Allgeyer v. Cincinnati City of et al

Filing 17

ORDER adopting 14 Order by the Magistrate Judge; granting in part and denying in part 12 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Judge Michael R. Barrett on 3/31/18. (ba)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
Mary Jill Allgeyer,
:
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:16cv1128
:

District Judge Barrett
Magistrate Judge Bowman

-vsCity of Cincinnati, et al.,
:
Defendants.

ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the magistrate judge’s October 5, 2017 report
and recommendation (Doc. 14), which converts Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings (Doc. 12) into motion for summary judgment, and recommends that the
Motion be granted in part and denied in part. On October 19, 2017, Plaintiff timely filed
objections. (Doc. 15). Despite an opportunity to do so, Defendants did not file a
response. This matter is now ripe for review.
I.

BACKGROUND

The magistrate judge summarized the factual background and procedural history
of this case, which will not be restated here, except as necessary to address Plaintiff’s
objections. In sum, however, Plaintiff alleges discrimination under Title VII and the
ADEA. In recommending partial judgment in favor of Defendants, the magistrate judge
reviewed all relevant exhibits submitted by both parties, and concluded that the
applicable statutes of limitation bar most – but not all – of Plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. 14;
PageID 373). The magistrate judge concluded that, based on when the Plaintiff filed
her claims with the EEOC, “any discriminatory acts that occurred prior to November 27,
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2015 would be time-barred under Title VII and the ADEA.” (Id.) The magistrate judge
observed that “[e]ven on its face, Plaintiff’s complaint makes clear that most of the
events of which she complains occurred not mere days, but years” prior to November
2015. (Id.) (emphasis added).
Ultimately, the magistrate judge issued the following recommendation to the
undersigned:
IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT Defendants’ construed motion
for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims be GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART. All claims relating to Plaintiffs’
1993 termination, all claims relating to the City’s failure to
promote her throughout her employment, and all claims
alleging discriminatory terms and conditions of her
employment should be dismissed as time-barred except for
Plaintiff’s “failure to promote” claims alleging race and age
discrimination based upon the City’s failure to promote
Plaintiff to positions for which Plaintiff submitted applications
on or after November 27, 2015. Discovery shall continue to
proceed only on the specified failure-to-promote claims.
Additionally, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT all claims against
individual Defendants Black and Kelly, and Plaintiff’s hostile
work environment claims, be DISMISSED for failure to state
any claim.

Plaintiff asks this Court to reject the foregoing recommendation.
II.

STANDARD

This Court shall consider objections to a magistrate judge's order on a nondispositive matter and “shall modify or set aside any portion of the magistrate judge's
order found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). When
objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation are received on a
dispositive matter, the assigned district judge “must determine de novo any part of the
magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

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72(b)(3). After review, the district judge “may accept, reject, or modify the
recommended decision; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate
judge with instructions.” Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
A district judge’s review of objections to a report and recommendation should not
be duplicative. Howard v. Sec’y of H.H.S., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). “Merely
restating arguments previously presented, stating a disagreement with a magistrate
judge's suggested resolution, or simply summarizing what has been presented before is
not a specific objection that alerts the district court to the alleged errors on the part of
the magistrate judge.” Renchen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29910
at *3-4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 11, 2015) (citing Howard, 932 F.2d at 508-09).
III.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff has submitted objections reiterating, in detail, the alleged facts
underlying her claims. However, she offers little in terms of a specific objection to the
magistrate judge’s computation of the statute of limitations. Without supporting
authority, Plaintiff argues that “the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Wage Act is an amendment under
Title VII that gives credence that I may be made whole after years of repeated
discrimination in many forms.” (Doc. 15; PageID 382). The foregoing objection
arguably concedes that the alleged discriminatory acts occurred “years” ago.
Furthermore, Plaintiff’s reliance on the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 is misplaced.
The magistrate judge already concluded – and the undersigned agrees – that Plaintiff’s
reference to the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 does not save her Title VII and
ADEA claims (i.e., the only claims set forth in the complaint). (Doc. 14; PageID 378)
(citing Morrow v. L & L Products, Inc., 945 F. Supp.2d 835, 848 (E.D. Mich. 2013); Ector

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v. Potter, 2010 WL 1433311 at n.6 (S.D. Ohio April 5, 2010); Squires v. City of Detroit,
2011 WL 2143116 at n.4 (E.D. Mich. May 10, 2011)).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objection is not well-taken.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the above, the Court ADOPTS the report (Doc. 14) of the
magistrate judge. Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 12) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED
IN PART. Specifically, all claims relating to Plaintiffs’ 1993 termination, all claims
relating to the City’s failure to promote her throughout her employment, and all claims
alleging discriminatory terms and conditions of her employment are DISMISSED as
time-barred, except for Plaintiff’s “failure to promote” claims alleging race and age
discrimination based upon the City’s failure to promote Plaintiff to positions for which
Plaintiff submitted applications on or after November 27, 2015. Additionally, all claims
against individual Defendants Black and Kelly, and Plaintiff’s hostile work environment
claims, are DISMISSED for failure to state any claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

S/ Michael R. Barrett
____________________________
Hon. Michael R. Barrett
United States District Judge

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