Andwan v. Greenhills, Village of et al
ORDER denying 228 First MOTION to Intervene Issue Injunction to halt demolition. Signed by Judge Michael R. Barrett on 10/13/17. (eh)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
VILLAGE OF GREENHILLS, OHIO, et al.,
) Case No.: 1:13cv624
) Judge Michael R. Barrett
) Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Pro Se Urgent Motion Intervene with Injunction to
Halt Demolition of Plaintiff’s Historic Neighborhood – 28 Homes >>> Retaliation and Intimidation of
Plaintiff >>> Further Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Intentional Financial Damage to
Plaintiff. 1 (Doc. 228).
Plaintiff asks the Court to issue an injunction “to HALT DEMOLITION” of certain properties
in the Village of Greenhills. (Id. at PageID 3759). Plaintiff asserts that the Village’s plan to redevelop
seven Village-owned sites into 29 new single-family homes (apparently situated adjacent and across
from Plaintiff’s home) will harm Plaintiff and her community.
She argues generally that the
redevelopment will cause her to suffer mental and financial harm. Finally, she argues this project was
put into motion as retaliation. Plaintiff’s arguments are without merit for several reasons.
First, the Court must consider whether Plaintiff has standing as it relates to her request for
injunctive relief. Article III standing is “the threshold question in every federal case, determining
the power of the court to entertain the suit.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). Plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112
Upon review of Plaintiff’s motion, the Court finds a response from Defendants is not necessary as it is clear on its
face the Court lacks jurisdiction over the motion.
S.Ct. 2130, 119, L.Ed.2d 531 (1992). Further, she must establish standing for each claim asserted
and for each form of relief sought. Smith v. Robbins & Meyers, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-281, 2014 WL
4705905, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 22, 2014). “To demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must have
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of
federal-court jurisdiction.” Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 711, 130 S.Ct. 1803, 176 L.Ed.2d 634
(2010). To satisfy the requirements of Article III standing, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) [she] has
suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by
a favorable decision.” Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Parma, 263 F.3d 513, 524 (6th Cir.
2001) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc.v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S.167, 180-181 (2000)).
Plaintiff identifies her injury as mental and financial harm related to the “fast-tracked”
redevelopment project, which could interfere with the Village’s National Historic Landmark status.
(Doc. 228, PageID 3757). Plaintiff, however, has not established a legally protected interest
related to the Village’s redevelopment project. She concedes the Village owns the seven parcels
identified as part of the project. Nevertheless, she argues that “[t]he Village of Greenhills has
already torn down 13 historic structures displacing scores of residents…without compensation for
relocation…” (Id. at PageID 3756). However, she does not argue that she has been displaced
without just compensation. Thus, she has not established a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy necessary to warrant invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.
Plaintiff next argues the project will “devalue these 28 residences in four buildings
(immediately adjacent and across the street from Plaintiff’s home).”
(Id. at. PageID 3758).
Construing the foregoing liberally, the Court understands Plaintiff’s argument to be that if the
value of the property adjacent to hers is diminished, her property value too will be diminished.
However, such an injury is conjectural or hypothetical at best, and is therefore insufficient to
establish standing. Finally, despite her assertion that the Village has not provided her any evidence
of minutes of meetings related to the project, inspection reports, and communications from the
National Park Department, she has not explained why she, as an adjacent property owner, is
entitled to these things. In short, Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of establishing standing as
it relates to her request for injunctive relief.
It is also worth noting that Plaintiff appears to request relief on behalf of not only her, but
also other Village residents.
(Doc. 228, PageID 3759) (“This injunction will allow Village
residents to collect the necessary documentation to DISCREDIT this rush to demolition of our
cherished national treasured Historic District.”). Plaintiff’s right to represent herself in federal
proceedings does not authorize her to represent others in federal court. Dickerson v. City of
Hickman, 2008 WL 5427762 (citing Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir.2002) (“pro
se” means to appear for one's self; thus, one person may not appear on another person's behalf in
the other's cause). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to represent other Village residents,
the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
Even if the Court were to find Plaintiff had standing to request injunctive relief on her own
behalf, Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is unrelated to the conduct complained of in her Second
Amended Complaint. 2 “[A] party moving for [injunctive relief] must necessarily establish a
relationship between the injury claimed in the party’s motion and the conduct asserted in the
Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 300 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation omitted).
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint alleges illegal conduct on the part of Village police, including
Plaintiff’s Complaint has been amended twice. Thus, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 103) is the
operative complaint. However, regardless of which complaint the Court reviews, Plaintiff’s request for injunctive
relief is unrelated.
utilization of excessive force against her, unreasonable search and seizure, malicious prosecution, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress related to public tormenting of Plaintiff subsequent to her
arrest. In other words, Plaintiff seeks relief for alleged violations of her Constitutional rights under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and related state law claims. (See generally Doc. 103). Her instant motion, however,
essentially seeks relief from the Village’s alleged and threatened condemnation of real property. See
Ohio Rev. Code. § 163.63. Plaintiff argues her “political activity since 2007 was and is based upon
initial threat of eminent domain to her home and destruction of her National Historic Landmark (NHL)
neighborhood.” The Court acknowledges the Second Amended Complaint cites to an acrimonious
relationship between the parties, in part, due to Plaintiff’s objections to the Village’s “devaluing of real
property in an effort to create favorable eminent domain seizure terms for itself in future property
razings and rehabilitations.” (Id. at PageID 960). Notwithstanding what initially caused the discordant
relationship between the parties, the simple fact remains: Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint seeks
relief for alleged excessive force and subsequent malicious prosecution of her – not claims related to
eminent domain. Thus, aside from the location where the alleged wrongful conduct occurred and the
acrimonious history between the parties, there is no connection between Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint and her current motion for injunctive relief. Accordingly, because the relief requested is
entirely different from her Section 1983 claims, Plaintiff’s recourse would be to file a new lawsuit for
her new claims. See Corsetti v. Hackel, E.D. Mich. No. 10—12823, 2012 WL 4955275, *2 (Sept. 26,
Next, as the Court understands Plaintiff’s request, she essentially seeks to bring a claim
under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. V. First, as explained
above, Plaintiff has not alleged her property has been taken. Regardless, the Takings Clause does
not prohibit the government from taking private property, but only prohibits the government from
taking private property “without just compensation.” Braun v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp., 519 F.3d
564, 569 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. at 194, 105 S.Ct. 3108 (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n.,
Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 297 n. 40, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981)) (emphasis added).
Importantly, before a plaintiff can bring a takings claim in federal court, she must first pursue
available remedies in state court. Id. Accordingly, even if Plaintiff’s property had been taken and
she had been denied just compensation by the state, Plaintiff’s claim is not ripe for review.
Finally, even if the Court were to consider on the merits Plaintiff’s request for an
injunction, she is not entitled to such relief. In determining whether to grant or deny a preliminary
injunction, the Court must consider four factors: (1) whether the movant has a likelihood of
success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury without the
injunction; (3) whether issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4)
whether the public interest would be served by the issuance of the injunction. ACLU Fund of
Mich. v. Livingston Cnty., 796 F.3d 636, 642 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Bays v. City of Fairborn, 668
F.3d 814, 818-19 (6th Cir. 2012). As explained above, the government is permitted to take private
property as long as a party is justly compensated. Harm that can be compensated by money
damages does not constitute irreparable harm.
Manakee Prof'l Med. Transfer Serv., Inc. v.
Shalala, 71 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir.1995) (“[M]onetary damages do not generally constitute
irreparable harm.”) (citations omitted). Because Plaintiff cannot show she would suffer irreparable
harm absent an injunction, she is not entitled to the extraordinary relief afforded under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 65.
In sum, Plaintiff does not have standing to seek the relief requested and thus, the Court
does not have jurisdiction over the motion; the relief requested is not related to her Second
Amended Complaint and is not properly brought in the instant lawsuit; any claims under the
Takings Clause are not ripe for review; and Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief, in part,
because she would not suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction. Considering the foregoing,
Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Michael R. Barrett
Michael R. Barrett, Judge
United States District Court
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