
because he is actually innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
A federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to correct an error in a state
proceeding that resulted in petitioner’s confinement, if that proceeding was rendered
fundamentally unfair by a violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Clemmons v. Sowders, 34 F.3d 352, 354 (6th Cir. 1994); 28 U.S.C. §2254(a).
The doctrine of procedural default bars a habeas petitioner from raising claims
that were not properly presented to the state court. If a state court previously dismissed
a state prisoner’s federal claim because the prisoner failed to comply with a state
procedural rule, a federal court ordinarily cannot consider the merits of that claim.
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-731 (1991). This doctrine bars habeas
review of such claims if: (1) the petitioner failed to comply with a state procedural rule;
(2) the state court clearly enforces that rule; (3) the rule is an adequate and independent
state ground for denying review of the federal constitutional claim; and (4) the petitioner
cannot show cause and prejudice that would excuse the default. Guilmette v. Howes,
624 F.3d 286, 290 (6th Cir. 2010 (en banc)(internal quotations omitted); Maupin v.
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Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986).
Under the fourth prong, a petitioner can excuse a default by establishing good
cause for the default, and actual prejudice resulting from the constitutional error.
Maupin, 785 F.2d at 139. Alternatively, a petitioner may establish that the state court
outcome amounts to a fundamental miscarriage of justice that requires habeas relief.
This is a rare situation, and a petitioner must produce new evidence demonstrating that
a constitutional violation has probably resulted in his conviction despite his actual
innocence. Moore v. Mitchell, 708 F.3d 760, 775 (6th Cir. 2013), citing Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).
Crutchfield’s Claims are Defaulted
There is no dispute that Crutchfield’s appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court was
untimely. He recognizes that under Ohio law, his notice of appeal had to be filed within
45 days of the decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals affirming his convictions, or by
December 5, 2011. See Ohio Sup. Ct. R. II, §2(A)(1)(a). His appeal was not filed until
February 8, 2012. The court’s summary order denying his delayed appeal did not
explain the basis for the denial. The Sixth Circuit addressed an almost identical
situation in Bonilla v. Hurley, where the petitioner filed a motion for leave to file a
delayed appeal which was summarily denied by the Ohio Supreme Court. The Sixth
Circuit held:
This case turns upon whether the Ohio Supreme Court entry denying
Bonilla's motion for leave to file a delayed appeal constitutes a procedural
ruling sufficient to bar federal court review of Bonilla's habeas corpus
petition. Upon examination of the Ohio Supreme Court Rules, we conclude
that it does. The Ohio Supreme Court Rules require a motion for a
delayed appeal to state "the date of entry of the judgment being appealed
and adequate reasons for the delay." Ohio Sup. Ct. R. II, Section
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2(A)(4)(a). In addition, the motion must be accompanied by a supporting
affidavit and a "copy of the decision being appealed." Id. A motion for a
delayed appeal is not required to contain the actual claims and supporting
arguments sought to be presented on appeal. Id. Instead, only when "the
Supreme Court grants a motion for delayed appeal," is the appellant
required to "file a memorandum in support of jurisdiction." Ohio Sup. Ct.
R. II, Section 2(A)(4)(c). Thus, the applicable Ohio court rules indicate that
the denial of a motion for a delayed appeal is a procedural ruling, not a
ruling on the merits. Indeed, this court has previously reached this
conclusion, albeit in unpublished opinions. See Hall v. Huffman, 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 25956, No. 98-3586, 2000 WL 1562821, at *3 (6th Cir.
Oct. 11, 2000) (unpublished); Shabazz v. Ohio, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
13444, No. 97-3085, 1998 WL 384559, at *1 (6th Cir. June 18, 1998)
(unpublished).
We therefore conclude that Bonilla's grounds for relief have been
procedurally defaulted. See Simpson v. Jones, 238 F.3d 399, 406 (6th
Cir. 2000). Bonilla failed to file a timely notice of appeal with the Ohio
Supreme Court and his motion for leave to file a delayed appeal was
denied by that court apparently because he failed to demonstrate
adequate reasons for his failure to file a timely notice of appeal or to
otherwise comply with the provisions of Ohio Sup. Ct. R. II, Section
2(A)(4). Where a state court is entirely silent as to its reasons for denying
requested relief, we assume that the state court would have enforced any
applicable procedural bar. Simpson v. Sparkman, 94 F.3d 199, 203 (6th
Cir. 1996).
Bonilla, 370 F.3d at 497.
As both Bonilla and Smith v. State of Ohio Dept of Rehab., 463 F.3d 426, 431-32
(6th Cir. 2006) make clear, the Ohio Supreme Court’s 45-day rule is an adequate and
independent state ground for purposes of determining whether habeas claims have
been defaulted.
Therefore, to avoid dismissal, Crutchfield must demonstrate cause for his default
and actual prejudice. The Magistrate Judge found that he had not satisfied either test.
Crutchfield argues he has shown good cause because he mailed his notice of appeal on
December 1, 2011, which was within the 45-day filing period. His papers were returned
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to him, however, with instructions on proper filing requirements. It was not until
February 8, 2012 that his motion was accepted and filed with the Supreme Court. He
contends that the facility in which he was housed was a “23 hour lock down facility”
when he first arrived, and he had limited access to the prison law library. He also
suggests that he was not aware of the court’s requirements for properly filing a request
for delayed appeal. That suggestion is belied by the December 6, 2011 letter
addressed to him from the Supreme Court clerk, returning his original notice and
explaining to him what he had to do in order to move for a delayed appeal. (See Doc. 1
at 18) Despite this letter, Crutchfield failed to submit a properly drawn motion for almost
two months, and this additional delay is not explained. Moreover, his incarceration or
limited access to the prison law library is not sufficient cause to excuse his default, as
the Sixth Circuit plainly held in Bonilla.
Crutchfield also contends that two Ohio Supreme Court justices dissented from
that Court’s denial of his delayed appeal, which further establishes good cause to
excuse his default. The Ohio Supreme Court’s docket for Crutchfield’s appeal includes
no dissenting orders or opinions. See Case No. 2012-0241, State of Ohio v. Michael
Crutchfield, www.sconet.state.oh.us/Clerk/ecms, last accessed August 7, 2014. The
official publication of the order does state that two justices dissented (see State v.
Crutchfield, 131 Ohio St.3d 1483 (2012)). But the mere notation of a dissent does not
alter the analysis of whether he has demonstrated cause under federal law to avoid the
procedural bar erected by the majority’s order denying leave to appeal
Crutchfield further objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that he has not
established prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. All of the claims raised in
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Crutchfield’s habeas petition were raised on his direct appeal, and were rejected on the
merits by the Ohio Court of Appeals. He nevertheless contends that he is in prison “on
violations of his constitutional rights, and he is actually innocent” of the crime of which
he was convicted. (Doc. 19 at 4) He also claims that he was convicted “solely on
witness mis-identification,” and was denied the opportunity to cross-examine the
identifying witnesses at a suppression hearing because they did not appear. (Id. at 5)
A cognizable claim of actual innocence requires a petitioner to do more than
simply assert his innocence. Crutchfield must support his allegation “... with new
reliable evidence - whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness
accounts, or critical physical evidence - that was not presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo,
513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). He must show that, in light of the new evidence he presents,
no reasonable juror would have found him guilty. A claim of actual innocence that can
excuse a procedural default is, and should be, a rare situation.
Crutchfield offers no new evidence in support of his actual innocence assertion.
As the Magistrate Judge found, his petition and his reply to the Warden’s return simply
re-argue the facts and claims presented in the state court. This is not sufficient to
establish good cause to excuse his default and to consider the merits of his claims.
As the Court has concluded that Crutchfield’s claims must be dismissed based
on procedural default, the Court need not address Respondent’s alternative argument
that his petition is time-barred under 28 U.S.C. §2244(d).
CONCLUSION
As required by 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(C) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
72(b), the Court has conducted a de novo review of the record in this case. Upon such
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review, the Court finds that Crutchfield’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report are
not well taken, and are therefore overruled. The Report is adopted in full. Crutchfield’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed with prejudice.
The Court finds that a certificate of appealability should not issue with respect to
the petition, because reasonable jurists would not find it debatable whether this Court is
correct in its procedural ruling with respect to Crutchfield’s claims. See Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), that an appeal of this
Order would not be taken in good faith, and denies Crutchfield leave to appeal in forma
pauperis. See Kincade v. Sparkman, 117 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 1997).
SO ORDERED.
THIS CASE IS CLOSED.
DATED: August 11, 2014
s/Sandra S. Beckwith
Sandra S. Beckwith, Senior Judge
United States District Court
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