Patrick v. Shawnee State University

Filing 44

OPINION AND ORDER - It is ORDERED that Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 24 ) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part: Defendants Motion is granted regarding Plaintiffs claim of FMLA retaliation with respect to the Assistant Director positi on and denied regarding Plaintiffs claim of FMLA retaliation with respect to the Director position. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to file a Surreply (Doc. 37 ) is DENIED. The Court will schedule a telephone conference in this matter shortly. Signed by Judge Michael R. Barrett on 03/30/2020. (bjc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

Michelle Patrick,
Plaintiff,
v.
Shawnee State University.,
Defendant.

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Case No. 1:17-cv-00492

Judge Michael R. Barrett

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Shawnee State University’s Motion
for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 24). Plaintiff Michelle Patrick filed a Response in
Opposition (Doc. 39)1 and Defendants filed a Reply (Doc. 34). Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave
to file a Surreply (Doc. 37) is also before the Court. Defendant filed a Response in
Opposition (Doc. 40) and Plaintiff submitted a Reply (Doc. 41).
I.

Background
Defendant is a public university located in Portsmouth, Ohio. (Doc. 2, ¶ 2). Plaintiff
began working for Defendant in November 2003 as a Testing Coordinator in Defendant’s
Student Success Center which provides academic services and support to Defendant’s
students. (Doc. 20, PageID 20-21); (Doc. 21, PageID 221). Plaintiff became an Academic
Support Coordinator in the Student Success Center in 2011. (Doc. 21, PageID 222-23).
Brenda Haas was the Dean of the Student Success Center from 2011 until December
The Court permitted Plaintiff to file a corrected version of her Response in Opposition that included changes to
citations to conform with the undersigned’s Standing Orders and to correct her exhibit references. (Doc. 36).

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2016 and approved Plaintiff’s request to move from Testing Coordinator to Academic
Support Coordinator. (Doc. 20, PageID 70-71); (Doc. 21., PageID 222-23). In September
2013, Plaintiff applied for and became an Accessibility Coordinator in the Student
Success Center. (Id., PageID 235).
In 2015, Defendant posted the position of Director of Advising and Academic
Resources for the Student Success Center (“Director position”). (Doc. 20, PageID 87-88).
Dean Haas worked with Defendant’s Human Resources (“HR”) Department to form a
selection committee to fill the Director position. (Id., PageID 76-77). HR initially screened
the applications for the Director position from a nationwide search and gave a list of
applicants to the selection committee. Id. The committee used HR’s list to select
applicants for telephone interviews with the committee. (Id., PageID 80, 94-95). After the
telephone interviews, the committee selected five applicants for on-campus interviews
which consisted of a one-on-one interview with Dean Haas, an in-person interview with
the selection committee, and a presentation to the selection committee that was also open
to the entire university. (Id., PageID 94-95). The individual selection committee members
subsequently ranked each candidate and then the selection committee, as a group,
ranked each candidate by creating a final document titled “Data Fusion” for each
applicant. (Id., PageID 84-85, 102, 112-119); (Doc. 20-1, PageID 188-92). The rankings
found on the final Data Fusion sheets determined the order in which Defendant offered
the Director position to the remaining five applicants. (Doc. 20, PageID 103).
On June 3, 2015, Plaintiff informed Dean Haas, her boss, that she was interested
in taking intermittent FMLA leave for the summer, as her son was out of school for the
summer, his scheduled caretaker suddenly became ill, and he required a high level of

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care due to his severe autism. (Doc. 21, PageID 258); (Doc. 21-1, PageID 376, 379).
Plaintiff wanted to work a 20-hour week until mid-August when her son would return to
school. (Doc. 21, PageID 258); (Doc. 21-1, PageID 376). On June 4, 2015, Plaintiff
inquired with Defendant’s HR Department about taking FMLA leave and an HR
representative responded with the steps that Plaintiff needed to take to apply for FMLA
leave. (Doc. 21-1, PageID 378-79). Also on June 4, 2015, Plaintiff submitted her
application to Defendant for the Director position. (Doc. 21-1, PageID 373).
On June 9, 2015, Plaintiff received approval for her FMLA leave to begin on
June 15, 2015. Id. She had her telephone interview with the selection committee for the
Director position that same day. Id. The selection committee subsequently invited Plaintiff
to participate in an on-campus interview. Id. Her on-campus interview occurred on
June 26, 2015. Id.
After all of the on-campus interviews occurred, the selection committee met and
created a Data Fusion sheet for each candidate. (Doc. 20, PageID 103). Based on the
committee’s rankings, Defendant first offered the Director position to Ronda Bryant, an
individual who did not work for Defendant, who declined the offer. (Doc. 20, PageID 106);
(Doc. 24-2, ¶ 8). Defendant then offered the position to Melinda Finkle, an individual who
did not work for Defendant, and she also declined the offer. (Doc. 20, PageID 106); (Doc.
24-2, ¶ 8). Defendant next offered the position to Glenna Heckler-Todt, who worked for
Defendant as a Senior Developmental Writing Instructor in Defendant’s English
Department, and she accepted the offer. (Doc. 20, PageID 107); (Doc. 31, PageID 743).
The selection committee ranked Plaintiff immediately after Heckler-Todt. (Doc. 20-1,
PageID 188-92).

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On July 20, 2015, Plaintiff learned that the selection committee offered HecklerTodt the Director position. (Doc. 21, PageID 279). The next day, Plaintiff informed
Defendant’s Director of HR that she believed the selection committee did not offer her the
Director position because of her use of FMLA leave. (Doc. 23, PageID 443-45); (Doc. 231, PageID 501). Specifically, Plaintiff believed that there was a calculated effort between
Dean Haas and the selection committee to not award Plaintiff the position due to Dean
Haas’ dislike of Plaintiff’s use of, inter alia, FMLA leave. Id. Defendant’s HR Department
met with Plaintiff, conducted interviews, and created an Investigation Report, dated
September 18, 2015, which stated HR’s conclusion that no discrimination against Plaintiff
occurred when the selection committee offered Heckler-Todt the Director position instead
of Plaintiff. (Id., PageID 501-03).
In late 2016, Defendant’s Provost, Dr. Jeffrey Bauer, appointed Colleen Kosan, an
individual who already worked at Defendant as an Academic Advisor in the Student
Success Center, to be the Assistant Director of Advising and Academic Resources
(“Assistant Director position”). (Doc. 29). Dean Haas and Glenna Heckler-Todt
recommended Colleen Kosan to Dr. Bauer and there was no internal or external search
for applicants or formation of a selection committee. (Id., PageID 686-88).

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Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this matter on July 20, 2017 (Doc. 1) and her First
Amended Complaint on August 8, 20172 (Doc. 2). She brings one count of retaliation3 in
violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. Id. She
asserts that Defendant retaliated against her, as Defendant's failure to promote her to the
Director position and appoint her to the Assistant Director position was due to her use of
FMLA leave to care for her son. Id.
II.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Surreply
Plaintiff moves to submit an additional affidavit as a surreply and asserts that it is
“new evidence” that shows pretext and a genuine dispute of material facts relating to the
composition of the section committee. (Doc. 37) (relying on Seay v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 339 F.3d 454, 481-82 (6th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiff’s reliance on Seay is misplaced.
(Doc. 37, PageID 1020). In that case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that the district court abused its discretion when it granted the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment just three days after receiving the reply brief, to which the defendant
attached new evidence and the court relied on that new evidence without giving Plaintiff
2

To the extent that Plaintiff’s Response includes additional theories of FMLA retaliation based on facts that
occurred in March 2018, i.e., that she received an allegedly negative performance review and her position
was transferred to a different department (Doc. 39, PageID 1038-39, 1049-50), she has not filed a motion
to further amend her complaint to include any additional facts or theories of recovery based on new facts
that occurred after she filed her First Amended Complaint. Cf. Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 909 (6th
Cir. 2003) (“Once the scheduling order's deadline passes, a [party] first must show good cause under Rule
16(b) for failure to earlier seek leave to amend before a court will consider whether amendment is proper
under Rule 15(a).”); FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a), 16(b)(4). The Court will only consider Plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation
theory based on the facts pled.
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To the extent that Plaintiff’s Response suggests that her Amended Complaint includes a theory of recovery
based on FMLA interference, the Court is not convinced and will not analyze such a theory of recovery,
because the essence of her claim is retaliation and not interference with her substantive FMLA rights. See
Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., LLC, 681 F.3d 274, 282 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Brown v. Duke Energy
Corp., No. 1:13CV869, 2019 WL 1439402, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2019) (“The Sixth Circuit has
recognized two discrete theories of recovery under the FMLA: (1) the so-called interference or entitlement
theory arising from § 2615(a)(1), and (2) the retaliation or discrimination theory arising from § 2615(a)(2).”)
(quoting Seeger, 681 F.3d at 282) (internal quotation marks omitted). Compare (Doc. 39, PageID 1040,
1042,1048), with (Doc. 2).

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an opportunity to respond to it. Seay, 339 F.3d at 481-82. The Sixth Circuit explained that,
“[w]hen new submissions and/or arguments are included in a reply brief, and a
nonmovant's ability to respond to the new evidence has been vitiated, a problem arises
with respect to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)” which “requires that an adverse
party receive ten days notice before a district court may enter summary judgment.” Id. at
481 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)).
Here, Defendant did not include any new evidence in or attached to its Reply.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant “referred to the final members of the Selection Committee
as Brenda Haas, Heather Cantrell, Marcie Simms, and Michael Barnhart” in its Reply and
the affidavit establishes otherwise. (Doc. 37) (citing (Doc. 34, PageID 890)). Defendant’s
assertion about the final composition of the selection committee in its Reply, however, is
not new, as Defendant asserted in its Motion for Summary Judgment that the committee
included only Brenda Haas, Heather Cantrell, Marcie Simms, and Michael Barnhart. (Doc.
24, PageID 507). The proper time for Plaintiff to introduce the proposed affidavit was
when she filed her Response and she failed to do so. Finally, Plaintiff fails to acknowledge
the Court’s prohibition on additional memoranda—beyond memoranda in support,
memoranda in opposition, and reply memoranda—without leave of court for good cause
shown. S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 7.2(a)(2); rather, she tersely asserts that cases should be
resolved on their merits, not mere technicalities. (Doc. 41, PageID 1151).
The Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion (Doc. 37) due to her failure to establish that
Defendant introduced new evidence that necessitates an additional response, show good
cause, and explain why this is an appropriate circumstance for the Court to use its
discretion to allow a surreply. See Seay, 339 F.3d at 482; see also S.D. Ohio Civ. R.

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7.2(a)(2); accord. United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc.,
238 F. Supp. 2d 270, 276-77 (D.D.C. 2002) (“A surreply may be filed only by leave of
Court, and only to address new matters raised in a reply to which a party would otherwise
be unable to respond.”).
III.

Motion for Summary Judgment
a. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment is proper
“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party has the burden of
showing an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case. Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden of
production, the non-moving party cannot rest on his pleadings, but must present
significant probative evidence in support of his complaint to defeat the motion for
summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986).
b. FMLA Retaliation
The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to 12 workweeks of leave during a 12month period to, inter alia, “care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the
employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health condition.”
29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). The FMLA “makes it unlawful for employers to . . . retaliate
against employees who exercise their FMLA rights.” Staunch v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc.,
511 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2008); 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) (“It shall be unlawful for any
employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for
opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter.”). “Federal regulations

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regarding the FMLA specifically prohibit employers from “us[ing] the taking of FMLA leave
as a negative factor in employment actions, such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary
actions.” Campbell v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 3:12-CV-00306, 2013 WL 5164635,
at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 2013) (citing 29 C.F.R. 825.220(c)).
Plaintiff may prove her FMLA retaliation claim through direct or indirect evidence,
and she need only prove retaliation through one of those methods. Kline v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 348-49 (6th Cir. 1997). “Direct evidence must establish not only that
the plaintiff's employer was predisposed to discriminate on the basis of [the FMLA], but
also that the employer acted on that predisposition.” Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc.,
544 F.3d 696, 706 (6th Cir. 2008). Direct evidence is that evidence which, if believed,
requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor” in
the adverse employment decision at issue. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
247 (1989) (emphasis added).
The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to FMLA retaliation
claims that are based on circumstantial evidence. Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2012); see generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). McDonnell Douglas, as modified by Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), established a tripartite burden-shifting framework. White v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 391 (6th Cir. 2008). First, “the plaintiff bears the
initial ‘not onerous’ burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). Second, if a
plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the defendant ‘to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.’” Burdine,

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450 U.S. at 253 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 441 U.S. at 802). Third, if the defendant
articulates such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to present evidence that
the non-discriminatory reason offered by the defendant was merely a pretext for
discrimination. Id.
i. Direct Evidence
Plaintiff asserts that she has direct evidence of FMLA retaliation in the form of
Dean Haas’ statements to both James Weaver and Dr. Bauer. (Doc. 39, PageID 104041). Starting with Haas’s statements to Weaver, Plaintiff alleges that Haas told Weaver
that Haas: was upset that Plaintiff took FMLA leave, thought Plaintiff could not do the
Director position because of Plaintiff’s FMLA leave, and was going to give the Director
position to Heckler-Todt mainly because Haas did not want Plaintiff to have the job. (Id.,
PageID 1041). For support for each of those alleged statements, Plaintiff cites only her
own affidavit. Id. (citing Exhibit C); see (Doc. 39-3, ¶ 7, PageID 1041). Plaintiff’s
allegations—that Weaver told Plaintiff that Haas told him—constitute inadmissible
hearsay within hearsay. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4); FED. R. EVID. 802; see also Sperle
v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 297 F.3d 483, 495 (6th Cir. 2002) (affidavit must be based on
personal knowledge, not hearsay or inadmissible evidence); Jacklyn v. Schering Plough
Healthcare Prods. Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 927 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Hearsay evidence
may not be considered on summary judgment.”). But see FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) (“A
statement that meets the following conditions is not hearsay: The statement is offered
against an opposing party and was made by the party's agent or employee on a matter
within the scope of that relationship and while it existed.”). Plaintiff does not address the
admissibility of these statements or provide any facts to demonstrate that the content of

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the statements satisfies the scope requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D).
See Ward v. Sevier Cty. Gov't, No. 3:18-CV-113, 2020 WL 889159, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. Feb.
24, 2020). Accordingly, the Court will not consider the statements by Haas to Weaver as
alleged in Plaintiff’s affidavit.4 See Sperle, 297 F.3d at 495; see also Jacklyn, 176 F.3d at
927.
Turning to Dean Haas’ alleged statements to Dr. Bauer, Plaintiff asserts that Hass
disclosed Plaintiff’s use of FMLA leave to Bauer during the selection committee process
and argues that “[a] jury could infer that [this disclosure] was done to secure support for
the selection of Ms. [Heckler-]Todt for the Director position.” (Doc. 39, PageID 1041)
(citing Doc. 29, PageID 675-76). However, this statement, if in fact said by Haas, does
not constitute direct evidence, as direct evidence does not require an inference to reach
the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was a motivating factor in the adverse
employment decision. See Ryder v. Beaumont Health Inc., No. 18-10760, 2019 WL
5068474, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 9, 2019) (“Direct evidence of discrimination is that which
‘does not require a factfinder to draw any inferences in order to conclude that the
challenged employment action was motivated at least in part by prejudice against
members of the protected group.’”) (quoting Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 865
(6th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiff’s argument expressly anticipates an inference by the factfinder
and thus does not constitute direct evidence of FMLA retaliation.
ii. Indirect Evidence: McDonnell Douglas Step One
“[A]t the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff’s burden is merely to present
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff suffered an

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This includes Plaintiff’s argument that “stereotyping constitutes direct evidence.” (Doc. 39, PageID 1041).

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adverse employment action ‘under circumstances which give rise to an inference of
unlawful discrimination.’” Macy v. Hopkins County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 484 F.3d 357, 364
(6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). A plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case of retaliation under the FMLA by showing that: (1) she exercised an FMLA-protected
right; (2) the defendant knew she exercised the right; (3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse
employment action; and (4) a causal connection exists between the plaintiff’s protected
activity and the adverse employment action. See Stein v. Atlas Ind., Inc., 730 F. App'x
313, 319 (6th Cir. 2018).
Regarding Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant retaliated against her when it failed
to promote her to the Director position due to her use of FMLA leave, Defendant argues
that Plaintiff cannot establish the second and forth elements. (Doc. 24, PageID 513-15).
However, Defendant acknowledges that both its HR Department and Dean Haas,
Plaintiff’s boss and the chair of the selection committee, were aware of Plaintiff’s use of
FMLA leave at the time it filled the Director position. See id. Moreover, “[w]here an
adverse employment action occurs very close in time after an employer learns of a
protected activity, such temporal proximity between the events is significant enough to
constitute evidence of a causal connection for the purposes of satisfying a prima facie
case of retaliation.” Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2008)
(emphasis added). Here, on June 3, 2015, Plaintiff informed Dean Haas that she was
interested in taking FMLA leave for the summer (Doc. 21, PageID 376); on June 4, 2015,
Plaintiff inquired with Defendant’s HR Department about taking FMLA leave, an HR
representative responded with the steps Plaintiff needed to take to apply for FMLA leave,
and she submitted her application for the Director position (Id., PageID 378-79); on

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June 9, 2015, she received FMLA designation (Id., PageID 373); and, on July 20, 2015,
she learned that the selection committee selected Ms. Heckler-Todt for the Director
position (Id., PageID 279). The Court finds that this proximity in time between Plaintiff’s
protected activity and the adverse employment action—the 47 days between June 3,
2015 and July 20, 2015—constitutes evidence of a causal connection. See Bryson v.
Regis Corp., 498 F.3d 561, 571 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding causal connection where the
plaintiff was terminated three months after she requested FMLA leave, and the very day
that she was scheduled to return to work); Brown v. Duke Energy Corp., No. 1:13CV869,
2019 WL 1439402, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2019). The Court concludes that Plaintiff
has established a prima facie case of retaliation under the FMLA.
With respect to Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant retaliated against her when it
failed to appoint her to the Assistant Director position due to her use of FMLA leave,
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot show the third or fourth elements of a prima facie
case. (Doc. 34, PageID 896-99). Assuming without deciding that Plaintiff has established
the third element, the Court agrees that she fails to establish the fourth element. Plaintiff
informed Defendant of her intent to take intermittent FMLA leave on June 3, 2015 and Dr.
Bauer appointed Ms. Kosan to be the Assistant Director of Advising and Academic
Resources in either November 2016 or December 2016 (Doc. 39, PageID 1037, 1048), a
year and a half later. Plaintiff does not acknowledge her burden to establish a prima facie
case regarding this theory of FMLA retaliation and fails to establish that there is a causal
connection between her use of FMLA leave in June 2015 and Defendant’s appointment
of Ms. Kosan to the Assistant Director position in November 2016 or December 2016.
See (id., PageID 1048-49); see also Nilles v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 521 F. App'x 364,

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370 (6th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff fails to state a prima facie case with respect to the Assistant
Director position and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
iii. Indirect Evidence: McDonnell Douglas Step Two
Proceeding with Plaintiff’s claim of FMLA retaliation regarding the Director position
only, once the burden shifts to the defendant to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the adverse employment action, the defendant need not “persuade the court
that it was actually motivated by the proffered reason[ ]” but must “raise a genuine issue
of fact.” Provenzano v. LCI Holdings, Inc., 663 F.3d 806, 814-15 (6th Cir. 2011). Here,
the Court finds that Defendant has articulated a legitimate reason for not promoting
Plaintiff to the Director position, as Defendant presents evidence that Ms. Heckler-Todt
was more qualified than Plaintiff in light of Ms. Heckler-Todt’s vision for the program,
experience, doctorate work, and rapport with the faculty. See (Doc. 20, PageID 144-45);
see also Campbell, 2013 WL 5164635, at *8.
iv. Indirect Evidence: McDonnell Douglas Step Three
A plaintiff may demonstrate that an employer's proffered legitimate reason for an
adverse employment action is pretextual in one of three ways: (1) the defendant’s stated
reason for the adverse employment action has no basis in fact; (2) the reason offered for
the adverse employment action was not the actual reason; or (3) the reason offered was
insufficient to explain the defendant's action. See Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am., Inc.,
686 F.3d 339, 349 (6th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff alleges the second type of pretext (Doc. 39,
PageID 1042-48) and thus must establish that “the sheer weight of the circumstantial
evidence of discrimination makes it ‘more likely than not’ that the employer's explanation
is a pretext.” Campbell, 2013 WL 5164635, at *9 (citing Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock

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Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds by Geiger
v. Tower Auto., 579 F.3d 614, 621 (6th Cir. 2009)).
Defendant’s proffered legitimate reason relies heavily on both the selection
committee’s final Data Fusion sheets for each candidate and Dean Haas’ description of
those sheets. (Docs. 24, 34). Defendant states that the final Data Fusion sheets: include
all of the selection committee members’ individual scores and a group “consensus score”
for each candidate; the numbers that appear under the initials of each committee member
represent the scores that the individual committee member assigned to each applicant;
the “consensus score” was the committee’s score as a group after comparing and
discussing their individual score; and the candidate with the highest score was the
committee’s first rank, the second highest score its second rank, and so on. (Doc. 24,
PageID 508); (Doc. 20-1, PageID 188-92). However, Plaintiff contends that questions of
material fact exist regarding the creation and compilation of the final Data Fusion sheets
and, consequently, on Defendant’s reliance on the sheets for justification of its hiring
decision.
The final Data Fusion sheets for the five applicants who participated in on-campus
interviews appear to consist of a row labeled “Committee Member” and a column labeled
“Competency” and lists four committee members’ initials along with their scores for the
four Competency categories (those categories are discussed below). (Doc. 20-1, PageID
188-201). However, there is one column with scores for the four Competency categories
that has no corresponding committee member’s initials. Id. In its Reply, Defendant asserts
that “[t]his unassigned column with scores is easily explained” as “Denise Gregory was
initially on the selection committee, and then left [Defendant]’s employ” and “[t]hese are

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most likely her scores in the un-assigned column, but because she did participate in the
consensus vote, her name was likely not included.” (Doc. 34, PageID 895). However,
when asked about the column with scores on it that are not assigned to a particular
selection committee member, Dean Haas responded that the column “may have been
[Dean Haas’] general idea of what [the consensus score] was going to be” and confirmed
that the scores in that column were “preliminary score[s]” of what she thought might end
up to be the selection committee’s ultimate “consensus score” for each Competency for
the respective applicant. (Haas Depo. Doc. 20, PageID 119-122). The unassigned
column’s scores, and their significance to the selection committee’s ultimate hiring
decision, are not as easily explained as Defendant asserts. Compare (Doc. 34, PageID
895), with (Doc. 20, PageID 119-122), and (Doc. 20-1, PageID 188-201).
Plaintiff next asserts that although there is a final Data Fusion sheet for each of the
five final applicants, there are no individual score sheets or notes from the selection
committee members except for Michael Barnhart’s individual score sheets for individual
applicants and then only Mr. Barnhart’s individual score sheets for Glenna Heckler-Todt
and Plaintiff and not the other three applicants. (Doc. 20-1, PageID 186-87); (Doc. 39,
PageID 1045). Plaintiff questions where the other individual committee members’
individual score sheets went. (Doc. 39, PageID 1045-46). Dean Haas acknowledged that
she and the other selection committee members had individual score sheets but could
not explain where they went, why Defendant did not keep them in this instance, or if
keeping them or not was standard practice on Defendant’s hiring selection committees.
See (Doc. 20).

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As noted above, the final Data Fusion sheets each have four “Competency”
categories that the selection committee used to rank the applicants: professionalism,
communication, collaboration, and problem solving. (Doc. 20-1, PageID 188-201).
Defendant asserts that the selection committee selected those four competencies to be
the characteristics that the committee thought the Director should embody. (Doc. 24,
PageID 507) (citing Haas Depo., Doc. 20). Plaintiff explains that other Competencies
were available as options to include to assess the applicants, including one titled “InTouch” which would have been more favorable to her. (Doc. 39, PageID 1042-43) (citing
Doc. 20-1, PageID 201). She asserts that it is unclear whether the Student Success
Center Staff, the selection committee, or Dean Haas selected those four Competencies
and why the decision-maker chose to include those four Competencies and not the other
Competency options for ranking the Director position applicants. Id. The Court agrees
after a review of Dean Haas’ testimony and corresponding exhibits. Compare (Doc. 20,
PageID 81-84), and (Doc. 20-1, PageID 183-84), with (Doc. 20, PageID 128-32).
In light of the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence
such that a jury could reasonably find that Defendant’s proffered reason is “more likely
than not” pretext. See Campbell, 2013 WL 5164635, at *9; see also Singfield v. Akron
Metro. Hous. Auth., 389 F.3d 555, 564 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Courts have recognized that in
discrimination and retaliation cases, an employer's true motivations are particularly
difficult to ascertain, thereby frequently making such factual determinations unsuitable for
disposition at the summary judgment stage.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The Court need not evaluate the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s other circumstantial evidence

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allegedly showing discriminatory retaliation, as she satisfies her burden based on the final
Data Fusion sheets. See id.
Finally, “[t]he honest-belief rule is, in effect, one last opportunity for the defendant
to prevail on summary judgment. The defendant may rebut the plaintiff's evidence of
pretext, by demonstrating that the defendant's actions, while perhaps mistaken, foolish,
trivial, or baseless, were not taken with discriminatory intent.” Clay v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 501 F.3d 695, 714-15 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). Defendant asserts
that it had an honest belief that it acted properly in light of its HR Department’s
investigation and final conclusion that there was no retaliation or discrimination for
Plaintiff’s use of FMLA leave. (Doc. 24, PageID 520). However, that investigation also
relied on the final Data Fusion sheets and the Court finds that the honest belief rule is
inapplicable for summary judgment purposes in this matter. (Doc. 23-1).
IV.

Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 24) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part: Defendant’s
Motion is granted regarding Plaintiff’s claim of FMLA retaliation with respect to the
Assistant Director position and denied regarding Plaintiff’s claim of FMLA retaliation with
respect to the Director position. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to
file a Surreply (Doc. 37) is DENIED. The Court will schedule a telephone conference in
this matter shortly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_s/ Michael R. Barrett__________
Michael R. Barrett, Judge
United States District Court

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