Smith v. Wyoming City of et al
Filing
104
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE (Doc. 99 ). Signed by Judge Timothy S. Black on 8/22/2016. (mr)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
GLENDA A. SMITH,
Case No. 1:13-cv-915
Plaintiff,
Judge Timothy S. Black
vs.
CITY OF WYOMING, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE (Doc. 99)
This civil action is before the court on Plaintiff’s motion in limine (Doc. 99) and
the parties’ responsive memoranda (Docs. 101, 102).
I.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The Sixth Circuit held that there are two triable incidents in this case: (1) the entry
of Plaintiff’s house by Defendants World and Krummen on March 9, 2012, alleged to be
a violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (2) the arrest of Plaintiff by Defendant World
on April 2, 2013, alleged to be without probable cause and a violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Smith v. City of Wyoming, 821 F.3d 697 (6th Cir. 2016).
Plaintiff argues that the only witnesses to the March 9, 2012 incident are the two
officers, Plaintiff, and her guest, Ms. Littles. Plaintiff argues that only these witnesses
can give relevant testimony as to whether the entry by the officer was consented to or not.
With respect to the April 2, 2013 incident, Plaintiff argues that the only witnesses are
Plaintiff, Officer World, and Mr. Chinn. Accordingly, Plaintiff argues that her former
husband (Joseph Johnston), her minor children (Jasmine and Tiffany), and all other
people listed as witnesses have no relevant testimony on the claims or defenses and
should be excluded.
A. Testimony Regarding March 9, 2012 Incident
Plaintiff called Nadine Riley, a neighbor, on the morning of March 9, 2012 to ask
for a ride to her daughter’s school to drop off lunch. (Doc. 55 at 70-72; Doc. No. 56-1 at
¶ 3). Ms. Riley arrived at Plaintiff’s residence and observed that Plaintiff stumbled as she
walked and had cash wadded up in her hand. (Doc. 56-1 at ¶¶ 4-5). Ms. Riley testified
that Plaintiff smelled of alcohol and began petting her hand while in the vehicle. (Id. at
¶ 5). Ms. Riley drove Plaintiff to the school, and upon Plaintiff’s request, Ms. Riley took
the money into the school for Plaintiff’s daughter. (Doc. 56-1 at ¶ 6-8; Doc. 55 at 72).
Ms. Riley testified that out of concern for the safety of Plaintiff’s two daughters, she
communicated to a school official that Plaintiff appeared to be intoxicated and offered to
pick the girls up after school. (Doc. 56-1 at ¶ 10). These observations and the concerns
she expressed ultimately led the principal to speak with Plaintiff’s daughter, Jasmine, 1
and notify the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services of the situation,
precipitating the call to the Wyoming Police Department that caused Sergeant World and
Officer Krummen to respond to Plaintiff’s residence that day. (Doc. 49 at 21-22; Doc. 51
at 27-28; Doc. 56-3 at ¶ 4).
Plaintiff, who denies being intoxicated but admitted to “not feeling well that day,”
was cooking dinner with her friend Renee Littles and waiting for Tiffany and Jasmine to
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The principal asked if Plaintiff had a drinking problem, and Jasmine responded that she did.
(Doc. 49 at 21-22).
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come home from school. Smith, 821 F.3d at 710. At roughly 3:20 pm., Sergeant World
and Officer Krummen knocked on the door. Id. Littles opened the door and told them
that Plaintiff was unavailable to speak with them. Id. The officers persisted even after
Plaintiff called out from the kitchen to say that she was unavailable. Id. Within a few
minutes, the officers stepped inside the house to find Plaintiff. Id. Whether the officers
had consent to enter the home is a disputed issue of fact. The encounter ended with the
police arranging for the children to spend that night with their father, Joseph Johnston.
(Doc. 55 at 92; Doc. 51 at 33-34).
For purposes of deciding the motion for summary judgment and construing all
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the Court of Appeals found that the
officers only knew that Plaintiff was possibly intoxicated and unable to care for her
children earlier in the day. Smith, 821 F.3d at 711. The officers did not arrive at
Plaintiff’s house until two hours after they were notified of the threat of possible neglect,
so it does not appear that they treated the situation as an emergency. Id. Nor does the
record show that the officers believed that Tiffany and Jasmine were at home and
potentially in danger. Id. Accordingly, “[g]iving Smith the benefit of all reasonably
inferences, the evidence shows that the police perceived their task to be a routine check
on Smith to ensure the welfare of her children.” Id.
B. Testimony Regarding the April 2, 2013 Incident
Around mid-day on April 2, 2013, Johnston called 911 after Tiffany (then 10 years
old) told him on the telephone that a man whom she did not know was in Plaintiff’s
house and that his presence was making her uncomfortable. Smith, 821 F.3d at 704. Mr.
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Johnston reported to the 911 operator that Plaintiff had a very serious drinking problem,
that she was very drunk, and that an unknown male was “acting real strange around”
Tiffany. (Doc. No. 56-2 at Page ID # 655-657). He also stated that “last time this
happened, [Plaintiff] got real belligerent and . . . Wyoming Police [had to] remove the
kids” from Plaintiff’s supervision. (Id.)
Sergeant World and Officer Murphy were dispatched to Plaintiff’s home. Smith,
821 F.3d at 704. Tiffany opened the door and the officers entered, although the parties
dispute whether Tiffany consented to their entrance. Id. Tiffany informed them that her
mother and the unknown man were in an upstairs bedroom. Id. The officers went
upstairs and knocked on the bedroom door and Plaintiff opened it and the officers asked
her to step out of the room so they could identify the man inside. Id. The parties have a
different account of what happened next. Id. Plaintiff claims that she and the man
(Chinn) immediately stepped outside of the room. Id. The officers claim the two were
visibly drunk and Plaintiff did not comply with the officers’ repeated requests to leave the
bedroom. Id. at 704-05. Sergeant World arrested Plaintiff for obstructing official
business. Id. at 705. Chinn showed his identification to the officers and was allowed to
leave. Id. The criminal charge against Plaintiff was ultimately dropped. Id.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“A ruling on a motion in limine is no more than a preliminary, or advisory,
opinion that falls entirely within the discretion of the district court.” United States v.
Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir. 1994). Generally, “[m]otions in limine are … used
to … eliminat[e] evidence that is clearly inadmissible for any purpose.” Indiana Ins. Co.
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v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (citing Jonasson v.
Lutheran Child & Family Servs., 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1997)). Because in limine
rulings are advisory in nature, a court may alter its ruling during the course of the trial.
Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41-42 (1984). “Courts are generally reluctant to grant
broad exclusions of evidence in limine because a court is almost always better situated
during the actual trial to assess the value and utility of evidence.” Ohio Willow Wood Co.
v. ALPS South, LLC, No. 2:04cv1223, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103107, at *5 (S.D. Ohio
July 29, 2014).
Similar to other evidentiary rulings, the decision to grant or deny a motion in
limine is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Otto v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co., 134 F.3d 841, 852 (7th Cir. 1998). However, “[o]rders in limine which exclude
broad categories of evidence should rarely be employed.” Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975). Rather, motions in limine are “generally
confined to very specific evidentiary issues of an extremely prejudicial nature.” Brown v.
Oakland Cnty., No. 14-CV-13159, 2015 WL 5317194, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2015).
If the evidence is not plainly inadmissible on all potential grounds, the Court’s
“evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation,
relevancy and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” Indiana Ins. Co.,
326 Supp. 2d at 846.
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III.
ANALYSIS
Evidence is relevant if it has the “tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 401. Under Rule 401, the standard for
relevancy is “extremely liberal.” Dortch v. Fowler, 588 F.3d 396, 400 (6th Cir. 2009).
Additionally, Rule 403 states that although relevant, evidence may be excluded “if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of … unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.” To exclude evidence under Rule 403, it must be more
than damaging to the adverse party; it must be unfairly prejudicial. United States v. Rey,
923 F.2d 1217, 1222 (6th Cir. 1982). This Court has broad discretion to decide Rule 403
issues. United States v. Vance, 871 F.2d 572, 576 (6th Cir. 1989).
A. March 9, 2012 Incident
Plaintiff argues that because the Sixth Circuit rejected Defendants’ argument
regarding exigent circumstances during the March 9 incident, Defendants should be
prevented from presenting evidence at trial of any facts outside of the conversation that
took place between the responding officers and Renee Littles regarding consent to the
officers’ entry into Plaintiff’s residence.
With regard to exigent circumstances, the Sixth Circuit held, in ruling on the
parties’ summary judgment motions, that “on the facts developed thus far,” viewed in a
light most favorable to Plaintiff, there were not exigent circumstances to enter the home.
Smith, 821 F.3d at 711. The question of exigent circumstances is now one for the jury,
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and the jury must be presented with the relevant evidence surrounding the officers’ entry
into Plaintiff’s home on March 9, 2012, including the facts of the situation within the
officers’ knowledge.
Specifically, the question of consent to the officers’ entry requires consideration of
the “totality of all the circumstances.” Smith, 821 F.3d at 710 . Thus, the facts giving
rise to the 911 call on March 9 are relevant to the extent the officers were aware of such
facts, as they establish the context in which the officers responded to Plaintiff’s residence
in the first place. Accordingly, the testimony of Nadine Riley and Jasmine is relevant if
the officers were aware of their allegations when they arrived at Plaintiff’s house on
March 9.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s alcohol consumption is also probative of her behavior on
March 9, and is therefore relevant. Bell v. City of Miamisbug, Case No. C-3-90-258,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22764, at *67 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 17, 1992) (evidence to alcohol
consumption on the day of an encounter with police is probative evidence of an
individual’s behavior during the encounter). Accordingly, the testimony of Nadine Riley
(that Plaintiff had been drinking the morning of March 9) is relevant. Jasmine’s
conversation with her principal, that her mother had an alcohol problem, is likely more
prejudicial than probative with respect to the March 9 incident, unless Jasmine intends to
testify that she observed her mother drinking that day or her conversation with the
principal was relayed to the officers. Additionally, the testimony of Joseph Johnston,
who arrived at the scene after the officers entered Plaintiffs’ home, is only relevant to the
extent that he testifies about Plaintiff’s behavior that day.
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B. April 2, 2013 Incident
An essential element of a Section 1983 claim alleging deprivation of constitutional
rights under color of law is that probable cause did not exist at the time the claimant was
subjected to the unconstitutional deprivation. Garner v. Grant, 328 F. App’x 325, 327
(6th Cir. 2009). Probable cause has been defined as the “facts and circumstances within
[an] officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of
reasonable caution, in believing that [a] suspect has committed, is committing, or is about
to commit an offense.” Mechler v. Hodges, No. 1-02-948, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76550,
at *15 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 11, 2006). The definition implies that where there are facts and
circumstances within an officer’s knowledge that would lead a reasonable person to
conclude that a person has committed a crime, those facts would tend to support probable
cause, or at the very least, sway the probable cause calculus in favor of the officer.
Sutkiewicz v. Monroe Cty. Sheriff, 110 F.3d 352, 358 (6th Cir. 1997). Additionally,
evidence of an officer’s previous encounters with an individual is particularly probative
when evaluating the officer’s conduct when interacting with the same individual during
subsequent encounters. Watson v. Dyersburg City Police Dep’t., No. 08cv2718, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134754, at *83 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 20, 2013). 2
The crime of obstructing official business contains five elements: (1) an act by the
defendant; (2) done with the purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay a public official;
2
See also Hubbard v. Gross, 179 F. App’x 327, 338 (6th Cir. 2006) (admitting evidence of a
suspect’s history with police in evaluating reasonableness of police action).
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(3) that actually hampers or impedes a public official; (4) while the official is acting in
performance of a lawful duty; and (5) the defendant so acts without privilege. Ohio Rev.
Code § 2921.31. The proper focus in a prosecution for obstructing official business is on
the defendant’s conduct, verbal or physical, and its effect on the public official’s ability
to perform the official’s lawful duties. State v. Wellman, 879 N.E.2d 215, 218 (Ohio
App. 2007).
Here, the essential issue pertaining to Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest claim is whether
Sergeant World had probable cause to believe that Plaintiff was obstructing official
business. The facts known to the officers, and the context in which the visit was made,
are relevant because they make the existence of a “fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action,” i.e., the existence of probable cause at the time of arrest,
more probable.
Accordingly, to the extent Joseph Johnston’s 911 testimony was relayed to the
officers, it is relevant. Additionally, to the extent Johnston shared Plaintiff’s history of
alcohol abuse with Sergeant World at the March 9 incident, it is relevant to the April 2
encounter. Specifically, the contested evidence of context is directly relevant to Sergeant
World’s probable cause determination. Tiffany Johnston’s fear attributable to the
presence of an unknown male alone with Plaintiff in her bedroom is only relevant to the
extent such fear was communicated with the officers before Plaintiff’s arrest. However,
Tiffany can testify to the events that took place while the officers were present in
Plaintiff’s residence.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion in limine (Doc. 99) is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as explained in this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 8/22/16
s/ Timothy S. Black
Timothy S. Black
United States District Judge
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