Wagner et al v. Circle W Mastiffs et al
Filing
180
ORDER denying ( 174 in case 2:08-cv-00431-GCS-TPK & (159) in case 2:09-cv-00172-GCS-TPK) Motion to Compel. Signed by Magistrate Judge Terence P Kemp on 5/14/2013. Associated Cases: 2:08-cv-00431-GCS-TPK, 2:09-cv-00172-GCS-TPK (kk2)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Fredericka Wagner, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Case No. 2:08-cv-431
Circle W Mastiffs, et al.,
JUDGE SMITH
Magistrate Judge Kemp
Defendants.
Craig W. Williamson,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 2:09-cv-0172
American Mastiff Breeders
Council, et al.,
JUDGE SMITH
Magistrate Judge Kemp
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on a motion to compel filed
by Diane St. Martin, Cameran Pridmore, and Sandy Taylor.
The
motion seeks an order compelling Craig and Jennifer Williamson
and Circle W Mastiffs (the Williamsons) and Fredericka Wagner and
Flying W Farms, Inc. (Ms. Wagner) to produce the settlement
agreement they entered into
resolving their claims in this case.
Only Ms. Wagner and Flying W Farms have filed a response opposing
this motion and the motion now has been fully briefed.
For the
following reasons, the motion to compel (#174) will be denied.
I.
This consolidated action has been pending in this Court for
five years.
Throughout that time, the factual and procedural
history has been set forth many times in various orders and will
not be repeated here.
For purposes of the current motion,
however, the following background is relevant.
These cases involve the sale of American Mastiff puppies.
Case No. 2:08-cv-431 was filed by Fredericka Wagner, Flying W
Farms, the American Mastiff Breeders’ Council and others on May
6, 2008, against Circle W Mastiffs and Nevada residents Jennifer
and Craig Williamson.
According to the factual allegations of
the complaint, Ms. Wagner and Flying W Farms created the American
Mastiff dog breed.
The complaint asserts claims under the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1117-25, for various alleged actions by the
Williamsons which diluted the value of the American Mastiff breed
and brand.
The Williamsons and Circle W filed a counterclaim
against only Ms. Wagner and Flying W for breach of contract,
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent and
negligent misrepresentation, implied and equitable indemnity, and
contribution.
By order dated March 12, 2010, the Court dismissed
all counterclaims against Ms. Wagner and Flying W except those
for fraud/fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation.
In addition to filing a counterclaim in Case No. 2:08-cv431, Mr. Williamson also originally filed Case No. 2:09-cv-172 in
the United States District for the District of Nevada naming the
plaintiffs in Case No. 2:08-cv-431 as defendants.
By order dated
March 9, 2009, the case was transferred to this District and was
consolidated with Case No. 2:08-cv-431 by order dated March 26,
2009.
Following an amendment to his complaint, Mr. Williamson
asserted claims for violations of the Sherman Act, defamation and
libel/slander per se, fraud, intentional interference with a
business relationship, and conspiracy.
By order dated August 10,
2010, the Court dismissed all of Mr. Williamson’s claims except
the defamation and libel/slander per se claims and the
intentional interference with a business relationship claim.
On February 21, 2013, a “Stipulation of dismissal of all
claims between Fredericka Wagner and Flying W Farms, Inc. and
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Craig Williamson, Jennifer Williamson and Circle W Mastiffs only
- all other claims remain pending” was filed by Ms. Wagner on
behalf of herself personally and as president of Flying Farms and
the Williamsons, with Mr. Williamson signing as Circle W’s
authorized representative.
In other words, following the
settlement agreement, Mr. Williamsons’ claims for defamation,
libel/slander per se, and intentional interference with a
business relationship claim remain pending against the remaining
defendants in Case No. 2:09-cv-172.
Further, the Lanham Act
claim remains pending on behalf of the remaining plaintiffs in
Case No. 2:08-cv-431.
On that same date the stipulation was
filed, Diane St. Martin, Cameran Pridmore, and Sandy Taylor - who
remain as plaintiffs in Case No. 08-431 and defendants in Case
No. 09-172 - filed the motion to compel currently before the
Court.
II.
In the motion to compel, the moving parties, without any
discussion of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26, contend that the settlement
agreement is discoverable despite any claim of confidentiality.
They assert that the settlement agreement is relevant for several
reasons.
First, they argue that they need to know how their
potential liability may be limited by the settlement.
As they
explain it, there is a complete overlap of claims between the
Williamsons’ recovery from Wagner and the Williamsons’ remaining
claims against them.
The moving parties argue that they do not
want to be a source of double recovery for the Williamsons if the
settlement with Ms. Wagner has made them whole with respect to
some or all of their claims.
Further, they maintain that
allowing them access to the settlement agreement may promote the
resolution of this matter.
That is, they argue that knowing the
terms of the settlement agreement will allow them to estimate
more accurately the amount of the Williamsons’ alleged damages.
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Finally, they argue that knowledge of the terms of the settlement
agreement may help them evaluate Ms. Wagner’s potential bias,
interest and credibility.
As they see it, because she is the
lead plaintiff, the head of the AMBC, and the “main target” of
the Williamsons’ claims, Ms. Wagner “is the key witness in this
case.”
They suggest that they are entitled to discovery of the
settlement agreement to the extent that it might provide evidence
of something in the nature of a quid pro quo between Ms. Wagner
and the Williamsons.
In response, Ms. Wagner explains that she has suffered a
debilitating stroke which prevents her further participation in
this matter and necessitated her entering into a settlement
agreement with the Williamsons.
She perceives that the moving
parties are upset by her agreement to settle with the
Williamsons, leaving them essentially to fend for themselves.
She believes that their desire to gain access to the settlement
agreement is intended as a punitive measure, especially since,
from her perspective, none of the few remaining claims in this
action involve her.
This state of affairs, she argues, does not
provide support for compelling disclosure of the settlement
agreement.
On a more substantive level, Ms. Wagner contends that the
motion to compel should be denied for various reasons.
First,
she asserts that because she is no longer a party to this action,
she cannot be compelled to provide a copy of the settlement
agreement, let alone such an agreement designated by the settling
parties as confidential.
Further, she argues that the agreement
is not admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 408 and not discoverable
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26.
Acknowledging, however, that courts have found settlement
agreements subject to discovery upon a demonstration of
relevance, Ms. Wagner asserts that the agreement here is not
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relevant for purposes of impeachment or determining liability.
With respect to the issue of impeachment, Ms. Wagner argues that
she will be unable to testify at trial and the settlement
agreement cannot be used to impeach her deposition testimony
offered prior to the settlement agreement so this issue provides
no basis for a finding of relevance.
Ms. Wagner recognizes the
potential for bias or collusion raised by certain agreements,
frequently termed as “Mary Carter” agreements, but merely states,
without any elaboration, that “[n]o such agreements exist in this
consolidated case.”
See Response, p.5.
On the issue of liability, Ms. Wagner contends that the
settlement agreement has no bearing on the issue and the moving
parties, who bear the burden on this issue, have not demonstrated
otherwise.
As Ms. Wagner explains, to the extent that the moving
parties seek access to the settlement agreement to assess the
extent of their own liability and damages, such an assessment is
not impacted by the terms of her settlement with the Williamsons.
She asserts that this is not a personal injury case involving
joint and several or contribution liability so double recovery
simply is not possible here.
Rather, she continues, the
Williamsons’ remaining claims in Case No. 09-172 against the
moving parties are based only on Cameran Pridmore’s allegedly
tortious actions.
In light of this, she argues, there is no
overlap of claims because the settlement agreement addresses only
the direct transactions between herself and the Williamsons.
She
has submitted the settlement agreement for the Court’s in camera
review, at the same time acknowledging, to some extent, that the
document is not privileged.
In reply, the moving parties contend that Ms. Wagner remains
a party to this case because the stipulation of dismissal was
filed without the consent of the required parties and they do not
consent to it.
Additionally, they argue that Ms. Wagner remains
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an active party in this case as the president and statutory
agent, or controlling member, of AMBC.
In addressing Ms. Wagner’s more substantive arguments, the
moving parties contend that the settlement agreement is
discoverable under the liberal standards of Rule 26.
They note
that courts in both this District and the Northern District have
found settlement agreements relevant to the issue of damages.
To
the extent that Ms. Wagner argues that there is no issue of setoff here because this is not a set-off action, they assert that
Ohio law holds otherwise.
In support of this position, they cite
to Ohio Revised Code §2307.28, and Celmer v. Rodgers, D.O., 2005
WL 3610478 (Trumbull Co. App. Dec. 29, 2005), in which the court
held that “[s]etoff of settlement funds has been recognized as a
means to protect against the danger of a double recovery in cases
where settlement agreements have been entered into between codefendants.”
On this point, they contend that, contrary to Ms.
Wagner’s position, the Williamsons’ remaining claims are directed
at all defendants in Case No. 2:09-cv-172, even to the extent
that they address the conduct of Cameran Pridmore.
They also
note that the Lanham Act claim remains pending in Case No. 2:08cv-431 and that the Williamsons have indicated their intention to
seek attorneys’ fees against all parties.
As a result, they
maintain, the claims against Ms. Wagner cannot be separated from
the claims against them, thereby providing the potential for
double recovery.
With respect to the issues of collusion or bias, the moving
parties argue that they have no way of confirming the state of
Ms. Wagner’s health and that no evidentiary support has been
provided to demonstrate that Ms. Wagner cannot appear for trial.
Further, they dismiss her bare statement that no “Mary Carter”
agreement exists here as insufficient to demonstrate lack of
relevance.
They again rely on cases where courts have found a
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settlement agreement relevant in circumstances similar to those
here.
Finally, the moving parties contend that the settlement
privilege is not applicable to a finalized settlement agreement.
As a result, they argue that the Court should decline Ms.
Wagner’s invitation to conduct an in camera review.
III.
Briefly, at the outset, the Court notes that Ms. Wagner has
raised the issue of Fed.R.Evid. 408 in challenging the motion to
compel.
That rule, however, “governs admissibility rather than
discoverability” and cannot be relied upon to prevent the
production of the settlement agreement at the discovery stage.
Tanner v. Johnston, 2013 WL 121158, *2 (D. Utah January 8, 2013).
Ms. Wagner appears to recognize as much in her response.
Consequently, as evidenced below, the Court will not be analyzing
the issues presented by the current motion to compel in terms of
admissibility under Fed.R.Evid. 408.
In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc.,
332 F.3d 976, 981 (6th Cir. 2003), the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals recognized a “settlement privilege” which protects
settlement negotiations from discovery but does not extend to the
terms of the final agreement.
In line with this decision, courts
within this Circuit have compelled the disclosure of settlement
agreements, including a breakdown of the claims actually settled
and the settlement amounts.
See, e.g., Scheurer Hospital v.
Lancaster Pollard & Co., 2012 WL 5471135 (E.D. Mich. November 9,
2012); Gardiner v. Kelowna Flightcraft, Ltd., 2011 WL 1990564
(S.D. Ohio May 23, 2011); Oberthaler v. Ameristep Corporation,
2010 WL 1506908 (N.D. Ohio April 13, 2010); Thomas & Marker
Const. Co. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2008 WL 3200642 (S.D. Ohio
August 6, 2008).
In doing so, courts have not been persuaded by any claim of
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confidentiality as grounds for precluding the disclosure of a
settlement agreement.
As explained by the court in Oberthaler:
[A]greements are not protected from discovery
simply because they have been denominated
“confidential” by the parties. “[A] general concern for
protecting confidential information does not equate to
privilege [ ... ].[I]n the context of settlement
agreements the mere fact that settling parties agree to
maintain the confidentiality of their agreement does
not serve to shield the information from discovery.
Simply put, litigants may not shield otherwise
discoverable information from disclosure to others by
agreeing to maintain its confidentiality.”
Id. at *1; see also American Guar. and Liab. Ins. Co. v. CTA
Acoustics, Inc., No. 05–80–KKC, 2007 WL 1099620, at *4 (E.D. Ky.
April 10, 2007) (“the confidential settlement agreement is not
privileged ... [and] is not protected from discovery simply
because it has been denominated ‘confidential’ by the parties”).
Rather, the analysis regarding discovery of a settlement
agreement, like the one involved here, has focused on the issue
of relevance under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26.
In light of the above, the only issue before the Court is
that of relevance under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26.
Because there is no
issue of privilege here, the Court will not conduct the in camera
review Ms. Wagner suggests.
See Gardiner, supra; Thomas &
Marker, supra.
Turning to Rule 26, the general principles involving the
proper scope of discovery are well known.
The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure authorize extremely broad discovery.
United
States v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 542 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied 430 U.S. 945 (1977).
Therefore, Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 is
to be liberally construed in favor of allowing discovery.
v. Midwestern Indemnity, 88 F.R.D. 191 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
Dunn
Any
matter that is relevant, in the sense that it reasonably may
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is not
-8-
privileged, can be discovered.
The concept of relevance
during discovery is necessarily broader than at trial, Mellon
v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 424 F.2d 499 (6th Cir. 1970), and
"[a] court is not permitted to preclude the discovery of
arguably relevant information solely because if the
information were introduced at trial, it would be
'speculative' at best."
Coleman v. American Red Cross, 23
F.3d 1091, 1097 (6th Cir. 1994).
Information subject to disclosure during discovery need
not relate directly to the merits of the claims or defenses
of the parties.
Rather, it may also relate to any of the
myriad of fact-oriented issues that arise in connection with
the litigation.
340 (1978).
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S.
On the other hand, the Court has the duty to
deny discovery directed to matters not legitimately within
the scope of Rule 26, and to use its broad discretionary
power to protect a party or person from harassment or
oppression that may result even from a facially appropriate
discovery request.
(1979).
See Herbert v. Lando, 44l U.S. 153
Additionally, the Court has discretion to limit or even
preclude discovery which meets the general standard of relevance
found in Rule 26(b)(1) if the discovery is unreasonably
duplicative, or the burden of providing discovery outweighs the
benefits, taking into account factors such as the importance of
the requested discovery to the central issues in the case, the
amount in controversy, and the parties’ resources.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2).
See
Finally, the Court notes that the scope
of permissible discovery which can be conducted without leave of
court has been narrowed somewhat by the December 1, 2000
amendments to the Federal Rules.
Rule 26(b) now permits
discovery to be had without leave of court if that discovery “is
relevant to the claim or defense of any party ....”
-9-
Upon a
showing of good cause, however, the Court may permit broader
discovery of matters “relevant to the subject matter involved in
the action.”
Id.
There is no question that “‘[t]he proponent of a motion to
compel discovery bears the initial burden of proving that the
information sought is relevant.’” Guinn v. Mount Carmel Health
Systems, 2010 WL 2927254, *5 (S.D. Ohio July 23, 2010) quoting
Clumm v. Manes, Case No. 2:08–cv–567 (S.D.Ohio May 27, 2010)
(King, J.); see also Berryman v. Supervalu Holdings, Inc., 2008
WL 4934007 (S.D. Ohio Nov.18, 2008) (“At least when the relevance
of a discovery request has been challenged the burden is on the
requester to show the relevance of the requested information.”)
(internal citation omitted).
When the information sought appears
to be relevant, the party resisting production has the burden of
establishing that the information either is not relevant or is so
marginally relevant that the presumption of broad disclosure is
outweighed by the potential for undue burden or harm.
See
Vickers v. General Motors Corp., 2008 WL 4600997, *2 (W.D. Tenn.
September 29, 2008).
With respect to confidential settlement agreements
specifically, the Court notes that there is some authority for
application of a heightened relevancy standard for discovery.
See, e.g., Bottaro v. Hatton Assocs., 96 F.R.D. 158 (D.C.N.Y.
1982); In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation, 2013 WL 1703864
(W.D. Pa. April 19, 2013).
For example, some courts have
required the party seeking discovery “‘to make a particularized
showing that the documents relating to settlement agreements are
relevant and likely to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.’”
omitted).
Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation, at *1 (citation
Other courts, however, have declined to apply such a
heightened standard.
See, e.g., Tanner,2013 WL 121158 at *3; ABF
Capital Management v. Askin Capital, 2000 WL 191698 (S.D.N.Y.
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Feb. 10, 2000).
Ms. Wagner has not argued for the Court’s
application of a heightened relevancy standard here and has not
cited to any controlling cases from this Circuit supporting the
application of such a standard.
Turning to the moving parties’ arguments regarding the
settlement agreement, they contend that it is relevant to the
issues of Ms. Wagner’s bias and credibility as a witness and to
the issue of damages.
They also argue, to some degree, that its
relevance arises from the potential that their knowledge of its
contents will promote their own settlement in this matter.
A.
Relevance as to Bias and Credibility
With respect to the issue of Ms. Wagner’s bias and
credibility, the Court notes that settlement agreements
frequently are found to be discoverable in order to allow the
requesting party to explore these issues with respect to
witnesses.
See, e.g., Cadlerock Joint Venture, L.P. v. Royal
Indemnity Company, 2012 WL 443316 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2012)
(settlement agreement relevant to testifying witnesses’
credibility and bias); Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Dow
Deutschland GMBJ & Co. OHG, 2009 WL 3614959 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 28,
2009); Tanner v. Johnston, 2013 WL 121158, at *5-6;
Transportation Alliance Bank, Inc. v. Arrow Trucking Co., 2011 WL
4964034, *2 (N.D. Okla. October 19, 2011)(settlement agreement
relevant for purposes of exploring bias and credibility of
important fact witness); see also Thomas & Marker, 2008 WL
3200642, at *2 (requesting party insisted employees of settling
party would be called to testify at trial and settle agreement
found relevant on issue of their credibility).
Settlement
agreements also have been found subject to discovery when there
is the potential for a witness to testify in person at trial.
See, e.g., Meharg v. I-Flow Corporation, 2009 WL 3032327, *6
(S.D. Ind. Sept. 18, 2009).
On the other hand, courts have found
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a confidential settlement agreement not to be relevant to the
issue of bias or credibility where there is a stated intention
not to call particular witnesses at trial or no indication that
particular witnesses will testify.
See, e.g., In re Flat Glass,
2013 WL 1703864, at *1; Pamlab, L.L.C. v. Rite Aid Corporation,
2006 WL 186199 (E.D. La. Feb. 7, 2006).
Here, Ms. Wagner was deposed prior to entering into the
settlement agreement with the Williamsons.
As a result,
disclosure of the agreement to assist the moving parties with
preparation for her deposition clearly is not necessary and the
moving parties do not suggest otherwise.
Rather, the focus of
their argument as to credibility and bias is directed to Ms.
Wagner’s trial testimony.
Ms. Wagner has represented to the
Court, however, that she is in poor health and will not be able
to participate in any trial of this matter.
The moving parties
take issue with this representation and note that no evidence has
been presented in support.
At the same time, however, the moving
parties do not provide any evidence refuting this representation.
Accordingly, the Court, at this point, presumes the truthfulness
of Ms. Wagner’s representations regarding her health.
In light
of this, as it stands now, this case does not present a situation
where the potential bias or credibility of a trial witness is at
issue.
This fact easily distinguishes it from the circumstances
of the numerous cases where courts somewhat routinely have
ordered the disclosure of a settlement agreement.
For this
reason, the Court is not persuaded that, at this time, the
settlement agreement is relevant to the issues of Ms. Wagner’s
credibility or bias.
Consequently, the motion to compel will not
be granted on this ground.
The Court notes that, as an aside, the moving parties
mention that the settlement agreement also is relevant to the
bias and credibility of the Williamsons.
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The Court does not find
this suggestion persuasive given the Williamsons’ posture in this
consolidated action relative to the moving parties.
In reaching the above conclusion, the Court is aware of the
significance of Ms. Wagner’s role in these consolidated actions.
Consequently, the moving parties are free to renew their motion
to compel regarding the settlement agreement should circumstances
change and should it become apparent that Ms. Wagner will provide
live testimony at some future date.
B.
Relevance as to Damages
The moving parties also argue that the settlement agreement
is relevant to the issue of damages or, more specifically, a setoff analysis.
Although they briefly reference the pending Lanham
Act claim and Mr. Williamson’s alleged intention to seek
attorneys’ fees relating to that claim, they argue the issue of
set-off in terms of Ohio law only.
In light of this, the Court
understands their argument on the issue of set-off as directed
specifically to the Williamsons’ state law claims.
In making
their argument, they rely, without much elaboration, on O.R.C.
§2307.28.
That statute sets forth the effect of a release or a
covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment and provides that
the claim against other tortfeasors is reduced by the amount of
the consideration paid in exchange for the release.
Eysoldt v.
Proscan Imaging, 2011 WL 6885346 (Hamilton Co. Dec. 28, 2011);
Spalla v. Fransen, 188 Ohio App.3d 666 (Geauga Co. 2010).
According to the moving parties, there is a complete
overlap of claims and potential for double recovery by the
Williamsons that entitled them to learn the terms of the
settlement agreement for purposes of set-off.
To the contrary,
Ms. Wagner argues that no potential for double recovery exists in
this case because there is no overlap of claims.
As Ms. Wagner
sees it, the remaining claims relate most directly to the actions
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of Cameran Pridmore.
The Williamsons’ three remaining claims are for defamation
(Counts VI and VII) and intentional interference with a business
relationship (Count IX).
The moving parties argue that because
these claims are directed against all defendants, including Ms.
Wagner, there is a complete overlap of claims which cannot be
separated.
It may well be that the settlement agreement is
relevant to the issue of set-off in this case.
Further, the
Court is aware that other courts in this District have found the
potential for set-off sufficient to satisfy the relevance
standard of Rule 26 and have compelled the disclosure of
settlement agreements in similar circumstances.
supra; Thomas & Marker, supra.
See Gardiner,
Here, however, the moving parties
have not addressed the issue with enough specificity in their
current briefing to allow the Court to make a decision on this
issue.
That is, the moving parties, who, as discussed above,
bear the burden on this issue, simply have not met that burden
here.
They have not, for example, set forth facts about the
potentially overlapping claims that would show, or even make
likely, that conduct engaged in by Ms. Wagner could form the
basis for any claim against them, or that Ms. Wagner’s and their
actions necessarily combined to produce a single injury.
Any
conclusions on issues like these would, on the current record, be
nothing more than speculation.
Consequently, the motion to
compel will not be granted on this ground at this time.
However,
the moving parties are free to renew their motion to compel if
they are able to address this issue more specifically.
C.
Relevance as to Potential Dispute Resolution
The moving parties’ final argument is that the settlement
agreement is relevant to the issue of dispute resolution because
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it will allow them to assess more accurately the Williamsons’
current alleged damages.
In making this argument in their
motion, they rely on White v. Kenneth Warren & Son, Ltd., 203
F.R.D. 364 (N.D. Ill. 2001) where the court compelled disclosure
of a settlement for, among other reasons, its belief that such
disclosure would promote further settlement as well as judicial
economy.
Ms. Wagner does not specifically address this issue in
her response and the moving parties have not raised it again in
their reply so there is minimal briefing on this issue.
To the
extent that the moving parties may continue to rely on such an
argument, however, it is easily addressed.
Other courts addressing this issue have concluded that,
simply because access to a settlement agreement may promote
settlement or judicial economy, this potential does not make the
agreement relevant.
Rather, these courts have concluded that
these arguments address the policy reasons in favor of disclosure
of settlement agreements, rather than the issue of relevance.
See, e.g., Tanner, 2013 WL 121158, at *6; ABF Capital Management,
2000 WL 191698, at *2; Centillion Data Systems, Inc. v. Ameritech
Corp., 193 F.R.D. 550 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
The Court agrees that
access to a settlement agreement for purposes of evaluation of
settlement or negotiation strategy is not an issue directed to
relevance.
Consequently, the motion to compel will not be
granted on this ground.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to compel (#174) is
denied.
V.
Any party may, within fourteen days after this Order is
filed, file and serve on the opposing party a motion for
reconsideration by a District Judge.
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28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A),
Rule 72(a), Fed. R. Civ. P.; Eastern Division Order No. 91-3, pt.
I., F., 5.
The motion must specifically designate the order or
part in question and the basis for any objection.
Responses to
objections are due fourteen days after objections are filed and
replies by the objecting party are due seven days thereafter.
The District Judge, upon consideration of the motion, shall set
aside any part of this Order found to be clearly erroneous or
contrary to law.
This order is in full force and effect, notwithstanding the
filing of any objections, unless stayed by the Magistrate Judge
or District Judge.
S.D. Ohio L.R. 72.3.
/s/ Terence P. Kemp
United States Magistrate Judge
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