Gilvin et al v. FCA US LLC et al

Filing 27

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS - IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT Plaintiffs' motion to remand 15 should be DENIED and Defendants' motions to dismiss 16 17 should be GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part, consistent with this Report and Recommendation. Objections to R&R due by 1/4/2019. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman on 12/21/2018. (km)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
MELISSA GILVIN, et al.,

Case No. 1:18-cv-107

Plaintiffs,
Dlott, J.
Bowman, M.J.

vs.
FCA US LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This civil action is now before the court on Plaintiffs’ motion to remand and
defendants’ motions to dismiss. The motions will be addressed in turn.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs reside in Clermont County, Ohio. Defendant FCA US LLC, distributes,
markets, and sells FCA US LLC motor vehicles to persons in Ohio. (Doc. 3). Defendant,
ISG is an agent of FCA US LLC. In May 2016, Plaintiffs leased a new 2016 Ram 1500
truck which was sold, manufactured or distributed by FCA US LLC. Plaintiffs leased the
motor vehicle from Jeff Wyler, Eastgate Auto Mall in Batavia, Ohio, at which time they
received a written statement of their rights under the Ohio Lemon Law. (See Doc. 1, ¶¶
8-11). “Upon initially leasing the [truck], [] Plaintiffs did not pay the costs of the taxes,
security deposit, or title fees.” Id. at ¶ 25.
Plaintiffs’ claim that their vehicle was out of service by reason of repair for a
cumulative total of 30 or more calendar days. Plaintiffs further assert that their motor
vehicle was “possessed substantially the same nonconformity, which was subject to
repair three or more times, and the nonconformity either continued to exist or was

recurring. Id. at ¶ 17. According to Plaintiffs, FCA US LLC, their agents and/or their
authorized dealer, were unable to conform Plaintiffs motor vehicle to any applicable
express warranty by repairing or correcting the nonconformity after a reasonable number
of repair attempts. Id. at ¶ 18.
In January 2017, “Plaintiffs were forwarded to Defendant FCA US LLC’s agent,
ISG, to facilitate an informal dispute resolution to this nonconforming motor vehicle issue.”
(Id. at ¶ 19). During the informal negotiations, ISG made a “refund” offer to Plaintiffs. See
Doc. 1, Ex. B at pp. 3-6. ISG explained to Plaintiffs that, as a matter of course, the amount
of an offer made for the return of a vehicle included a deduction for “the costs for taxes,
title fees, and security deposits if the consumer had not paid the costs of these items at
the outset of the consumer’s dealings with FCA US LLC.” Id. at p. 3. Plaintiffs were told
that since “FCA US LLC had paid the costs of taxes, title fees, and security deposits (or
simply waived these costs),” they were not included in the offer being made. Id. at pp. 34. After ISG “explained … that FCA US LLC was entitled to these costs,” ISG gave
Plaintiffs “a few days to either accept the settlement offer or ISG would close the case.”
Id. at p. 4. “Plaintiffs did not accept the settlement offer from ISG.” Id.
Thereafter, Plaintiffs initiated this action for alleged violations of Ohio’s Lemon
Law, O.R.C. § 1345.72.

Notably, Plaintiffs originally filed this action in the Court of

Common Pleas for Clermont County, Ohio in January 2018. Plaintiffs seek relief for, inter
alia, “damages in excess of $25,000 … for the refund of the full purchase price of their
nonconforming motor vehicles.” Doc. 1, Ex. B at p. 25. In addition to compensatory
damages, Plaintiffs also seek punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and injunctive and
declaratory relief. Id. at ¶ 92 (averring that for their fraud claim Plaintiffs are “seeking

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damages, plus punitive damages, interest, and attorneys’ fees”); (Id. at ¶¶ 105-06)
(requesting injunctive and declaratory relief); See also Id. at ¶¶ 107-08) (seeking recovery
of attorneys’ fees).
Plaintiffs’ also seek to bring this action on behalf of themselves as well as two
classes of persons: The “First Sub-Class” is apparently attempting to plead a fraud claim,
and is defined as:
“persons within the state of Ohio who, within the last five years, are
identified under R.C. §1345.71 as a ‘consumer,’ that has engaged in a
consumer transaction with FCA US LLC where the consumer acquires a
motor vehicle manufactured by FCA US LLC, and these person-consumers
have attempted to exercise their right to a refund of their nonconforming
motor vehicle under R.C. §1345.72, and, either through dealing with FCA
US LLC or contact with the agents of FCA US LLC, have been denied the
refund of the ‘full purchase price’ for this nonconforming motor vehicle as
defined under R.C. §1345:72, either through denial of a refund for title fees,
taxes, and security deposits, or being forced to retroactively pay the cost of
these items, which the consumer is specifically entitled to under R.C.
§1345.71 et seq.”
Doc. 1, Ex.B, ¶45.
The “Second Sub-Class” which is apparently seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief, encompasses:

“persons within the state of Ohio who, within the last five years, are
identified under R.C. §1345.71 as a ‘consumer’ of a motor vehicle
manufactured by FCA US LLC, these persons are currently attempting to
exercise their right to a refund of their nonconforming motor vehicle under
R.C. §1345.72, and, either through dealing with FCA US LLC or contact
with the agents of FCA US LLC, are being denied the refund of the ‘full
purchase price’ for this nonconforming motor vehicle as defined under R.C.
§1345.72, either through a denial of a refund for title fees, taxes, and
security deposits, or being asked to retroactively pay the cost of these items,
which the consumer is specifically entitled to under R.C. §1345.71 et seq.”
Id. at ¶ 94.

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Defendants filed a notice of removal with this court on February 14, 2018. (Doc.
1). Defendants’ notice of removal asserted jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2),
which is commonly referred to as the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), as well as
diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
On or about August 21, 2017, Plaintiffs made a written settlement demand on FCA
US, claiming that “[t]he fraudulent actions” at issue caused them “to sustain far greater
damages than simply the recoupment of the ‘full purchase price’ of their nonconforming
motor vehicle.” See Doc. 21, Ex. A, Krueger Decl., ¶ 4. In the demand letter, Plaintiffs
valued their “compensatory, incidental, and punitive damages [at] no less than
$400,000.00 (Four-Hundred Thousand Dollars and Zero Cents).” Id.
II. REMAND
Plaintiffs’ now seek to remand this matter back to state court.

Specifically,

Plaintiffs’ contend: 1) the notice of removal was flawed where Defendant, FCA US LLC,
failed to adequately show that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory limits set
forth in the CAFA; 2) Defendant failed to show that subject matter jurisdiction for this Court
exists separate from the requirements set forth in the CAFA; and 3) Defendant has not
provided this Court or Plaintiffs with any actual proof as to the size of the class or the
amount in controversy. Plaintiffs’ contentions are not well-taken.
A. Legal Standard
The basis for removing a state court case to federal court “must be disclosed upon
the face of the complaint, unaided by the answer or by the petition for removal.” Gully v.
First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936); see also Powell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No.
14-155-HRW, 2015 WL 2063966, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 30, 2015) (noting that “jurisdiction

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is determined at the time of removal”). Thus, the Court may not consider defenses in
deciding if a case may be removed. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393
(1987); Loftis v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 342 F.3d 509, 515 (6th Cir. 2003). Because
removing a case interferes with the state court’s jurisdiction, removal statutes are
construed narrowly. See Long v. Bando Mfg. Co. of Am., Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 757 (6th Cir.
2000) (stating “removal statutes are to be narrowly construed” because “they implicate
federalism concerns”).
The requirements for federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship are set
forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Diversity is satisfied if no plaintiff and no defendant are
citizens of the same state, and the amount in controversy is $75,000 or greater. See 3LI
Consultant Grp. V. Catholic Health Partners, No. 1:15-cv-455, 2016 WL 246202, at *1
(S.D. Ohio Jan. 21, 2016). The amount in controversy generally does not include interest,
costs, or attorney’s fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see, e.g., Torres v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 478 F. Supp. 2d 924, 927–28 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 14, 2007). However,
punitive damages may be included in the calculation. Hayes v. Equitable Energy Res.
Co., 266 F.3d 560, 572 (6th Cir. 2001). More specifically, unless it is a “legal certainty”
that punitive damages cannot be recovered, the Court must consider such damages when
examining the jurisdictional amount. Id. (citing Holley Equip. Corp. v. Credit Alliance
Corp., 821 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1987)).
Whether Plaintiff will prevail on her claims is irrelevant for the purposes of
determining the amount in controversy. See Garza v. Bettcher Indus., Inc., 752 F. Supp.
753, 763 (E.D. Mich. 1990). It is sufficient if a fair reading of the Complaint demonstrates
that, if Plaintiff is successful, it is more likely than not that her damages will exceed the

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required amount. Id. Finally, Defendants bear the burden of proving they have satisfied
the amount-in-controversy requirement by a preponderance of the evidence. Rogers v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 230 F.3d 868, 871 (6th Cir. 2000).
B. Analysis
28 U.S.C. § 1332 was amended by the Class Action Fairness Act “CAFA” to
provide, in pertinent part, that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000,
exclusive of interest and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). In determining the amount in
controversy, the plaintiff is the “master of his complaint”:
It is well established that the plaintiff is the “master of [his] complaint” and
can plead to avoid federal jurisdiction. Accordingly, subject to a “good
faith” requirement in pleading, a plaintiff may sue for less than the amount
[he] may be entitled to if [he] wishes to avoid federal jurisdiction and remain
in state court.
Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 407 (6th Cir. 2007)
With respect to removal under the CAFA, the United States Supreme Court has
instructed that when a class action case is removed by a defendant to federal court under
the CAFA “no antiremoval presumption attends.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co.,
LLC v. Owens,135 S.Ct. 547, 554 (2014). Defendants further contend that the legislative
history of CAFA suggests that its “provisions should be read broadly, with a strong
preference that interstate class actions should be heard in a federal court if properly
removed by any defendant.’” Id. (quoting S.Rep. No. 109-14, p. 43 (2005)).
Furthermore, the burden to show the jurisdictional requisites is not an exacting
one. Where, as here, this Court’s diversity jurisdiction is invoked, a removing defendant
bears the burden only to “show by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in

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controversy requirement has been met.” Hayes v. Equitable Energy Res. Co., 266 F.3d
560, 572 (6th Cir. 2001). “This standard does not place upon the defendant the daunting
burden of proving, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff’s damages are not less than the
amount-in-controversy requirement.” Id. (emphasis added; citation omitted). Rather, as
the Supreme Court explained in Dart Cherokee, when a plaintiff challenges a defendant’s
contention that the amount-in controversy requisite is met, “both sides submit proof and
the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-incontroversy requirement has been satisfied.” 135 S.Ct. at 554.
Here, according to Plaintiffs, Defendants’ seek to compute the amount in
controversy by relying on Rosen v. Chrysler Corp., 205 F.3d 918 (6th Cir. 2000)1 to find
that the value of each putative class member’s claim will be the total $30,000 or more
value of the vehicles as opposed to the amount placed in controversy by Plaintiffs’
complaint which includes, but is not limited to, the costs of security deposits, taxes, and
title fees. Doc. 1, ¶15. Defendants’ Notice of Removal also claims that Plaintiffs’ class is
made up of more than 600 potential members. Id. at ¶13. Defendants then choose to
multiply the total estimated cost of the vehicles ($30,000) by the random number of 600
potential class members to find that the amount in controversy is in excess of
$18,000,000. Id. at ¶15.
Plaintiffs argue that the amount-in-controversy requisites are not satisfied
because, under Ohio law, the relief they seek (i.e., return their Ram truck in exchange for
a refund of the “full purchase price”) must be categorized as “revocation” and not as
“rescission”. Doc. 15, PageID #158-62. Plaintiffs further contend that they have no way

1

In Rosen, the Court held that the amount-in-controversy threshold for diversity jurisdiction was satisfied
in a case seeking rescission of motor vehicle sales contracts. Id.

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of knowing the actual size of the class beyond the random number of 600 potential class
members that was provided by the Defendants. At this time, Plaintiffs have no way of
knowing the costs of security deposits, taxes, and title fees for each individual class
member, but Plaintiffs are similarly able to roughly estimate that the total cost of security
deposits, taxes, and title fees for even the most expensive automobile that FCA US LLC
has to offer would most likely amount to less than $5,000.00 per class member. As such,
Plaintiff’s contend that Defendants could not meet the $5,000.000.00 threshold. Such an
evidentiary dispute, however, does not require remand at this time.
Defendants’ notice of removal sufficiently sets forth that the amount in controversy
is satisfied. See, e.g., Henry v. Jolley, 2018 WL 1473637, *3 (S.D. Ohio 2018) (“As a
threshold matter, Plaintiff’s contention that remand is required because ‘Defendants have
not produced any evidence to prove the value of Plaintiff’s claims,’ is without merit. The
United States Supreme Court considered and rejected such an argument, holding instead
that a notice of removal ‘need not contain evidentiary submissions’ supporting the
allegation that the amount in controversy is satisfied” (citing Dart Cherokee, 135 S.Ct. at
551) (internal citation to record omitted)).
Moreover, Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages alone is enough to put this case
over the $5M threshold even if Plaintiffs’ $3M compensatory figure is adopted. As this
District has recognized, although Ohio law does not apply a “precise mathematical
formula for calculating punitive damages,” even awards which exceed the amount of
compensatory damages can be appropriate. Conrad v. McDonald's Corp., 2016 WL
1638889, *4 (S.D. Ohio 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 2853594
(S.D. Ohio 2016) (citations omitted). In fact, Ohio statutory law allows for punitive

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damages in an amount twice that awarded for compensatory damages. See Ohio Rev.
Code § 2315.21(D)(1)(a). Furthermore, this Court also has jurisdiction of this case under
the general diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), because the value of Plaintiffs’
individual claims exceeds $75,000.
Last, as detailed above, before filing this case, Plaintiffs sent a written settlement
demand to FCA US for $400,000. See Doc. 21, Ex. B, Krueger Decl., ¶ 4; See also Id. at
Ex1. According to Plaintiffs, this demand was justified because they have suffered “far
greater damages than simply the recoupment of the ‘full purchase price’ of their
nonconforming motor vehicle,” and this amount was necessary to cover their
“compensatory, incidental, and punitive damages.” Id. Both the Sixth Circuit and this
District have found that settlement demands, like the $400,000 one made by Plaintiffs
here, are evidence that a district court must consider when determining the amount in
controversy. See, e.g., Shupe v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 566 Fed.Appx. 476, 480-81
(6th Cir. 2014); Finnegan v. Wendy’s International, Inc., 2008 WL 2078068, **3-4 (S.D.
Ohio 2008); see also Norris v. People’s Credit Co., Inc., 2013 WL 5442273, *3 (N.D. Ohio
2013).
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. 15) is not well taken and is
herein DENIED.
III. MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Defendants ask the court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint asserting that Plaintiffs
failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Specifically, Defendants contend
that Plaintiffs have failed to meet the pleading standards of Rule 8(a). In the alternative,
to the extent that the Court were to find that Plaintiffs have pleaded a valid claim,

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Defendants contend that the class Plaintiffs define is legally improper.

Defendants

contentions are not well-taken, in part.
A. Legal Standard
“Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of actions that fail to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Ruff v. Bakery, Confectionery, Tobacco Workers & Grain Millers &
Indus. Int’l, 2015 WL 9412927,*2 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (citation omitted). To survive a motion
to dismiss under the Rule, the complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (emphasis added). “Generally, an action will be
dismissed under this standard where “there is no law to support the claims made.” Ruff,
2015 WL 9412927 at *2.
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the general pleading
standard and requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Ruff, 2015 WL 9412927 at *2 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Under
Rule 8(a), a complaint is legally insufficient if it does nothing more than “tender[] ‘naked
assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Even beyond this standard, when, as here, Plaintiffs plead a claim of fraud they must
meet the heightened pleading standards set forth in Rule 9(b), which requires the
pleading of “specific facts about alleged misrepresentations, including the statements
made and by whom, when and where they were made, and to whom they were made.”
William Beaumont Hosp. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC, 677 Fed.Appx. 979, 983
(6th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added).

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B. Analysis
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to meet the pleading requires set
forth in Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather than pleading facts,
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs proffer the legal conclusion that the offer made to them
was insufficient to comply with the refund requirements of Ohio Code Section 1345.71,
which mandates only that, upon return of a motor vehicle, a lessee be given that amount
of money which equates with the actual charges “incurred by the consumer.” Defendants
further contend that Plaintiffs do not plead a claim under the Ohio Lemon Law, R.C. §
1345.71, et seq and instead plead a claim for fraud, contending that ISG intentionally
misinformed them that the offer being made constituted the “full purchase price” as
defined in Section 1345.71(F) of the Ohio Lemon Law. As such, Defendants contend that
Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to meet the pleading requirements to allege a plausible claim for
fraud. Defendants contentions are not well-taken.
Notably, O.R.C. § 1345.72(B) requires that if the manufacturer is unable to conform
the motor vehicle to any applicable express warranty, “the manufacturer, at the
consumer's option, ... either shall replace the motor vehicle with a new motor vehicle
acceptable to the consumer or shall accept return of the vehicle from the consumer and
refund each of the following: (1) [t]he full purchase price ... [and] (2) [a]ll incidental
damages.” Piergallini v. Alfa Leisure, Inc., 2008 WL 687167 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (citation
omitted). Additionally, O.R.C. §1345.75(A) explicitly provides for a statutory claim for
damages against the manufacturer and states that “any consumer may bring a civil action
in a court of common pleas or other court of competent jurisdiction against any
manufacturer if the manufacturer fails to comply with section 1345.72 of the Revised Code

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and, in addition to the relief to which the consumer is entitled under that section, shall be
entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and all court costs..” The Supreme Court of
Ohio has ruled that the “Lemon Law is designed to protect consumers from chronically
defective new automobiles. It requires new vehicles to live up to warranties given by
manufacturers. The Lemon Law attaches a clear duty to sellers and provides a clear
remedy to buyers should the seller breach its duty.” Royster v. Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 531 (Ohio 2001).
As noted by Plaintiffs, a manufacturer’s duties under O.R.C. 1345.72 to reimburse
a consumer who owns a “lemon” are created when: (1) the consumer is the owner of a
vehicle that is covered by a written warranty, (2) the motor vehicle does not conform to
the applicable expressed warranty, (3) the nonconformity is reported to the manufacturer
or the manufacturer's authorized dealer within one year following the original date of
delivery, or the first 18,000 miles of operation, whichever is earlier, and (4) the
manufacturer or authorized dealer was unable to conform the motor vehicle to the express
warranty by repairing or correcting a defect that substantially impaired the use, safety, or
value of the motor vehicle, after a reasonable number of repair attempts. Iams v.
DaimlerChrysler, 883 N.E.2d 466 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).
Here, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint states that “Plaintiffs leased a new 2016 Ram
1500 on May 4, 2016” and that Plaintiffs have “not been in possession of the
nonconforming motor vehicle dating back to December of 2016.” See Doc. 1, Ex. B, Am.
Comp., PageID #39, at ¶8, #41, at ¶21. Additionally, Plaintiffs plead the following
allegations in their complaint: “Named Plaintiffs’ motor vehicle was out of service by
reason of repair for a cumulative total of 30 or more calendar days;” “Named Plaintiffs’

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motor vehicle possessed substantially the same nonconformity, which was subject to
repair three or more times, and the nonconformity either continued to exist or was
recurring;” and “FCA US LLC, their agents, or their authorized dealer, were unable to
conform Named Plaintiffs’ motor vehicle to any applicable express warranty by repairing
or correcting the nonconformity after a reasonable number of repair attempts.” Id.,
pageID#40, ¶¶ 15, 16, 17. In light of the foregoing, at this time, the undersigned finds that
Plaintiffs’ complaint contains sufficient allegations to state a claim for relief under Ohio’s
Lemon law.
Defendants further assert that Plaintiffs’ class allegations should be dismissed or
stricken from the record because such allegations define an impermissible “fail-safe”
class. See, e.g., Swetic, 235 F.Supp.3d at 890-91; Sherrod, 2016 WL 25979 at **3-5;
Sauter, 2014 WL 1814076 at **4-9. A “fail-safe” class is one defined in such a way that it
cannot be determined who is in the class until the case is resolved on the merits. Id.; see
also Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 538 (6th Cir. 2012) (a class
definition is impermissible where it is a “fail-safe” class, that is, a class that cannot be
defined until the case is resolved on its merits”). In this regard, Defendants contend that
the “Master Class” and “sub-classes” defined by Plaintiffs in the Amended Complaint are
improper “fail-safe” classes. See Doc. 1, Ex. B, Am. Comp., PageID ##45-46, 48, 54 (¶¶
45, 57, 94). They include only those vehicle owners/lessees who were denied a refund of
the “full purchase price” as defined by the Lemon Law. Id.
Because the classes proffered by Plaintiffs are defined by legal conclusions,
Defendants argue that the issue of whether a person is actually a class member “can only
be resolved by adjudications on the merits,” (i.e., by first determining whether a putative

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class was subjected to fraud and/or denied a full recovery), and this makes clear they
“are impermissible failsafe classes.” Wilkinson v. Greater Dayton Reg’l Transit Auth.,
2017 WL 3578702, *7 (S.D. Ohio 2017). As such, Defendants ask the Court to dismiss
the class allegations in Paragraphs 45, 57, and 94.
Plaintiffs’ response in opposition to Defendants motion to dismiss fails to address
FCA US’s argument that the class they have defined is an improper fail-safe class. As
such, Plaintiffs do not dispute Defendants’ argument that this Court should dismiss or
strike their class allegations as legally improper. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that
Paragraphs 45, 57, and 94 should be dismissed from the complaint.
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motion to remand (Doc.15) should be DENIED and
Defendants’ motions (Docs. 16, 17) to dismiss should be GRANTED in part, and
DENIED in part, consistent with this Report and Recommendation.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Stephanie K. Bowman
Stephanie K. Bowman
United States Magistrate Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
MELISSA GILVIN,

Case No. 1:18-cv-107

Plaintiff,
Dlott, J.
Bowman, M.J.

vs.
FCA US LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to this Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of
the filing date of this R&R. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely
motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of
the R&R objected to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of
the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN (14)
DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make objections in
accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

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