Brown v. Cincinnati Police Department et al
Filing
4
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re #3 Complaint filed by DaQuan Brown. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT: (1) All claims against all Defendants except for Defendants Wermuth, Ward, Pect and Esser should be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B); (2) Consistent with the Order directing service on Plaintiff's behalf, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Wermuth, Ward, Pect and Esser should be permitted to proceed for further development at this time. Objections to R&R due by 7/22/2024. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman on 7/8/2024. (km)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
DAQUAN BROWN,
Case No. 1:24-cv-316
Plaintiff,
McFarland, J.
Bowman, M.J.
v.
CINCINNATI POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On June 7, 2024, Plaintiff DaQuan Brown, proceeding pro se, filed an application
seeking to initiate the above-captioned case in forma pauperis, or without payment of a
filing fee. By separate Order, Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This matter is now before the Court for a sua
sponte review of the complaint to determine whether the complaint, or any portion of it,
should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned
recommends that claims against four Defendants be permitted to proceed for further
development, with claims against all other Defendants to be dismissed for failure to state
a claim.
I.
The Screening Standard
In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a
“litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying
litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive
lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)).To prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized federal
courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action is
frivolous or malicious. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be
dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable
basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v.
Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis
when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal
interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint
filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token,
however, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill, 630 F.3d
at 470-71 (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for
failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept
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all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual
allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that
offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557. The complaint
must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).
II.
Plaintiff’s Complaint
Plaintiff tendered a pro se civil rights complaint form that identifies the parties and
the relief she seeks, (Doc. 1-3 at PageID 80-83), along with summons forms. (See id. at
PageID 38-79). Plaintiff’s complaint identifies the following thirteen Defendants: (1) the
Cincinnati Police Department; (2) Jacob Hicks; (3) Jeffrey Wicezorkowski; (4) Emily Ward;
(5) Elsa Esser (6) Christopher Wermuth; (7) Dustin Pect; (8) Michael Miller; (9) P361; (10)
Douglas White; (11) Arron Roach; (12) Justin Gottman; and (13) Millenium Towing.
The complaint form identifies the basis for federal jurisdiction as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff states that she seeks the following injunctive relief and monetary damages: “I
want the court to order CPD to terminate the officers involved, make policy changes,
award damages for intentionally causing severe distress, remove negative filed CPD hold,
drop charges/remove probation, order stay away order.” (Doc. 1-3, PageID 83). However,
rather than setting forth her allegations on the complaint form itself, Plaintiff references
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an attachment – a separately filed document consisting of 32 unnumbered hand-written
single-spaced pages. Although the referenced attachment lacks a caption, the pages
have been docketed as her “complaint.”1 Within the body of that document, Plaintiff also
seeks punitive damages. (Doc.. 1-1, ¶¶54-57, PageID 21).
Plaintiff’s lengthy complaint is difficult to follow, but has been liberally construed
as written. Most of the allegations are contained in sequentially numbered paragraphs,
and are written below fifteen headings/subheadings that are presumed to set forth
Plaintiff’s combination of state and federal claims2: (1) Background Facts and Ohio R.C.
§2921.313; (2) Retaliation; (3) Tortious Interference With a Business Relationship; (4)
False Arrest under the Fourth Amendment; (5) Excessive Force under the Fourth
Amendment (; (6) First Amendment Violation; (7) Failure to Intervene with Excessive
Force; (8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (9) Racial Profiling; (10) Punitive
Damages; (11) Excessive Force and Retaliation under the First Amendment; (12)
Discrimination; (13) Tampering with Evidence; (14) Fourth Amendment Violation; and (15)
Deprivation.
Although judicial economy precludes setting forth the entirety of Plaintiff’s
allegations, the undersigned relies on Plaintiff’s “Background Facts” (¶¶1-23 at PageID
1-10) as a summary of her allegations. Pursuant to that summary, Plaintiff’s claims began
with an incident that occurred on January 8, 2024, when the Cincinnati Police Department
responded to a “911, domestic violence call.” (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 1). Three Defendants, identified
1
It appears that the original complaint form itself was inadvertently and erroneously filed with the tendered
summons forms at Doc. 1-3, PageID 80-83, instead of being filed as the first pages of Doc. 1-1.
2
Spelling and grammatical errors in the headings have been corrected for readability.
3
The heading “Background Facts” appears to encompass Paragraphs 1-24. A subheading under ¶ 1 reads
“Section 2921-31” and is construed as a reference to an Ohio Revised Code provision concerning the
offense of Obstructing Official Business.
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as Caucasian officers named Emily Ward, Dustin Pect and Christopher Wermuth,
appeared at the “Eatondale site” with the “alleged victim Kayla Gill (African American).”
(Id.) Plaintiff, who also identifies as African American, was in her brother’s (Romero
Tyler’s) apartment at the time. Defendants assisted Ms. Gill in entering the apartment to
retrieve Ms. Gill’s belongings even though Plaintiff alleges she informed Defendants that
Ms. Gill was not a leaseholder and (in Plaintiff’s view) could not give consent to enter the
apartment. Plaintiff alleges that CPD Officials ignored her protestations and “proceeded
to force their entry.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that after she expressed her alleged Fourth
Amendment rights,4 Defendant Wermuth became angry “and unlawfully removed me from
my brother[‘s] home.” (Id.) Plaintiff clarifies that she was not detained or arrested and was
permitted to leave. (Id.) She further alleges that officers subsequently learned from Ms.
Gill of “open warrants I had” and later “filed an obstructing official business charge against
me” under Ohio R.C. § 2921.31. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that in support of the obstruction charge, Defendant Wermuth
stated that Ms. Brown was standing in the doorway during the officers’ active domestic
violence investigation. Plaintiff alleges that statement was “untrue” because she was
standing there “because CPD Officials were acting under color of law, interfering with”
her alleged Fourth Amendment rights by failing to properly investigate the domestic
violence claim. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶2-6). Plaintiff alleges that CPD officials failed to accept her
offer to retrieve Ms. Gill’s belongings even though “my brother had left me to care for his
home while he was away.” (Id., ¶7). She states that CPD officials charged her brother
with assault and domestic violence, but charges were eventually dismissed. (Id., ¶ 9).
4
Plaintiff also refers to her rights under the “U.S.C.” which the undersigned infers to be a reference to the
U.S. Constitution.
5
Based on the January 8 incident, Plaintiff filed a complaint for misconduct and
excessive force with CPD Internal Affairs on January 9, 2024. (Id., ¶ 10). CPD allegedly
retaliated by placing her “under Federal investigations” and “having CPD officials spy on
me at work.” (Id.) She alleges that unspecified CPD officers arrived at her workplace (the
Eatondale apartment complex) and asked for her identification, questioning her about her
employment. When she called a manager, CPD officials began questioning him and
falsely told him they had received a loud noise complaint. (Id., ¶¶ 11-12). CPD allegedly
“deployed two officials from district 4 (CPD) to spy on me” at another worksite. (Id., ¶ 13).
Shortly after an internal affairs investigator interviewed Plaintiff about her January
complaint, “CPD and [nonparty] ATF responded… by escalating their harassment.” (Id.,
¶ 14). Plaintiff alleges that in March 2024, CPD began using informants to “track and
harass me,” by having Eatondale and/or UC employees “ask children they suspected sold
drugs for me, for coke,” and additionally have “informants go steal cars with those
children.” (Id., ¶ 15). During a subsequent investigation “CPD and ATF learned…that I
was not the reason[] for [the child’s] behavior,” and “that I was not the kind of person that
they suspected me to be.” (Id., ¶ 16).
Plaintiff further alleges that as part of the same retaliatory “harassment,” CPD “had
officials and ATF agents [pose] as kidnappers” in March 2024, in an incident in which an
ATF agent drove up at high speed and yelled that Plaintiff was going to go to jail for
aggravated robbery. The agent allegedly changed course when Plaintiff pulled out her
phone and told him to get back. (Id., ¶ 17). During the same time period, Plaintiff alleges
that CPD instructed “informants” to target Plaintiff and harass her while she was out for
drinks at a local bar, which harassment included “dirty gestures, bumping into me and
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following me around the bar,” as well as individuals in ski masks waiting outside the bar
who also gave her “dirty gestures” and taunted her. (Id., ¶ 18).
Plaintiff alleges that her additional complaints against the CPD resulted in an
escalation of harassment of her and her brother by CPD and ATF, including entering her
brother’s home without a warrant in April 2024. (Id., ¶ 19-20). She alleges that the two
agencies “began using traffic lights and street lights to capture pictures” of her and “would
violate friends and family 4th Amendment and record from their cameras,” and would “tap
into their phone calls and pick up voice reception.” (Id., ¶ 21). She also alleges that in
May 2024, “CPD along with [Millenium] towing stole me and my brother food truck,”
refusing to return it, that CPD official Elsa Esser committed battery by putting his hand
“on me and my brother” while continually trying to find reasons to arrest and harass the
two of them. (Id., ¶ 22).
In an unnumbered narrative addendum to the alleged “Background Facts,” Plaintiff
reiterates and expands upon her allegations as follows:
CPD escalated their harassment and began targeting me and my family for
allege[d] crimes suggested by the CPD. CPD began having their helpers
follow us, while taunting and recording us. CPD also allowed other[s] to
track and harass us through our car apps radio and phone gps. …After filing
multiple complaints against CPD, CPD place me, my brother, Family, child
mother and others under Federal investigation. CPD began having others
willfully depriving us of our protected rights and privileges. CPD also start
having people intentionally harass us to get reactions out of us. During CPD
harassment, CPD and Federal agents would also use radios to record lyrics
from songs playing on the radio…. The radios would began to tune out and
static on certain songs. Also would remove bass. During CPD harassment,
informants would continually ask for drugs and guns, helpers would
continually taunt us and companies that would help CPD, would continually
help deprive us of our protected rights and privileges.
(Doc. 1-1 at 7, PageID 10).
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III.
Analysis
“To state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff ‘must allege that ?he
was deprived of a right secured by the Federal Constitution or laws of the United States
by a person acting under color of state law.’” Smith v. Detroit Entertainment L.L.C., 338
F.Supp.2d 775, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (quoting Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335
(6th Cir.1992)). Here, many of Plaintiff’s allegations that other individuals (including but
not limited to Plaintiff’s brother, friends, associates, and other family members) were
deprived of their constitutional rights. But a pro se party cannot represent the rights or
interests of anyone other than herself. Therefore, she fails to state a claim with respect to
any actions allegedly taken by any Defendant against third parties. In addition, many of
the allegations refer vaguely to unidentified or unknown Cincinnati Police Department
“informants” or “helpers” or to other nonparties such as ATF agents. To the extent that
Plaintiff complains of actions by nonparties, she fails to state a claim against any named
Defendant.
Plaintiff also falls short when it comes to specific factual allegations against most
of the named Defendants, including the Cincinnati Police Department. In terms of
capacity, the Cincinnati Police Department is “a mere arm of the City” and “not its own
entity” and is therefore “not capable of being sued.” Hale v. Vance, 267 F.Supp.2d 725,
737 (S.D. Ohio 2003); see also Rhodes v. McDaniel, 945 F.2d 117, 12 (6th Cir. 1991)
(Police Departments are part of a larger political subdivision and cannot be sued). But
even if construed as a suit against the City of Cincinnati, Plaintiff fails to state any
cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While the City of Cincinnati is a governmental
entity that could theoretically act under color of state law, “a local government may not be
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sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is
when execution of a government's policy or custom ... inflicts the injury that the
government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1245-46 (6th
Cir.1989). Plaintiff does not allege any specific policy or custom by the Cincinnati Police
Department that allegedly caused her injuries. And this Court will not infer allegations that
are not pleaded. Accord Stump v. City of Mount Vernon, 2019 WL 176325, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio Jan. 11, 2019) (dismissing on initial screening complaint where plaintiff failed to
allege that any official policy or custom resulted in the violation of his constitutional rights).
For the same reasons, none of the individual Defendants can be held liable in their official
capacities under § 1983 absent the assertion of a clear “policy or custom” that caused the
injury.
Plaintiff also has named Millennium Towing as a Defendant. The only allegation
against this entity is that in May 2024, “CPD along with [Millenium] towing stole me and
my brother food truck,” and refused to return it. This single allegation is insufficient to state
a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because a private towing company does not act under
color of state law.
Turning next to the individual Defendants, Plaintiff fails to include sufficient factual
allegations to state a claim against seven of them.5 Identifying who harmed the plaintiff
and how they did so is a “basic pleading essential” required to state a claim. Wells v.
5
Plaintiff does not identify the capacity in which the individual Defendants have been named and continually
refers to them as CPD officials. While not necessarily definitive, her references suggest that the officers
may be named solely in their official capacities. See generally, Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769,
772 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted); see also Donaldson v. City of Dayton Ohio Police Dept., No.
3:22-cv-368-WHR-PBS, 2023 WL 2925124, at *4 n.3 (S.D. Ohio, April 13, 2023), R&R adopted at 2023 WL
3205208 (S.D. Ohio, May 2, 2023)
9
Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 507
Fed. Appx. 543, 547 (6th Cir. 2012) (courts “are not required to conjure up allegations not
pleaded or guess at the nature of an argument.”). “The Sixth Circuit ‘has consistently held
that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of
constitutional rights must allege...facts that demonstrate what each defendant did that
violated the asserted constitutional right.’” Reid v. City of Detroit, No. 18-13681, 2020 WL
5902597, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 5, 2020) (quoting Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684
(6th Cir. 2008)) (emphasis in original). That is, Plaintiff must show that the alleged
violation of his constitutional rights “was committed personally” by the defendant. Id.
(emphasis in original); Heyerman v. Cty. of Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 2012)
(persons sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 are liable only for their own
unconstitutional behavior) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff’s complaint appears to lack any factual allegations at all against Michael
Miller, Douglas White, Arron Roach, and Justin Gottman. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to
state any claim against those four Defendants.
Plaintiff’s only allegation against Defendant Police Officer P361 appears to be that
during a May 20124 encounter with Plaintiff and her brother that also involved Defendant
Elsa Esser, Officer P361 “reached for his gun and lifted it.” (Doc. 1-1, ¶22, PageID 9).
Plaintiff alleges that once she confronted him, the “official realize[d] he was on video and
tried say he was fixing his belt.” (Id.) This single allegation concerning an allegedly fleeting
display of an officer’s weapon is insufficient as a matter of law to state any claim.
Plaintiff’s primary allegations against Defendants Jacob Hicks and Officer Jeffrey
Wicezorkowski fall under the heading “Retaliation” (see Doc. 1-1, ¶¶24-29). Plaintiff
10
alleges that she filed multiple complaints in 2021 and 2022 against unidentified CPD
officials “after numerous incidents with CPD officers….” (Id., ¶ 27). She states that on or
about March 16, 2022, Defendants Hicks and Wicezorkowski and another unidentified
official “from CPD “‘Gang Unit’ held a private meeting with my [former] regional
manager…and [former] supervisor” at Eatondale apartment complex where Plaintiff was
then employed. (Id., ¶28; see also ¶ 31, alleging “tortious interference with a business
relationship). Allegedly as a result of statements made by Hicks and Wicezorkowski
during that March 2022 meeting, Plaintiff was eventually demoted by her employer and
was terminated on August 4, 2022. (Id.) In Ohio, however, the statute of limitations for a
claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is two years. Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989,
992 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989)). Therefore, even if a
claim were otherwise stated, a claim based on Defendants’ March 2022 alleged meeting
with Plaintiff’s supervisors would be time-barred.6
That leaves Defendants Christopher Wermuth, Emily Ward, Dustin Pect, and Elsa
Esser. Broadly speaking, many of Plaintiff’s claims arise from the January 8, 2024 incident
involving a response to a domestic violence call at her brother’s apartment by three of the
Defendants. Many of Plaintiff’s allegations are rambling, vague and conclusory in their
assertion of various constitutional violations,7 with some allegations appearing to fall
6
Plaintiff includes a second cursory reference to Defendants Hicks and Wicezorkowski in paragraph 49,
wherein Plaintiff alleges that the same two Defendants committed the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress in violation of state law in both “2022 [and] 2024.” But because Plaintiff includes no
factual details to support the entirely conclusory allegation that the referenced Defendants did anything in
2024, the undersigned recommends dismissal of all claims against Defendants Hicks and Wicezorkowski
for failure to state a claim.
7
For example, despite captioning one of her claims as “False Arrest,” Plaintiff alleges that she was not
arrested or detained, and was permitted to leave on January 8, 2024. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 1). Plaintiff alleges that
she was later wrongfully charged with “obstruction,” but it is not clear whether she was ever convicted of
that charge.
11
within the category of “fantastic or delusional.”8 But not every allegation can be summarily
dismissed. For example, Plaintiff specifically alleges that “Christopher Wermuth used
force and unlawfully removed me from my brother[‘s] home and caused physical injuries
and trigged [sic] my PTSD.” (Doc. 1-1, ¶39; see also id., ¶45). Plaintiff further alleges that
Defendants Emily Ward and Dustin Pect accompanied Defendant Wermuth and failed to
intervene to prevent the excessive use of force. (Id., ¶¶43-46). It appears that Plaintiff
also alleges subsequent retaliatory conduct based on her refusal to permit officers to
enter her brother’s apartment, and/or based on her filing a complaint with Internal Affairs
the next day. At this stage in the proceedings, without the benefit of briefing by the parties
to this action, the undersigned concludes, in an abundance of caution, that Plaintiff’s
claims
against
Defendants
Wermuth,
Ward
and
Pect
are
deserving
of
further development.
In addition, and again, in an abundance of caution at this preliminary stage of
review, the undersigned will permit Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Elsa Esser to
proceed. Unlike Defendant P361 who is alleged only to have momentarily displayed his
gun during the May 2024 encounter, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Elsa Esser “put his
hand on me” during the same encounter. (Id., ¶22).
The undersigned has concluded that some of Plaintiff’s allegations contain
sufficient factual detail to hypothetically support one or more claims against four of the
identified individual Defendants. That said, the undersigned acknowledges that a number
8
The Court need not accept as true factual allegations that are fantastic or delusional in reviewing a
complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989)). Because Plaintiff’s more “fantastic” allegations concern either third-party victims
or involve allegations against alleged “helpers” and “informers” who are not named Defendants, and/or are
dismissed on other grounds, the undersigned declines to further parse through those allegations at this
stage of the proceedings.
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of claims appear to be somewhat if not completely duplicative. And it is not at all clear
that all state and federal claims are properly asserted against all four Defendants. But
mindful of the limitations of sua sponte review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the
undersigned declines to further parse through Plaintiff’s claims at this time. In short, this
preliminary determination is not to be construed as a ruling on the merits of any future
dispositive motions that may be filed by any party.
IV.
Conclusion and Recommendation
For the reasons stated, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. All claims against all Defendants except for Defendants Wermuth, Ward, Pect
and Esser should be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);
2. Consistent with the Order directing service on Plaintiff’s behalf, Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendants Wermuth, Ward, Pect and Esser should be permitted to
proceed for further development at this time.
s/Stephanie K. Bowman
Stephanie K. Bowman
United States Magistrate Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
DAQUAN BROWN,
Case No. 1:24-cv-316
Plaintiff,
McFarland, J.
Bowman, M.J.
v.
CINCINNATI POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants.
NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to this Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of
the filing date of this R&R. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely
motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of
the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of
the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN (14)
DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make objections in
accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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