Jones v. Ahmed et al

Filing 11

ORDER adopting Report and Recommendation re 5 Report and Recommendation overruling 10 Objections and permitting Plaintiff leave of Court to amend his Complaint; ODRC is dismissed with prejudice; the matter is returned ot the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings. Signed by Judge Michael R. Barrett on 8/5/16. (ba)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

STEVEN JONES,

:
:

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 1:14cv964
District Judge Michael R. Barrett
Magistrate Judge Karen L. Litkovitz

:

DR. AHMED, et al.,

:

Defendants.

:

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the February 17, 2015 Report and Recommendation of
the Magistrate Judge, which recommends dismissing the Complaint with prejudice following a
sua sponte review. (Doc. 5). After being granted an extension of time, Plaintiff timely filed his
Objections to the Report on April 15, 2015. (Doc. 10).
I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND/FACTS
Plaintiff is an inmate at Warren Correctional Institution in Lebanon, Ohio. Plaintiff was

granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (Doc. 4). He brings
this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Dr. Ahmed, the “Chief Medical Officer” at
the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility in Lucasville, Ohio, as well as the Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”). (See Doc. 1-1, PageID 6-7).
In recommending dismissal of the Complaint, the Magistrate Judge reached two primary
conclusions. First, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff’s Complaint failed to state an
actionable claim against the ODRC because the ODRC is not an entity subject to suit under
U.S.C. §1983.

(Doc. 5, PageID 27).

Second, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff’s

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Complaint failed to state a claim against Dr. Ahmed because the allegations in the Complaint
were factually insufficient to satisfy the objective and subjective components of an Eighth
Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment; Specifically, the facts did not suggest that
“Dr. Ahmed was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need that required immediate
emergency attention.” (Doc. 5, PageID 29).
II.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. In Forma Pauperis
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), codified in relevant portion at 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e) and 1915A, requires federal district courts to screen in forma pauperis cases at the
moment of filing and to sua sponte dismiss those complaints that are frivolous or fail to state a
claim for relief. Wingo v. Tennessee Dep’t of Corr., 499 F. App’x 453, 454 (6th Cir. 2012)
(citing Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 571-72 (6th Cir. 2008)). A complaint filed by a pro se
plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token, a complaint “must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” (Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (“dismissal standard
articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1)).
B. Objections
When objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation are received on a
dispositive matter, the assigned district judge “must determine de novo any part of the magistrate

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judge's disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). After review,
the district judge “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further
evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id.; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). General objections are insufficient to preserve any issues for review: “[a] general
objection to the entirety of the Magistrate [Judge]’s report has the same effect as would a failure
to object.” Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).
Nevertheless, the objections of a petitioner appearing pro se will be construed liberally. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
III.

ANALYSIS
A. ODRC
The Magistrate Judge found the ODRC is not a ‘person’ or legal entity that may be sued

under § 1983 and thus, Plaintiff did not state an actionable claim. Plaintiff does not object to the
Magistrate Judge’s conclusion with respect to the ODRC. As such, Plaintiff’s claim against the
ODRC is dismissed with prejudice.
B. Dr. Ahmed
1. Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Complaint
Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the allegations contained in his
Complaint are factually insufficient. He argues that “he is not obligated to include each and
every iota per Erickson v. Pardus (2007) S.Ct. 2197…” (Doc. 10, PageID 39). He also contends
that he “was with the sincere good faith belief that his short, concise statement per Erickson was
sufficient to file his complaint, and that he could later make appropriate amendments after
discovery was taken.” (Id. at PageID 40).

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To state a claim for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment based
upon inadequate or delayed medical care, a plaintiff inmate must allege facts indicating that (1)
he had a “serious medical need, which is something “more than ‘mere discomfort or
inconvenience,’” and (2) the defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to the inmate’s
health and safety. Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249, 253-54 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Talal v.
White, 403 F.3d 423, 426 (6th Cir. 2005)).

This amounts to a standard of “deliberate

indifference” when an inmate’s injury puts him at “substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1994) (citations omitted). This standard has both an objective
and subjective component. Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004)
(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
Under the objective component, a medical need is “serious if it is one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Id. at 897 (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted). Under the subjective component, a plaintiff must allege facts showing
that prison officials had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying immediate medical
care. Id. at 895. Thus, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that a prison official was both
“aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists,” and also that the official drew that inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; see also
Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 896. “Knowledge of the asserted serious needs or of circumstances
clearly indicating the existence of such needs, is essential to a finding of deliberate indifference.”
Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 896 (quoting Horn by Parks v. Madison Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 22 F.3d 653,
660 (6th Cir. 1994)).

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In this case, the Magistrate Judge properly found that Plaintiff’s Complaint failed to state
a claim; it did not satisfy either the objective component or subjective component necessary to
state a claim for inadequate or delayed medical care. (Doc. 5, PageID 29). Plaintiff’s Complaint
alleges the following facts:
Plaintiff complained that he could not see clearly from his left eye. The
SOCF nurse placed Plaintiff on a waiting list to see an optometrist.
Following this complaint, the very next day, Plaintiff could not see at all
from his left eye. Defendant Ahmed could have, and should have, sent
Plaintiff on an emergency visit to a hospital where Plaintiff’s vision could
have been promptly corrected. However, Defendant Ahmed willfully and
knowingly allowed Plaintiff to remain in a sight-impaired state far beyond
the time persons in the free community would have had to wait in denying
Plaintiff prompt and proper medical attention.
(Doc. 1, PageID 2).
First, the Complaint does not satisfy the objective component, as it states only that
Plaintiff complained to a nurse that “he could not see clearly from his left eye.” (Doc. 1-1,
PageID 7). This Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that such a vague statement does not
prompt concerns that would be obvious to a lay person about the existence of a life threatening
situation or make it apparent that delay in medical treatment would detrimentally exacerbate
Plaintiff’s vision problem. (Doc. 5, PageID 29).
Plaintiff’s Complaint also fails to satisfy the subjective component. Plaintiff’s Complaint
alleges no facts to support an inference that Dr. Ahmed had knowledge of Plaintiff’s complaints
of eye pain. Rather, the Complaint avers only that the nurse knew of Plaintiff’s eye pain.
Consequently, the Magistrate Judge correctly determined that the Complaint fails to state
a claim against Dr. Ahmed.

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2. Leave to Amend
In his Objections, however, Plaintiff also requests leave to amend his Complaint to
“include the specifics.” (Doc. 10, PageID 40). He includes additional facts related to his claim
against Dr. Ahmed. As such, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff should be granted leave
to amend his Complaint.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), a party is permitted to amend its pleadings once as a
matter of course within twenty-one days after service, after a responsive pleading (if one is
required), or after a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f). In all other cases, leave to amend
should be freely given “when justice so requires.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “Whether to allow
leave to amend is a decision within the discretion of the district court.” Brown v. Matauszak, 415
Fed. App’x 608, 616 (6th Cir. 2011).
“The Sixth Circuit recently held in accordance with other circuit courts that ‘under Rule
15(a), a district court can allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint even when the complaint is
subject to dismissal’ on initial screening under the Prison Litigation Reform Act.” Logue v. U.S.
Marshals, No. 1:13—cv—348, 2013 WL 3983215, *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 2013) citing
LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013) (and First, Seventh, Fifth, Eighth, Fourth
and Eleventh Circuit cases cited therein). Other circuits’ decisions on this issue, which have
been cited favorably by the Sixth Circuit, are also instructive. For example, the Eleventh Circuit
held in Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1348-1349 (11th Cir. 2004) that a pro se plaintiff
granted in forma pauperis status had the right to amend his complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a) after a Report and Recommendation had concluded that a sua sponte dismissal was proper.
See LaFountain, 716 F.3d at 951.

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Plaintiff attaches to his Objections the decision of the chief inspector on his grievance
appeal related to the treatment he received for his eye complications. (Doc. 10-1, PageID 41).
Facts contained in that decision, along with the arguments set forth in Plaintiff’s Objections
could possibly address the factual deficiencies in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Regarding the objective
component, Plaintiff alleges that after alerting Dr. Ahmed to his eye condition, he separately
contacted the deputy warden. (Doc. 10, PageID 40). And upon seeing Plaintiff, the deputy
warden realized “something was seriously wrong” with Plaintiff’s eye and “demanded that
Plaintiff be seen immediately” by the optometrist. (Id. at PageID 41). Moreover, that same day,
he was diagnosed with retinal detachment of the left eye, sent to Ohio State University Hospital
for further examination, and subsequently underwent retinal surgery. (Doc. 10-1, PageID 41).
At first glance, when construing Plaintiff’s Objections liberally, these facts could be sufficient to
state a claim against Dr. Ahmed with respect to the objective component; assuming the deputy
warden is not a doctor, the allegations, if true, suggest that Plaintiff’s injury was “so obvious that
even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity of a doctor’s attention.” Blackmore, 390
F.3d at 897.
Further, the additional facts also speak to the subjective component of Plaintiff’s claim.
While Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege Dr. Ahmed knew about Plaintiff’s eye condition,
Plaintiff now argues it was Dr. Ahmed who ordered that Plaintiff be placed on the “eye doctor’s
list.” (Doc. 10, Page ID 40; Doc. 10-1, PageID 41). For that reason, Plaintiff agues “Dr. Ahmed
was certainly ‘aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exist[ed].” (Doc. 10, PageID 39). Liberally construing Plaintiff’s Objections, the
subjective component could be satisfied—at least at the motion to dismiss stage.

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Accordingly, at this stage in the proceedings, out of an abundance of caution, the Court
concludes that Plaintiff should be granted leave to amend his Complaint.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Consistent with the foregoing, Plaintiff’s claim against the ODRC is DISMISSED with

prejudice. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to amend his Complaint with respect to his claim
against Dr. Ahmed. Plaintiff’s Objections (Doc. 10) are OVERRULED in all other respects.
This matter is returned to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
________________________________
s/Michael R. Barrett
Michael R. Barrett, Judge
United States District Court

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