Dillow v. Home Care Network, Inc.

Filing 66

ORDER granting 62 Plaintiff's Unopposed Motion for Final Settlement Approval and granting 63 Plaintiff's Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses. The Court hereby dismisses the Action with prejudice, and all Released Claims against each and all Released Persons, and without costs to any of the parties as against the others. This case is TERMINATED on the docket of this Court. Signed by Judge Timothy S. Black on 10/3/18. (sct)

In the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio
Western Division
_____________________________________________________________________
RHONDA DILLOW,
On behalf of herself and those
similarly situated,

Case No. 1:16-cv-612

Plaintiff,

Judge Timothy S. Black

v.
HOME CARE NETWORK, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S UNOPPOSED MOTION
FOR FINAL SETTLEMENT APPROVAL AND
GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND EXPENSES
_____________________________________________________________________
Before the Court are Plaintiff’s unopposed motion for final approval of the class
action settlement (Doc. 62), Plaintiff’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and
expenses (Doc. 63), and the oral arguments presented by counsel at the fairness hearing
on September 18, 2018. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants both motions.
I.

BACKGROUND

a. Litigation History
This is a wage and hour lawsuit brought on behalf of a class of home healthcare
workers. Plaintiff alleges that she and similarly situated workers were not paid overtime
wages from January 1, 2015 until approximately March 2016. (Doc. 24, ¶¶ 39–40).
1

Plaintiff alleged that, due to change in the Department of Labor’s Regulations, effective
January 1, 2015, she and her fellow home healthcare workers were entitled to overtime
wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wages Standard
Act. (Doc. 24, Counts 1 and 2). Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that because Defendants
failed to pay those wages, they also violated the Ohio Prompt Pay Act, O.R.C. § 4113.15.
(Doc. 24, Count 3).
On December 16, 2016, Defendants moved for partial summary judgment on the
issue of when the new DOL Regulation became effective. (Doc. 15). The Court
previously detailed the background of the regulatory change. (Doc. 26). In sum, the
DOL amended its regulations related to “companionship services,” thereby entitling
certain workers to overtime wages under the FLSA. See Application of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to Domestic Service, 78 Fed. Reg. 60454, 60455 (Oct. 1, 2013). The
amendments’ effective date was January 1, 2015. Id. Because the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia held the DOL had exceeded its rule-making authority,
but was later reversed, there was a question as to when the amendment truly became
effective. (Doc. 26). This Court held that, because judicial decisions apply retroactively,
the amendments’ effective date was January 1, 2015. Id. Accordingly, the Court denied
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Id.
On January 27, 2017, Plaintiff moved for conditional certification of a collective
action and Rule 23 class certification. (Doc. 20). On June 5, 2017, the Court granted
Plaintiff’s motion. (Doc. 31).

2

Following the Court’s Order granting certification, Plaintiff’s counsel sent notice
of this lawsuit to approximately 305 class members. (Doc. 62, PAGEID 1509). Seventyone individuals joined the lawsuit or about 23% of the total class. Id. One person
excluded herself. (Doc. 40).
On March 27, 2018, Plaintiff moved to preliminarily approve the parties’
settlement agreement. (Doc 58). On April 17, 2018, the Court granted Plaintiff’s
motion. (Doc. 60). Plaintiff then sent notice to all class members regarding the
settlement. (Doc. 62, PAGEID 1510). No class members objected or excluded
themselves. Id.
b. Payments to Class Members
This case has one unusual aspect relevant to evaluating the parties’ settlement
agreement—Defendants elected to pay class members their unpaid overtime wages prior
to the parties reaching a formal settlement agreement. (Doc. 62, PAGEID 1508–9).
These payments occurred in two stages. Id.
First, at around the same time that Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, Defendants began to
pay class members for any overtime wages earned from approximately October 13, 2015
to April 2016. Id. Defendants made those payments, totaling $122,315.30 over the
course of three months. Id. Though there is some dispute among the parties as to
whether these payments were made as a result of this lawsuit, neither party counts these
payments as a benefit Plaintiff achieved for the class for purposes of this settlement and
proposed fee award.

3

Second, following the Court’s denial of Defendants’ motion for partial summary
judgment, Defendants voluntarily paid the class members an additional $435,252.20 in
overtime wages earned from January 1, 2015 to approximately October 2015. Id.
The Court notes that Defendants’ handling of this situation and the Court’s
February 27, 2017 Order is commendable. In doing so, the Court does not disagree that
FLSA settlements “generally require approval by a district court or the United States
Department of Labor.” Johnson v. Kestrel Eng’g, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-2575, 2016 WL
7655249, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 22, 2016). However, Defendants’ actions in promptly
addressing the claims in this case should not go unrecognized.
c. The Settlement Agreement
The parties’ settlement agreement obligates Defendants to pay $113,224.67 (in
addition to the above amounts) allocated to three categories of payments and damages.
(Doc. 62, PAGEID 1511).
First, Defendants will pay $14,224.67 to class members for unpaid overtime
wages. Id. This, combined with the payments noted above will mean that class
members, regardless of whether they joined this lawsuit, will receive 100% of their
unpaid overtime wages. Id.
Second, Defendants will pay $56,000 divided equally among the 197 class
members who have at least one pay period of alleged unpaid overtime wages during the
October 2015 to April 2016 time period. Id. Each of those class members will receive an
additional $284.26 to account for Ohio Prompt Pay Act liquidated damages. Id.

4

Third, Defendants will pay $43,000 divided among the class members who joined
the lawsuit. Id. This amount will be divided on a prorated basis, based on each class
members’ alleged FLSA liquidated damages. Id. This will give each opt-in class
member approximately 35.5% of their alleged FLSA liquidated damages. Id.
In addition to the above, Defendants have agreed to pay the named Plaintiff an
$8,500 service award, subject to this Court’s approval. Id. Finally, in addition to these
amounts, Defendants have agreed to pay the class’s reasonable attorney’s fees and
expenses, as determined by this Court. Id. These two issues are discussed in further
detail below.
II.

ANALYSIS
a. The parties’ settlement is fair and reasonable.
Before a district court approves a settlement, the Court must find that the

settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Johnson v. Midwest Logistics Sys., Ltd.,
Case No. 2:11-cv-1061, 2013 WL 2295880, at *4, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74201, at *9
(S.D. Ohio May 24, 2013) (citation omitted). In the Sixth Circuit, district courts consider
seven factors in determining whether a class settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate:
(1) the risk of fraud or collusion; (2) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the
litigation; (3) the amount of discovery engaged in by the parties, (4) the likelihood of
success on the merits; (5) the opinions of class counsel and class representatives; (6) the
reaction of absent class members; and (7) the public interest. UAW v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
497 F.3d 615, 631 (6th Cir. 2007). As set forth below, each of these factors weighs in
favor of approving the parties’ settlement.
5

i. The Risk of Fraud or Collusion
The evidence before the Court clearly reflects that the Settlement Agreement is the
product of arms-length negotiations conducted by experienced counsel on both sides.
Nothing before the Court suggests that the Settlement is the result of fraud or collusion.
The Court notes that, at the fairness hearing, counsel described the negotiations as
involving numerous, detailed settlement proposals, which included law and argument,
and additional oral negotiations. This is indicative of arms-length negotiations. Moreover,
the parties reached the settlement after the Court decided two significant legal issues in
the case—class certification and Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment—and
after the parties conducted the discovery necessary to evaluate the parties’ claims and
defenses. See In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. 359, 380 (N.D. Ohio
2001) (“when a settlement is the result of extensive negotiations by experienced counsel,
the Court should presume it is fair”).
ii. The Complexity, Expense and Likely Duration
From the outset, the Court notes that wage and hour class and collective actions,
such as this, are inherently complex and time-consuming. Swigart v. Fifth Third Bank,
No. 1:11-cv-88, 2014 WL 3447947, at *7 (S.D. Ohio July 11, 2014). This case was no
exception.
This case also presented a relatively novel legal question related to the DOL’s
regulatory change, noted above. During the fairness hearing, counsel for both parties
noted that an appeal would have been likely on this issue because the Sixth Circuit has

6

not yet addressed the issue. See, e.g., Scheck v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc., 5:17-cv2480, 2018 WL 3772728, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Aug 9, 2018).
Resolving these issues and the remaining discovery, procedural, merits, and
damages questions would have been risky, costly, and time consuming. Accordingly, the
litigation was difficult and complex, and this weighs in favor of the settlement.
iii. The Amount of Discovery Engaged in by the Parties
The parties reached their settlement after having exchanged the most crucial piece
of evidence in this case—Defendants’ payroll records. (Doc. 62, PAGEID 1514). While
the parties did not conduct any depositions, in a wage and hour case based primarily on
payroll records, this is sufficient for the parties to properly evaluate their risks and fairly
settle the claims. The Court finds that this settlement resulted from informed negotiations
by experienced counsel.
iv. The Opinions of Class Counsel and Class Representatives
The Class Representative, present at the fairness hearing, approves the Settlement
Agreement. Plaintiff’s counsel believes that the settlement is fair, adequate and
reasonable. (Doc. 62, PAGEID 1514). This factor weighs in favor of approval. See In re
Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., Case No. 08-MD-01952, 2011 WL 717519, at *11, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17255, at * 55 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 22, 2011) (“Class counsel’s judgment
that settlement is in the best interest of the class is entitled to significant weight, and
supports the fairness of the settlement”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

7

v. The Reaction of Absent Class Members
The class’s reaction strongly supports approval. Out of 305 class members, none
rejected, objected, or excluded themselves from the settlement. One class member
excluded herself from the case during the original opt-in period (Doc. 40), and prior to a
settlement being reached, which does not bear on the class’s reaction to the settlement.
vi. The Public Interest
Public policy favors settlement of class action lawsuits. Swigart v. Fifth Third
Bank, No. 1:11-cv-88, 2014 WL 3447947, at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 11, 2014). This case is
no exception. The settlement provides relief to the class members, avoids further
litigation in a complex case, and frees the Court’s judicial resources. Accordingly, the
Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of approving the proposed Settlement because
the public interest is served by resolution of this action.
vii. Overall Settlement Terms
The Court finds that the settlement provides a fair, adequate, and reasonable
resolution to this lawsuit. Combined with Defendants’ prior unpaid wage payments, the
agreement provides class members, regardless of whether they joined the case, 100% of
their unpaid overtime wages. (Doc. 62, PAGEID 1513). The agreement also provides
class members who joined the case an additional 35.5% of their unpaid wages as FLSA
liquidated damages. Id. Finally, the agreement provides an additional $284.26 to those
class members with at least one pay period after October 2015. The Court finds this is a
good result for the class members and appropriately accounts for the risk of going
forward with the litigation.
8

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s unopposed motion for final approval of the
parties’ settlement agreement.
b. Fees, Expenses, and Contribution Awards
i. Plaintiff’s counsel are entitled to their requested fee
Plaintiff’s counsel have requested an order approving the payment of $185,658.73
in attorney’s fees. (Doc. 63). In this case, the settlement agreement provides that the
attorneys’ fees will be paid separately from and in addition to the money going to the
class. (Doc. 63, PAGEID 1537).
Defendants agree that Plaintiff’s counsel are entitled to a fee award but dispute the
amount of the award. (Doc. 64). Defendants suggest that “any fee should be at most
$76,000.” Id. at PAGEID 1574.
District courts may award reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses from the
settlement of a class action under Rules 54(d)(2) and 23(h). See Lowther v. AK Steel
Corp., Case No. 1:11-cv-877, 2012 WL 6676131, at *1, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181476,
at * 2 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2012). When assessing the reasonableness of a fee petition,
district courts engage in a two-part analysis. See In re Cardinal Health Inc. Sec. Litig.,
528 F. Supp. 2d 752, 760 (S.D. Ohio 2007). First, the district court determines the
method for calculating fees: either the percentage of the fund approach or the lodestar
approach. Id. (citation omitted). Second, the court must analyze the six factors set forth
by the Sixth Circuit in Ramey v. Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 508 F.2d 1188, 1196 (6th Cir.
1974). Id.

9

1. The Court adopts the percentage approach.
In the Sixth Circuit, district courts have the discretion to determine the appropriate
method for calculating attorneys’ fees in light of the unique characteristics of class
actions in general, as well as the particular circumstances of the actual cases pending
before the Court, using either the percentage or lodestar approach. In re Cardinal Health
Inc. Sec. Litigs., 528 F. Supp. 2d at 761. In the Southern District of Ohio, the preferred
method is “to award a reasonable percentage of the fund, with reference to the lodestar
and the resulting multiplier.” Connectivity Sys. Inc. v. Nat'l City Bank, Case No. 2:08-cv1119, 2011 WL 292008, at *13, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7829, at *34 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 26,
2011) (citation omitted).
Although this case is not precisely a common fund case (as the funds going to pay
for attorneys’ fees and costs are to be paid under the Settlement Agreement separate and
apart from the money that goes to the wages and liquidated damages to the class
members), nonetheless, the common fund analysis properly applies. Merkner v. AK Steel
Corp., No. 1:09-cv-423, 2011 WL 13202629, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 10, 2011). The Court
finds that the percentage approach is proper in this case.
To determine the amount of the “fund” for purposes of this analysis, courts include
all amounts benefitting the class, including those amounts typically born by the class,
such as attorneys’ fees and notice and administration costs. As the Sixth Circuit
explained, when conducting a percentage of the fund analysis, “Attorney’s fees are the
numerator and the denominator is the dollar amount of the Total Benefit to the class
(which includes the ‘benefit to class members,’ the attorney’s fees and may include costs
10

of administration).” Gascho v. Glob. Fitness Holdings, LLC, 822 F.3d 269, 282 (6th Cir.
2016). To determine the amount of the benefit conferred, courts look to the total amount
made available to the class, rather than the amount ultimately claimed by class members.
Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 480-81, 100 S.Ct. 745, 62 L.Ed.2d 676 (1980).
Here, the settlement will result in a total benefit to the class of at least
$745,457.23: $556,976.87 in payments to class members, $185,658.73 in attorneys’ fees,
and $2,821.63 in expenses. Plaintiff’s fee request is 24.9% of this amount. Defendants
argue that the fee and expense award should not be considered when calculating the
common fund amount. (Doc. 64, PAGEID 1571). The Sixth Circuit, however, has
instructed that the Court should consider those items in the calculation. Gascho, 822
F.3d at 282.
Even if the Court did not consider fees and expenses as part of the class’s benefits,
Plaintiff seeks 33% of the amount directly going to the class members. Under either
calculation, whether 24.9% or 33%, this Court finds Plaintiff’s request is reasonable and
well within the ranges of fees typically approved by courts in the Sixth Circuit. See In re
Broadwing, Inc. ERISA Litig., 252 F.R.D. 369, 380-81 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (“Attorneys fees
awards typically range from 20 to 50 percent of the common fund”) (collecting cases); In
re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 137 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (“the range of
reasonableness ... has been designated as between twenty to fifty percent of the common
fund”); In re S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 173 F.R.D. 205, 217 (S.D. Ohio 1997), rev’d on
other grounds, 24 Fed. Appx. 520 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[t]ypically, the percentage awarded
ranges from 20 to 50 percent of the common fund”).
11

2. The Ramey factors
In reviewing the reasonableness of the requested fee award, the Sixth Circuit
requires district courts to consider six factors, known as the Ramey factors: (1) the value
of the benefits rendered to the class; (2) society’s stake in rewarding attorneys who
produce such benefits in order to maintain an incentive to others; (3) whether the services
were undertaken on a contingent fee basis; (4) the value of the services on an hourly basis
(the lodestar cross-check); (5) the complexity of the litigation; and (6) the professional
skill and standing of counsel on both sides. Ramey, 508 F.2d at 1196. Here, each of
these factors weighs in favor of granting the requested fee.
First, Plaintiff’s counsel’s work resulted in significant benefit to class members
whereby each class member will receive at least 100% of their unpaid wages, and, in
many cases, will receive more. The settlement provides tangible relief to class members
now and eliminates the risk and uncertainty parties would otherwise incur if this litigation
were to continue. The fact that there have been no opt-outs to the settlement and no
objections demonstrates that class members recognize the settlement’s substantial benefit.
See Hainey v. Parrott, 617 F. Supp. 2d 668, 675 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (“a small number of
objections, particularly in a class of this size, indicates that the settlement is fair,
reasonable and adequate”).
Second, the Court finds that there is a benefit to society in ensuring that claimants
with smaller claims may pool their claims and resources, and attorneys who take on class
action cases enable this. See Moore v. Aerotek, Inc., Case No. 2:15-cv-2701, 2:15-cv1066, 2017 WL 2838148, at *8, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102621, at * 26 (S.D. Ohio June
12

30, 2017) (citation omitted). This is particularly true in the wage and hour context, where
often, as here, class and collective actions allow a large number of low-wage workers
recover unpaid wages. Here, Plaintiff’s counsel’s effort resulted in a tangible reward for
the class members. Many of the class members would not have been able or willing to
pursue their claim individually, and many would likely not even be aware they had a
claim against Defendant. Id. Society has a stake in rewarding attorneys who achieve a
result that the individual class members probably could not obtain on their own. Id.
(citation omitted).
Third, despite the risks associated with prosecuting this case, Plaintiff’s counsel
litigated this matter on a wholly-contingent basis with no guarantee of recovery over a
period of more than two years. (Doc. 63, PAGEID 1542).
Fourth, a lodestar cross-check, while unnecessary, also supports Plaintiff’s
counsel’s fee request. See Rikos v. Proctor & Gamble Co., No. 1:11-cv-226, 2018 WL
2009681, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 30, 2018). Under the lodestar calculation, the Court
multiplies the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable
hourly rate. See Gascho, 822 F.3d at 279 (citation omitted). The Court then has the
discretion to enhance the lodestar with a separate multiplier that can serve as a means to
account for the risk an attorney assumes in undertaking a case, the quality of the
attorney’s work product, and the public benefit achieved. Id. at 279, 280.
Here, Plaintiff’s counsel expended 234.3 hours litigating this case. (Doc. 62-4,
PAGEID 1532). Defendants do not dispute the reasonableness of the amount of hours
Plaintiff’s counsel expended, nor their overall lodestar of $63,978. (Doc. 64, PAGEID
13

1569). Defendants note that “[d]espite a much higher hourly rate, this amount is actually
fairly close to the defense costs for the case, demonstrating that it represents the actual
cost to litigate the case.” Id. Defendants dispute, however, at least one of Plaintiff’s
counsel’s hourly rates and the lodestar multiplier. Id. at PAGEID 1573.
With respect to the hourly rates used in this case by Plaintiff’s counsel’s primary
timekeepers, the Court finds the rates to be reasonable in light of counsel’s experience,
skill, and areas and level of expertise. In making this assessment, the Court uses its own
experience and knowledge of the relevant legal market, Plaintiff’s submissions (Docs. 63,
63-3, 63-4), counsel’s arguments at the fairness hearing, and counsel’s conduct during
this litigation. Moreover, the Court considered the Rubin Committee rates, adjusted for
2018.
Attorney
Mike Lore
Andy Biller
Andrew Kimble
Eric Kmetz

Years in Practice
25
13
7
3

Requested Rate
$675
$400
$325
$250

Rubin Rate
$506
$448
$380
$283

Using Plaintiff’s counsel’s customary hourly rates, the proposed fee award is
approximately 2.9 times the lodestar. The Court finds that this is well within the
acceptable range of multipliers for cases such as this. See, e.g., Swigart, 2014 WL
3447947, at *6 (finding a 2.57 multiplier was appropriate in an FLSA class/collective
action); see also Lowther v. AK Steel Corp., No. 1:11-cv-877, 2012 WL 6676131, at *5
(S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2012) (approving a 3.06 multiplier and citing cases that found
multipliers ranging from 4.3 to 8.5 to be reasonable); Castillo v. Morales, Inc., No. 2:12-

14

cv-650, 2015 WL 13021899, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 22, 2015) (holding that a 2.5
multiplier is “typical of lodestar multipliers in similar cases”).
Fifth, as noted above, this was a complex wage and hour class/collective action
that included a relatively novel legal question. The Court finds that this factor weighs in
favor of approval.
Sixth, and finally, Plaintiff and Defendants are represented by highly experienced
counsel. All counsel are highly qualified and have substantial experience in federal
courts and class action litigation. (See Docs. 62-2; 63-4; 64-1). Plaintiff’s counsel has
substantial experience in wage-and-hour litigation. Castillo, 2015 WL 13021899, at *7
(referring to Mr. Biller).
For these reasons, the Court determines the fees requested are reasonable, and
GRANTS Plaintiff’s Counsel’s request for fees in the amount of $185,658.73.
3. Plaintiff’s counsel are entitled to reimbursement of
expenses.
Under the common fund doctrine, Plaintiff’s counsel are entitled to reimbursement
of all reasonable out-of-pocket expenses and costs incurred in the prosecution of claims
and in obtaining settlement. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D. 508, 535
(E.D. Mich. 2003). Expense awards are customary when litigants have created a
common settlement fund for the benefit of a class. Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff’s counsel request $2,821.63 in expenses that have been incurred
prosecuting this case. (Doc. 63, PAGEID 1536). The limited expenses primarily include
filing fees and class notice-related fees. Upon review, all of Plaintiff’s Counsel’s
15

expenses were reasonable and necessary in connection with litigating and resolving this
case and are therefore reimbursable. Defendants do not dispute that the fees are
reasonable and reimbursable.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Counsel’s request for $2,821.63 in
expenses.
ii. The class representative is entitled to a contribution award.
Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Plaintiff requests a service award of
$8,500. Courts typically authorize contribution (or “incentive” awards) to class
representatives for their often-extensive involvement with a lawsuit. See Estep v.
Blackwell, Case No. 1:06-cv-106, 2006 WL 3469569, at *5–6, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
89360, at * 15 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 29, 2006) (citations omitted). Such compensation to
named plaintiffs is typically justified where the named plaintiffs expend time and effort
beyond that of the other class members in assisting class counsel with the litigation, such
as by actively reviewing the case and advising counsel in the prosecution of the case. In
re S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 175 F.R.D. 270, 273 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
Here, Plaintiff contributed her efforts to the lawsuit by providing information and
documents to her counsel, remaining informed and involved throughout the litigation,
contacting and consulting her counsel concerning the litigation, reviewing documents and
settlement proposals, and was willing to testify at a trial. During the fairness hearing,
Plaintiff’s counsel noted that, even with the incentive award, Plaintiff will receive less
money than some of the class members that she helped through this lawsuit.

16

The Court finds that, only through Plaintiff’s efforts did a large group of low-wage
workers receive a substantial amount of unpaid wages and liquidated damages. Plaintiff’s
efforts furthered the important public policies underlying the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The Court further finds that it is appropriate to reward plaintiffs, particularly in wage and
hour cases, who obtain excellent, tangible benefits for their fellow workers. In light of
these considerations, the Court finds that the proposed service award of $8,500 is modest.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for a service award of
$8,500.
III.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff’s unopposed motion for final settlement
approval (Doc. 62) and Plaintiff’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses
(Doc. 63) are GRANTED. Accordingly:
1. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2), the Court finds after a
hearing and based on all of the parties’ submissions, the settlement
agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court considered the record in its entirety and heard the arguments of counsel
for the parties. In addition, the Court has considered a number of factors,
including: (1) the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation;
(2) the reaction of the class members to the settlement agreement; (3) the
stage of proceedings and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the risks of
establishing liability; (5) the risks of maintaining the class action through the
trial; and (6) the reasonableness of monetary benefits to the class members.
2. The terms and provisions of the Settlement Agreement are the product of
thorough, arms-length negotiations among experienced and competent
counsel. Approval of the Settlement Agreement will result in substantial
savings of time, money and effort to the Court and the parties, and will further
the interests of justice.

17

3. All class members who have not timely and validly filed opt-outs are thus
class members who are bound by this Judgment and by the terms of the
Settlement Agreement.
4. Nothing in the Settlement Agreement, this Judgment, or the fact of the
settlement constitutes any admission by any of the parties of any liability,
wrongdoing, or violation of law, damages or lack thereof, or of the validity
or invalidity of any claim or defense asserted in the Action.
5. The Court has considered the submissions by the parties and all other
relevant factors, including the results achieved and the efforts of Plaintiff’s
counsel in prosecuting the claims on behalf of the class members. Plaintiff
participated in the Action, acted to protect the Class, and assisted her counsel.
The efforts of Plaintiff’s counsel have produced the Settlement Agreement
entered into good faith, and which provides a fair, reasonable, adequate, and
certain result for the Class. Plaintiff’s counsel have made application for an
award of $185,658.73 in attorneys’ fees and $2,821.63 in expenses incurred
in the prosecution of the Action on behalf of themselves and the other
Plaintiff’s counsel. The combined total of the award is $188,480.36, which
the Court finds to be fair, reasonable, and adequate under the circumstances.
The Court hereby awards $188,480.36 as attorneys’ fees and expenses.
Plaintiff’s counsel shall be responsible for distributing and allocating the
Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses award to Plaintiff’s counsel in their sole
discretion. Further, Plaintiff is entitled to a fair, reasonable and justified
service award of $8,500, to be paid by Defendant.
6. The Court hereby dismisses the Action with prejudice, and all Released
Claims against each and all Released Persons, and without costs to any of the
parties as against the others.
7. Without affecting the finality of this Judgment, the Court reserves
jurisdiction over the implementation, administration, and enforcement of this
Judgment and the Settlement Agreement, and all matters ancillary thereto.
8. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly, whereupon this case is
TERMINATED on the docket of this Court.

Date:

10/3/18

Timothy S. Black
United States District Judge

18