Jamar-Mamon X v. The University of Cincinnati et al

Filing 40

OPINION & ORDER denying 2 Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and denying with prejudice 32 Plaintiff's Motion to Reassign Case. Denying as moot 13 Plaintiff's Motion to Strike and 22 Motion to Supplement, as well as 24 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff is cautioned that any future misconduct or vexatious acts may result in filing restrictions or additional sanctions, whether under the Court's inherent authority or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Furthermore, the Court certifies that an appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith. Signed by Judge Michael R. Barrett on 11/25/2024. (kkz)(This document has been sent by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

NURIEL DIZYN JAMAR-MAMON X,

Case No. 1:24-CV-484

Plaintiff,

Judge Michael R. Barrett

v.
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI, et al.,

OPINION & ORDER

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on the motion for a preliminary injunction filed by
Plaintiff Nuriel Dizyn Jamar-Mamon X. (Doc. 2). Defendants University of Cincinnati
(“UC”) and Jack Miner have responded and moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim
and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. 24). Jamar-Mamon X has also moved for the
undersigned’s recusal. (Doc. 32). For the following reasons, the Court will deny the motion
for recusal, deny injunctive relief, and dismiss this matter with prejudice under its inherent
sanction power.
I.

Background
On September 6, 2024, Jamar-Mamon X brought the instant action and sought a

preliminary injunction, alleging that Defendants had rescinded his admission to UC and
taken adverse action based upon what Jamar-Mamon X termed an “alleged falsification”
in his application. (Doc. 2, PageID 17). Three days later, Jamar-Mamon X filed an
amended complaint asserting a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights, breach of contract, bankruptcy retaliation, racial discrimination, intentional infliction

1

of emotional distress, tortious interference with prospective business relations, and
tortious interference with contractual relations. (Doc. 6, PageID 35-36).
One day after that, on September 10, Jamar-Mamon X moved for a temporary
restraining order (“TRO”) barring Defendants from taking any adverse actions or evicting
him from student housing. (Doc. 8). Following a brief phone call with Jamar-Mamon X
and counsel from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office, and based upon Jamar-Mamon X’s
representations to the Court that he was a degree-seeking, matriculating student whose
enrollment was terminated erroneously and without due process, (see Doc. 11), the Court
issued a TRO and set a formal hearing for September 18, (Doc. 10).
During the September 18 hearing, consequential information came to light that
provided the Court with a substantially clearer picture. In May 2024, under the name
Nuriel Jamar, Jamar-Mamon X completed UC’s basic data form for visitors who seek to
take classes but are not enrolled in a degree program.1 (Doc. 16, PageID 230). On the
form, Jamar-Mamon X answered “no” when asked “[h]ave you ever pled guilty or been
convicted of a criminal offense, other than a traffic violation, or are there any criminal
charges currently pending against you?” (Id., PageID 255). Based on this, his form was
approved and he was allowed to enroll in classes and access university housing. (Id.,
PageID 231).
Jamar-Mamon X enrolled in graduate-level courses as a non-matriculated student
and lived in university housing during the summer semester. (Id.). Following that, he
enrolled in graduate-level courses as a non-matriculated student and signed up to live in
university housing for the fall semester. (Id.). But on August 20, UC notified Jamar-Mamon

1 These visitors, so-called “non-matriculated students,” receive a transcript that designates them as a visitor

associated with the Adult Learning Center. (Doc. 16, PageID 230).
2

X that he had an outstanding balance of $16,556.69 for the summer semester and his fall
enrollment would be put on hold if he did not pay. Although Jamar-Mamon X sent UC a
check for the full amount on August 23, he then forwarded a “Notice of Bankruptcy Case
Filing,” advised that his check would be cancelled, and cautioned that UC was to stop all
collection efforts. (Id., PageID 339-41).
Upon reviewing the bankruptcy court document that Jamar-Mamon X submitted,
an official at the Registrar’s Office noticed that the petition had been filed under the name
Jamar Mamon, and not Nuriel Jamar. (Id., PageID 250). Further investigation revealed
that Jamar-Mamon X has a considerable criminal history under a number of aliases,
including a 2008 federal conviction for fraud under the name Kevin Blevins, see United
States v. Blevins, 403 F. App’x 101 (7th Cir. 2010), and more recent Indiana felony
convictions for battery resulting in bodily injury to a public safety official, battery by bodily
waste, and resisting law enforcement, see Mamon v. State, 38 N.E.3d 226 (Ind. Ct. App.
2015) (table).2
In 2022, under the name Jamar Mamon, he pleaded guilty in Texas to disorderly
conduct with a firearm and was subsequently unsatisfactorily terminated from community
supervision when he allegedly violated his terms by possessing a firearm or ammunition,
failing to report to his community supervision officer, and failing to remit various court
costs and fees. See State v. Mamon, No. 168990501010 (337th Dist. Ct.—Harris Cnty.).
And finally, he has been indicted and is awaiting trial in Indiana, under the name Jamar
Kurile Mamon, for battery against a public safety official, resisting law enforcement, and

2 Searches for Jamar-Mamon X’s various aliases in Indiana public state court records yielded numerous

additional convictions for, inter alia, criminal conversion, possession of stolen property, operating a vehicle
while under suspension, and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in damage to property.
3

criminal trespass. (Doc. 16, PageID 357-63). None of this information was disclosed to
UC.
At the close of the September 18 hearing, the Court dissolved the TRO upon
finding that (1) Jamar-Mamon X failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) Defendants could suffer harm as a result of any injunctive relief; and (3) a grant
of further injunctive relief would be detrimental to the public interest. (See Doc. 17). Before
the Court now are Jamar-Mamon X’s motion for a preliminary injunction, (Doc. 2), motion
to strike, (Doc. 13), and motion to supplement, (Doc. 22), as well as Defendants’ motion
to dismiss, (Doc. 24). Also before the Court is Jamar-Mamon X’s motion for the recusal
of the undersigned. (Doc. 32).
II.

Motion for Disqualification
a. Legal Standard
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455, a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in

which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Recusal is
required when a judge “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.” Id. § 455(b)(1); see
Garrett v. Ohio State Univ., 60 F.4th 359, 368 (6th Cir. 2023). “[T]he terms ‘bias or
prejudice’ connote instances of partiality or opinions that are ‘somehow wrongful or
inappropriate.’” United States v. Liggins, 76 F.4th 500, 506 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Liteky
v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550-52 (1994)).
The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly affirmed that “a judge is presumed to be impartial,
and the party seeking disqualification ‘bears the substantial burden of proving otherwise.’”
Scott v. Metro. Health Corp., 234 F. App’x 341, 352 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States

4

v. Denton, 434 F.3d 1104, 1111 (8th Cir. 2006)). Motions for recusal are ultimately
committed to the sound discretion of the district court, Youn v. Track, Inc., 324 F.3d 409,
422 (6th Cir. 2003), and “there is as much obligation upon a judge not to recuse himself
when there is no occasion as there is for him to do so when there is,” Easley v. Univ. of
Mich. Bd. of Regents, 853 F.2d 1351, 1356 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting In re Union Leader
Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 391 (1st Cir. 1961)).
b. Analysis
Jamar-Mamon X claims that impartial adjudication is not possible here because
the undersigned was born and raised in Cincinnati, earned degrees from UC, and
previously served a term on UC’s board of trustees. (Doc. 32, PageID 473). But JamarMamon X provides no actual explanation of why he thinks the undersigned’s impartiality
“might reasonably be questioned,” and it is well established that a judge “need not recuse
himself based on the subjective view of a party, no matter how strongly that view is held.”
Garrett, 60 F.4th at 369 (cleaned up).
Simply put, there is no factual basis for Jamar-Mamon X’s contention that “there
exists a potential conflict of interest that raises questions about [the undersigned’s]
impartiality in adjudicating matters involving his alma mater,” (Doc. 32, PageID 473), and
absolutely no legal support for the idea that a judge cannot be impartial when adjudicating
a case merely because his alma mater is party to that case. In fact, “[a]lumni connections
are not a reasonable basis for questioning a judge’s impartiality, even if alumni contribute
financially or participate in educational activities.” Roe v. St. Louis Univ., 746 F.3d 874,
886 (8th Cir. 2014); see also Garrett, 60 F.4th at 369-70. Jamar-Mamon X offers nothing

5

more than a subjective and wholly conclusory allegation of bias, and thus does not meet
the burden of demonstrating that recusal is appropriate or necessary.
III.

Preliminary Injunctive Relief
c. Legal Standard
Preliminary injunctions are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. “The

purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the
parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Poffenbarger v. Kendall, 588 F.Supp.3d
770, 782 (S.D. Ohio 2022) (quoting Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395
(1981)). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted
only if the movant carries his or her burden of proving that the circumstances clearly
demand it.” Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir.
2002). A movant’s burden is higher than that required to survive a motion to dismiss or
even a motion for summary judgment. Enchant Christmas Light Maze & Mkt. v. Glowco,
LLC, 958 F.3d 532, 539 (6th Cir. 2020); see also Doe v. Knox Cnty. Bd. Of Educ., No. 225317, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 22897, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 17, 2022); Hartman v. Acton, 613
F.Supp.3d 1015, 1021-1022 (S.D. Ohio 2020).
The Court looks to four factors when reviewing a motion for a preliminary
injunction: “(1) whether there is a likelihood of success on the merits of the plaintiff's claim;
(2) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; (3)
whether others would be harmed by granting the injunction; and (4) whether the public
good is served by issuing the injunction.” Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 223 F.Supp.3d 704,
709 (S.D. Ohio 2016). Notably, “where there is no likelihood of either success on the

6

merits or irreparable harm, an injunction in unwarranted—regardless of the showing on
the other factors.” Union Home Mortg. Corp. v. Cromer, 31 F.4th 356, 366 (6th Cir. 2022).
a. Analysis
As a threshold matter, Defendants argue that Jamar-Mamon X’s underlying
procedural due process claim is barred by sovereign immunity. “Eleventh Amendment
immunity ‘bars all suits, whether for injunctive, declaratory or monetary relief, against the
state and its departments. . . .’” Doe v. Miami Univ., 247 F.Supp.3d 875, 883 (S.D. Ohio
2017) (quoting McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693 F.3d 654, 661 (6th Cir. 2012)). Because
UC is a public university in the State of Ohio, it qualifies as an arm of the state and is
therefore generally immune from suit.3 See id.
However, “[s]uits for injunctive and declaratory relief against state officials acting
in their official capacities . . . are permitted in limited circumstances.” Doe v. Cummins,
662 F. App’x 437, 443-44 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56
(1974)). Those limited circumstances include suits seeking prospective injunctive relief
from state officials. Doe v. Miami Univ., 247 F.Supp.3d at 883. Jamar-Mamon X seeks
the reinstatement of his admission to UC, and this Court has held previously that “[a] claim
for reinstatement constitutes prospective injunctive relief.” Doe v. Ohio State Univ., 219
F.Supp.3d 645, 654 (S.D. Ohio 2016). Consequently, Defendants are not shielded from
that component of Jamar-Mamon X’s claim, and the Court will assess the likelihood of
success on the merits.
In granting a TRO, the Court initially relied upon Jamar-Mamon X’s representation
that he was a “visiting graduate researcher” who was “enrolled in a doctoral program in

3

This reasoning applies to Miner, as well, because he has been sued in his official capacity as an
administrator at UC.
7

Political Science.” (Doc. 8, PageID 48). Jamar-Mamon X claimed that the rescission of
his admission and eviction from university housing “was done without proper due process
and was based on unfounded allegations of falsification on [his] application.”4 (Id.). But
as subsequent filings have laid bare, that is simply not true.
First, it is not clear that Jamar-Mamon X even has a property interest in continued
enrollment or the coursework he completed. Protected property interests are “defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law,”
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), but Jamar-Mamon X has identified
no such source. His cause is potentially also damaged by the fact that he never actually
paid the balance due to UC for tuition, lodging, and a meal plan. And as Defendants note,
Jamar-Mamon X “did not appear to have an undergraduate bachelor’s degree from any
university, which would make it impossible to transfer graduate level courses” or obtain
admission to graduate programs in the first place. (Doc. 25, PageID 430).
But even assuming the existence of a protected property interest, Jamar-Mamon
X has provided no authority in support of his argument that he was entitled to the full
disciplinary procedure generally afforded to enrolled, degree-seeking students under the
UC student code of conduct. Cf. Simmons v. Wayne Cnty. Cmty. College Dist., No. 2:11CV-14936, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24542, at *16 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 7, 2014) (“The mere
fact that faculty base their decision on a student’s conduct . . . is insufficient to establish
that the decision was disciplinary rather than academic.”). Courts have typically looked

4 Jamar-Mamon X now also asserts that Defendants retaliated against him on account of his bankruptcy

filing, but the Court sees a far less sinister reason behind the temporal proximity of the bankruptcy filing
and the adverse actions: Jamar-Mamon X applied to and attended UC under a name that was not his legal
name, and Defendants only became aware of his aliases—with their accompanying criminal histories—
when he sent them a bankruptcy document.
8

“to the general rule that ‘[a]n academic dismissal is where a student’s scholarship or
conduct reflects on the personal qualities necessary to succeed in the field in which he or
she is studying, and can be based on at least partially subjective appraisal of those
qualities.’” Id. (quoting Allahyerdi v. Regents of the Univ. of N.M., No. CIV 05-277, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27682, at *61 (D.N.M. Apr. 25, 2006)). “In the context of an academic
dismissal, procedural due process does not require a formal hearing before a decisionmaking body either before or after the termination is made.” Bazzi v. Wayne State Univ.,
No. 21-CV-10642, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 326, at *24 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 3, 2023); see Bd.
of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 86 (1978).
Jamar-Mamon X was, in his own words, “a non-matriculated student who has yet
to apply for formal admission to the university,” and UC rescinded his admission “for
falsifying his application.” (Id., PageID 424-25). Although UC’s adverse action was not
based directly upon Jamar-Mamon X’s course performance, it was premised upon a
specific instance of Jamar-Mamon X’s conduct that was itself reflective of his ability and
qualifications to succeed academically and professionally. The simple fact is that JamarMamon X fraudulently obtained admission to a UC program, which the Court sees as an
instance “where the factual question was sharply focused and extremely narrow, and
defendants had before them all the pertinent information.” Martin v. Helstad, 578 F.Supp.
1473, 1485 (W.D. Wisc. 1983). And because the rescission of Jamar-Mamon X’s
admission was academic in nature—as opposed to disciplinary—he was not entitled to a
formal hearing or other proceeding, he cannot establish a legitimate claim of entitlement
to continued enrollment at UC or the non-transferrable coursework he completed there,
and he is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his procedural due process claim.

9

IV.

Sanctions Under the Court’s Inherent Authority
d. Legal Standard
The Court may sua sponte issue sanctions under its inherent powers “when a party

has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons, or when the
conduct is tantamount to bad faith.” Metz v. Unizan Bank, 655 F.3d 485, 489 (6th Cir.
2011) (cleaned up); cf. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 49 (1991) (“The Court’s
prior cases have indicated that the inherent power of a court can be invoked even if
procedural rules exist which sanction the same conduct.”). Even pro se litigants,
regardless of their level of legal sophistication, may not disregard the law or engage in
abusive conduct. See, e.g., Givens v. Criswell, No. 5:08-CV-25, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
63451, at *6-7 (N.D. W. Va. June 24, 2010).
To be sure, the Court’s authority “must be exercised with the greatest restraint and
caution, and then only to the extent necessary.” United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11
F.3d 450, 461 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Gueye v. Comair, Inc., No. 08-66-WOB, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 137431, at *23-26 (E.D. Ky. July 9, 2009). But “a court’s inherent power to
dismiss a case and protect the sanctity of the judicial process is never more compelling
than in a situation of individuals who engage in fraud upon the court.” Plastech Holding
Corp. v. WM GreenTech Auto. Corp., 257 F.Supp.3d 867, 878 (E.D. Mich 2017) (quoting
Perna v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 916 F.Supp. 388, 397 (D.N.J. 1995)). In addition, “it is not
an abuse of discretion to dismiss, even though other sanctions might be workable, if
dismissal is supportable on the facts.” Laukus v. Rio Brands, Inc., 292 F.R.D. 485, 512
(N.D. Ohio 2013) (quoting Regional Refuse Sys., Inc. v. Inland Reclamation Co., 842 F.2d
150, 155 (6th Cir. 1988)).

10

e. Analysis
Jamar-Mamon X initially represented to the Court that the omission of his criminal
history on UC’s basic data form was “a complete oversight.” (Doc. 11, PageID 65). But
the expungement in 2015 of a single felony forgery conviction from Indiana does little to
detract from Jamar-Mamon X’s voluminous criminal history, nor does it change the fact
that he knowingly concealed and misrepresented that criminal history to both Defendants
and the Court. After all, “[f]elony status is simply not the kind of thing that one forgets.”
Wallace v. United States, 43 F.4th 595, 603 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Greer v. United
States, 593 U.S. 503, 508 (2021)).
Jamar-Mamon X has a history of fabrication and obfuscation, and even continued
to perpetuate demonstrable falsehoods in his attempt to appeal the Court’s dissolution of
the TRO. This is far from a novel occurrence.5 While Jamar-Mamon X was incarcerated,
a judge in the Southern District of Indiana noted that he had “a litigation track record
involving three or more ‘strikes’ because litigation in which he was the plaintiff was
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, or as frivolous.”
Mamon v. Shepherd, No. 1:13-CV-345, Doc. 21, PageID 77 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 17, 2014). To
that end, the Northern District of Indiana also designated Jamar-Mamon X a “restricted
filer” on account of his repeated (and knowing) attempts to circumvent filing safeguards.

5 Jamar-Mamon X’s dishonesty extends further, as evidenced by the representation in his supplemental

complaint that he “was taking courses that lead to tiered degrees in Master of Legal Studies, and he was
also pursuing a PhD in Political Science.” (Doc. 22, PageID 386). As the Court is now aware, Jamar-Mamon
X was not pursuing an advanced degree and he lacked the academic credentials to even enroll in the
aforementioned programs. Nevertheless, that did not stop him from representing on his resume that he had
earned a Bachelor of Business Administration from the University of Houston, or on his LinkedIn account
that he was pursuing a Master of Legal Studies and a PhD in Political Science at UC. (Doc. 16, PageID
279, 282).
11

See Blevins v. O’Malley, No. 1:10-CV-401, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127589, at *3, n.2 (N.D.
Ind. Dec. 2, 2010).
Similarly, a panel of the Tennessee Court of Appeals noted that a civil action
brought by Jamar-Mamon X was complicated by “a very lengthy and onerous procedural
history, which was principally due to [his] acts and omissions.” Mamon v. Geico Indem.
Ins. Co., No. M2016-01145-COA-R3-CV, 2017 Tenn. App. LEXIS 618, at *3 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Sep. 15, 2017). And on at least one prior occasion, a state court judge in Indiana
sanctioned Jamar-Mamon X with the dismissal of his civil case after repeated failures to
comply with a discovery order. See Mamon v. Garrity, 102 N.E.3d 347 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)
(table). As should be obvious now, this is not a matter of a pro se litigant who inadvertently
violated a procedural rule on one occasion; rather, the Court is faced with an individual
who continues to disrespect and abuse the justice system.
In light of the foregoing, the Court opts to exercise its “inherent authority to sanction
a party who has ‘acted bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons,’ or
who has engaged in conduct that was ‘tantamount to bad faith.’” Ndoye v. Major
Performance LLC, No. 1:15-CV-380, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28923, at *30 (S.D. Ohio Mar.
1, 2017) (quoting Laukus, 292 F.R.D. at 502-03). Jamar-Mamon X is proceeding in forma
pauperis, “so by definition he has no resources to pay any kind of monetary sanction,
much less one sufficient to deter him from repeating the same behavior.” Gueye v. UC
Health, No. 1:13-CV-673, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141834, at *16 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 6, 2014).
As a result, the Court finds that no sanction short of dismissal with prejudice will
adequately address Jamar-Mamon X’s egregious misconduct and deter future instances
of misconduct.

12

V.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for a preliminary injunction, (Doc. 2), is

DENIED, the motion for disqualification, (Doc. 32), is DENIED, and this matter is
DISMISSED with prejudice. Jamar-Mamon X’s motion to strike, (Doc. 13), and motion
to supplement, (Doc. 22), are DENIED as moot, as is Defendants’ motion to
dismiss, (Doc. 24).
Jamar-Mamon X is CAUTIONED that any future misconduct or vexatious acts may
result in filing restrictions or additional sanctions, whether under the Court’s inherent
authority or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Furthermore, the Court
CERTIFIES that an appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3); see Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3)(A).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Michael R. Barrett
Michael R. Barrett
United States District Judge

13