Chappel v. Hunter et al

Filing 9

OPINION AND ORDER adopting in part, modifying in part, and rejecting in part 7 the R&R - the Court agrees with its ultimate recommendation of dismissal (though the Court concludes dismissal of this action should be without prejudice), (id. at #539) . Accordingly, the Court overrules 8 Chappel's objections and dismisses the action without prejudice. Because the case is dismissed, the Court denies as moot 3 Chappel's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and 6 her Notice to Vacate Vo id Orders. Finally, the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal of this Opinion and Order would not be made in good faith and denies Chappel leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Signed by Judge Douglas R. Cole on 3/27/24. (sct)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
DAWN M. CHAPPEL,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:23-cv-728
v.
DAVID M. HUNTER, et al.,

JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE
Magistrate Judge Bowman

Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Bowman’s December 7, 2023, Report and
Recommendation (R&R, Doc. 7), which recommends that the Court dismiss Plaintiff
Dawn M. Chappel’s tendered Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 3) and dismiss
with prejudice the Complaint (Doc. 5) Chappel filed here. As explained below, the
Court ADOPTS IN PART, MODIFIES IN PART, AND REJECTS IN PART the
R&R (Doc. 7). That is to say, the Court agrees with the R&R’s ultimate
recommendation that it dismiss the action, but with the caveat that the dismissal
will be without prejudice. The Court therefore OVERRULES Chappel’s Objections
(Doc. 8) and DISMISSES Chappel’s Complaint (Doc. 5) WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
And because the case is dismissed, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Chappel’s Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 3) and DENIES AS MOOT her Notice to Vacate
Void Orders (Doc. 6).

BACKGROUND1
Chappel’s Complaint, while detailed, is not always easy to parse. When
construed liberally, it makes clear that this is a recent iteration of Chappel’s attempt
to litigate issues arising from proceedings in a state juvenile court involving a state
agency’s custody of Chappel’s children. (Doc. 5 ¶¶ 1–8, #278–79). Her previous suit in
this Court, which raised claims against Adams County Children’s Services and one
of its caseworkers, was dismissed at the screening stage because it was barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine as an impermissible attempt to appeal the state juvenile
court’s determinations and otherwise failed to state a claim for relief. Chappel v.
Adams Cnty. Child.’s Servs., No., 2023 WL 4191724, at *3–*5, *7–*8 (S.D. Ohio May
19, 2023). In the current suit, Chappel sued different defendants and raised several
claims not adjudicated in the first suit—although many allegations still appear to be
directed at the validity of the state court proceedings. The current defendants include
two state court judges involved with the custody dispute, two public defenders who
had represented Chappel in those proceedings, the juvenile court’s guardian ad litem,
the Adams County Board of County Commissioners, and an official with the Adams
County Health Department. (Doc. 5 ¶¶ 2–8, #277–78). Six of her seven claims allege
violations of her procedural due process rights: claims premised on (1) the alleged

The case comes before the Court on its sua sponte screening authority under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), which is governed by the same standards that
apply to motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Williams v. Parikh, No. 1:23-cv-167,
2023 WL 8824845, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2023). So while the Court must accept the wellpleaded allegations in the Complaint as true, Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528
F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008), it “may take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts of
record.” Granader v. Pub. Bank, 417 F.2d 75, 82 (6th Cir. 1969).
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2

tampering with court documents, (id. at #279–82), (2) the state court’s claimed lack
of jurisdiction, (id. at #282–83), (3) her alleged inability to present evidence through
counsel, (id. at #283–84), (4) allegedly faulty procedures used during her courtordered drug tests, (id. at #284–85), (5) bias in the state court proceedings, (id. at
#285–86 (referencing also the Equal Protection Clause)), and (6) the alleged use of
unlicensed individuals to administer drug screening and drug counseling programs,
(id. at #287). Her seventh claim purports to raise a substantive due process right on
behalf of the minors in the state agency’s custody for the guardian ad litem’s failure
to safeguard their welfare.2 (Id. at #286–87). For these violations, Chappel demands
a smorgasbord of relief: an expansive order halting the state court’s use of its current
drug-screening protocol and requiring an investigation into the practices, declaratory
and injunctive relief for the purported constitutional violations, compensatory and
punitive damages, and this Court’s reversal of the state court orders. (Id. at #288).
When filing the Complaint, Chappel also moved for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (IFP).3 (Doc. 1). As a result, under this Court’s General Order Cin. 22-02,
the matter was referred to a Magistrate Judge. On December 7, 2023, the Magistrate
Judge granted Chappel IFP status. (Doc. 4). That same day, invoking the Court’s

Other than Count 1 of the Complaint, which expressly alleges that the defendants have
violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985, (Doc. 5, #280), the Court construes the six other due process claims
as having been brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as that is the only mechanism by which state
actors can be sued for constitutional violations. Williams, 2023 WL 8824845, at *1 n.1.
2

Chappel’s IFP motion also included several other miscellaneous motions as attachments.
(See Docs. 1-1, 1-2). The Magistrate Judge denied the non-dispositive motion as moot in the
R&R. (Doc. 7, #520 n.1). Chappel has not objected to those rulings under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 72(a). (See Doc. 8). So the Court does not disturb these rulings, especially
considering it agrees with the Magistrate Judge that dismissal of the action is warranted.
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authority under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), to
conduct a sua sponte review of the Complaint, the Magistrate Judge issued her R&R
recommending dismissal of the Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as
well as a failure to state a claim for relief. (Doc. 7, #531–39). And in the R&R, the
Magistrate Judge also recommended that the Court deny Chappel’s separately filed
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus on the grounds that Chappel could not represent
the interests of her children. (Id. at #530). The Magistrate Judge made no
recommendation regarding Chappel’s self-styled “Notice to Vacate Void Orders,”
which is best construed as a motion for judgment on the pleadings considering
Chappel argues in the document that she merits relief from the state juvenile court
orders based solely on the allegations in her Complaint. (See Doc. 6).
Chappel objected to the R&R. (Doc. 8). Chappel (1) generally argues the merits
of her Complaint, (id. at #541–55; (2) appears to abandon several forms of requested
relief, including her demand for a declaration that Defendants violated her
constitutional rights, an injunction “restraining Defendants from further violation of
Plaintiff’s rights,” compensatory and punitive damages, and a “[r]eversal of the court
orders issued in the state court,” (id. at #555); and (3) objects to the R&R insofar as
it found that the suit must be dismissed because of claim preclusion or for want of
subject-matter jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment, the Burrus doctrine, and
Rooker-Feldman, (id. at #555–58). Along with objecting, Chappel filed 20 more pages
of exhibits. (id. at #560–80).
Accordingly, the R&R and Chappel’s objections are ripe for the Court’s review.

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LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3), “district courts review an R&R
de novo after a party files a timely objection.” Bates v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr.,
No. 1:22-cv-337, 2023 WL 4348835, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 5, 2023). But that review
extends only to “any portion to which a proper objection was made.” Id. (citation
omitted). In response to such an objection, “the district court may accept, reject, or
modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter
to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3))
(cleaned up). By contrast, if a party makes only a general objection, it “has the same
effect[] as would a failure to object.” Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 932
F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). A litigant must identify each issue in the R&R to which
he objects with sufficient clarity, or else forfeit the Court’s de novo review. Miller v.
Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995) (“The objections must be clear enough to
enable the [] court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.”).
That said, Chappel is proceeding pro se. A pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be
construed liberally and are subject to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
filed by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Franklin v. Rose,
765 F.2d 82, 84–85 (6th Cir. 1985). But pro se litigants still must comply with the
procedural rules governing civil cases. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113
(1993). “The liberal treatment of pro se pleadings does not require the lenient
treatment of substantive law.” Johnson v. Stewart, No. 08-1521, 2010 WL 8738105,
at *3 (6th Cir. May 5, 2010) (citations omitted). For unobjected portions of the R&R,
“the advisory committee notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) suggest that
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the Court still must ‘satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the
[R&R] … to accept the recommendation.’” Redmon v. Noel, No. 1:21-cv-445, 2021 WL
4771259, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 13, 2021) (collecting cases).
The Court is reviewing the Complaint under its screening authority under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which permits sua sponte dismissals for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. Sua sponte dismissals under these provisions are
governed by the same standards that apply to motions to dismiss for failure to state
a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468,
470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Under that standard, a “complaint must present sufficient
facts to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Robbins v. New Cingular
Wireless PCS, LLC, 854 F.3d 315, 319 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In making that determination, the Court
“construe[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Bassett v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Before diving into the merits, the Court needs to lay some groundwork. As
noted above, Chappel’s nominally labeled objections do not require full consideration.
This is because her decision to argue about the merits of her claims without specific
reference to aspects of the R&R she believes are in error, (Doc. 8, #541–55),
constitutes only a general objection that results in a forfeiture of the Court’s de novo
review. Miller, 50 F.3d at 380; Jennifer R. V. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:19-cv-114,
2023 WL 6583815, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 10, 2023). Chappel also backtracks on the

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relief she requested by abandoning all but her request for declaratory and equitable
relief resulting in the state court’s termination of its drug testing procedures. (Doc. 8,
#555 (“The plaintiff seeks to correct the complaint, removing accidentally included
relief requests (6–10).”); see Doc. 5, #288 (listing relief related only to the state court’s
drug procedures in paragraphs 1–5)). The Court accepts Chappel’s express disavowal
of such relief and proceeds accordingly by treating the drug-testing-related forms of
relief, (id.), as the only remedies Chappel demands for her claims. Healthcare Venture
Partners, LLC v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, No. 1:21-cv-29, 2021 WL 5194662,
at *3 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 8, 2021) (“[Chappel] is the master of [her] Complaint, and [she]
has elected not to seek [certain forms of] recovery … . That is [her] right.”); see
generally McNeil v. Cmty. Prob. Servs., LLC, 945 F.3d 991, 996 (6th Cir. 2019) (“The
plaintiff is the master of the complaint and free to choose between legal theories.”
(cleaned up)).
With that clarification out of the way, the question is how to proceed. The R&R
lumps all the claims together because the Magistrate Judge concluded that the
judicial doctrines discussed in the R&R applied equally to all seven claims raised in
the Complaint. (See Doc. 7, #531–36, 537–39). The Court is less certain. So it opts
instead for a cautious approach and groups claims only to the degree that they can be
disposed of via the same doctrine. For each, the Court will note whether Chappel
objected to that position. Finally, as is its charge at all stages of the litigation, the
Court starts with subject-matter jurisdiction issues first. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–95 (1998). That said, it may take questions of subject-

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matter jurisdiction in any “order it pleases.” Dates v. HSBC, No. 1:24-cv-81, 2024 WL
860918, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 29, 2024).
A.

Lack of Redressability for Counts 1, 2, 3, and 5
The first doctrinal problem barring this Court’s jurisdiction over several claims

in the Complaint is Chappel’s lack of Article III standing to pursue those claims. To
invoke this Court’s authority to dispense remedies for legal claims, Chappel must
“answer the question: ‘What’s it to you?’” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413,
423 (2021) (quoting Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 881, 882 (1983)). And “[t]o answer that
question in a way … [that] establish[es] standing, a plaintiff must show (i) that he
suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent;
(ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would
likely be redressed by judicial relief.” Id.
This third component is where Chappel struggles. Redressability is an
essential prerequisite for a party’s invocation of a federal court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction because such jurisdiction hinges on the ability to “provide[] a remedy that
can redress the plaintiff’s injury.” Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 592 U.S. 279, 801
(2021). It is not enough for the plaintiff to obtain psychic relief by forcing a defendant
to explain the legality of its actions if the “relief [requested] does not remedy the
injury suffered.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 107. In other words, ameliorating the asserted
legal injury “is the very essence of the redressability requirement.” Id. Applying that

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rule to the still-live requested forms of relief shows why Chappel lacks standing to
pursue Counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 of her Complaint.
Count 1 in the Complaint appears to raise a civil rights conspiracy claim
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1985 for the state court’s alleged tampering with its own
documents, all purportedly to deprive Chappel of her due process rights. (Doc. 5
¶¶ 10–30, #279–82). Count 2 attempts to challenge the constitutional legitimacy of
the state juvenile court’s orders because they were issued “without proper
jurisdiction.” (Id. ¶¶ 32–35, #282–83). Count 3 challenges the validity of the statecourt legal proceedings based on claims that the two attorneys that represented her
were ineffective and that Chappel was purportedly barred from presenting probative
evidence before the juvenile court (although what evidence Chappel wanted
presented is not identified with any specificity or particularity). (Id. ¶¶ 37–44, #283–
84). And Count 5 claims that the state court proceedings are biased and therefore
must be invalidated because the cast of characters involved hold “a prejudiced
attitude towards individuals with addiction issues, which could have affected their
ability to fairly adjudicate” the custody case. (Id. ¶¶ 56–61, #285–86). These four
claims all contend that the state court proceedings are tainted by alleged due process
violations and therefore cannot carry the force of law: the legal injury stems from the
continued enforcement of the court’s orders in those cases. So, to have standing,
Chappel would need to demand a remedy that permits her to recover for the alleged
harm caused by the state court’s orders.

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But as a reminder, as a result of Chappel’s abandonment of certain forms of
relief in her objections, the only remedies she still requests are various forms of
declaratory and injunctive relief related to the state juvenile court’s drug testing
procedures. (Id. at #288; Doc. 8, #555). That presents a redressability/standing
problem, as federal court orders directed at the juvenile court’s drug testing
procedures would do nothing to remedy or to stem the harm arising from the legal
injury she identifies in each of these counts. Even were the Court to conclude that it
could offer all the relief Chappel desires from the drug testing (to be clear, the Court
does not so conclude, see infra Part C), such relief would not disturb the ongoing effect
or the state court’s orders nor compensate Chappel for any rights violations she
purportedly experienced. What that means is Chappel’s prosecution of Counts 1, 2, 3,
and 5 of the Complaint purportedly “seeks not remediation of her own injury … but
vindication of the rule of law—the undifferentiated public interest in faithful”
compliance with due process. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 106. That does not suffice to vest
this Court with jurisdiction over those claims.
So, while these allegations, and Chappel’s further broad assertions about the
state court’s alleged nefarious handling of other child custody cases, certainly raise
some concerns (if true), they suffer from a fatal redressability flaw that bars this
Court’s jurisdiction over these claims. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss them
without prejudice.

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B.

Count 6 – Substantive Due Process Claim
Chappel’s sixth claim challenges the actions of the guardian ad litem as

purportedly in violation of her and her children’s rights. (Doc. 5 ¶¶ 63–68, #286–87).
First, as Chappel acknowledges in several filings with this Court, (id. ¶ 63,
#286; Doc. 3, #274; Doc. 8, #547), her children are not currently in her custody,
Chappel, 2023 WL 4191724, at *1, which suggests that this claim seeks to raise the
rights of third parties she no longer represents. (Doc. 5 ¶ 67, #286 (claiming the
guardian ad litem breached his duty by failing to account for “the children’s wishes”)).
But the Supreme Court has cautioned against federal courts’ exercising jurisdiction
over this exact scenario as a prudential matter: the state’s temporary custody
determination, a quintessential family-law matter reserved for its sole consideration,
“has deprived [Chappel] of that [next friend] status” necessary for her to assert her
children’s rights. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 16–18 (2004),
abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
572 U.S. 118 (2014). In such a case, “it is improper for th[is] federal court[] to
entertain a claim by [Chappel, given her] … standing to sue is founded on family law
rights that are in dispute [which, in turn, raises the specter that] prosecution of th[is]
lawsuit may have an adverse effect on [her] [children] who [are] the source of
[her] … claimed standing.” Id. at 17. So, to the extent Chappel seeks to assert
substantive due process claims held by her children, who are not in her custody, this
claim must be dismissed for want of prudential standing.
Second, in as much as Chappel challenges a denial of her own substantive due
process rights by challenging the legitimacy of the actions the guardian ad litem has
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taken in the state court proceedings, (Doc. 5 ¶ 68, #287 (alleging harm to Chappel’s
“right to family life”)), the Court still lacks jurisdiction over the claim for the reasons
articulated above, see supra Part A. Namely, Chappel objects to the guardian ad
litem’s actions because they have injured her filial rights by the guardian’s
advocating for the continued separation between her and her children. (Doc. 5 ¶¶ 66,
68, #286–87). But to remedy that injury, Chappel would need either to be
compensated for the alleged harm or to have her children returned to her. And as
noted above, Chappel no longer requests such relief—she had disavowed any relief
save for relief directed at terminating the state court’s continued use of its current
drug testing procedures. (Id. at #288; Doc. 8, #555). But again, as before, this Court’s
granting of relief related to the drug testing procedures would not provide relief from
the asserted injury identified in this claim. And so, the claim, to the extent that it is
Chappel’s assertion of her own rights, must fail on redressability grounds as well. So
the Court will dismiss it without prejudice on account of Chappel’s lack of standing.
C.

Counts 4, 7 – Eleventh Amendment and Younger Abstention
The final two counts in the Complaint raise challenges directly implicating the

juvenile court’s employment of allegedly improper drug testing procedures under
state law. Count 4 claims that the ongoing state custody proceedings relied on faulty
drug screening procedures because the testing devices do not properly comply with
state law and because the court documents incorporate “false[] reports” of tests’ being
conducted as well as “false[] reports” of test results. (Doc. 5 ¶¶ 46–53, #284–85). And
Count 7 objects to Defendant Shayla Tumbleson’s administration of the court-ordered

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drug tests on Chappel because Tumbleson purportedly lacks a proper license, which
allegedly violates state law. (Id. ¶¶ 69–76, #287). Count 4 appears to be directed
against defendant state court judges and defendant Adams County Board of County
Commissioners, and Count 7 appears to be directed against those same defendants
in addition to Tumbleson.4 Admittedly, both counts directly implicate the validity of
the state court’s reliance on drug testing procedures, so there are no redressability
problems as a result of Chappel’s preservation of the drug-testing-related forms of
relief after her objections. (Id. at #288; Doc. 8, #555). But while there are no standing
problems, the Court still cannot reach the merits of either claim. For starters, because
certain defendants are sued in their official capacities there is a jurisdictional
problem under the Eleventh Amendment. Moreover, because the allegations as
explained above all contest the drug testing used by the state juvenile court in
connection with the ongoing custody proceedings regarding Chappel’s children, (Doc.
5 ¶¶ 49–50, 52–53, #284–85 (citing a “November 1, 2024 hearing” in her children’s
custody case and “plaintiff’s case documents” as evidencing the impropriety of the
state court’s drug testing procedures and its “illegally constructing evidence to
support allegations against parents”)), there is an abstention problem barring this
Court’s review. Each are addressed in turn.

Based on the allegations listed in the Complaint, the Court can only surmise who are the
proper defendants for these claims. Chappel neither identifies who she believes allegedly
violated her rights nor makes out any coherent claim for relief based on the allegations
included. As is the Court’s responsibility, however, with pro se plaintiffs, the Court construes
the Complaint as liberally as possible to reach this conclusion.
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1.

Eleventh Amendment

Chappel’s claims, to the extent that they are raised against the state court
judges (Judge Spencer and Magistrate Judge Hunter) in their official capacities, must
be dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction. As caselaw has established, the
courts of common pleas, the state juvenile courts, and their employees are state
officers for § 1983 purposes. Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., Loc. 860 v. Neff, 29 F.4th
325, 333–34 (6th Cir. 2022); Williams v. Parikh, No. 1:23-cv-167, 2023 WL 8824845,
at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2023). So that means the official-capacity claims against the
state court judges are the equivalent of suits against Ohio, which is clothed with
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. Williams, 2023 WL 8824845, at *5. And
while Chappel is correct that Ex parte Young authorizes federal courts to entertain
suits for prospective equitable relief against state officials in their official capacities
generally, (Doc. 8, #555), that exception does not apply to equitable relief “directed
toward state judicial officers regarding their adjudication of the cases and
controversies put before them.” Williams, 2023 WL 8824845, at *6. Namely,
Chappel’s official-capacity claims against the state court judges are barred by
sovereign immunity as all the prospective declaratory and equitable relief demanded
would interfere with the ongoing custody suit and drug testing attendant to those
proceedings. (Doc. 5, #288). So these claims must be dismissed without prejudice on

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jurisdictional grounds as they are barred by the state’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity.5 Williams, 2023 WL 8824845, at *6–*7.
2.

Younger Abstention

What about the remaining claims contained in counts 4 and 7 of the Complaint
(i.e., those individual-capacity claims brought against the judges and the same claims
raised against Adams County Board of County Commissioners and Tumbleson in
both her official and individual capacities)? The Court concludes it cannot resolve
these claims because of the Younger abstention doctrine.
Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny, a federal court
generally must abstain from adjudicating a federal cause of action when doing so
would interfere with an ongoing child custody proceeding. Meyers v. Franklin Cnty.
Ct. Common Pleas, 23 F. App’x 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2001). To satisfy the three
prerequisites of Younger, there must be a pending state court proceeding that

This analysis does not apply to either the Adams County Board of County Commissioners
or Tumbleson when sued in her official capacity because both parties are arms of the local
government. See generally Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 688–90 (1978) (holding
that “municipalities and other local government units” may be sued under § 1983). The
Adams County Board of County Commissioners is the proper local body politic under Ohio
law that may be sued under § 1983, Lovelo v. Clermont Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., No. 1:23-cv-114,
2023 WL 8828008, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2023), and it cannot claim entitlement to the
state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, S.J. v. Hamilton Cnty., 374 F.3d 416, 420 (6th Cir.
2004). Tumbleson is alleged to be an employee of the Adams County Health Department,
(Doc. 5 ¶ 8, #278), which department is funded and managed by the Adams County Board of
County Commissioners under state law. Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3709.03, .31. And given Ohio state
courts treat the county health departments as arms of the county, Trubiani v. Graziani, No.
2874-M, 2000 WL 14043, at *3–*4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1999) (granting political
subdivision immunity to the county health department); see generally Stewart v. Allen, 2008Ohio-1645 (9th Dist.) (equating the county with the county health department throughout
the opinion), it is clear that the health department is properly considered an arm of the local
rather than state government. Cf. Lowe v. Hamilton Cnty. Dep’t of Job & Family Servs., 610
F.3d 321, 325–32 (6th Cir. 2010). So, when Tumbleson is sued in her official capacity, she
cannot claim any entitlement to the state’s immunity from suit.
5

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implicates important state interests and that “afford[s] the plaintiff an adequate
opportunity to raise constitutional claims.” Id. As the Court has explained, Chappel’s
allegations in Counts 4 and 7, as bolstered by the drug-testing related relief she
requests, make clear that she challenges the state court’s ongoing proceedings and
its continuing reliance on the current drug testing procedures and the results from
the tests purportedly administered to Chappel. (Doc. 5, #284–85, 287–88). By seeking
an invalidation of the current procedures and a determination that the past drug
tests cannot be used against her in the current custody proceedings, Chappel’s drugtesting due process claims constitutes an implicit request that this Court intermeddle
in the ongoing state court proceedings.6 But such interference runs headlong into
Younger. After all, child custody matters, like other domestic matters, are inherently
and exclusively vested in state courts. Cf. Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94
(1890) (“The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and
child, belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of the United States. As
to the right to the control and possession of this child, as it is contested by its father
and its grandfather, it is one in regard to which neither the congress of the United
States, nor any authority of the United States, has any special jurisdiction.”). And as
caselaw makes clear, the juvenile court provides an adequate forum for Chappel to

The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the Complaint is best construed as
alleging “that the Adams County Juvenile Court proceedings remain ongoing.” (Doc. 7, #535).
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raise her constitutional due process challenges to those proceedings.7 Meyers, 23 F.
App’x at 205 & n.3.
So because Chappel did not object to the R&R’s invocation of the Younger
abstention doctrine, (Doc. 7, #535–36), nor identify extraordinary circumstances
requiring federal intervention, Younger applies. The Court will therefore abstain
from adjudicating these two remaining claims and dismiss them without prejudice.8
Meyers, 23 F. App’x at 204–06.
*

*

*

Altogether, the Court finds that all of the claims must be dismissed for one
reason or another.9 That leaves the question of what to do about Chappel’s other

Although Chappel argues that the state court proceedings were unfair on account of her
speculation about the state court’s supposed tampering with evidence and her disagreement
with the court’s sustaining objections to legal arguments she made about state law, (e.g., Doc.
5 ¶¶ 13, 49, #280, 284–85), this contention does not meet her burden of showing that the state
proceeding would not permit her to raise her constitutional claims. First, Chappel’s
allegations smack of speculation and are not grounded in competent evidence. Second, these
arguments imply that Chappel merely disagrees with the legal conclusions reached in the
state court proceedings, rather than contests the adequacy of the forum. This is bolstered by
the fact that under Ohio law, juvenile courts are given broad jurisdiction to hear claims to
assure parties have fair and constitutionally compliant hearings. Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.01;
Meyers, 23 F. App’x at 205 n.3. Finally, to the extent that Chappel finds that some of the
procedures are improper and contends that her legal arguments should not have been
ignored, “the proper avenue for registering that disagreement is by way of an appeal” in the
state court system. Dates, 2024 WL 860918, at *9.
7

Younger abstention would not require dismissal of these claims were Chappel to have
requested damages. Meyers, 23 F. App’x at 206 (noting that damages claims currently barred
by Younger should be held in abeyance pending the resolution of the state court proceeding).
But Chappel has expressly disavowed her demand to recover damages in her objection, as
noted above. (Doc. 8, #555 (removing requested relief number 8, which prays for
compensatory and punitive damages, (Doc. 5, #288))). So Younger requires a dismissal of the
entirety of both claims without prejudice.
8

Because the explanations above suffice to dismiss the Complaint, the Court need not
address the R&R’s alternative reasons for dismissing this action. That said, the Court notes
its disagreement with the R&R’s claim preclusion analysis. (Doc. 7, #537–39). A suit is not
9

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pending requests for relief: her effort to obtain a writ of habeas corpus to compel
Adams County Children’s Services to present her children to the federal court, (Doc.
3, #274), and her motion to have this Court vacate the state court’s orders, which
Chappel believes are void, (Doc. 6, #513). Although the R&R recommended dismissing
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on the petition’s merits, (Doc. 7, #530)—
a recommendation to which Chappel did not object—the Court finds that denying the
petition as moot is the more prudent route given it has already dismissed the entire
action and considering the jurisdictional issues that prevent the Court from
exercising its authority over many of the claims in the Complaint. For exactly the
same reasons, the Court will also deny Chappel’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings, nominally styled as a “Notice to Vacate Void Orders,” as moot.
Finally, because Chappel is proceeding IFP, the Court must assess, under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), whether an appeal taken from this Order would be “in good faith.”
Considering the Complaint suffers from clear jurisdictional issues and abstention
issues that jump out from the face of the Complaint, as detailed above, “any appeal
of this decision would not have an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Johnson v.
barred by the doctrine of res judicata if the previous suit raising identical claims was
dismissed for a want of subject-matter jurisdiction. Hughes v. United States, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
232, 237 (1866). And as the thrust of the prior court’s decision was to dismiss Chappel’s claims
as outside the scope of the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, Chappel, 2023 WL 4191724, at *3–*4, the judgment in that case does not operate
as a bar to the adjudication of this current dispute. Nor is the Court convinced that nonmutual claim preclusion is a viable theory of law as the R&R proclaims. (Doc. 7, #538–39).
This is particularly so given the well-reasoned analysis in The 81 Development Company,
LLC v. Soil & Materials Engineers, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-998, 2021 WL 868886, at *11–*15 (W.D.
Mich. Mar. 9, 2021), which rejected a litigant’s attempt to loosen the privity requirement
required for claim preclusion to attach, and the Supreme Court’s strict delineation in Taylor
v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893–95 (2008), of the six recognized categories of privity for which
non-party claim preclusion is permissible.

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DeWine, No. 22-cv-587, 2023 WL 6421286, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 2023) (cleaned up).
So the Court certifies that any such appeal would not be in good faith.
CONCLUSION
In accordance with its explanation above, the Court ADOPTS IN PART,
MODIFIES IN PART, AND REJECTS IN PART the R&R (Doc. 7)—the Court
agrees with its ultimate recommendation of dismissal (though the Court concludes
dismissal of this action should be without prejudice), (id. at #539). Accordingly, the
Court OVERRULES Chappel’s objections (Doc. 8) and DISMISSES the action
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Because the case is dismissed, the Court DENIES AS
MOOT Chappel’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 3) and her Notice to
Vacate Void Orders (Doc. 6). Finally, the Court CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3), that an appeal of this Opinion and Order would not be made in good
faith and DENIES Chappel leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to enter judgment and to TERMINATE this
case on its docket.
SO ORDERED.
March 27, 2024
DATE

DOUGLAS R. COLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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