Lumenate Technologies, LP v. Baker et al

Filing 183

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE (Doc. 161 ). Signed by Judge Timothy S. Black on 7/19/2016. (mr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
LUMENATE TECHNOLOGIES, LP,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:14-cv-125
Judge Timothy S. Black

vs.
DANIEL BAKER, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION IN LIMINE (Doc. 161)
This civil action is before the court on Plaintiff’s motion in limine (Doc. 161) and
the parties’ responsive memoranda (Docs. 164, 180).
I.

BACKGROUND

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 104, 401, and 402, Plaintiff moves the
Court to exclude from admission at trial all evidence, arguments, and questioning
regarding alternative causation theories for why Lumenate lost customers and/or revenue.
Lumenate maintains that this Court’s Order resolving motions for partial summary
judgment (Doc. 149), resolved the question of why certain customers left Lumenate and
determined as a matter of law that Lumenate’s damages were caused by the “Individual
Defendants’” breaches of their DPS Agreements. 1 Lumenate claims that re-litigating this
decided issue would needlessly prolong the trial and could lead to inconsistent results.

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The “Individual Defendants” include Defendants Baker, Anderson, and Hahn.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges claims for: conspiracy, misappropriation of
trade secrets, breach of non-compete agreements, tortious interference with contractual
relations, tortious interference with business relations, breach of fiduciary duty, and
computer fraud and abuse. (Doc. 39). The Order granting partial summary judgment
only pertains to Count Three, breach of the non-compete agreements. (Doc. 149). The
other eleven counts, including all the claims against Defendants Trebbi and RDI, were
not the subject of any dispositive motion. Nevertheless, Lumenate contends that this
“Court’s causation ruling also applies to the remainder of [its] claims and should bar
Defendants from disputing causation.” (Doc. 161 at 6, n. 6). Furthermore, Lumenate
claims that while Defendants should not be permitted to present evidence regarding
causation, it “still retains the right to present evidence at trial of how Defendants caused
customers to leave, as such evidence is relevant to Lumenate’s other claims, including
but not limited to, its unfair competition, tort, and punitive damages claims.” (Id. at 2).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A ruling on a motion in limine is no more than a preliminary, or advisory,
opinion that falls entirely within the discretion of the district court.” United States v.
Yannott, 42 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir. 1994). Generally, “[m]otions in limine are…used
to…eliminat[e] evidence that is clearly inadmissible for any purpose.” Indiana Ins. Co.
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (citing Jonasson v.
Lutheran Child & Family Servs., 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1997)). Because in limine
rulings are advisory in nature, a court may alter its ruling during the course of the trial.

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Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41-42 (1984). “Courts are generally reluctant to grant
broad exclusions of evidence in limine because a court is almost always better situated
during the actual trial to assess the value and utility of evidence.” Ohio Willow Wood Co.
v. ALPS South, LLC, No. 2:04cv1223, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103107, at *5 (July 29,
2014 S.D. Ohio). “This presumption is particularly strong in a bench trial.” Id.
Similar to other evidentiary rulings, the decision to grant or deny a motion in
limine is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Otto v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co., 134 F.3d 841, 852 (7th Cir. 1998). However, “[o]rders in limine which exclude
broad categories of evidence should rarely be employed.” Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975). Rather, motions in limine are “generally
confined to very specific evidentiary issues of an extremely prejudicial nature.” Brown v.
Oakland Cnty., No. 14-CV-13159, 2015 WL 5317194, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2015).
If the evidence is not plainly inadmissible on all potential grounds, the Court’s
“evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation,
relevancy and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” Indiana Ins. Co.,
326 Supp. 2d at 846.
III.

ANALYSIS

With respect to the claim for breach of the non-compete agreements, Lumenate
was required to prove: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) breach by Defendants;
(3) causation; and (4) damages. (Doc. 149 at 12) (citing Palmer-Donavin Mfg. Co. v.
Rheem Sales Co., No. 2:14cv91, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82993, at *10 (S.D. Ohio 2014)).
This Court ruled in Lumenate’s favor on the first three elements, holding as a matter of
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law that: (1) Lumenate can enforce the DPS Agreements against the Individual
Defendants; (2) the Individual Defendants breached their respective DPS Agreements by
competing with DPS/Lumenate, soliciting DPS/Lumenate’s customers and employees,
and by using and retaining DPS/Lumenate’s confidential information; and (3) the
Individual Defendants’ breaches caused the damages Lumeante seeks to recover. (Doc.
149 at 15-19). While the amount of Lumenate’s recoverable damages is a disputed issue
of fact that must be adjudicated at trial, the cause of Lumenate’s damages with respect to
the Individual Defendants’ breach of the non-compete agreements has already been
determined. (Doc. 149 at 18) (“Here, there is undisputed evidence directly tying
Lumenate’s damages to the Defendants’ breaches of their non-compete obligations.”);
(id. at 19) (“The exact amount of damages is a disputed issue of fact that will be
determined at trial”).
Lumenate argues that any evidence or argument supporting alternative and
speculative causation arguments should be excluded from the trial because the amount of
Lumenate’s damages is the only remaining issue. While the Court ruled that Lumenate
proved causation as a matter of law with regard to its breach of contract claim against the
Individual Defendants, Lumenate also asserts numerous other causes of action. The
Court’s breach of contract causation ruling does not bar Defendants from disputing
causation as to the other causes of action. If Lumenate wanted to avoid the burden of
establishing its claims at trial, it should have requested such relief at the summary
judgment stage. Moreover, since this is a trial to the bench, without the risk of jury

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confusion, the best course is for the Court to hear the evidence and determine what is
relevant to the causation element of each claim.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion in limine (Doc. 161) is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, Defendants are precluded
from re-alleging arguments that this Court has already considered (causation as to the
breach of the non-compete agreements), but may present alternative causes for claims not
yet adjudicated by this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 7/19/16

s/ Timothy S. Black
Timothy S. Black
United States District Judge

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