Bruno v. RBS Citizens, NA

Filing 34

ORDER granting 20 Citizens' Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Timothy S. Black on 5/30/17. (sct)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
BRIDGET BRUNO,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
RBS CITIZENS, NA, et al.
Defendants.

Case No. 1:16-cv-245
Judge Timothy S. Black

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(Doc. 20)
This civil action is before the Court on the motion of Defendant Citizens Bank,
N.A., a subsidiary of Citizens Financial Group, Inc. (“Citizens”), for summary judgment
(Doc. 20) and the parties’ responsive memoranda (Docs. 21, 30).
I.

BACKGROUND FACTS

This is an employment dispute. Plaintiff Bridget Bruno worked for Citizens as a
Group Underwriting Manager at Citizens’ Home Lending Solutions (“HLS”) site in
Cincinnati (“Cincinnati Site”) from November, 2009, to October 7, 2014.
Citizens’ HLS division offers residential mortgage and home equity loans. Ms.
Bruno was authorized to approve loans of $1,000,000 or less. In 2014, Ms. Bruno
requested an increase in lending authority. Citizens ultimately denied her request. On
May 23, 2014, Ms. Bruno’s attorney Jason Matthews (“Attorney Matthews”) wrote a
letter to Citizens alleging this denial was the result of age and sex discrimination (the
“May 23, 2014 Letter”).
1

In the fall of 2014 Citizens “spun off” from its corporate parent, the Royal Bank of
Scotland. As part of this transition, Citizens underwent a corporate initiative aimed at
reducing its workforce to eliminate redundant positions; specifically, Citizens endeavored
to eliminate a layer of management where possible (the “Reduction in Force”).
At the Cincinnati Site, prior to the Reduction in Force, underwriters reported to
Regional Underwriting Managers, the Regional Underwriting Managers reported to the
Group Underwriting Manager (Ms. Bruno), and the Group Underwriting Manager
reported to the Regional Operations Group Manager/Cincinnati Vice President
(William Terry). Accordingly, there were two layers of management between the
underwriters and Mr. Terry.
During its 2014 restructuring, Citizens decided that the two-layer management
structure utilized at the Cincinnati Site was unnecessary for a group of its size. As a
result, in October, 2014, Citizens eliminated the Group Underwriting Manager Position at
the Cincinnati Site and Ms. Bruno lost her job. Ms. Bruno found another job in
November, 2014.
On October 21, 2014, Ms. Bruno filed a charge with the Ohio Civil Rights
Commission (“OCRC”) alleging she was terminated in retaliation for the May 23, 2014
Letter. On September 30, 2015, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) sent a separate right-to-sue notice (the “Right-to-Sue Notice”). On January
19, 2016, Ms. Bruno commenced this lawsuit, alleging unlawful retaliation in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02.
2

On January 20, 2017, Citizens filed the instant motion for summary judgment,
arguing that Ms. Bruno’s Title VII claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations,
and her retaliation claims fail on the merits.
II.
1.

UNDISPUTED FACTS 1

Citizens is one of the leading commercial banking companies in the United

States. Its HLS division offers residential mortgage and home equity loans based out of
four locations— Warwick, Rhode Island (“Rhode Island Site”); Glen Allen, Virginia
(“Virginia Site”); Melville, New York (“New York Site”); and the Cincinnati Site. (Doc.
26 at 28:24- 29:10).
2.

Ms. Bruno began working for Citizens in November 2009 as a Group

Underwriting Manager and remained in this position throughout her employment with
Citizens. (Doc. 24 at 67:19-22; 223:6-10).
3.

Ms. Bruno’s immediate supervisor was Mr. Terry, the HLS Regional

Operations Group Manager/Vice President in the Cincinnati office. (Doc. 25 at 8:249:23).
4.

Mr. Terry reported to Matthew Egan, the HLS National Operations

Manager, who is based near Philadelphia. (Doc. 26 at 10:9-11:11).
5.

Mr. Egan reported to Cheryl Nolda, who was involved in the Reduction in

Force at a high level but did not participate in individual, site-level determinations

1

See Doc. 20-1 and Doc. 23.
3

regarding which positions would be eliminated at each location. (Doc. 26 at 60:1761:11). 2
6.

When Ms. Bruno began at working at Citizens, she was the sole

manager within the Cincinnati underwriting department, and individual underwriters
reported directly to her. (Doc. 24 at 68:18-21).
7.

In 2010, Bruno hired two Regional Underwriting Managers. The

individual underwriters then reported to one of the Regional Underwriting Managers,
who in turn reported to Plaintiff. (Doc. 24 at 70:8-19).
8.

In 2014, the Cincinnati Regional Underwriting Managers were Greg

Barton and Janine Dabney-Battle. (Doc. 25 at 39:20-24; Doc. 20-10).
9.

At the HLS location in New York, there were only a few underwriters, all

of whom reported directly to Group Underwriting Manager Peggy Miceli, with no
intervening layer of Regional Underwriting Managers. (Doc. 24 at 100:23-101:8; Doc.
26 at 35:3-6, 51:6-12).

2

Ms. Bruno denies a portion of this Paragraph, as well as some or all of the facts asserted
in Paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 25, 26, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, and 42 of this section,
without providing a citation to any evidence in the record which supports her denial.
Such failure violates this Court’s Standing Order Governing Civil Motions for Summary
Judgment. The Standing Order requires that “[e]ach statement of material fact in a
statement of Proposed Undisputed Facts or Response to Undisputed Facts, and each
denial in a statement of Disputed Issues of Material Fact, must be followed by a specific
citation or citations to (1) the affidavit of a witness competent to testify as to the facts at
trial, (2) a sworn deposition, and/or (3) other evidence, including documentary evidence,
that would be admissible at trial.”
4

10.

At the HLS Virginia location, there was one Group Underwriting

Manager, Chip Owens, and one Regional Underwriting Manager. (Doc. 26 at 34:2535:2).
11.

Roughly half of the Virginia underwriters reported directly to Mr. Owens,

the Group Underwriting Manager, and the remainder reported to the Regional
Underwriting Manager (who in turn reported to Mr. Owens). (Doc. 26 at 34:25-35:2).
12.

Ryan Gausland, the Group Underwriting Manager in Rhode Island, had

three Regional Underwriting Managers who reported to him. (Doc. 26 at 35:11- 15).
13.

Underwriters and underwriting managers at Citizens have a preset lending

authority that limits the maximum size of a loan that he or she can approve unilaterally.
(Doc. 24 at 27:8-19).
14.

An underwriter may underwrite loans in excess of his or lending authority,

but the work is subject to a further level of review. (Doc. 24 at 32:7-21).
15.

Ms. Bruno’s lending authority was set at $1,000,000. (Doc. 24 at 28:6-9).

16.

Ms. Bruno requested higher credit authority beginning in the summer of

2010, less than a year after she joined the bank. (Doc. 24 at 85:17-21).
17.

A higher lending authority would not have changed Ms. Bruno’s title or

her pay. (Doc. 24 at 83:6-14).
18.

Both Mr. Egan and Mr. Terry supported Ms. Bruno’s request for a

higher lending authority. (Doc. 24 at 43:9-14, 51:13-52:1; Doc. 25 at 43:2-8).

5

19.

Lending authority limits are not set by Ms. Bruno’s direct supervisors.

(Doc. 26 at 66:22-67:4).
20.

Those limits are set by Citizens’ Consumer Credit Risk Administration,

a separate and independent business unit with the authority to adjust limits on an
individual-by-individual basis. (Doc. 24 at 44:17-45:8; 54:3-13).
21.

In January 2014, Ms. Bruno renewed her request for higher lending

authority and was asked to complete a series of “test cases,” which is common
industry practice when an underwriter requests increased lending authority. (Doc. 24 at
86:25-87:23, 88:18-89:1).
22.

To complete these test cases, Ms. Bruno was asked to underwrite loans of

over $1,000,000, which would then be audited and graded. (Doc. 24 at 87:18- 88:4,
120:14-17).
23.

Ms. Bruno responded that she had previously completed other test cases,

but Citizens informed her that those cases were not recent enough to evaluate. (Doc. 24
at 86:25-87:14; Doc. 20-9).
24.

All but one of the test cases date from 2011, meaning they were between

two and three years old at the time of Ms. Bruno’s e-mail. (Doc. 20-9).
25.

In addition, some of these earlier test cases received a “red mark,” which

represents a “very serious defect” in the underwriting process that may affect the
salability of the loan. (Doc. 24 at 118:22-119:14).

6

26.

Citizens created a formal plan for Ms. Bruno to complete several test

cases to justify her increased authority. (Doc. 24 at 86:25-87:23, 88:10-17). She refused
to complete even a single test case. (Doc. 24 at 91:20-92:1). As a result, her lending
authority remained the same. Peggy Miceli, who like Ms. Bruno is a female over the
age of 40, did complete her assigned test cases, and her lending authority was increased
to $1,500,000. (Doc. 24 at 99:11-100:5).
27.

In May 2014, Attorney Matthews wrote a letter alleging “age and sex

discrimination” based on Ms. Bruno’s allegedly insufficient lending authority. (Doc.
24-1 at 3-4).
28.

Attorney Matthews also made a vague complaint of a hostile work

environment. (Doc. 24-1 at 3-4).
29.

The May 23, 2014 Letter was not directed at Mr. Terry or Mr. Egan; they

had no control over Ms. Bruno’s lending authority. (Doc. 24 at 43:14-16; Doc. 26 at
66:22-67:4).
30.

The May 23, 2014 Letter was directed at “people that worked in the bank

that were above [Ms. Bruno] in other departments…” (Doc. 26 at 29:1-2).
31.

Citizens conducted an investigation regarding Ms. Bruno’s allegations.

(Doc. 24 at 35:19-36:14).
32.

Citizens ultimately concluded that there were a few “curt” e-mails

between Ms. Bruno and various sales employees— with Ms. Bruno both sending and

7

receiving such emails—but there was no finding of wrongful conduct. (Doc. 24 at
37:10-38:2).
33.

No discipline was issued, and Citizens considered the matter closed. (Doc.

25 at 12:11-21, 15:11-24; Doc. 26 at 25:1-8).
34.

Prior to 2014, Citizens was known as RBS Citizens, N.A., and was a

subsidiary of the Royal Bank of Scotland. Around September 2014, Citizens separated
from the RBS umbrella. (Doc. 26 at 8:22-9:8).
35.

As part of this spin-off, Citizens underwent a broad corporate-wide

restructuring to reduce expenses and eliminate redundant positions across its divisions.
(Doc. 26 at 36:20-37:22, 39:13-19).
36.

The ultimate goal of the restructuring was to reduce expenses by

eliminating a layer of management wherever possible, across all sites in the HLS
Division. (Doc. 25 at 27:19-28:13; Doc. 26 at 37:23-38:6).
37.

Citizens’ management individually reviewed the staffing at each site to

determine what best fit that particular site’s business needs moving forward. (Doc. 26
at 40:18-41:1).
38.

At the Cincinnati Site, there was a surplus of managerial employees

within the underwriting department—one Group Underwriting Manager (Ms. Bruno)
and two Underwriting Managers who reported directly to her. (Doc. 26 at 37:2338:6, 42:12-43:1; Doc. 20-10).

8

39.

This two-layer management structure was deemed unnecessary for a group

consisting of only twenty-two underwriters, and Citizens chose to eliminate Ms.
Bruno’s position. (Doc. 25 at 24:5- 11; Doc. 26 at 38:25-39:21).
40.

After the reduction in force, the former Regional Underwriting Managers

now reported directly to Mr. Terry, thus eliminating a layer of management. (Doc. 26-1
at 3).
41.

There was an open position within the Cincinnati processing department,

so former Group Processing Manager Sean Cunningham was offered a demotion to a
slightly lower ranking position, which he accepted. (Doc. 25 at 30:3-20). 3
42.

The Group Underwriting Manager position at the Rhode Island Site was

eliminated and Mr. Gausland moved to an open “pod leader” position within the
processing department because he had prior experience there. (Doc. 26 at 44:23-45:9,
49:5-9; Doc. 26-1 at 1-2).
43.

Mr. Owens was likewise demoted to an underwriting manager position,

where he directly supervised underwriters. (Doc. 26-1 at 1-2).
44.

There were no open positions for Ms. Bruno within the Cincinnati

underwriting department; in fact, there was a surplus of underwriters, and one was laid
off as part of the Reduction in Force. (Doc. 25 at 30:21- 25). 4

3

Ms. Bruno denies there was an open position and states that Kim Slavens was moved
from a processing manager position to an underwriting position and Sean Cunningham
was moved into Kim Slaven’s position. (Doc. 23 at ¶ 41) (citing Doc. 26 at 64-65).
4
Ms. Bruno denies this assertion, arguing that Mr. Egan testified Mr. Terry could have
chosen to terminate either Ms. Bruno, Mr. Barton or Ms. Dabney Battle and Kim Slavens
9

45.

The Reduction in Force was announced on October 7, 2014, which was the

last day Ms. Bruno performed work for Citizens. (Doc. 24 at 21:21-23).
46.

Ms. Bruno remained on the Citizens payroll until October 24, 2014,

which is the effective date of her termination. (Doc. 14 at ¶ 10).
47.

Ms. Bruno found a new job one month later. (Doc. 24 at 174:25-175:5). 5

48.

On October 21, 2014, Ms. Bruno filed a charge with the OCRC, alleging

that she was terminated in retaliation for the May 23, 2014 letter. (Doc. 24-1). 6
49.

After an investigation, the OCRC issued a finding of no probable cause

and stated that “the Commission finds no credible information supporting Charging
Party’s allegation of unlawful activity.” (Doc. 24-1 at 2).
50.

The EEOC sent the Right-to-Sue Notice on September 30, 2015. (Doc. 14-

1).
III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the evidence submitted to
the Court demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Celotex

was moved from a processing manager position to an underwriting position. (Doc. 23 at
¶ 44) (citing Doc. 26 at 43; 64-65).
5

Ms. Bruno admits that she began her new employment on either November 26, 2017, or
November 27, 2017. (Doc. 23 at ¶ 47) (citing Doc. 24 at 175).

6

Ms. Bruno admits she signed her OCRC charge on October 21, 2014 and the charge was
filed on October 22, 2014, alleging retaliation for the May 23, 2014, letter. (Doc. 23 at

¶ 48).

10

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of genuine
disputes over facts which, under the substantive law governing the issue, might affect the
outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. All facts and inferences must be
construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
A party opposing a motion for summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (1986).

11

IV.

ANALYSIS

A.
Ms. Bruno’s Title VII claim is NOT barred by the statute of
limitations.
Defendants argue Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is untimely. (Doc. 20 at 10-11). The
Court does not agree.
Title VII requires a charge of discrimination to be filed with the EEOC (or
applicable state agency) within 300 days after the alleged act of discrimination occurs.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Title VII requires a civil action to be filed in federal court
within 90 days after the EEOC has given a “right-to-sue” notice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(1). The requirement that a civil action be filed within 90 days is not a “jurisdictional
prerequisite to suit in a federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations,
is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling.” Simmons v. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emp.
Assoc. AFSCME Local 11, 259 F. Supp. 2d 677, 681 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (Sargus, J)
(quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982)).
In the Sixth Circuit, a right-to-sue notice mailed by the EEOC is presumed to have
been received, and the 90-day statute of limitations begins to run, on the fifth day after
the mailing date. Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d
552, 557 (6th Cir. 2000). However, a plaintiff may rebut this presumption by presenting
proof that he did not receive the right-to-sue notice. Id. at 557.
The Sixth Circuit has identified five factors to consider when determining whether
to equitably toll a statute of limitations: (1) lack of notice of the filing requirement;
(2) lack of constructive knowledge of the filing requirement; (3) diligence in pursuing
12

one’s rights; (4) absence of prejudice to the defendant; and (5) the plaintiff’s
reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the particular legal requirement. Truitt v. County
of Wayne, 148 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1998).
Here, each of these factors weighs in favor of tolling the 90-day limitations period.
There is no evidence to suggest Ms. Bruno had actual or constructive knowledge that her
90-day limitations period began to run on September 30, 2015; the undisputed evidence is
that she did not receive the Right-to-Sue Notice until January 6, 2016. (Doc. 22 at ¶ 22).
Ms. Bruno acted diligently once she became concerned that she had not received the
Right-to-Sue Notice; in December, 2015, she called the OCRC every day for two weeks.
(Doc. 22 at ¶¶ 17-18). Tolling the limitations period for the Title VII claim will not
prejudice Citizens, as it will have to defend Ms. Bruno’s state law claim—premised on
identical allegations—regardless of whether the Title VII claim proceeds. Finally, the
Court does not believe that Ms. Bruno remained ignorant of any legal requirement.
In these circumstances, the Court finds it appropriate to equitably toll the 90-day
limitations period until January 6, 2016, when Ms. Bruno first received the Right-to-Sue
Notice. See Schmidlin v. Uncle Ed’s Oil Shoppes, Inc., Case No. 2:13-cv-10552, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100641 at ** 12-15 (E.D. Mich. July 24, 2014) (finding affidavit
testimony that plaintiff did not receive the right-to-sue notice, along with evidence that
plaintiff attempted to contact the EEOC on several occasions, sufficient to equitably toll
the 90-day period).

13

Citizens argues that federal courts only “sparingly” bestow equitable tolling.
(Doc. 30 at 15). After a thorough review of Sixth Circuit case law on this issue, the
Court agrees. However, in refusing to toll the 90-day limitations period, courts in this
Circuit typically cite to one of four reasons, none of which apply here.
First, courts refuse to toll the 90-day limitations period where the plaintiff
provides only “vague” testimony regarding receipt of the right-to-sue notice. See Fuller
v. Mich. DOT, 580 Fed. App’x 416, 424-25 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding plaintiff did not
provide sufficient evidence to rebut the five-day presumption of notice when he testified
that he received the right-to-sue notice “a week or two” after it was mailed and did not
recall the specific date).
Second, courts refuse to toll the limitations period where the plaintiff had
knowledge or suspicion that the EEOC had issued a right-to-sue notice. See GrahamHumphreys, 209 F.3d at 561-62 (equitable tolling not available when plaintiff ignored
notice of certified mail which she acknowledged she “suspected” contained a right-to-sue
notice).
Third, courts have refused to toll the limitations period where the plaintiff bears
some fault for not receiving the notice on time. See Banks v. Rockwell International
North American Aircraft Operations, 855 F.2d 324, 326-27 (6th Cir. 1988) (refusing to
toll 90-day limitations period where plaintiff did not receive the right-to-sue because he
failed to notify the EEOC of a change of address) (citing Hunter v. Stephenson Roofing
Co., 790 F.2d 472, 474-75 (6th Cir. 1986)).
14

Fourth, courts have refused to toll the limitations period where the plaintiff
received the letter more than five days after mailing, but still within the 90-day
limitations period. See Graham-Humphreys, 209 F.3d at 561 (citation omitted) (denying
equitable tolling because the plaintiff still had 74 days after actual receipt of her right-tosue notice to file a civil complaint).
Here, none of the reasons typically relied on by courts in this Circuit for denying
equitable tolling are present. There is no evidence to suggest that Ms. Bruno was at fault
for not receiving the Right-to-Sue Notice. She did not have actual or constructive
knowledge of the Right-to-Sue Notice until after the expiration of the original 90-day
period. (Doc. 22 at ¶ 22). Finally, there is no vague or inconsistent evidence as to the
date of receipt. Ms. Bruno asserts that she did not receive the Right-to-Sue Notice until
January 6, 2016, and that assertion is not contradicted by any evidence in the record.
(Id.).
The Court finds that Ms. Bruno has sufficiently rebutted the presumption that she
received the Right-to-Sue Notice five days after it was sent, and the start of the 90-day
limitations period should be equitably tolled until January 6, 2016. As Ms. Bruno filed

the Complaint on January 19, 2016, just 13 days later, Citizens’ request for summary
judgment on the grounds that the Title VII claim is untimely is DENIED.
B.

Citizens is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the merits.

15

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against any employee
“because he has opposed any practice made ‘an unlawful practice by [Title VII], or
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].’” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. 7
In an action under Title VII, the plaintiff may prove unlawful retaliation by either
(1) presenting direct evidence of retaliation or (2) by raising an inference of retaliation.
See Novotny v. Reed Elsevier, No. C-3-05-424, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66608 at * 65
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 10, 2007) (Rose, J) (citing Haughton v. Orchid Automation, 206 F.
App’x 524, 530 (6th Cir. 2006)).
Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion that
unlawful retaliation was a motivating factor in the employer’s action. Abbott v. Crown
Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537, 542 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Laderach v. U-Haul of

Northwestern Ohio, 207 F.3d 825, 829 (6th Cir. 2000)). Stated another way, evidence is
“direct” if it is capable of proving unlawful retaliation “without any inferences or
presumptions.” Id. (citation omitted).

7

Ms. Bruno brings claims for retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and Ohio Revised Code Section 4112.02. Because federal and state law retaliation
claims are governed by the same standards, the claims will be considered together. See
Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., Inc., 348 F.3d 537, 541-42 (6th Cir. 2003).
16

Here, Ms. Bruno does not offer any direct evidence of retaliation and instead asks
the Court to infer retaliation from the timing and circumstances of her discharge. (See
Doc. 21 at 9-14). Therefore, her claim will be reviewed using the three-step McDonnell
Douglas burden shifting analysis. Novotny, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66608 at * 65 (citing
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
Under the first step, Ms. Bruno must initially establish a prima facie retaliation
case by showing (1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) Citizens knew about the
protected activity, (3) Citizens took an adverse employment action against the employee,
and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
action. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 570 (6th Cir. 2004). Typically, the
burden of establishing a prima facie case in a retaliation action is not onerous, but one

17

easily met. Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2000). 8
If a plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie retaliation case, the burden
shifts to the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Mickey v.
Zeidler Took & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 562 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). If the
defendant articulates such a reason, the plaintiff may then show that the defendant’s
stated reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id.

1.

Ms. Bruno has not shown a prima facie case of discrimination.

8

Citizens argues Ms. Bruno faces a “heightened” burden at this first step because she was
discharged as part of the Reduction in Force. (Doc. 20 at 28). The Court does not agree.
The cases cited by Citizens in support of this proposition involve claims for unlawful
discrimination as opposed to unlawful retaliation. This distinction is critical because a
prima facie case of discrimination requires a plaintiff to show that she (1) is a member of
a protected class; (2) was qualified for the job or promotion sought; (3) experienced an
adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by someone outside of the protected
class. See Simpson v. Vanderbilt Univ., 359 Fed. App’x 562, 568-69 (6th Cir. 2009).
An employee who is discharged as part of a reduction in force generally cannot show the
fourth element of a discrimination claim (that she was replaced). That is why courts
require those plaintiffs to also show “additional, direct, circumstantial, or statistical
evidence tending to indicate that the employer singled out the plaintiff for discharge for
impermissible reasons.” Id. Without this additional requirement, every member of a
protected class who was included in a workforce reduction would be able to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination. Id.
Here, Ms. Bruno’s retaliation claim already requires her to show a causal connection
between her protected activity and discharge, and accordingly, the concerns which lead
the Sixth Circuit to require an additional showing in reduction in force discrimination
cases are not present. See Asmo v. Keane, Inc., 471 F.3d 588, 593 (6th Cir. 2006)
(finding the Barnes “additional-evidence” requirement irrelevant to a claim for FMLA
discrimination because the plaintiff was already required to show, inter alia, “a nexus
between her pregnancy and the adverse employment decision.”).
18

Defendants concede for purposes of their motion that Ms. Bruno has raised an
issue of fact as to the first three factors of a retaliation claim, but argue Ms. Bruno cannot
show the fourth factor, causation, “because there is no evidence from which any
reasonable finder of fact could conclude that Plaintiff’s October 2014 termination was
caused by the May 2014 letter.” (Doc. 20 at 19).
To meet the “causal connection” requirement, a plaintiff must show that “the
unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful
action or actions of the employer.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct.
2517, 2533 (2013). The Supreme Court has made clear that a “but-for” standard of
causation, rather than the less demanding “motivating factor” standard, applies in Title
VII retaliation cases. Id. at 2533-34. Accordingly, to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation, a plaintiff “must establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause
of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” Id. at 2534.
Ms. Bruno argues there is a causal connection between the May 23, 2014 Letter
and the termination of her employment because (1) temporal proximity exists between
Citizens’ receipt of the letter and its decision to discharge Ms. Bruno; (2) Ms. Bruno was
treated adversely by Mr. Terry after complaining of sex discrimination; (3) Mr. Terry and
Mr. Egan are not willing to accept responsibility for making the decision to discharge Ms.
Bruno and (4) Ms. Bruno was the only person in her position or salary grade who was
terminated in connection with the alleged reorganization. (Doc. 21 at 9-14).
a. Temporal proximity in this case does not establish a causal
connection.
19

Plaintiff argues the temporal proximity between the May 23, 2014 Letter and her
discharge is sufficient to infer retaliation. (Id. at 9-11). The Court does not agree.
Though Sixth Circuit case law on the issue is expansive, there is no “bright line”
rule for when a court may infer causation solely from the temporal proximity between the
employee’s protected activity and the adverse employment action.
On one hand, the Sixth Circuit has expressly stated “[t]he law is clear that
temporal proximity, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a causal connection for a
retaliation claim.” Tuttle v. Metro Gov’t, 474 F.3d 307, 321 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Little
v. BP Exploration & Oil Co., 265 F.3d 357, 363-64 (6th Cir. 2001) and Nguyen, 229 F.3d
at 566 (6th Cir. 2000)). 9 According to this line of cases, temporal proximity must be
combined “with other evidence of retaliatory conduct to establish a causal connection.”
See Tuttle, 474 F.3d at 321 (finding a causal connection when plaintiff was terminated
less than three months after she filed a complaint with the EEOC and, prior to
termination, was threatened by a human resources manager).
On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit has held “in certain distinct cases where the
temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse employment action is
acutely near in time, that close proximity is deemed indirect evidence such as to permit
an inference of retaliation to arise.” DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 421 (6th Cir. 2004)
(citations omitted); Asmo, 471 F.3d at 593 (“[t]emporal proximity can establish a causal
9

Nguyen is frequently cited for the proposition that temporal proximity cannot establish
causation, but the Sixth Circuit expressly stated in its opinion that “there may be
circumstances where temporal proximity alone would be sufficient.” 229 F.3d at 567.
20

connection between the protected activity and the unlawful employment action in the
retaliation context”); Brown v. ASD Computing Ctr., 519 F. Supp. 1096, 1116 (S.D. Ohio
1981) (Rice, J) (“where there is no direct proof of a retaliatory motive, retaliation may be
imputed if the timing of the retaliatory act is such as to allow an inference of retaliation to
arise”) (citation omitted).
The Sixth Circuit reconciled these two lines of cases in Mickey, reasoning that the
issue is whether enough time has passed between the employer’s knowledge of the
protected activity and the adverse employment action to allow the employee to produce
other evidence of retaliatory conduct:
[t]he two lines of cases are fully reconcilable. Where an adverse
employment action occurs very close in time after an employer learns of a
protected activity, such temporal proximity between the events is
significant enough to constitute evidence of a causal connection for the
purposes of satisfying a prima facie case of retaliation. But where some
time elapses between when the employer learns of a protected activity and
the subsequent adverse employment action, the employee must couple
temporal proximity with other evidence of retaliatory conduct to establish
causality. See Little, 265 F.3d at 365 (“[T]emporal proximity, when
considered with the other evidence of retaliatory conduct, is sufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact as to” a causal connection.).
The reason for this distinction is simple: if an employer immediately
retaliates against an employee upon learning of his protected activity, the
employee would be unable to couple temporal proximity with any such
other evidence of retaliation because the two actions happened
consecutively, and little other than the protected activity could motivate the
retaliation. Thus, employers who retaliate swiftly and immediately upon
learning of protected activity would ironically have a stronger defense than
those who delay in taking adverse retaliatory action.
516 F.3d at 525.

21

After Mickey, the Sixth Circuit has explained that temporal proximity, alone, can
create an inference of retaliation when the adverse employment action occurs “very
close” in time after the employer learns of a protected activity such that the circumstances
create an inference the employer acted with impermissible motives. See Lindsay v. Yates,
578 F.3d 407, 418 (6th Cir. 2009).
Initially, the parties disagree as to the relevant period of time for the temporal
proximity analysis. Citizens argues five months passed between its receipt of the May
23, 2014 Letter and Ms. Bruno’s last day of work on October 7, 2014. (Doc. 20 at 14).
Ms. Bruno argues the period could be as short as three months, and points to what
purports to be an organizational chart of the Cincinnati Site, dated August 29, 2014, that
does not include the Group Underwriting Manager position as part of the Cincinnati
Site’s underwriting management. (Doc. 21 at 10).
The Court agrees with Ms. Bruno that the relevant period of time is the date
Citizens became motivated to terminate her, not when she learned of her discharge. See
Haji v. Columbus City Schs., 621 Fed. App’x 309, 313 (6th Cir. 2015). Unfortunately,
that date is unclear. Ms. Bruno has the burden at this stage to point to facts in the record
indicating that temporal proximity exists from which the Court can infer causation, but
she has not set forth any affirmative evidence demonstrating when Citizens made the
decision to eliminate her position. In light of the Sixth Circuit’s instruction that causation
may be inferred from timing alone only when the adverse employment action occurs

22

“very close” to the protected activity, the Court will not infer causation in the absence of
affirmative evidence as to when that decision occurred.
In any event, even if the Court were to agree with Ms. Bruno that the adverse
employment action occurred three months after the protected activity, this, in and of
itself, would not show causation. Courts have reached inconsistent conclusions on
whether a period of three months in between the protected activity and subsequent
adverse employment action is short enough to infer a causal connection. See Basch v.
Knoll, Inc., 619 Fed. App’x 457, 461 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[a]bsent other evidence, three
months does not suffice to support a finding of causation”); but see Haji, 621 Fed. App’x
at 313 (“in an appropriate case, a gap of three months between the time the employer
learns of the protected activity and the adverse employment action may permit a jury to
draw a causal-connection inference.”) (citation omitted). However, on the facts of this
case, and in light of the fact that Ms. Bruno essentially concedes her position was
eliminated due to the Reduction in Force, 10 the Court refuses to draw the inference from
timing alone that Defendants acted with impermissible motives.
b. There is no “other evidence of retaliatory conduct.”

10

In her response to Citizens’ Statement of Proposed Undisputed Facts, Ms. Bruno denied
“due to a lack of knowledge” Citizens’ assertions that it eliminated the Cincinnati Group
Underwriting Manager position as part of a 2014 initiative to eliminate a layer of
management where possible. (Doc. 23 at ¶¶ 34-37, 39). Not only does her failure to
support her denial with evidence in the record violate this Court’s Standing Order
Governing Motions for Summary Judgment, but it is insufficient to meet her burden at
this stage to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).
23

Having found that temporal proximity alone is insufficient, the Court now
considers whether there is “other evidence of retaliatory conduct” sufficient to show
causation.
Ms. Bruno argues she “was treated adversely” by Mr. Terry after complaining of
sex discrimination. (Doc. 21 at 11). First, Ms. Bruno argues that, prior to her complaint,
she was permitted to attend personal appointments during the day, and after the May 23,
2014 Letter, Mr. Terry was stricter about requiring her to make up time she missed. (Id.).
Second, Ms. Bruno argues that Mr. Terry requested she reschedule her vacation, despite
not making a similar request prior to the May 23, 2014 Letter. (Id.). Third, Ms. Bruno
argues that, after the May 23, 2014 Letter, Mr. Terry sent multiple emails questioning her
decisions. (Id.).
These arguments are not well-taken. Initially, conclusory allegations of
harassment or scrutiny like those asserted by Ms. Bruno are insufficient to create a
genuine issue of fact as to the “causal connection” element of a retaliation claim. See
Levesque v. City of Toledo, No. 3:10-cv-606, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21881 at * 20 (N.D.
Ohio Jan. 27, 2011) (plaintiff’s statement that she was “harassed repeatedly . . .
disciplined following each exercise of her rights . . .followed by [another employee], and
monitored by supervisors” was insufficient evidence of “other retaliatory conduct” to
defeat employer’s motion for summary judgment).
In any event, the conduct alleged by Ms. Bruno is not retaliatory or harassing. Ms.
Bruno does not allege that she was disciplined or even that her requests for vacation or
24

leave were denied; she merely alleges she was asked if she “could” reschedule a vacation
and required to make up time for which she was out of the office. The Court refuses to
draw the inference that Citizens discharged Ms. Bruno for impermissible reasons from
these allegations.
c. There is no evidence that Mr. Egan or Mr. Terry are trying to
evade liability for an alleged unlawful employment action.
Ms. Bruno argues that the testimony between Mr. Egan and Mr. Terry regarding
who made the ultimate decision to terminate her employment is unclear, and argues a
reasonable finder of fact could infer from this that “neither is willing to accept
responsibility for making a decision which violates state and federal anti-discrimination
laws.” (Doc. 21 at 12).
The Court does not agree. The testimony of Mr. Egan and Mr. Terry is consistent
that Ms. Bruno’s position was eliminated during the Reduction in Force (Doc. 25 at 24:516; Doc. 26 at 40:5-15) and they both admit they were involved in that decision (Doc. 25
at 23:3-5; Doc. 26 at 37:23-41:8). Nothing the testimony of Mr. Egan or Mr. Terry
suggests the decision to terminate Ms. Bruno’s employment was unlawful or that they are
trying to escape culpability.
d. The fact that Ms. Bruno was the only person in her position or
salary grade to be terminated is irrelevant.
Ms. Bruno argues the Court can infer a retaliatory motive from the fact that she
was the only one of the four Group Underwriting Managers, and the only salary grade 17
employee, to lose her job in the Reduction in Force. (Doc. 21 at 12-14).
25

The Court does not agree for two reasons. First, Ms. Bruno’s argument focuses on
title and salary grade but completely ignores the different organizational structures at the
four HLS sites. The changes made by Citizens during the Reduction in Force do not
suggest a retaliatory motive; they suggest Citizens reorganized each site so as to only
have one layer of underwriting management at each location.
Prior to the Reduction in Force Ms. Bruno was the second layer of management at
the Cincinnati Site: the individual underwriters reported to one of two Regional
Underwriting Managers who in turn reported to Ms. Bruno. (Doc. 24 at 70:8-19).
Accordingly, when Ms. Bruno was discharged, the Cincinnati Site went from having two
layers of management to one. Id.
The only other HLS location to operate with two distinct layers of underwriting
management was the Rhode Island Site. Prior to the Reduction in Force, underwriters at
that site reported to three Regional Underwriting Managers who in turn reported to the
Group Underwriting Manager (Mr. Gausland). (Doc. 25 at 35:11-15). The Rhode Island
Group Underwriting Manager position was eliminated during the Reduction in Force.
(Doc. 26 at 44:23-45:9; Doc. 26-1). As a result, just like in Cincinnati, the Rhode Island
Site went from having two layers of management to one.
The Court does not afford any evidentiary weight to the fact that Ms. Miceli and
Mr. Owens, the Group Underwriting Managers at the New York and Virginia Sites, kept
their jobs. Prior to the Reduction in Force, underwriters at both the New York and
Virginia sites reported to Ms. Miceli and Mr. Owens directly without an intervening layer
26

of Regional Underwriting Managers. 11 Ms. Miceli and Mr. Owens were not just the
second layer of a two-layer management structure like Ms. Bruno (or Mr. Gausland);
they were the sole layer of management above the underwriters who reported to them.
The Court will not infer that Ms. Bruno’s discharge was the result of retaliation from the
fact that Ms. Miceli and Mr. Owens remained employed because the Court does not view
these individuals as “similarly situated” to Ms. Bruno.
Second, even if the Court were to view Ms. Miceli and Mr. Owens as “similarly
situated” to Ms. Bruno, the Court is unable to infer retaliation because Ms. Bruno did not
set forth any evidence they did not engage in a protected activity prior to the Reduction in
Force. See Keller v. Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 639 F. Supp. 2d 928, 945 (S.D.
Ind. 2009) (finding defendant-employer was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffemployee’s retaliation claim when the plaintiff-employee failed to set forth evidence that
other employees “did not engage in protected activity and were treated more favorably
than he was”) (emphasis added).
2.

11

Citizens articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
Ms. Bruno’s discharge.

Mr. Owens’ situation was unique: prior to the Reduction in Force, half of the Virginia
underwriters reported to Mr. Owens; the other half reported to a Regional Underwriting
Manager who in turn reported to Mr. Owens. (Doc. 20-1 at ¶¶10-11). After the
Reduction in Force, he exclusively managed underwriters. (Id. at ¶ 43). Mr. Owens was
never a distinct “second layer” of management like Mr. Gausland or Ms. Bruno, and the
fact that Citizens eliminated the portion of his duties that included managing another
manager is consistent with its stated goal of eliminating unnecessary layers of
management.
27

Even if Ms. Bruno were able to make a prima facie showing of retaliation, that
would not end the Court’s analysis. The burden would shift to Citizens to articulate a
non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Mickey, 516 F.3d at 562.
Citizens claims Ms. Bruno was discharged as part of its corporate initiative to
eliminate excessive layers of management. (Doc. 20 at 15-16; see also Doc. 25 at 24:516; Doc. 26 at 40:5-15). The Court finds Citizens has met its burden to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Schuch v. Savair, Inc., 118 Fed. App’x 16, 23
(6th Cir. 2004) (holding defendant set forth a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
plaintiff’s termination by presenting evidence that plaintiff’s position was eliminated as
part of a cost-saving reorganization effort).
3.

Ms. Bruno has not shown Citizens’ reason is pretext for
retaliation.

Ms. Bruno argues the Reduction in Force is merely pretext for Citizens’ unlawful
retaliation. (Doc. 21 at 15-20). The Court does not agree.
A plaintiff can demonstrate pretext by “showing that the proffered reason (1) has
no basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate the defendant’s challenged conduct, or
(3) was insufficient to warrant the challenged conduct. Dews v. A.B. Dick Co., 231 F.3d
1016, 1021 (6th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
Here, it is undisputed that the Reduction in Force occurred and that, as a result,
Citizens eliminated the Group Underwriting Manager position at the Cincinnati Site. 12

12

See note 10, supra.
28

Ms. Bruno sets forth three arguments seemingly aimed the second option, that the
Reduction in Force was not the actual motivation behind her discharge.
First, Ms. Bruno claims the testimony of Mr. Egan and Mr. Terry regarding who
decided to terminate her employment is inconsistent, and argues these inconsistencies
create an issue of fact as to whether the Reduction in Force was really the reason for her
discharge. (Doc. 21 at 16-19).
The Court does not agree. In some cases, Courts have found pretext when an
employer presents inconsistent justifications as to why it terminated an employee. See
Tinker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 127 F.3d 519, 522 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding inconsistent
testimony regarding who decided to fire an employee and what the real reason for the
decision was created an issue of fact as to pretext); Pierson v. Quad/Graphics Printing
Corp., 749 F.3d 530, 540 (6th Cir. 2014). As the Sixth Circuit has acknowledged,
inconsistent justifications may create an issue of fact as to what the real reason for
termination was and create an inference that the proffered reasons are pretext for
unlawful action:
Shifting justifications over time calls the credibility of those justifications
into question. By showing that the defendants’ justification for firing him
changed over time, [the plaintiff] shows a genuine issue of fact that the
defendants’ proferred reason was not only false, but that the falsity was
pretext for discrimination.
Cicero v. Borg-Warner Auto, Inc., 280 F.3d 579, 592 (6th Cir. 2002).
That is not the case here. The Court has reviewed the testimony of both Mr. Egan
and Mr. Terry and finds them consistent in all material aspects. Mr. Egan and Mr. Terry
29

both admit that they were involved in the decision to terminate Ms. Bruno’s employment.
(Doc. 25 at 23:3-5; Doc. 26 at 37:23-41:8). Importantly, Mr. Egan and Mr. Terry are
consistent that the reason for this decision was Citizens’ effort to decrease underwriting
management in the Cincinnati office from two layers of management to one. (Doc. 25 at
24:5-16; Doc. 26 at 40:5-15). To the extent they exist, the inconsistencies in their
testimony are simply not enough to cause the Court to question whether the Reduction in
Force was the real reason for Ms. Bruno’s termination. See Muir v. Chrysler LLC, 563 F.
Supp. 2d 783, 795 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (inconsistencies in testimony do not show pretext
when they “do not show the proffered reason lacks factual support or motivation for the
decision.”).
Second, Ms. Bruno repeats her argument that she must have been retaliated against
because she was the only Group Underwriting Manager to lose her job, and because
several Group Processing Managers—who were also salary grade 17 employees—were
reassigned to Pod Leader positions, while Ms. Bruno was discharged. (Doc. 21 at 13).
For a number of reasons, the Court does not agree. Ms. Bruno’s argument
regarding the other Group Underwriting Managers fails for the reasons set forth in
Section IV(B)(1)(d), supra. Ms. Bruno’s attempt to assign a retaliatory motive to the fact
that some Group Processing Managers were reassigned to Pod Leader positions fails
because employees in the processing department perform different functions than those in
the underwriting department (see Doc. 26 at 16:22-17:11) and there are no facts
suggesting the Group Processing Managers are “similarly situated” to Ms. Bruno other
30

than their salary grade, which is insufficient by itself to make these employees proper
comparators. See Thomas v. Kmart Corp., No. 4:04CV-171-M, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
71475 at ** 15-16 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 28, 2006) (holding an employee was not similarly
situated to other employees who “received essentially the same salary” because “the
record indicates that their job responsibilities were different.”).
And again, Ms. Bruno’s conclusory assertion that “[t]he one factor which
distinguished [her] from the other HLS Group Underwriting Managers and salary grade
17 Group Processing Managers was that she engaged in a protected activity” is woefully
unsupported by the record, as she has not provided any evidence that any Citizens
employee who kept his or her job did not engage in any protected activity.
Third, and finally, Ms. Bruno argues that Mr. Terry could have fired one of the
Cincinnati Regional Underwriting Managers, Mr. Barton or Ms. Dabney-Battle, and
replaced them with Ms. Bruno, but he “inexplicably” did not. (Doc. 21 at 20).
The Court does not agree. The evidence on this issue is that the Cincinnati
underwriters already reported to the Regional Underwriting Managers prior to the
Reduction in Force, and Citizens did not want to interrupt those established working
relationships. (Doc. 26 at 43:17-44:3). The Court will not second guess this decision.
See Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 763 (6th Cir. 2000) (“it is inappropriate for
the judiciary to substitute its judgment for that of management.”); Simms v. Oklahoma ex
rel. Dep’t of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1330 (10th Cir.

31

1999) (“[o]ur role is to prevent unlawful hiring practices, not to act as a ‘super personnel
department’ that second guesses employers’ business judgments.”).

32

V.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for these reasons, Citizens’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 20)
is GRANTED. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly, whereupon this case is
TERMINATED in this Court.

Date: ________
5/30/17

______________________
Timothy S. Black
United States District Judge

33