Campinha-Bacote v. University of Washington et al
Filing
18
ORDER denying as moot 8 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting 12 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Michael R. Barrett on 11/20/15. (ba)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
JOSEPHA A. CAMPINHA-BACOTE
d/b/a TRANSCULTURAL C.A.R.E.
ASSOCIATES,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 1:15-cv-277
Judge Michael R. Barrett
v.
DR. KAREN WICK,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Keren Wick’s Motion to Dismiss the
original Complaint for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 8), Plaintiff Josepha A. Campinha-Bacote’s
response in opposition (Doc. 11), and Defendant Keren Wick’s reply (Doc. 13). In light of
Plaintiff’s filing of the Amended Complaint, Defendant’s first Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) is
moot.
However, also before the Court is Defendant Keren Wick’s Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint (Doc. 12), Plaintiff Josepha A. Campinha-Bacote’s response in opposition
(Doc. 14), and Plaintiff Keren Wick’s reply (Doc. 15). This motion is ripe for review.
I.
BACKGROUND
A.
Allegations in Amended Complaint
Plaintiff does business as Transcultural C.A.R.E. Associates, a sole proprietorship
registered under the laws of Ohio that provides keynotes presentations, workshops, seminars,
consultations, and training focused on clinical, administrative, research, and educational issues
related to cultural competence, transcultural health care, and mental health. (Doc. 9, PageId 60-
Page 1 of 13
61). Plaintiff is the President and Founder of Transcultural C.A.R.E., which has a principal place
of business in Cincinnati, Ohio. (Id. at PageId 60). Plaintiff operates a website from Ohio
through which her tools and models can be ordered by individuals who pay a fee. (Id., PageId
61-62). Plaintiff’s website, presentations, books, and other mediums in which she conducts
business “publicly make clear” her ties to Ohio.
(Doc. 9, PageId 62).
In 2002, Plaintiff
developed a mnemonic model of cultural competence entitled “Cultural Competency in
Healthcare Delivery: Have I ‘ASKED’ Mysef the Right Questions?” (“ASKED model”), which
was an original work that was copyrighted under U.S. law in 2003 with Registration No. TX 5837-864, effective date September 11, 2003. (Id., PageId 63). The copyright registration itself
contains the address of Plaintiff in Cincinnati, Ohio. (Doc. 1-2, PageId 6). The ASKED model
does not contain any express indication as to Plaintiff’s residence in Ohio. (Doc. 1-1, PageId 5). 1
Defendant is a resident of the State of Washington and is an Assistant Professor, Director
of Research and Graduate Programs, and Director of Academic Outreach at the University of
Washington. (Doc. 9, PageId 61). “Upon information and belief, Defendant publishes academic
literature and publications throughout the United States, including Ohio.” (Id. at PageId 62). On
or around March 28, 2015, Plaintiff “learned that Defendants reproduced and published
[Plaintiff’s] ASKED model in an article titled “Tradition and treatment: The impact of cultural
beliefs on medical decision making” that is found on page 18 in Volume 19, Number 12, of the
December 2006 issue of JAAPA. (Id., PageId 63). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant did not have
permission to publish the ASKED model and that neither Defendant nor her employer were able
to produce any documentation permitting use of Plaintiff’s ASKED model.
(Id.).
“Upon
information and belief, Defendant’s employer, University of Washington . . . recruits students
1
Both the ASKED model and the copyright registration were attached to the original Complaint. (Doc. 1). While
they were referenced in the Amended Complaint, they were not attached thereto. (See Doc. 9).
Page 2 of 13
from the State of Ohio, and students from Ohio have attended UW’s academic institution, in part
due to publications such as Defendant’s.” (Id., PageId 62).
Plaintiff now brings a claim against Defendant for copyright infringement pursuant to 17
U.S.C. § 501.
B.
Defendant’s Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss
Defendant avers that she is currently employed by the University of Washington as an
Assistant Professor, Director of Research and Graduate Programs, and Director of Academic
Outreach. (Doc. 8-4, PageId 57). She further avers that she has been employed by UW since
1998 and that she has been a resident of the State of Washington since 1995. (Id.). She also
declares that she has never personally been to Ohio; never advertised in Ohio; never transacted
any business, of any kind, in Ohio; never contracted to supply services or goods in Ohio; never
caused tortious injury by an act or omission in Ohio; never solicited any business, or engaged in
any other persistent course of conduct, or derived substantial revenue from goods used or
consumed or services rendered in Ohio; never committed any act outside of Ohio with the
purpose of injuring persons in Ohio; never contracted to insure any person, properly or risk
located in Ohio; and does not have any interest in using or possessing real property in Ohio.
(Doc. 8-4, PageId 57-58). She states that the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio is approximately 2,000 miles away from her residence in the State of
Washington. (Id., PageId 58).
II.
ANALYSIS
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving personal jurisdiction exists over an out-of-state
defendant. Beydoun v. Wataniya Rests. Holding, Q.S.C., 768 F.3d 499, 504 (6th Cir. 2014)
(citing CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262063 (6th Cir. 1996)); see also Neogen
Page 3 of 13
Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 887 (6th Cir. 2002). “‘[I]n the face of a
properly supported motion for dismissal, the plaintiff may not stand on his pleading but must, by
affidavit or otherwise, set forth specific facts showing that the court has jurisdiction.’” Carrier
Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430, 449 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Theunissen v. Matthews,
935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991)). When a court considers a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(2) without an evidentiary hearing, however, the plaintiff “‘need only make a prima
facie showing of jurisdiction.’” Beydoun, 768 F.3d at 504 (citing CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1262).
The plaintiff can make this prima facie showing by “‘establishing with reasonable particularity
sufficient contacts between [the defendant] and the forum state to support jurisdiction.’” Neogen
Corp., 282 F.3d at 887 (quoting Provident Nat’l Bank v. California Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 819 F.2d
434, 437 (3d Cir. 1987)). The court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Beydoun, 768 F.3d at 504 (citing Neogen Corp., 282 F.3d at 887).
The Sixth Circuit has established a two-step inquiry to determine whether a federal
district court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant: (1) whether the law of the state
in which the district court sits authorizes jurisdiction, and (2) whether the exercise of jurisdiction
comports with the Due Process Clause. Conn v. Zakharov, 667 F.3d 705, 711 (6th Cir. 2012)
(citing Int’l Techs. Consultants v. Euroglas S.A., 107 F.3d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 1997));
CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1262.
A. Long-Arm Statute
The Sixth Circuit has explained that there are two kinds of personal jurisdiction: general
jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tryg Int’l Ins. Co., 91 F.3d
790, 793 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Jurisdiction may be found to exist either generally, in cases in which a
defendant’s ‘continuous and systematic’ conduct within the forum state renders that defendant
Page 4 of 13
amenable to suit in any lawsuit brought against it in the forum state . . . or specifically, in cases
in which the subject matter of the lawsuit arises out of or is related to the defendant’s contacts
with the forum.”). There has been some debate as to whether Ohio courts recognize general
jurisdiction. See Indus Trade & Tech., LLC v. Stone Mart Corp., No. 2:11-cv-637, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 144668, at *6-8 n. 1 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 14, 2011) (describing split on whether general
personal jurisdiction is available under Ohio law). Recently, the Sixth Circuit has stated that
“under Ohio law, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only if
specific jurisdiction can be found under one of the enumerated bases in Ohio’s long-arm statute.”
Conn v. Zakharov, 667 F.3d 705, 718 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Lexon Ins. Co. v. Devinshire Land
Dev., LLC, 573 F. App’x 427, 429 (6th Cir. 2014) (same as Conn). Accordingly, this Court will
analyze only whether specific jurisdiction exists over Defendant. See Stone v. Twiddy & Co. of
Duck, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-591, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104738, at *7 (S.D. Ohio July 27, 2012).
For specific jurisdiction, Plaintiff relies upon Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.382(A)(6), which
allows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who:
Caus[es] tortious injury in this state to any person by an act outside this state
committed with the purpose of injuring persons, when he might reasonably
have expected that some person would be injured thereby in this state.
The cases from within the Sixth Circuit suggest that this provision of Ohio’s long-arm statute
may encompass claims for copyright infringement under some circumstances. For example,
Plaintiff relies on Haley v. City of Akron, No. 3:10-cv-155, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26187, at *32
(N.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2011), which cites to Stolle Mach. Co., LLC v. RAM Precision Indus., No.
3:10-cv-155, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144662 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2011), for the proposition that
copyright infringement may give rise to a tortious injury for the purpose of the statute. In Stolle
Mach. Co, LLC, the employee of the plaintiff violated the copyright laws while still employed in
the plaintiff’s Ohio facility by misappropriating the documents. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144662,
Page 5 of 13
at*9.
The employee then moved out of state and used that previously misappropriated
information to start his own company in China. Id. Similarly, in another case upon which
Plaintiff relies, J4 Promotions, Inc. v. Splash Dogs, LLC, No. 08-cv-977, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11023, at *24-26 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 13, 2009), the district court determined that the defendants
were amendable to suit in Ohio under § 2307.382(A)(6) for their alleged copyright infringement
where the plaintiff used the intellectual property in Ohio such that the injury would be felt most
severely in Ohio and where the defendants actually made a physical entry into the state and held
a three-day event in Columbus, Ohio. 2
Here, Plaintiff has not presented any affidavits or others supporting documents to satisfy
her burden of proving personal jurisdiction exists over the out-of-state defendant. See Carrier
Corp., 673 F.3d at 449. Instead, Plaintiff’s argument rests entirely on the unsworn, unverified
allegations in the Amended Complaint that would indicate that the injury to Plaintiff would be
felt most severely in Ohio where she resides and does business and that Defendant had
knowledge, through plain indicators on Plaintiff’s website and materials, that the alleged
infringement would injure Plaintiff in Ohio. However, Plaintiff has provided no support that
would demonstrate those factual allegations to be true. In fact, the ASKED model attached to
the original complaint contains no such plain indicator. On the other hand, Defendant has
presented a declaration in which she attests that, among other things, she has never been to Ohio,
transacted business in Ohio, caused tortious injury in Ohio, or committed any act outside of Ohio
with the purpose of injuring persons in Ohio. (Doc. 8-2, PageId 57-58). Therefore, the only
2
Plaintiff also relies on Dayton Superior Corp. v. Yan, 288 F.R.D. 151, 163-64 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 29, 2012 ), in which
the court provides examples of circumstances in which Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.382(A)(6) has applied. As for
Plaintiff’s citation to Cash Homebuyers, Inc. v. Morningstar, No. 5:05-cv-2296, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72674
(N.D. Ohio Oct. 5, 2006), it is not helpful to Plaintiff because the opinion contains no analysis and the action was
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Page 6 of 13
evidentiary materials provided to the Court support a finding that the Court does not have
jurisdiction over Defendant under § 2307.382(A)(6) of Ohio’s long-arm statute.
B. Due Process
Even if Plaintiff satisfied her burden as to Ohio’s long-arm statute, she still must show
that jurisdiction comports with due process. Conn, 667 F.3d at 711 (citing CompuServe, 89 F.3d
at 1262); see also Fraley v. Estate of Oeding, 138 Ohio St. 3d 250, 257 (2014) (“[E]ven
satisfaction of the long-arm statute does not justify the exercise of jurisdiction unless that
exercise also comports with the defendant’s constitutional right to due process.”). To comport
with due process, the defendant must “have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state]
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The Sixth Circuit has established a three-part test to determine whether personal
jurisdiction under Ohio’s long arm statute meets the due process requirements. U.S. Diamond &
Gold v. Julius Klein Diamonds LLC, No. C-3-06-371, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23076, at *25
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2007) (citing Burnshire Dev., LLC v. Cliffs Reduced Iron Corp., 198 F.
App’x 425, 430 (6th Cir. 2006); Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 401 F.2d
374 (6th Cir. 1968)). “First, the defendant must purposely avail himself of the privilege of acting
in Ohio or causing a consequence in Ohio.” U.S. Diamond & Gold, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23076, at *25. “Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant’s activities in Ohio.”
Id. “Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a
substantial enough connection with Ohio to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant
reasonable.” Id.
Page 7 of 13
Here, the Court finds that personal jurisdiction over Defendant does not comport with due
process.
First, as with the long-arm statute, Plaintiff has provided no affidavits or other
documents to support her position as to personal jurisdiction. Instead, Plaintiff again relies
solely on the unsown, unverified allegations in the Amended Complaint, which is insufficient.
See Carrier Corp., 673 F.3d at 449. 3
Second, Plaintiff’s arguments as to purposeful availment resting solely upon the
allegations in the Amended Complaint are not well taken. Plaintiff’s primary argument is that
Defendant used a copyright owned by a person in Ohio and had knowledge that Plaintiff resided
in and/or conducted business in Ohio such that Defendant knew the injury would occur in Ohio.
But such allegations are insufficient to establish minimum contacts with Ohio for the purposes of
the due process analysis.
Indeed, the Sixth Circuit recently rejected such an argument in
Maxitrate Tratamento Termico e Controles v. Super Sys., No. 14-3807, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS
8999, at *5-6 (6th Cir. May 28, 2015), explaining:
Hedman principally contends that Seguros’s refusal to defend Maxitrate counts
as purposeful activity in Ohio, citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S. Ct.
1482, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1984), in support. There, the Court held that tabloid
journalists in Florida were properly sued for libel in California, where the
plaintiff lived. The tabloid had sold over 600,000 copies in California, and the
defendants knew that “the brunt of [the plaintiff’s] injury would be felt” there.
Id. at 785, 789-90. Hedman relies on language in Calder suggesting that, if a
defendant knows that its intentional acts will cause effects in a state, then that
state can exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. See id. at 789-90. But the
Supreme Court rejected that theory of personal jurisdiction (and that
interpretation of Calder) last year in Walden [v. Fiore], 134 S. Ct.[1115,]
1123-26 [(2014)]. There, the Court held that Nevada could not exercise
jurisdiction over a defendant from Georgia based merely on the defendant’s
knowledge that his false affidavit would cause harm to two plaintiffs in
Nevada. Id. at 1125-26. To hold otherwise, the Court held, would
“improperly attribute[] a plaintiff’s forum connections to the defendant and
mak[e] those connections decisive in the jurisdictional analysis.” Id. at 1125
(quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Court held, “it is the defendant, not the
3
Plaintiff has not requested to conduct any discovery on personal jurisdiction to support her motion.
Page 8 of 13
plaintiff or third parties, who must create contacts with the forum State.” Id. at
1126.
Similar to Maxitrate Tratamento Termico e Controles, Plaintiff’s arguments do not show that
Defendant purposefully created any contacts with Ohio. To the contrary, the allegations show, at
best, that Defendant merely knew or should have known that her actions may have some effect in
Ohio. That is not enough to show purposeful availment. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125
(2014) (“[M]ere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum.
Regardless of where a plaintiff lives or works, an injury is jurisdictionally relevant only insofar
as it shows that the defendant has formed a contact with the forum State. The proper question is
not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s
conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.”).
Plaintiff next alleges that “Upon information and belief, Defendant publishes academic
literature and publications throughout the United States, including Ohio.” (Doc. 9, PageId 62).
Plaintiff adduces no evidence to support this bare allegation. Plaintiff’s reliance on Ampro
Industries Inc. v. Dr. Farrah Gray Publ’g, LLC, No. 12-2696, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138290
(W.D. Tenn. Sept. 26, 2013) is misguided. Not only is the decision non-binding on this Court,
but the decision was rendered in the context of a motion for default judgment where the
defendant had offered no response or evidence. Id. at *1. The district court therefore construed
an allegation in the Complaint that the defendant publishes and distributes books throughout the
United States, including in the forum state, as establishing that the defendant distributed its
books with direct knowledge that its product was being distributed within the forum state. Id. at
13. This case does not involve a motion for default judgment, and Defendant has proffered an
affidavit to support her motion to dismiss. Plaintiff thus cannot rest on her pleadings alone to
establish personal jurisdiction. Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430, 449 (6th Cir.
Page 9 of 13
2012). Given that Plaintiff has adduced no evidence to support a finding that Defendant herself
directly published this article or any other article in Ohio and Defendant has presented evidence
to the contrary, Plaintiff has failed to evince a meaningful connection between Defendant and
Ohio.
Even Plaintiff’s more specific allegation as to the publication at issue in this case that
“Defendant[] reproduced and published Dr. Camphina-Bacote’s ASKED model in an article
titled “Tradition and treatment: The impact of cultural beliefs on medical decision making” in
the December 2006 issue of JAAPA (Doc. 9, PageId 63) fails to show purposeful availment.
The Supreme Court has explained:
The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not
an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.
Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve
the market in the forum State, for example, designing the product for the
market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels
for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the
product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the
forum State. But a defendant’s awareness that the stream of commerce may or
will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of
placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the
forum State.
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). As such, mere
knowledge that a company may or is likely to distribute a product nationally is insufficient
conduct upon which to predicate purposeful availment. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N the
Water Publ’g, 327 F.3d 472, 480 (6th Cir. 2003). Here, Plaintiff’s allegation as to this particular
article show nothing more than placement into the stream of commerce with knowledge that a
company potentially may distribute the article nationally.
There are no allegations that
Defendant, for example, advertised in Ohio, contracted for the distribution of her article into
Ohio, or designed the article to serve the Ohio market specifically. While Plaintiff relies on Bird
v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2002), for the proposition that distribution, even if not directly
Page 10 of 13
targeted to Ohio residents, is sufficient to establish purposeful availment, that case does not alter
the outcome. Plaintiff ignores that the Bird plaintiff also proffered some evidence that the
defendant repeatedly accepted the business of potentially 4,666 Ohio residents. Id. at 874-75.
No such evidence that Defendant purposefully connected with Ohio in a meaningful way has
been proffered here.
Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant’s employer recruits students from Ohio and students
from Ohio have attended the University of Washington’s academic institution due in part to
publications such as Defendant’s (Doc. 9, PageId 62) similarly fails to establish that Defendant
herself created or directed contact with Ohio. In fact, Plaintiff offers no explanation as to why
such contact by her employer is sufficient to support personal jurisdiction over Defendant
consistent with due process.
Finally, her allegation that “Upon information and belief, Defendant published Dr.
Campinha-Bacote’s copyright in such a way that individuals in Ohio viewed Dr. CampinhaBacote’s copyrighted work” (Doc. 9, PageId 62) is insufficient. Not only is it unclear as to how
Ohio residents were able view the published work, it also is unclear as to how the ability of
individuals in Ohio to view the published work impacts the due process analysis. To the extent
this argument relates to the placement of the article into the stream of commerce, the above
analysis also is applicable here. The Court further surmises that Plaintiff is attempting to
analogize the facts of this case to those cases in which courts have held that a defendant’s use of
a website can support personal jurisdiction. But simply making content available does not
satisfy the threshold for due process. “The Sixth Circuit has explained that the operation of a
website may constitute the purposeful availment of the privilege of acting in a forum state ‘if the
website is interactive to a degree that reveals specifically intended interaction with residents of
Page 11 of 13
the state.’” Stone v. Twiddy & Co. of Duck, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-591, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
104738, at *16 (S.D. Ohio July 27, 2012) (quoting Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc.,
282 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002)). Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate with any reasonable
particularity that Defendant punished the copyright “in such a way” that would demonstrate any
interactive element or any intent of Defendant to target Ohio residents specifically. Again, for
the same reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s reliance on Bird, 289 F.3d at 874-75, does not alter
that conclusion. As Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant purposefully availed herself of
the protections and benefits of Ohio laws, the Court cannot conclude that Defendant would have
reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Ohio.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). 4
Given the above conclusion that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendant had
sufficient minimum contacts with Ohio, Plaintiff’s cause of action for copyright infringement
cannot arise from Defendant’s Ohio activities and Plaintiff is not entitled to an inference of
reasonableness. See Haley v. City of Akron, No. 5:13-cv-232, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26187, at
*30 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 2014). Without that inference, and considering the burden of Defendant
defending a lawsuit in a distant forum in which she has not reasonably anticipated being haled
4
Plaintiff has not cited to a single case where a court exercised personal jurisdiction based on the same or similar
facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint. In each of the cases relied upon by Plaintiff in which a court found
personal jurisdiction to exist, the plaintiff had shown that the defendants had substantial connections to Ohio. For
example, the defendants in those cases were prior residents, were employed by Ohio companies, traveled to Ohio for
business purposes, or had specifically targeted Ohio residents. See Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2002)
(holding that the purposeful availment requirement was satisfied where the defendant maintained a website on which
Ohio residents could register domain names and where the plaintiff proffered evidence that the defendant accepted
business of 4,666 Ohio residents); Haley v. City of Akron, No. 5:13-cv-232, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26187 (N.D.
Ohio Deb. 27, 2014) (holding that due process was satisfied as to several defendants where evidence showed they
specifically and intentionally availed themselves of the privileges and benefits of Ohio laws when they contacted
law enforcement in Ohio to procure the return of a vehicle to Texas); J4 Promotions, Inc. v. Splash Dogs, LLC, No.
08-cv-977, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11023 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 13, 2009) (holding that it did not offend constitutional
due process to exercise personal jurisdiction over a business where it maintained an interactive website specifically
targeting Ohio residents and where it held and promoted an event in Ohio; nor did it offend constitutional due
process to exercise personal jurisdiction over individuals who had regular oral and written contacts with the plaintiff
in Ohio, had an employment relationship with the plaintiff spanning a number of years, and were paid through an
Ohio bank account). Plaintiff has adduced no evidence as to any such similar facts in this case.
Page 12 of 13
into court, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant would not be reasonable in this
case.
Accordingly, Defendant’s second motion to dismiss shall be granted.
III.
CONCLUSION
Consistent with the foregoing, Defendant’s first Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) is DENIED
AS MOOT and Defendant’s second Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) is GRANTED. This case is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Michael R. Barrett
JUDGE MICHAEL R. BARRETT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Page 13 of 13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?