Anderson et al v. City of Blue Ash

Filing 28

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 13 ). Signed by Judge Timothy S. Black on 7/7/2014. (mr1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

INGRID ANDERSON, et al.

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Plaintiffs,
vs.
CITY OF BLUE ASH, OHIO,
Defendant.

Case No. 1:14-cv-151

Judge Timothy S. Black

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 13)
This civil action is currently before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 13) and the parties’ responsive memoranda. (Docs. 23 & 24).
I.

FACTS 1

Defendant City of Blue Ash has enacted zoning laws regulating respective land
uses throughout the City. Plaintiff Anderson lives in an area zoned R-3 Residential,
which is strictly for residential purposes. (Doc. 7 at 2). The Zoning Code specifically
lists the land uses that are permitted in each district. If a use is not listed, then it is
prohibited. (Id.) Moreover, as specifically at issue here, Section 505.21 of the Blue Ash
Codified Ordinance prohibits sheltering, maintaining, keeping, or harboring of “farm”
animals on residential property, including miniature horses, alpacas, and pigs. However,
this Ordinance does not apply to animals otherwise specifically permitted by federal law.
(Doc. 8-3 at 13).

1

The parties agree that the undisputed facts of this case have already been identified by the
parties and analyzed by the Court in connection with Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary
Injunction. (See Doc. 23 at 2; Doc. 24 at 1).

In 2010, Plaintiff C.A.’s physician, Dr. Ron Levin, recommended and prescribed
hippotherapy for Plaintiff C.A. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 28). Hippotherapy literally refers to treatment
or therapy aided by a horse. Dr. Levin defined hippotherapy to include “several avenues of

traditional therapy including physical, occupational, speech and language.” (Doc. 8-10 at
36). Dr. Levin prescribed that the hippotherapy be conducted at Plaintiff C.A.’s home in
the presence of one or more therapists with expertise in physical, occupational, speech,
and language therapy. (Id.) Dr. Levin further states that this therapy is to be at a level in
which Anderson and provider are comfortable with …” (Id.) (emphasis added). All
parties agree that hippotherapy can be accomplished by taking C.A. to a local stable or
farm. (Doc. 7 at 4).
Plaintiff Anderson obtained a miniature horse for Plaintiff C.A.’s hippotherapy in
2010. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 30, 54). In August, 2010, Defendant’s Community Development
Director & Zoning Administrator began receiving citizen complaints about a miniature
horse on Plaintiff Anderson’s property. (Doc. 8-1 at 18-19). The first complaint alleged
“extremely offensive” smell, “health issues,” and that Plaintiff Anderson’s actions were
de-valuing the surrounding homes. (Id.) Following this complaint, the Hamilton County
Public Health Department issued “Outdoor Animal Waste Clean-Up” guidelines to
standardize the manner in which it would respond to animal waste complaints and cleanup of animal waste. (Id. at 20). As a result, Defendant’s Community Development
Director ordered that the miniature horse be removed. The Board of Zoning Appeals
(“BZA”) denied Anderson’s appeal seeking approval to keep this miniature horse.
Nevertheless, Defendant decided to forestall enforcement at that time to assist Plaintiff
2

Anderson and her child. (Id. at 22).
Plaintiff Anderson obtained a second miniature horse in 2011. (Doc. 7 at 6).
Plaintiff Anderson obtained a physician’s letter from Dr. Derek Fletcher dated August 16,
2011 in support of two miniature horses. (Doc. 8-1 at 33). At this time, Plaintiff
Anderson also maintained a service dog for Plaintiff C.A. to detect seizures; and,
moreover, Defendant alleges there were also five other dogs on her property at this time.
(Doc. 1 at ¶ 50; Doc. 7 at 6). Defendant cited Plaintiff Anderson for the second miniature
horse, and the Defendant’s Community Development Director asked her to permanently
remove this horse on February 27, 2012. (Doc. 8-1 at 35). On March 8, 2012, Anderson
appealed to the BZA, seeking permission for a second miniature horse and in support,
submitted a letter from Dr. Derek Fletcher. (Id. at 36-38). This is the last written
correspondence from Dr. Fletcher, or any other medical doctor, concerning Plaintiff C.A.
and hippotherapy. (Doc. 7 at 6). On April 9, 2012, the BZA affirmed the Community
Development Director’s decision after an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 8-2). The BZA
found that neither miniature horse on Anderson’s property was a service animal under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Doc. 8-1 at 28).
Unrelated to the Blue Ash administrative proceedings, in March 2012, the
Hamilton County Public Health Department issued notice to Plaintiff Anderson’s
counsel, noting that a complaint had been made concerning Plaintiff Anderson’s
possession of farm animals on a residential property and the unsanitary conditions
existing there. (Id. at 34). Specifically, the Hamilton County Public Health Department
Inspector documented that a pig, two miniature horses, and a chicken coop were on the
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property and that animal waste was causing runoff and odors. (Id.) The Inspector
recommended a plan of action to control the animal waste. (Id.)
Plaintiff Anderson properly appealed the BZA’s decision to City Council on
May 16, 2012. She submitted a brief outlining the reasons for her appeal on June 27,
2012, specifically arguing that Defendant was required to accommodate the horses under
the ADA. (Doc. 8-3 at 1-3). The Blue Ash City Council (“Council”) considered the
BZA’s decision on June 14, 2012, August 9, 2012, and September 13, 2012, and
ultimately denied Anderson’s appeal and affirmed the BZA’s decision. (Doc. 8-1 at 21).
Specifically, the Council found that Anderson’s physician letters never characterized the
miniature horses as service animals. (Id. at 24). The Council found that the miniature
horses at issue were not service animals because they did not assist Plaintiff C.A. in
indoor activities, Plaintiff C.A. was able to ambulate without the horses, the horses were
not housebroken, Plaintiff Anderson’s property was admittedly not big enough for even
one miniature horse to be “healthy-happy,” and the horses did not attend school with
Plaintiff C.A. nor help her with any of life’s daily activities. (Id. at 25-31). Plaintiff
Anderson never appealed this administrative decision under Chapter R.C. 2506. (Doc. 7
at 7).
Plaintiff Anderson has had four different miniature horses in the last five years.
(Doc. 8-10 at 40). During the BZA hearing on April 9, 2012, Plaintiff Anderson’s two
miniature horses were named Jack and Lacey. (Doc. 8-2 at 9). After the Council denied
Plaintiff Anderson’s appeal and required her to remove these miniature horses from the
property, Plaintiff Anderson obtained a different miniature horse, Ellie. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 27).
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On November 8, 2013, two health inspectors went to Plaintiff Anderson’s property
and observed a miniature horse, alpaca, pig, and several dogs. (Id. at 9-12). When the
health inspectors arrived on Plaintiff Anderson’s property, she initially stated that the
miniature horse and alpaca were not on the property. (Id.) The health inspectors walked
around the property and noticed an odor by the back fence. As they peeked through the
fence, they saw the miniature horse, alpaca, and a pig. (Id.) After their investigation,
Plaintiff Anderson admitted that she had six dogs, a pig, a miniature horse, an alpaca, and
some outdoor cats. (Id.)
On December 4, 2013, the Hamilton County Public Health Department issued a
Notice of Violation to Plaintiff Anderson for excessive animal waste, flies throughout the
house, odor due to animal urine, and a rear door off its hinges. (Doc. 8-3 at 6-7). The
Hamilton County Public Health Department asserted that Plaintiff Anderson was in
violation of its regulations and Ohio law, and it required her to remove pet waste, sanitize
the property’s basement, plant grass to prevent animal waste run off into neighboring
properties, and maintain the house by regular cleaning to reduce or eliminate the flies.
(Id. at 6-7).
Subsequently, in January 2013, Defendant Blue Ash passed an ordinance
disallowing farm animals. (Id.) Immediately prior to this ordinance taking effect,
Plaintiff Anderson was informed that possession of a horse and alpaca on her property
would be illegal going forwqard. (Doc. 8-3 at 8; Doc. 1 at ¶ 66). After this ordinance
became effective, a member of the Blue Ash Police visited Plaintiff Anderson’s property
to inquire whether she had removed the miniature horse and alpaca from her property in
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conformity with the ordinance after another complaint was made to Defendant. (Doc. 8-3
at 14-15; Doc. 1 at ¶ 67). Despite the ordinance, Plaintiff Anderson had a horse and
alpaca on her property. The police officer informed Plaintiff Anderson that he would
return to the property to ensure compliance with the ordinance at a later date. (Id.) On
March 15, 2013, the Blue Ash Police spoke with Plaintiff Anderson to confirm that she
had removed the animals from her property and she responded that she had done so.
(Doc. 8-3 at 16; Doc. 8-4 at 22-24). However, on July 4, 2013, the Blue Ash Police
Department received a complaint regarding Plaintiff Anderson’s property, so an officer
was dispatched to respond. (Id. at 24). On July 8, 2013, the officer observed a miniature
horse and an alpaca and photographed them. (Doc. 8-10 at 1-14). On July 16, 2013, the
officer again visited Plaintiff Anderson’s property and observed the miniature horse and
alpaca. (Id. at 15-16).
On July 8 and 16, 2013, Plaintiff Anderson was cited for two violations of the
farm animal ordinance, specifically for keeping a miniature horse and an alpaca at her
residence. She was tried in Mayor’s Court and convicted. (Doc. 7 at 11). She then
appealed to the Municipal Court and was again convicted on November 13, 2013. (Doc.
8-10 at 17; Doc. 1 at ¶ 75). Plaintiff Anderson’s principal defense was that she was
entitled to keep the horse and the alpaca because they were permitted by federal law.
(Doc. 8-4 at 57-66, 76-82, 92-94; Doc. 8-10 at 17-32). However, Plaintiff Anderson
never appealed these convictions. (Doc. 7 at 11).
On January 2, 2014, Plaintiff Anderson filed a Housing Discrimination Charge
with the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Ohio Civil Rights
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Commission (“OCRC”). (Doc. 8-10 at 33-35). In this charge, Plaintiff Anderson alleges
that she and Plaintiff C.A. are being discriminated against on the basis of her daughter’s
disability under Section 804(f) of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended
by the Fair Housing Act of 1988 (“FHA”). (Id.) The case is still under investigation and
no decision has been made. (Doc. 7 at 12). Plaintiffs’ Complaint also alleges a claim
under the ADA, specifically 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130(b)(7), 35.136. (Doc. 1). The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has not issued a right to sue letter.
(Doc. 7 at 12).
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the evidence submitted to
the Court demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of genuine
disputes over facts which, under the substantive law governing the issue, might affect the
outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
All facts and inferences must be construed in a light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment “may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (1986).

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III.

ANALYSIS

The Court finds that there is no dispute of material fact precluding summary
judgment in favor of Defendant.
A.

Claim and Issue Preclusion
First, Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by claim preclusion

and/or issue preclusion. Plaintiffs have previously argued that they were entitled to keep
a miniature horse under the ADA and/or the FHA. They raised their claims in an
administrative proceeding in Blue Ash in 2012 and again during the criminal trial of
Plaintiff Anderson in Hamilton County Municipal Court. (Doc. 8-1 at 32; Doc. 8-4 at 5766, 76-82; Doc. 8-13 at 1-3). They lost and did not appeal those decisions.
When applying claim and issue preclusion, federal courts must give the same
preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments would receive in courts of
the rendering state. ABS Indus., Inc. v. Fifth Third Bank, 333 Fed. Appx. 994, 998 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citing Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 593 (6th Cir. 1999)). “[I]f
an individual is precluded from litigating a suit in state court by the traditional principles
of res judicata, he is similarly precluded from litigating the suit in federal court.” Id. at
998 (citing Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1537 (6th Cir. 1987)). The Sixth Circuit
looks to the “state’s law to assess the preclusive effect it would attach to that judgment.”
Id.; see also Ingram, 185 F.3d at 593.
Under Ohio law, “a valid, final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all
subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that
was the subject matter of the previous action.” Grava v. Parkman Twp., 73 Ohio St. 3d
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379, 1995 Ohio 331, 653 N.E.2d 226, 229 (Ohio 1995) (citing Restatement (Second) of
Judgments §§ 24-25 (1982)). Claim preclusion consists of four elements:
‘(1) [A] prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties or their privies,
as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been
litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous
action.’
Portage County Bd. of Commirs v. City of Akron, 109 Ohio St. 3d 106, 2006 Ohio 954,
846 N.E.2d 478, 495 (Ohio 2006) (quoting Hapgood v. Warren, 127 F.3d 490, 493 (6th
Cir. 1997)). Thus, “[r]es judicata operates as a complete bar to any subsequent action on
the same claim or cause of action between the parties or those in privity with them.”
Brown v. City of Dayton, 89 Ohio St. 3d 245, 2000 Ohio 148, 730 N.E.2d 958, 961 (Ohio
2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Importantly, “claim preclusion not only bars all claims that were litigated, but also
all claims that could have been litigated growing from the same transaction.” Price v.
Carter Lumber Co., No. 24991, 2010 Ohio 4328, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3658, at *15
(Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2010); see also Schmidt v. Village of Newtown, 1st Dist. No.
C110470, 2012-Ohio-890 (applying collateral estoppel to bar claims raised in subsequent
action that were necessarily litigated in prior administrative action and not appealed
under R.C. 2506). “Ohio preclusion principles do not require that a claim be the same as
the claim brought in the previous matter; they only require that the claim could have been
litigated.” Demsey v. Demsey, 488 Fed. Appx. 1, 5 (6th Cir. 2012); A to Z, Inc. v. City of
Cleveland, N.D. Ohio No. 1:05CV2137, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43666, at *29-30 (June

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14, 2007).
The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ claims in this action are precluded by at least
Plaintiff Anderson’s criminal trial. During that proceeding, Defendant cited Plaintiff
Anderson for keeping farm animals in violation of Ordinance 505.21 because she kept an
alpaca and miniature horse at her Myrtle Avenue property. Plaintiff Anderson
specifically argued that she did not violate the ordinance because she was entitled to keep
the animals under the ADA or FHA. In both the Mayor’s Court hearing and the appeal to
the Hamilton County Municipal Court, Plaintiff Anderson argued that Ellie, the miniature
horse at issue then and now, was a service animal. During the Municipal Court trial, a
representative of Plaintiff HOME testified that Ellie and the alpaca were both allowed
under the FHA. (Doc. 8-4 at 66). In closing argument, Plaintiff Anderson’s counsel
stated:
So to find her guilty of these two charges because they don’t understand the
ADA permits a miniature horse as a service animal it’s not justice…And
eventually it was – since we know Lieutenant Schueler goes to the dry
cleaners and the coffee shop to make sure there’s no animals in the
backyard. That was the small period of time that animal [alpaca] served as
an assistance animal…I would ask before you make your decision today
that you look through Exhibit A, Exhibit B, and Exhibit C, then consider
whether or not that horse of a different color is entitled to be used by them
as their service animal as they have done…[Anderson is] going to use some
reason and common sense from now on with regard to the use of service
animals and assistance animals…
(Id. at 92-94). Notably, a HUD circular “advising on service animals and support
animals” under the ADA and FHA was Exhibit A in Plaintiff Anderson’s criminal trial
and is now Exhibit 57 in this case. (Id. at 59-60). Both during that trial and now,
Plaintiffs cite it for the proposition that a reasonable accommodation was required under
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either the ADA or FHA. (Doc. 10 at 25-26).
In this present case, Plaintiffs again claim that Ellie is a “service animal.” (Doc. 1
at ¶ 27). Plaintiffs argue that Plaintiff Anderson is not seeking to have her convictions
overturned but that the decisions had no evaluation of the ADA and no mention of
applicable Fair Housing law. (Doc. 10 at 12-13). Plaintiffs again allege that Defendant is
violating both the ADA and the FHA, this time by denying Plaintiff Anderson’s request
for a reasonable accommodation and enforcing Ordinance 505.21. (Doc. 13 at 19). In
the appeal of her criminal conviction to the Hamilton County Municipal Court, Plaintiff
Anderson had the opportunity to argue she was entitled to keep Ellie under federal law,
and she did so. (Doc. 8-4 at 76, 81-83).
All of the elements necessary to establish preclusion are present here. Plaintiffs
raised the FHA and ADA claims in the criminal trial, the determination of these issues
was necessary to the outcome of that proceeding, Judge Allen rendered a final judgment
that was not appealed, and Plaintiff Anderson had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issues. (Doc. 22 at 11-12). Thus, Defendant has demonstrated that claim and/or issue
preclusion bar Plaintiff Anderson and her daughter’s claims.
Plaintiff HOME’s claims also fall with those of the other Plaintiffs. Privity for
claim or issue preclusion purposes is somewhat amorphous. Nevertheless, a mutuality of
interest, including an identity of desired result, creates privity between [parties for claim
or issue preclusion].” ABS Indus., Inc., 333 Fed. Appx. at 999 (citing Brown v. City of
Dayton, 89 Ohio St. 3d 245, 248 (Ohio 2000)). Alternatively, Ohio courts have defined
privity as “such an identification of interest of one person with another as to represent the
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same legal right.” Id. at 999 (citing Elec. Enlightenment Inc. v. Kirsch, 2008-Ohio-3633,
¶ 8 (9th Dist. 2008)).
Plaintiff HOME became involved with Plaintiff Anderson in August 2013. (Doc.
1 at ¶ 11). The Municipal Court trial occurred on October 22, 2013, well after Plaintiff
HOME began its assistance to Plaintiff Anderson. She was convicted in November 2013,
but no appeal was taken. In the trial, Plaintiff HOME clearly identified itself with
Plaintiff Anderson’s interests and sought the same result. (Doc. 8-4 at 66). Indeed, one
of its representatives testified in the Municipal Court trial that the horse and the alpaca
were permitted under federal law. Id. Plaintiff HOME’ s interest in the state court
proceedings mirrored Plaintiff Anderson’s interest, and the relief that Plaintiff HOME
now seeks in this Court is identical to the relief Plaintiff Anderson sought during the state
court proceedings, as well as the relief she seeks in this action. Claim and issue
preclusion thus also bar Plaintiff HOME’s claims. See ABS Indus., Inc., 333 Fed. Appx.
at 999-1000; see also Bates v. Twp. of Van Buren, 459 F.3d 731, 736 (6th Cir. 2006)
(employee and business in privity where they sought facial invalidation of an ordinance
and that “[i]t is of no moment that [the business] was a defendant in the earlier action
whereas [the employee] is a plaintiff here”); Evans v. Ohio Laborers Fringe Benefit
Programs, N.D. Ohio No. 5:12CV01459, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18054, at *12-13
(Feb. 11, 2013).
Accordingly, Defendant has demonstrated that all of Plaintiffs’ claims are
precluded by virtue of Plaintiff Anderson’s criminal trial, and, therefore, Defendant is
entitled to summary judgment.
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B.

Service Animal Designation
Under the ADA, a public entity must make reasonable modifications when they

are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability. This is so unless the
public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter
the nature of the service, program, or activity. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7); Access Now,
Inc. v. Town of Jasper, 268 F. Supp. 2d 973, 979 (E.D. Tenn. 2003).
To establish that Plaintiffs are entitled to a reasonable modification allowing the
miniature horse, they must show that: (1) there is a qualified individual with a disability;
(2) the horse is a service animal; and (3) the horse needs to be used as a service animal
under the ADA. Access Now, Inc. 268 F. Supp.2d at 979. To be a service animal under
the ADA, the horse must be trained to work with or perform tasks for the benefit of the
disabled individual. 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 35.136(i); Access Now, Inc., 268 F. Supp.2d at
980. There are no requirements as to the amount or type of training the service animal
must undergo, nor the type of work or assistance the service animal must provide. Access
Now, Inc., 268 F. Supp.2d at 980. Finally, Plaintiffs must show that the horse assists a
disabled individual “overcome or deal with an ADA disability.” Id. In contrast, an
animal that simply provides comfort or reassurance does not qualify as a service animal
under the ADA. Rose v. Springfield-Greene Cty. Health Dep’t, 668 F.Supp.2d 1206,
1215 (W.D. Mo. 2009).
The undisputed facts establish that the miniature horse is not a “service animal.”
The horse does not go to school with her and does not help her with any of life’s daily
activities. (Id.) In addition, the horse does not help Plaintiff C.A. accomplish any
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activity inside her house. (Id. at 29). It is never inside the house with her. (Id.) Plaintiff
C.A. is also able to ambulate without the horse. (Id.) Plaintiff C.A. only uses Ellie in the
backyard, and nowhere else. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 30, 34, 46, 78, 87; Doc. 23 at 8). The most
recent physician letter, submitted by Dr. Fletcher and dated March 14, 2014, merely
“support[s C.A]’s use of the miniature horse as a means [to being physically active],” and
makes no reference to any need for in-home therapy or hippotherapy. (Doc. 10-9 at 23).
No doctor has ever referred to any miniature horse as Plaintiff C.A’s service animal.
(Doc. 11 at 160). Indeed, it is undisputed that Ellie and has not been fully trained as a
service animal, is not a therapy animal, and does not provide therapy to Plaintiff C.A.
(Doc. 13-1 at 7-8, 11-12, 32-33, 38-39).
Even assuming that Ellie qualified as a service animal, however, Plaintiffs have
not demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact that a reasonable accommodation can
be made. Specifically for miniature horses, the following factors are considered with
regard to this determination:
(i) The type, size, and weight of the miniature horse and whether the facility
can accommodate these features;
(ii) Whether the handler has sufficient control of the miniature horse;
(iii) Whether the miniature horse is housebroken; and
(iv) Whether the miniature horse’s presence in a specific facility
compromises legitimate safety requirements that are necessary for safe
operation.
28 C.F.R. § 35.136(i)(2).
As detailed above, the presence of a miniature horse at Plaintiff Anderson’s home
compromises the legitimate health and public safety concerns of Defendant and its
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citizens. The miniature horse is not housebroken; and the property Plaintiff Anderson
rents, in her own words, cannot adequately accommodate it. (Doc. 13-1 at 51; Doc. 8-1
at 29-30). The property is two-tenths of an acre in the middle of a residential
neighborhood. Plaintiff Anderson herself admits that a miniature horse needs at
least one-third to one-half of an acre to be “healthy-happy.” (Doc. 8-1 at 30). The
Health Department investigations establish that the animals are creating health and safety
concerns to both Anderson and to her neighbors.
Plaintiffs have therefore failed to evidence that Ellie is a service animal or that, if
she were, any reasonable accommodation could be made on Plaintiffs’ behalf.
C.

Intentional Discrimination
Plaintiffs also claim that Defendant intentionally discriminated against them.

(Doc. 23 at 11). Plaintiffs must show the “discriminatory purpose was a motivating
factor” in Defendant’s decision-making. Smith & Lee Assoc., Inc. v. City of Taylor, 102
F.3d 781, 790 (6th Cir. 1996). Plaintiffs allege that “[t]here is extensive documentation
of animus on the part of City staff in dealing with C.A.’s attempts, through her mother, to
preserve her rights,” but in fact Plaintiffs cite no actual evidence of animus or
discriminatory purpose whatsoever, and no case holding that the facts here entitle them to
proceed beyond summary judgment. (Doc. 23 at 11). Indeed, on the contrary, as the
Court previously noted, Defendant decided to “forestall enforcement [of its Zoning Code
in 2010] to assist Plaintiff Anderson and her child.” (Doc. 22 at 2). Plaintiffs themselves
admit that “Blue Ash agreed to permit the Andersons to keep a miniature horse … at their
home in Blue Ash.” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 58).
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Next, Plaintiffs criticize Defendant for responding to complaints made by
neighbors. There is no dispute that complaints were made and were investigated by the
Hamilton County Health Department. (Doc. 22 at 2-6, 17-18). Judge Allen noted in the
criminal trial that “You’ve got neighbors that don’t like you and don’t like the animals it
sounds like to me.” (Doc. 8-5 at 7). Defendant had a duty to investigate complaints and
report them to the proper authorities if necessary, and doing so served fundamental
municipal functions – to maintain property values and community aesthetics and to
protect the health and safety of neighboring individuals. (Doc. 22 at 17-18).
Plaintiffs also fault Defendant for questioning Plaintiff Anderson’s motives and
intentions during this process. (Doc. 23 at 11-12). No authority supports any notion that
such conduct gives rise to an intentional discrimination claim. More importantly, as the
Court has noted multiple times, Plaintiff Anderson has never explained why the horse
must live at her residence other than for her own convenience. (Doc. 22 at 17). The
undisputed facts show that Defendant was engaging in fundamentally legitimate
municipal functions, not in unlawful intentional discrimination. (Id. at 17-18).
Finally, Plaintiffs claim that Defendant passed the ordinance outlawing farm
animals in order to discriminate against Plaintiffs Anderson and C.A. (Doc. 23 at 13).
As the ordinance preamble states, it was enacted in part to address “numerous inquiries”
Defendant had received over the past several years “from residents regarding the keeping
of horses, pigs, goats, sheep and alpacas.” (Doc. 8-3 at 13). Plaintiff Anderson did not
even have an alpaca until after the ordinance was effective. (Doc. 12 at 17-19). Plus, the
ordinance exempts all animals otherwise permitted by law, and Plaintiffs have not
16

challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance. (Doc. 22 at 1).
Plaintiffs have pointed to no evidence of animus or discriminatory purpose on the
part of Defendant on which an intentional discrimination claim could conceivably be
predicated.
D.

Disparate Impact
Plaintiffs also claim that Defendant’s actions have a disparate impact on Plaintiff

C.A. (Doc. 23 at 14). They argue that Plaintiff C.A. is “precluded from living” in Blue
Ash if she wants to “keep her horse.” (Id.) However, Defendant “has not rendered the
property inaccessible for Plaintiff C.A…” (Doc. 22 at 16). Plaintiff C.A. “can obtain
hippotherapy by traveling to a local farm or stable, and, in fact, she did so for a period of
time.” (Id.) Defendant has not precluded the Anderson Plaintiffs from living in Blue
Ash or deprived them of an equal opportunity to “enjoy the housing of their choice.”
(Id.) Plaintiffs have never established “that the miniature house must be housed at her
property.” (Id. at 17).
Plaintiffs have pointed to no evidence of unlawful disparate impact.
E.

FHA Claim
Plaintiffs allege that the miniature horse is an “assistance animal” permitted under

the FHA. Plaintiff Anderson never raised this in the administrative proceeding, but she
did vociferously during the criminal trial. In fact, Plaintiff HOME testified on her behalf
that FHA accommodation was required, both for the miniature horse and the alpaca.
(Doc. 8-4 at 66; 93-94). After the Municipal Court considered the arguments and
evidence, it found her guilty.
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Municipalities must provide reasonable accommodations to zoning practices if
they are necessary to afford residents an equal opportunity in the use and enjoyment of
property. Howard v. City of Beavercreek, 276 F.3d 802, 805-806 (6th Cir. 2002). To
establish liability under the FHA, Plaintiffs must show: 1) Plaintiff C.A. suffers from a
disability within the meaning of the FHA; 2) Defendant knew or should have known of
the disability; 3) Plaintiffs’ requested accommodation may be necessary to afford
Plaintiff C.A. an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; 4) the accommodation
is reasonable; and 5) Defendant refused to make the requested accommodation. 42
U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B); Dubois v. Ass’n of Apt. Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d
1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2005).
Defendant has not rendered the property inaccessible for Plaintiff C.A. and the
requested accommodation is thus not reasonable.
1.

Necessary Accommodation

Plaintiff Anderson cannot satisfy the third element of an FHA claim by showing
that her requested accommodation was necessary.
When analyzing whether an accommodation is required under this Act, the
three operative elements are ‘reasonable,’ equal opportunity’ and
‘necessary.’ An accommodation is ‘reasonable’ when it imposes no
‘fundamental alteration in the nature of the program’ or ‘undue financial
and administrative burdens.’ ‘Equal opportunity’ under the FHAA is
defined as ‘giving handicapped individuals the right to choose to live in
single-family neighborhoods, for that right serves to end the exclusion of
handicapped individuals from the American mainstream.’ Linked to the
goal of equal opportunity is the term ‘necessary.’ In order to prove that an
accommodation is ‘necessary,’ plaintiffs must show that, but for the
accommodation, they likely will be denied an equal opportunity to enjoy
the housing of their choice.’
Howard, 276 F.3d at 806 (internal citations omitted).
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Most instructive, in Howard, the court held that the plaintiff could not prove that
the requested accommodation was necessary under the FHA. There, the plaintiff had
enjoyed the housing of his choice without the accommodation for many years, and he had
continued to live in his home for years after the problems that led to his accommodation
request. Here, Plaintiff C.A. could obtain hippotherapy by traveling to a local farm or
stable, and, in fact, she did so for some period of time. (Doc. 1 at 28-29).
As such, the requested accommodation is unnecessary under the FHA to afford
Plaintiff Anderson and her family an equal opportunity to enjoy the housing of their
choice.
2.

Reasonableness

The requested accommodation is that Plaintiff Anderson be allowed conduct
hippotherapy for Plaintiff C.A. on her property, but Ellie is not trained to be used in or for
such therapy. As stated above, Dr. Fletcher’s letter merely “support[s C.A]’s use of the
miniature horse as a means [to being physically active].” (Doc. 10-9 at 23). There is no
written treatment regimen; and it is Plaintiff “C.A. dictated” and not administered by a
licensed medical or equine professional. No licensed professionals take part in any
session, and these alleged sessions last as long as Plaintiff C.A. tolerates them.
To reiterate the Court’s finding in denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, other than for her own convenience, Plaintiff Anderson never explains why
the miniature horse must live at her residence. Hippotherapy can be accomplished by
maintaining a miniature horse for Plaintiff C.A.’s use at a local farm or stable or by
bringing a miniature horse to her property regularly for a limited period of time. Plaintiff
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Anderson has not established that the miniature horse must be housed at her property, and
thus has failed to show such an accommodation is reasonable.
More to the point, Plaintiffs’ proposed modification to Defendant’s ordinances
would fundamentally alter the nature of the zoning scheme. Woodward v. City of Paris,
520 F. Supp. 2d 911, 916 (W.D. Tenn. 2007) (citing Jones v. City of Monroe, 341 F.3d
474, 480 (6th Cir. 2003) and Howard, 276 F.3d at 806). Municipalities may zone land
to accomplish any number of legitimate objectives related to the health, safety,
morals, or general welfare of the community. N. Ohio Sign Contractors Ass’n v.
Lakewood, 32 Ohio St. 3d 316, 317-318 (1987). The constitutional right of the
individual to use private property has always been subservient to the public welfare
under Section 19, Article I of Ohio’s Constitution. Id. at 318. “The protection of
real estate from impairment and destruction of value and the maintenance of the
aesthetics of a community are legitimate governmental interests that may be
protected by the reasonable exercise of a municipality’s police power where such actions
bear a substantial relationship to the general welfare of the public. These interests,
therefore, may be properly considered by a legislative body enacting zoning
ordinances.” Id. (emphasis supplied).
As stated above, Plaintiff Anderson lives in a residential area. Allowing farm
animals, such as miniature horses, alpacas, or pigs in these areas fundamentally alters the
zoning scheme. The presence of these farm animals potentially creates a threat to the
health and safety of the neighboring individuals, as well as the horse itself. 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(f)(9). The smell and waste created by the horse potentially creates a direct threat
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to the health and safety of Defendant’s citizens. As well established, the miniature horse
is not housebroken. In Plaintiff Anderson’s own words, the property cannot fully
accommodate the needs of the horse; it is not big enough for the horse to be “healthy
happy.” (Doc. 8-1 at 30). Moreover, allowing the horse could also reduce the property
value and community aesthetics of this residential area. See Columbia Oldsmobile v.
Montgomery, 56 Ohio St. 3d 60 (1990).
For the reasons outlined above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not shown any
genuine dispute of material fact that would preclude summary judgment in favor of
Defendant.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, there being no genuine issues of material fact
in dispute, and Defendant being entitled to entry of judgment as a matter of law,
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 13) is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk
shall enter judgment accordingly, and this case shall be CLOSED in this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 7/7/14

s/ Timothy S. Black
Timothy S. Black
United States District Judge

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