Steelcraft Manufacturing, a division of Allegion plc v. United Steelworkers AFL-CIO (Local 7697)

Filing 19

ORDER Resolving the Parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 12 , 13 ). Signed by Judge Timothy S. Black on 5/17/2021. (rrs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
STEELCRAFT MANUFACTURING, a
division of Allegion plc
Plaintiff,
vs.
UNITED STEELWORKERS AFL-CIO
(LOCAL 7697),
Defendant.

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Case No. 1:18-cv-45
Judge Timothy S. Black

ORDER RESOLVING THE PARTIES’ CROSS-MOTIONS
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docs. 12, 13)
This civil action is before the Court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary
judgment (Docs. 12, 13) and the parties’ responsive memoranda (Docs. 14, 15, 16, 17).
I. BACKGROUND 1
Plaintiff Steelcraft Manufacturing, a division of Allegion plc (the “Company”) is a
steel manufacturing company located in Blue Ash, Ohio. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 2). Defendant
United Steelworkers AFL-CIO (Local 7697) (the “Union”) is a labor organization as
defined in 29 U.S.C. § 185. (Id. at ¶ 3). In this case, the Company and the Union dispute
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The parties submitted competing summary judgment records to the Court in connection with
their cross-motions. The Court adopts the proposed record submitted by the Company. That
record includes: (1) the arbitration transcript/exhibits; (2) the parties’ post-hearing briefs; (3) the
arbitrator’s October 27, 2017 decision; (4) the Company’s request for reconsideration; and (5)
the arbitrator’s denial of the Company’s request. (Docs. 10-1, 10-2, 10-3, 10-4). The Court
finds the categories of documents in the Company’s proposed record consist with the records
previously used in cases before this Court. See Schlage Lock Company LLC v. United
Steelworkers AFL-CIO (Local No. 7697), No. 1:14-cv-82 (record contained the same categories
of documents as proposed by the Company in this matter). The undisputed facts set forth in the
following section are drawn from the proposed record submitted by the Company.

whether an arbitrator’s award, reinstating an employee fired after testing positive for
illegal drug use, violated either their collective bargaining agreement or well-established
public policy. (See generally id.).
The Company and the Union are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (the
“CBA”). (Doc. 10-1 at 235). Among other things, the CBA governs the discipline and
discharge of employees. (Id. at 280). The CBA provides that the Company can
discipline and discharge an employee for “proper cause” (“Article 14”). (Id.) The
Company and the Union must resolve any disputes regarding the application of the CBA
through binding arbitration. (Id. at 274–77). During arbitration, the arbitrator cannot
“add to, subtract from or modify any of the terms of th[e] [CBA].” (Id. at 277).
The CBA also contains a substance abuse policy (“Article 25”). (Id. at 292–97).
Article 25 governs the Company’s ability to subject its employees to drug tests. (Id. at
293–95). The Company is not allowed to subject its employees to “drug testing on a
random basis.” (Id. at 295). But drug testing is required after an accident that results in
either “physical injury or property damage.” (Id. at 293). Article 25 sets forth the
consequence of a positive test. (Id. at 294). It provides that “a confirmed positive test
will result in discharge.” (Id.)
A.

The Accident and Subsequent Testing

On April 28, 2016, the Company’s drug testing rules were triggered by a
workplace accident. (Doc. 10-3 at 1). That day, William Warren (the “Grievant”), a
Company employee and Union member, was using a forklift to move a wooden pallet.
(Id.) The wooden pallet was stacked with steel door heads (the “parts”) weighing about
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675 pounds (collectively). (Id. at 1–2). While the Grievant was operating the forklift, the
parts stacked on the pallet fell to the ground. (Id. at 2). It is not clear whether the parts
fell to the ground due to an error by the Grievant, or by a combination of factors. (Id.)
After the accident, the Grievant and two coworkers picked up the parts and restacked them on another wooden pallet. (Id.) Neither the Grievant nor his co-workers
saw any damage to the parts. (Id.) However, after the parts were re-stacked, the
supervisor on duty, Rob Knob, told the Grievant to go to the nurse’s office for drug
testing. (Id.) The Grievant’s co-workers protested that drug testing was not permitted as
the accident had not resulted in property damage. (Id.) But Mr. Knob insisted that
testing should occur, and the Grievant eventually acquiesced to testing. (Id.)
There is no evidence that the Company’s quality control department found any
evidence of property damage after the Grievant submitted to testing. (Id.) Nevertheless,
the Company allowed the Grievant’s sample to be analyzed. (Id.) On May 2, 2016, the
Grievant’s test results came back positive for Marijuana use. (Id.) The next day, the
Grievant received a letter from the Company terminating his employment. (Id. at 3). The
letter stated that due to the positive results of the Grievant’s April 28, 2016 drug test, the
Grievant’s employment was terminated pursuant to Article 25. (Id.)
Post-termination, the Union filed a grievance with the Company, alleging that the
Grievant had been unjustly terminated. (Id.) As required by the CBA, the Company and
the Union selected an arbitrator to hear the grievance (the “Arbitrator”). (Id.) Then, the
Company and the Union agreed that the Arbitrator would resolve the grievance by
answering three issues: (1) Did Article 25 give the Company the right to drug test the
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Grievant? (2) Was the Grievant discharged from the Company for “just cause”? And, (3)
If the Company did not have just cause for discharge, what was the remedy? (Id. at 3–4).
B.

The Arbitration and Award

On October 27, 2017, the Arbitrator issued a 15-page decision, sustaining the
Union’s grievance. (Id.) The Arbitrator began his analysis by setting out the background
facts giving rise to the grievance. (Id. at 1–3). Then, the Arbitrator set out the provisions
applicable to the parties’ dispute. (Id. at 4–5). Specifically, the Arbitrator quoted the
CBA’s drug testing provision (Article 25), the CBA’s “just cause” provision (Article
14),2 and the CBA provisions appliable to arbitration review. (Id.) Thereafter, the
Arbitrator analyzed each of the issues submitted by the parties in turn. (Id. at 10–14).
On the first issue, the Arbitrator concluded that the Company had not technically
violated the CBA by requiring the Grievant to submit to drug testing under Article 25.
(Id. at 10–13). The Arbitrator noted that Article 25 required drug testing after accidents
resulting in either “physical injury or property damage.” (Id. at 11). And the Arbitrator
found that, at the time of the Grievant’s accident, there was a “good faith belief” that
property damage had occurred. (Id. at 13). Under such circumstances, the Arbitrator
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As stated supra, Article 14 actually uses the words “proper cause” rather than “just cause.”
However, as numerous courts have noted, the terms “proper cause” and “just cause” have the
same meaning. See, e.g., Horton Automatics v. Indus. Div. of Commc'ns Workers of Am., 506 F.
App’x 253, 256 n.3 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[I]t is common to include the right to suspend and
discharge for ‘just cause,’ ‘justifiable cause,’ ‘proper cause,’ ‘obvious cause,’ or quite commonly
simply ‘for cause.’ There is no significant difference between these terms.” (citation omitted));
N. Philadelphia Health Sys. v. Dist. 1199C, No. 2:02-MC-194, 2002 WL 32341951, at *3 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 24, 2002) (“The collective bargaining agreement between Suburban and the union
permitted the company to discipline or discharge an employee for ‘proper cause,’ which the
court recognized was synonymous with ‘just cause.’”). Given the equivalence of these terms, the
Court uses the terms “just cause” and “proper cause” interchangeably in this Order.

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determined that the Company was “justified” when it required the Grievant to submit to
drug testing as an initial matter following the accident. (Id.) In other words, the drug
testing was not a random test, which would have been in violation of the CBA. (Id.; Doc.
10-1 at 295 (“[Article 25] does not authorize the use drug testing on a random basis”)).
Turning to the second issue, although the Company could require the Grievant to
submit to drug testing, the Arbitrator concluded that the Company could not terminate the
Grievant with “just cause.” (Id. at 13–14). The Arbitrator noted that just cause provisions
(such as Article 14) ensure that employees receive “industrial due process” pretermination. (See id.). The Arbitrator explained that the hallmarks of industrial due
process include “conduct[ing] a meaningful investigation,” review[ing] all “facts and
circumstances,” and considering the “aggravating and mitigating factors.” (Id. at 13).
The Arbitrator found that, instead of affording the Grievant industrial due process,
the Company “immediately terminated the Grievant’s employment based solely on the
results of the drug test.” (Id. at 14). The Arbitrator noted that the Company:
[D]ischarge[d] the Grievant without considering whether the
results of the drug test should be disregarded due to the absence
of any property damage. At the time of his discharge, the
Employer had no basis to conclude that the Grievant had been
in an accident that resulted in property damage. . . . Thus, the
Employer had no right to use the test result as a basis for
Grievant’s discharge.
(Id.) For those reasons, in conclusion of the second issue, the Arbitrator found that “the
Company did not have just cause to discharge the Grievant.” (Id.)

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Finally, because the Grievant was terminated without just cause, the Arbitrator
resolved the final issue by ordering the Company to reinstate the Grievant, pay him lost
income, and expunge all records of his discharge—including the positive test result. (Id.)
C.

This Case

On January 1, 2018, the Company filed the instant lawsuit, asking the Court to
vacate the Arbitrator’s award. (Doc. 1 at 1). Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges three causes of
action as to why the award should be vacated: (1) the Arbitrator exceeded the scope of his
authority; (2) the Arbitrator did not arguably interpret the CBA; and (3) enforcing the
award would violate public policy. 3 (Id. at ¶¶ 63–95).
Now, the parties have submitted cross motions for summary judgment on each of
the three claims set forth in the Complaint. (Docs. 12, 13). The cross motions have been
fully briefed and are ripe for adjudication. (Docs. 14, 15, 16, 17). This Order follows.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Summary Judgment

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the evidence submitted to
the Court demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and that
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 247–48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of
genuine disputes over facts which, under the substantive law governing the issue, might

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The Court sets forth the causes of action alleged in the Complaint in the order they are
addressed in the parties’ briefing. (See Docs. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17).

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affect the outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. All facts and inferences must
be construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
A party opposing a motion for summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
B.

Arbitration Review

When reviewing an arbitrator’s construction of a collective bargaining agreement,
courts apply “one of the narrowest standards of judicial review in all of American
jurisprudence.” Lattimer-Stevens Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, Dist. 27,
Sub-Dist. 5, 913 F.2d 1166, 1169 (6th Cir. 1990). This is because, when parties agree to
arbitrate disputes under a collective bargaining agreement, the parties bargain for the
interpretation of the arbitrator, not the federal court. Econ. Linen & Towel Serv., Inc. v.
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Teamsters Loc. Union 637, 917 F.3d 512, 513 (6th Cir. 2019).
In reviewing an arbitration award, the Court asks three questions of “procedural
aberration”:
Did the arbitrator act “outside his authority” by resolving a
dispute not committed to arbitration? Did the arbitrator
commit fraud, have a conflict of interest or otherwise act
dishonestly in issuing the award? And in resolving any legal
or factual disputes in the case, was the arbitrator “arguably
construing or applying the contract”?
Mich. Fam. Res., Inc. v. Serv. Emp. Int’l Union Loc. 517M, 475 F.3d 746, 753 (6th Cir.
2007). In addition, the Court must “refrain from enforcing” an arbitration award “if the

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contract as interpreted by [the arbitrator] violates some explicit public policy.” W.R.
Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983).
III. ANALYSIS
Here, there is no allegation that the Arbitrator committed fraud, had a conflict of
interest, or otherwise acted dishonestly. Instead, the Complaint alleges that it is
appropriate to vacate the award, because: (1) the Arbitrator exceeded his scope of
authority; (2) the Arbitrator did not arguably interpret the CBA; and (3) enforcement of
the award would violate public policy. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 63–95). As set forth infra, the Court
does not find any of these claims meritorious. As such, the Arbitrator’s decision must be
upheld on the undisputed facts and as a matter of law.
A.

The Arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority.

The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that “[a]n arbitrator does not exceed his authority
every time he makes an interpretive error; he exceeds that authority only when the
collective bargaining agreement does not commit the dispute to arbitration.” Equitable
Res., Inc. v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv.
Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO/CLC, 621 F.3d 538, 545 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Mich.
Family Res., 475 F.3d at 756).
“This approach severely curtail[s] the scope of authority concept such that an
award should not be vacated unless an arbitrator reaches a question not committed to
him by the parties.” Id. (quoting Totes Isotoner Corp. v. Int’l Chem. Workers Union
Council/UFCW Loc. 664C, 532 F.3d 405, 414 (6th Cir. 2008)) (emphasis added, internal

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quotation marks omitted)); see also Truck Drivers Local No. 164 v. Allied Waste Sys.,
512 F.3d 211, 217 (6th Cir. 2008).
Here, the Arbitrator plainly acted within the scope of his authority. The CBA
requires the parties to resolve any disputes regarding the application of the CBA through
binding arbitration. (Doc. 10-1 at 274–77). In accordance with the CBA’s provisions,
the parties selected the Arbitrator to hear the grievance now at issue in this Order. (Doc.
10-3 at 3). Then, the parties agreed that the Arbitrator would resolve three issues: (1) did
Article 25 give the Company the right to drug test the Grievant?; (2) was the Grievant
discharged from the Company for “just cause”?; and (3) if the Company did not have just
cause, what was the remedy? (Id. at 3–4). In his decision, the Arbitrator addressed each
of these issues committed to him—nothing more. (Id. at 10–14). Thus, the Arbitrator
plainly acted within the scope of his authority when resolving the grievance.
Notably, each of the Company’s arguments in opposition to this conclusion
focuses on whether the arbitrator made interpretive errors, rather than whether the dispute
was actually committed to the Arbitrator. (Doc. 12 at 13–14). As numerous courts have
recognized, arguments such as these do not provide a basis to conclude that the arbitrator
exceeded the scope of authority. See, e.g., Truck Drivers, 512 F.3d at 217; Americold
Logistics, LLC v. Loc. 17A United Food & Com. Workers, AFL-CIO, No. 5:12-CV-749,
2013 WL 351159, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 29, 2013).
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that, on the undisputed material
facts and as a matter of law, the Arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority when

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resolving the grievance. Thus, the Company’s first claim in support of vacating the
award is unavailing.
B.

The Arbitrator arguably interpreted the CBA.

The “arguably interpreted” test “focuses on a single question: did the arbitrator
appear[] to be engaged in interpreting the agreement or agreements before him? If so, the
court’s inquiry ends.” Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen v. United Transp.
Union, 700 F.3d 891, 901 (6th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citations omitted). To
determine whether arguable interpretation has occurred, courts consider whether the
arbitrator’s decision contains the “hallmarks” of contract interpretation. Id. That is,
courts ask whether the arbitrator’s decision “refers to, quotes from[,] and analyzes the
pertinent provisions of the agreement.” Id. (citation omitted).
Importantly, the arguably interpreted analysis is not concerned with “whether the
arbitrator interpreted the [agreement] correctly.” Teamsters, 917 F.3d at 513. “Whether
[the Court] agree[s] with the arbitrator’s reasoning, [or not] . . . is beside the point.”
Royal Ice Cream Co. v. Teamsters Loc. No. 336, 506 F. App’x 455, 458 (6th Cir. 2012).
What matters is that the Arbitrator plausibly sought to interpret the provisions of the
agreement, rather than implement his own “brand of industrial justice.” Truck Drivers,
512 F.3d at 217 (citation omitted).
Here, the Arbitrator’s decision easily meets the arguably interpreted standard. As
an initial matter, the Arbitrator’s decision bears all the hallmarks of contract
interpretation. The Arbitrator specifically referred to and quotes from the contract at
issue: the CBA. (Doc. 10-3 at 4–5). The Arbitrator then analyzed and interpreted the
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plain meaning of the CBA’s relevant provisions. (Id. at 10–14). And thereafter, the
Arbitrator unequivocally applied his reading of the CBA’s terms to the inquiries
submitted by the parties. (Id.) These hallmarks show that the Arbitrator’s award was
firmly based in the CBA’s provisions.
Moreover, the Arbitrator’s ultimate conclusion was also grounded in the CBA.
Reading the CBA’s just cause and drug testing provisions together, the Arbitrator found
that the Company had not acted arbitrarily in subjecting the Grievant to a test which it
believed was appropriate at the time. (Id. at 10–13). But, the Arbitrator determined that,
as the Company had not afforded the Grievant any sort of industrial due process predischarge, the Company had terminated him without “just cause.” (Id. at 13–14). On this
reading, the Arbitrator concluded that the Grievant must be reinstated with lost wages and
an expunged record. (Id. at 14).
Notwithstanding the Arbitrator’s careful analysis, the Company argues that the
Arbitrator’s interpretation of the CBA was wrong, because the Arbitrator failed to
consider Article 25’s termination provision: “a confirmed positive test will result in
discharge.” (Doc. 17 at 6–7). The Company claims that, based on the unequivocal
record presented, the Grievant tested positive for Marijuana use. (Id. at 6). And the
Company assets that, given the termination provision’s mandatory language, the
Arbitrator should have found the Grievant’s discharge was required. (Id.) The
Company’s argument misses the mark, for at least three reasons.
As an initial matter, the Court is not convinced that the Company’s reading of the
CBA is plausible. By asking the Court to focus solely on Article 25’s discharge
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language, what the Company is really asking the Court to do is read that discharge
language out of context. But there is no indication that Article 25 was meant to be
interpreted in isolation from the rest of the CBA. (Doc. 10-1 at 295). For example,
Article 25 does not say that termination shall result regardless of any just cause
determination; nor does Article 25 say that termination shall result absent any
investigation. (Id.)
Moreover, the Arbitrator fully considered Article 25’s termination provision. The
Arbitrator did not ignore the fact that Article 25 allows the Company to discharge an
employee after a positive drug test. (See Doc. 10-3 at 13–14). Rather, the Arbitrator
found that a positive drug test did not relieve the Company of its obligation to support a
termination with just cause. (See id.) (By, e.g., investigating the termination, considering
whether the test was duly administered, etc.). (See id.). Had the Company fully
considered the circumstances surrounding the Grievant’s test, the Arbitrator’s award may
well have been different.
Finally, the Court would note that, as the Court has concluded that the Arbitrator
arguably interpreted the CBA—i.e., that the Arbitrator applied the CBA and did not
disregard its terms—the Court’s analysis is at an end. Even if the Court had any
disagreements with or reservations about the Arbitrator’s analysis (which it does not),
“[w]hether [the Court] agree[s] with the arbitrator’s reasoning, [or not] . . . is beside the

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point.” Royal, 506 F. App’x at 458. Here, the Arbitrator’s analysis is grounded in the
CBA’s text. Thus, arguable interpretation unequivocally exists. 4
All things considered, the Court concludes that, on the undisputed material facts
and as a matter of law, the Arbitrator arguably interpreted the language of the CBA when
reaching his decision. Thus, the Company’s second claim in support of vacating the
award is unavailing.
C.

The Arbitration decision does not violate public policy.

The Court must “refrain from enforcing” an arbitration award “if the contract as
interpreted by [the arbitrator] violates some explicit public policy.” W.R. Grace & Co.,
461 U.S. at 766. “[W]hen an arbitration award is challenged on public policy grounds,
the court must determine whether the arbitrator’s [decision] . . . jeopardizes a welldefined and dominant public policy . . . .” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Lawrence Cty., Ohio v.
L. Robert Kimball & Assocs., 860 F.2d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 1988). The public policy must
“be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general
considerations of supposed public interests.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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The Company also asserts that the award “is the Arbitrator’s own brand of justice.” (Doc. 12 at
3–4). In support of this proposition, the Company asks this Court to follow Georgia-Pac.
Gypsum, LLC v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Loc. 117, No. X:11-CV-5497, 2011 WL 5438981 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 8, 2011). However, Georgia-Pac is readily distinguishable from this case. In
Georgia-Pac, an employee submitted to a random drug test pursuant to the CBA’s drug testing
policy, and was terminated after a positive result. Id. at *1. Although there was no “just cause”
provision in the CBA, the arbitrator read “just cause” into the policy, and determined that one
positive drug test over 25-years of unblemished service was not “just cause.” Id. The Western
District of Washington vacated the award because the clear and unambiguous language of the
CBA read that: “[a]ll positive test results will result in termination.” Id. *3. Moreover, there
was no other provision of the CBA lending a plausible explanation to the arbitrator reading “just
cause” into the policy when it did not exist. Id. That is simply not the case here—random
testing is a violation of the CBA and the CBA mandates discharge for just cause.

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Importantly, when considering whether an arbitration decision should be vacated
on public policy grounds, the key “issue is not whether the grievant’s conduct violates
public policy, but whether enforcement of [the arbitrator’s decision] would be contrary to
public policy.” Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc. v. Util. Workers Union of Am., 329 F. App’x
1, 4 (6th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original). Thus, whereas here, an arbitration decision
directs an employer to reinstate an employee, the key question at issue is whether the
employee’s reinstatement would violate public policy. Way Bakery v. Truck Drivers Loc.
No. 164, 363 F.3d 590, 595 (6th Cir. 2004)
Here, the Company correctly notes that there is a “broad [public] policy against
permitting individuals [to work] in safety-sensitive positions while under the influence of
drugs [such as Marijuana] . . . .” (Doc. 12 at 15); see Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v.
Becker, 195 F.3d 1201, 1205 (10th Cir. 1999) (confirming that “[s]everal courts have
held that a clear public policy exists against performing safety sensitive jobs while
impaired by drugs or alcohol” (collecting cases)); see also Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 621 (1989) (confirming that there is a strong interest in
preventing employees “from using alcohol or drugs while on duty” to ensure the safety of
the public and the employees).
However, the Court cannot conclude—as the Company asks it to conclude—that
the Grievant’s reinstatement would violate this “broad public policy.” In this case, there
is no question that the Grievant worked in a safety-sensitive position. (Doc. 10-3 at 1).
Nor is there any question that the Grievant tested positive for Marijuana. (Id. at 2).
However, there is simply no evidence on the record before the Court that the Grievant has
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ever worked under the influence of Marijuana. (See id. at 14). Nor is there any
indication that the Grievant is at risk of doing so in the future. (See id.).
On such a record, any concern that the Grievant will work while impaired, moving
forward, is based on nothing more than speculation. And the speculation that an
arbitration award will result in a violation of public policy is not a sufficient reason to
vacate the arbitration award. Cf. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco,
Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 44 (1987) (stating that it was not appropriate to infer that a grievant had
used marijuana at work, or to conclude that the grievant’s reinstatement would violate
public policy, from the fact that Marijuana was found in is car).
The Company also contends that the arbitration award is contrary to public policy
because “state and federal law allow employers to implement drug and alcohol policies
… [and] permit employers to enforce these policies.” (Doc. 12 at 16). 5 However, this
general formulation of public policy would not be violated by reinstating the Grievant,
particularly given the fact that the Arbitrator arguably interpreted a valid CBA. “[A]
formulation of public policy based only on ‘general considerations of supposed public
interests’ is not the sort that permits a court to set aside an arbitration award that was
entered in accordance with a valid collective-bargaining agreement.” Misco, 484 U.S. at
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The Company cites no statute or regulation in support of this argument, instead citing three
cases discussing arbitration awards and drug policies – none of which this Court finds
persuasive. (Doc. 12 at 16). In all three cases, the courts declined to consider or did not discuss
public policy arguments. Rather, the courts in those cases analyzed the CBAs at issue and the
arbitrator awards, as the Court did here. Gulf Coast Indus. Workers v. Exxon Chem. Ams., 863 F.
Supp. 423, 429 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (declined to consider public policy arguments); Voss Steel
Employees Union v. Voss Steel Corp., 797 F. Supp. 585, 591 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (declined to
consider); Mountaineer Gas Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union, 76 F.3d 606 (4th
Cir. 1996) (did not discuss public policy).

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44 (citing W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766). Thus, given the very speculative and general
public policies cited by the Company, this case is not an exceedingly narrow situation in
which a court may vacate an arbitration award based on well-defined, explicit public
policy. The Company’s third claim in support of vacating the award is unavailing.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Company’s cross motion for summary judgment
(Doc. 12) is DENIED in its entirety and the Union’s cross-motion for summary judgment
(Doc. 13) is GRANTED in its entirety. The Court hereby CONFIRMS that the
Arbitrator’s award (Doc. 10-3) is enforceable in its entirety. The Clerk shall enter
judgment accordingly, whereupon this civil action is TERMINATED upon the docket of
this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date:

5/17/2021

s/Timothy S. Black
Timothy S. Black
United States District Judge

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