Holmes v. Mercy Health Partners of Southwest Ohio et al

Filing 22

OPINION AND ORDER granting 15 Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss and for Judgment on the Pleadings. The Court DISMISSES Counts III and IV from the Complaint as not actionable. The Court's grant of such motion does not preclude Plainti ff from seeking punitive damages, should liability be determined, and should the requisite showing of intentional discrimination be established. Finally the Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff's alternative unopposed Motion to Amend her Complaint 18 , as her remaining claims for discrimination are plausible and adequate to give Defendants notice of the claims that they are defending. Signed by Judge S Arthur Spiegel on 2/21/2014. (km1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
CHRISTINE HOLMES,
Plaintiff,
v.
MERCY HEALTH PARTNERS
SOUTHWEST OHIO, DBA JEWISH
HOSPITAL, et al.,
Defendants.

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NO:

1:13-CV-00441

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Partial
Motion to Dismiss and For Judgment on the Pleadings (doc. 15), and
Plaintiff’s Response and in the Alternative Motion to Amend the
Complaint (doc. 18).

For the reasons indicated herein, the Court

GRANTS Defendants’ Motion.
I.

Background
Plaintiff is an African-American nurse who worked for

Defendants for 39 years (doc. 1).
she

was

treated

differently

than

In her Complaint, she alleges
similarly-situated

younger,

Caucasion, and male employees, and ultimately terminated (Id.).
Although Defendant indicated the termination was for Plaintiff
having improperly left medication at a patient’s bedside, Plaintiff
contends other employees were not terminated for having done so
(Id.).

She

brings

claims

for

federal

and

state

law

race

discrimination, age discrimination, and gender discrimination (Id).
In Count III of her Complaint she alleges “punitive damages” as a

cause

of

action,

and

in

Count

IV

she

alleges

an

Employment

Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) benefits violation (Id.).
These latter counts, III and IV, are those that Defendant moves the
Court to dismiss in the instant motion.
II. Motion to Dismiss Standard
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) requires the Court to determine whether a
cognizable claim has been pled in the complaint. The basic federal
pleading requirement is contained in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), which
requires that a pleading "contain . . . a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 858 (6th

Cir. 1976); Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (20027). In its scrutiny of the complaint, the
Court must construe all well-pleaded facts liberally in favor of
the party opposing the motion.
236 (1974).

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

A complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it

“contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Courie v. Alcoa

Wheel & Forged Products, 577 F.3d 625, 629-30 (6th Cir. 2009),
quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
A motion to dismiss is therefore a vehicle to screen out
those

cases

implausible.

that

are

impossible

as

well

as

those

that

are

Courie, 577 F.3d at 629-30, citing Robert G. Bone,

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Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94
IOWA L. REV. 873, 887-90 (2009).

A claim is facially plausible

when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct
alleged.

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.

Plausibility falls somewhere

between probability and possibility. Id., citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 557.

As the Supreme Court explained,

In keeping with these principles a court considering a
motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying
pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.
When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Id. at 1950.
The

admonishment

to

construe

the

plaintiff's

claim

liberally when evaluating a motion to dismiss does not relieve a
plaintiff of his obligation to satisfy federal notice pleading
requirements
conclusions.

and

allege

Wright,

more

Miller

than
&

Procedure: § 1357 at 596 (1969).

bare

Cooper,

assertions
Federal

of

legal

Practice

and

"In practice, a complaint…must

contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all of
the material elements [in order] to sustain a recovery under some
viable legal theory."

Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745

F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984), quoting In Re: Plywood Antitrust
Litigation, 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. 1981); Wright, Miller &

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Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1216 at 121-23 (1969).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit clarified
the threshold set for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal:
[W]e are not holding the pleader to an impossibly high
standard; we recognize the policies behind Rule 8 and the
concept of notice pleading.
A plaintiff will not be
thrown out of court for failing to plead facts in support
of every arcane element of his claim.
But when a
complaint omits facts that, if they existed, would
clearly dominate the case, it seems fair to assume that
those facts do not exist.
Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th
Cir. 1988).
III. Discussion
Defendant moves the Court to dismiss Count III for
punitive damages, contending such damages are a remedy and not a
cause of action (doc. 15).

Plaintiff agrees to the extent that

punitive damages are not an independent claim, but does not abandon
her right to seek such damages in relation to her discrimination
claims (doc. 18).

The Court finds well-taken the position of both

parties: the question of punitive damages is not a cause of action
to be independently pleaded, but rather is a determination to be
made in a damages calculation if and when liability is determined.
Punitive

damages

could

be

available

to

Plaintiff

should

she

ultimately be able to demonstrate intentional discrimination as to
her race and gender claims.
Defendant similarly moves to dismiss Count IV of the

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Complaint for an alleged ERISA benefits violation, contending that
as

a

religious

organization

1003(b)(2) (doc. 15).

it

is

exempt

under

29

U.S.C.

§

Plaintiff does not contest Defendant’s

position regarding the ERISA claim.

The Court finds Defendant’s

position well-taken, and agrees that Count IV is not actionable in
this matter.
Finally, in her Response, Plaintiff requests, in the
Alternative,

leave

to

Amend

her

Complaint

“should

the

Court

determine that additional allegations are necessary” to support her
discrimination claims (doc. 18).
objection to the proposed amendment.

Defendant filed no Reply in
The Court finds that absent

any Reply on the part of Defendant and the fact that Defendant has
already scrutinized the Complaint that it appears Defendant has
conceded Plaintiff’s allegations of discrimination pass muster.
The Court further finds plausible Plaintiff’s allegations that she
was

treated

differently

than

younger,

Caucasion,

and/or

male

employees such that her Complaint would, in any event, withstand a
challenge based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
IV. CONCLUSION
Having reviewed this matter, the Court finds well-taken
Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss such that it GRANTS such
motion (doc. 15) and DISMISSES Counts III and IV from the Complaint
as not actionable.

The Court’s grant of such motion does not

preclude Plaintiff from seeking punitive damages, should liability
be determined, and should the requisite showing of intentional

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discrimination be established.
Finally the Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s alternative
unopposed Motion to Amend her Complaint (doc. 18), as her remaining
claims for discrimination are plausible and adequate to give
Defendants notice of the claims that they are defending.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 21, 2014

s/S. Arthur Spiegel
S. Arthur Spiegel
United States Senior District Judge

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