Wilson v. Hill

Filing 227

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 179 Motion in Limine & granting in part and denying in part 199 Motion to Exclude. Signed by Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King on 1/18/2013. (kjm1)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

LAWRENCE E. WILSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil Action 2:08-CV-552
Magistrate Judge King

LEON HILL,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court, with the consent of the parties
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), for consideration of Defendant Leon
Hill’s Motion in Limine (“Defendant’s Motion in Limine”), Doc. No.
179.

Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s Motion in Limine.

Plaintiff

Lawrence E. Wilson’s Opposition to Defendant Leon Hill’s Motion in
Limine (“Plaintiff’s Response”), Doc. No. 195.
reply.

Defendant has filed a

Defendant Leon Hill’s Reply in Support of Motion in Limine

(“Defendant’s Reply”), Doc. No. 209.

Also before the Court is

Plaintiff Lawrence E. Wilson’s Objections to Defendant’s Witness and
Exhibit List and Renewed Motion in Limine (“Plaintiff’s Motion in
Limine”), Doc. No. 199, and Plaintiff’s Supplement to His Motion in
Limine, Doc. No. 208.

Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine.

Defendant Leon Hill’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Renewed
Motion in Limine to Exclude Witnesses and Exhibits (“Defendant’s
Response”), Doc. No. 217.

Plaintiff has filed a reply.

Reply in

Support of Plaintiff Lawrence E. Wilson’s Objections to Defendant’s
Witness and Exhibit List and Renewed Motion in Limine, Doc. No. 222.

For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s Motion in Limine is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part.

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine is GRANTED

in part and DENIED in part.
I.

Standard
The purpose of a motion in limine is to ensure the evenhanded and

expeditious management of trials by eliminating evidence that is
clearly inadmissible.

See Ind. Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 326

F.Supp.2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (citing Jonasson v. Lutheran Child
& Family Servs., 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1997)).

A court should

exclude evidence on a motion in limine only when that evidence is
determined to be clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.

Id.

When a court is unable to determine whether or not certain evidence is
clearly inadmissible, evidentiary rulings should be deferred until
trial so that questions of foundation, relevancy and potential
prejudice can be resolved in the proper context.

Id.

Whether or not

to grant a motion in limine falls within the sound discretion of the
trial court.

Branham v. Thomas Cooley Law Sch., 689 F.3d 558, 560

(6th Cir. 2012) (citing United States. v. Talley, 194 F.3d 758, 765
(6th Cir. 1999)).
II.

Background
This is an action instituted under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §

1983, in which plaintiff, a state prisoner, alleges that defendant, a
corrections officer at the Pickaway Correctional Institution, used
excessive force against him in violation of the Eighth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.

Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that

defendant slammed plaintiff into a wall and damaged two teeth that

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later required extraction.

Complaint, Doc. No. 3, p. 4.

After the denial of defendant’s first motion for summary
judgment, see Opinion and Order, Doc. No. 45, counsel was appointed
for plaintiff. Order, Doc. No. 52.

At a preliminary pretrial

conference held on May 19, 2010, the Court excused the parties from
making disclosures under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
Pretrial Order, Doc. No. 58.

Preliminary

After several extensions, primary expert

reports were to have been produced consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(2) by November 1, 2010 and rebuttal expert reports were to have
been produced by November 19, 2010. Id.;
Doc. No. 64.

Order, Doc. No. 60;

Order,

Defendant identified two experts, Clayborn Taylor,

D.D.S., and Daniel Michael Clinchot, M.D., on November 1, 2010, and
produced their expert reports on that same date.

Defendant Leon

Hill’s Disclosure of Expert Testimony, Doc. No. 74.

The date by

which all discovery was to have been completed was ultimately extended
to June 1, 2011.
No. 80;

Preliminary Pretrial Order, Doc. No. 58; Order, Doc.

Order, Doc. No. 87; Order, Doc. No. 95;

Order, Doc. No. 103.

On September 27, 2011, however, discovery was reopened to permit
plaintiff to depose two individuals whose declarations had been
attached to Defendant Leon Hill’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment,
Doc. No. 110, but whose identities had not been disclosed to plaintiff
prior to the close of discovery.

Order, Doc. No. 125.

See

Supplemental Memorandum of Plaintiff Lawrence E. Wilson in Opposition
to Defendant’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 139.
Defendant’s request to file a third motion for summary judgment
was denied on November 13, 2012, Opinion and Order, Doc. No. 171.

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Trial by jury is scheduled to begin on January 28, 2013.

Order, Doc.

No. 155.
III. Discussion
A.

Defendant’s Motion in Limine

Defendant intends to call Clayborn Taylor, D.D.S., as a witness
at trial to testify as plaintiff’s treating dentist and as an expert
regarding plaintiff’s allegation that two teeth suffered damage as a
result of defendant’s alleged excessive force.

Final Pretrial Order,

Doc. No. 210, p. 4; Declaration of Clayborn Taylor (“Taylor
Declaration”), attached to Defendant’s Motion in Limine, at ¶ 2.

Dr.

Taylor has “been a licensed dentist, in good standing, by the Ohio
State Dental Board, since 1984.”

Taylor Declaration, ¶ 5.

Dr. Taylor

was previously licensed as a dentist in 1976, but his license “was
revoked in 1978 due to felony convictions of conspiracy in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 –
United States v. Talbott, et al., 460 F.Supp. 253.”

Id. at ¶ 6.

In

1984, Dr. Taylor was again licensed by the Ohio State Dental Board “in
accordance with [his] rehabilitation efforts as verified by
documentation of [his] acceptance of responsibility for [his] criminal
convictions.”

Id. at ¶ 7.

Defendant now seeks to exclude, pursuant to Federal Rules of
Evidence 609(b) and 609(c)(1), all evidence related to “Dr. Taylor’s
1976 licensure, its subsequent revocation or his 1978 criminal
convictions.”

Defendant’s Motion in Limine, p. 3.

Plaintiff opposes

Defendant’s Motion in Limine on the basis that Dr. Taylor’s prior
convictions constitute crimes of dishonesty, the probative value of

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which outweighs their prejudicial effect, and that there is no
evidence that Dr. Taylor’s convictions or license revocation were the
subject of a pardon, annulment or certificate of rehabilitation.
Plaintiff’s Response, pp. 3-5.

Plaintiff also argues that Rule 609

has no application to dental license revocations.

Id.

Defendant

replies that evidence of Dr. Taylor’s license revocation is tantamount
to evidence of his criminal convictions because his license was
revoked as a result of his convictions.

Defendant’s Reply, p. 2.

Under Rule 609, “[e]vidence that a witness has been convicted of
a crime involving dishonesty or false statements, regardless of the
punishment, shall be admitted for impeachment purposes, without any
balancing test.”

United States v. Peatross, 377 F. App’x 477, 489

(6th Cir. 2010) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2)).

Rule 609(b) limits

the admissibility of evidence of prior convictions when the date of
conviction, or the date upon which the witness was released from
confinement, whichever is later, is more than ten years prior to the
proceeding.

Fed. R. Evid. 609(b).

Under those circumstances, “the

trial court must determine whether the probative value of the evidence
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effects.”
App’x at 489 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 609(b)).

Peatross, 377 F.

“̔Rule 609(b) creates, in

effect, a rebuttable presumption that convictions over ten years old
are more prejudicial than helpful and should be excluded.’”

United

States v. Rodriguez, 409 F. App’x 866, 869 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
United States v. Sims, 588 F.2d 1145, 1150 (6th Cir. 1978)).

The

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held
“that ̔evidence of convictions more than ten years old should be

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admitted very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances.’”

Id.

(quoting United States v. Sloman, 909 F.2d 176, 181 (6th Cir. 1990)).
In the case presently before the Court, Dr. Taylor’s 1978 felony
convictions for conspiracy and mail fraud relate to crimes involving a
dishonest act or false statement within the ambit of Rule 609(a)(2).
Nevertheless, the Court concludes that, in light of Dr. Taylor’s
apparent rehabilitation, subsequent re-licensure and continued good
standing since 1984, the probative value of Dr. Taylor’s 34-year-old
convictions does not substantially outweigh their prejudicial effect.
See Sims, 588 F.2d at 1148 (“When stale convictions are offered for
the purpose of impeaching a witness, they often shed little light on
the present tendency of the witness towards truthfulness and
veracity.”).
In short, the Court is not convinced that this case presents the
sort of “exceptional circumstances” under which Dr. Taylor’s
convictions should be admitted.

Plaintiff is therefore precluded from

impeaching Dr. Taylor with evidence of his 1978 felony convictions.
As to evidence of Dr. Taylor’s 1976 licensure and its 1978
revocation, defendant argues that the revocation is evidence of the
1978 criminal convictions because the license was revoked as a result
of the convictions.

Defendant’s Reply, pp. 3-5.

Defendant has not,

however, pointed to any precedent suggesting that Rule 609 applies to
the revocation of a state dental license.
“evidence of a criminal conviction.”

Rule 609 applies to

See Fed. R. Evid. 609(a).

license revocation is not a criminal conviction and, contrary to
defendant’s reasoning, there is no reason why plaintiff cannot

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A

question Dr. Taylor regarding the license revocation without eliciting
testimony regarding the prior convictions.

It is of no consequence

that Dr. Taylor’s license was revoked only because of his criminal
convictions.

Similarly, the 1984 reinstatement of Dr. Taylor’s

license “in accordance with [his] rehabilitation efforts,” see Taylor
Declaration, ¶ 7, is not evidence of a “pardon, annulment, certificate
of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure” under Rule
609(c)(1).

The Court will therefore not exclude this evidence under

Rule 609(c).
B.

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine

On December 17, 2012, defendant filed a list of witnesses and
exhibits expected to be used by the defense at trial.
Hill’s Witness and Exhibit List, Doc. No. 191.

Defendant Leon

Plaintiff’s Motion in

Limine seeks to exclude the testimony of certain witnesses and the use
of certain documents at trial because they were not identified or
produced by defendant during the discovery period.
First, plaintiff seeks to preclude the testimony of Timothy
Destafano, Carl Brown, James R. Woods, Steven Justice and Don Coble
because they were not disclosed during the discovery period.
Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine, pp. 2-4.

Plaintiff represents that he

made an initial request for Rule 26(a) disclosures in November 2008
and served multiple interrogatories requesting the identification of
persons believed to have knowledge of the events of January 3, 2008 or
that defendant may call as a witness.

Id. at p. 3; Declaration of

Jonathan P. Corwin (“Corwin Declaration”), Doc. No. 199-1.

Plaintiff

argues that, despite these requests, defendant failed to identify

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Timothy Destafano, Carl Brown James Woods, Steven Justice and Don
Coble as witnesses prior to the close of discovery.

Corwin

Declaration, ¶ 6.
Under Rule 26(a)(3) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, a
party must produce, inter alia, the names of witnesses whom that party
may present at trial, and must separately identify those witnesses
whom that party expects to present and those whom that party may call
only if the need arises.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3).

Moreover, a party

must supplement its disclosures and other discovery responses “in a
timely manner.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e).

Failure to comply with Rule

26(a) or (e) may result in the imposition of sanctions under Rule
37(c)(1) unless the violation was harmless or substantially justified.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).

See also Vaughn v. City of Lebanon, 18 F.

App’x 252, 263 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

The burden to

prove harmlessness or substantial justification rests on the
potentially sanctioned party.

Roberts ex rel. Johnson v. Galen of

Va., Inc., 325 F.3d 776, 782 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
Harmlessness “is key under Rule 37, not prejudice."
317 F.3d 686, 692 (6th Cir. 2003).

Sommer v. Davis,

“[T]he advisory committee's note

to Rule 37(c) ̔strongly suggests that ‘harmless' involves an honest
mistake on the part of a party coupled with sufficient knowledge on
the part of the other party.’”

Vaughn, 18 F. App’x at 264 (quoting

Vance v. United States, 182 F.3d 920 (6th Cir. 1999)).
Plaintiff, through counsel, expressly requested the identity of
all fact and expert witnesses whom defendant intends to call at trial,
as well as the production of all documents that defendant intends to

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use as an exhibit at trial.

Defendant Leon Hill’s Response to

Plaintiff Lawrence E. Wilson’s Supplemental Set of Interrogatories and
Document Requests, Exhibit A-1, attached to Declaration of Jonathan P.
Corwin, attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine
(“Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Supplemental Interrogatories and
Document Requests”).

Defendant does not argue that he ever disclosed,

prior to the June 1, 2011 discovery completion deadline, Timothy
Destafano, Carl Brown, James Woods, Steven Justice or Don Coble as
potential witnesses or as having relevant information, nor does
defendant attempt to justify that failure.

Instead, defendant argues

only that his failure to disclose these individuals as witnesses in a
timely fashion is harmless because the witnesses were known to
plaintiff “through his own pleadings prior to the start of discovery”
and were referred to by plaintiff in his deposition testimony.
Defendant’s Response, p. 4 (citing PAGEID 119-20, 123).
Plaintiff concedes that some of these individuals were identified
in the disposition of his grievance, which was attached to the
Complaint, but he notes that the disposition of grievance was drafted
by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, not by him.
Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine, pp. 3-4.
The disposition of grievance provides, in part, that the office
of the institutional inspector investigated plaintiff’s complaint and
talked to Captain Hill, Captain Stewart, Officers Brown,
Ard,
and
Mr.
Mr.
[sic]
Destafano,
psychology
assistant. . . . [O]fficer Brown said he did not witness[]
any use of force while you were brought to the officer’s
station. . . .
Mr. Destafano said he could not recall
talking to you about that incident while making rounds at
the special management housing unit.

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Complaint, p. 8.
The portions of plaintiff’s deposition testimony identified
by defendants provides that plaintiff knew “CO Brown” was present
and witnessed the alleged excessive use of force and that he
spoke to a “psych assistant” while in segregation who he thought
was named “Destafano.”

Deposition of Lawrence E. Wilson (“Wilson

Deposition”), Doc. No. 34, pp. 11-12.

Plaintiff also

specifically testified that he did not know the first name of “CO
Brown” and that he did not remember the name of the “psych
assistant.”

Id.

The disposition of grievance and plaintiff’s deposition testimony
do not suggest that defendant’s failure to disclose was harmless.
First, neither the disposition of grievance nor plaintiff’s deposition
testimony mentions James Woods, Steven Justice or Don Coble.

Second,

although the disposition of grievance mentions Brown and Destafano, it
does not suggest that either person had information relevant to the
lawsuit and it does not provide the first name of either person.
Complaint, p. 8.

See

Similarly, plaintiff specifically testified on

deposition that he did not know the first name of “CO Brown” and that
he did not remember the name of the “psych assistant.”

Furthermore,

when plaintiff’s counsel requested the deposition of the “Officer
Brown” who had been identified in the disposition of grievance,
defendant’s former counsel identified one Jacob Brown as the relevant
officer, not Carl Brown; in any event, neither officer was ever
tendered for deposition despite plaintiff’s request.
Declaration, ¶ 6.

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Corwin

Defendant did not identify Timothy Destafano, Carl Brown, James
Woods, Steven Justice or Don Coble as potential witnesses during the
discovery period,1 see Corwin Declaration, ¶¶ 5-8, despite
interrogatories requesting the identification of all such individuals.
See Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Supplemental Interrogatories,
at pp. 5-6.

This failure to comply with Rule 26 and Rule 33 was

neither harmless nor substantially justified.

Defendant is therefore

prohibited, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1), from
offering the testimony of Timothy Destafano, Carl Brown, James Woods,
Steven Justice or Don Coble at trial.
Plaintiff also seeks to exclude the testimony of expert witnesses
not identified in a timely fashion.
5.

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine, p.

Plaintiff represents that defendant Leon Hill, Captain Lee

Stewart, Mohammed Yakabu, James Woods, Steven Justice, Carl Brown,
Ralph Ard and Don Coble were not identified as experts prior to the
parties’ Proposed Joint Final Pretrial Order, Doc. No. 197, which was
filed on December 28, 2012.

Id.

Defendant’s Response in this regard is not entirely clear.
Defendant does not argue that these witnesses were previously
identified as experts.

In fact, defendant seems to state that these

individuals, or at least Mohammed Yakubu, have never been identified
as experts.

See Defendant’s Response, p. 5 (“Further, undersigned

counsel correctly asserted that as of February 16, 2012, Mohammed
Yakubu had not been identified as an expert.
1

In fact that same

According to plaintiff, Steven Justice was first identified as a
potential witness on October 18, 2011, more than four months after the close
of discovery, and Don Coble was first identified on June 26, 2012, more than
one year after the close of discovery. Corwin Declaration, ¶¶ 7-8.

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assertion, in all honesty is still the same.”).

However, defendant

goes on to argue that all of the witnesses identified as experts “have
specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training or education as it
pertains to use of force, which is considered under Fed. R. Evid. 702
to be expert testimony, which ‘will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.’”
Defendant’s arguments are without merit.

Id.

Defendant does not

contest that he did not identify defendant Leon Hill, Captain Lee
Stewart, Mohammed Yakabu, James Woods, Steven Justice, Carl Brown,
Ralph Ard or Don Coble as potential expert witnesses prior to December
27, 2012, just one month before trial.
Defendant’s Response, pp. 4-5.

See Corwin Declaration, ¶ 9;

There is no indication that defendant

ever produced the expert reports required by this Court’s pretrial
orders and by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B),(C). Notably, defendant does
not provide the expert qualifications for any of these witnesses even
in the Final Pretrial Order, see Final Pretrial Order, pp. 16-21, nor
did he list them as experts in Defendant Leon Hill’s Disclosure of
Expert Testimony, Doc. No. 74, or in response to plaintiff’s
interrogatory requesting the identities of expert witnesses intended
to be called at trial, see Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s
Supplemental Interrogatories, p. 5, as he did for Drs. Clinchot and
Taylor.

Defendant has wholly failed to comply with the disclosure

requirements relating to expert witnesses and, although even if
plaintiff had the opportunity to depose these witnesses, he was never
afforded the opportunity to inquire regarding their qualifications or
opinions as experts.

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Defendant has wholly failed to comply with Rule 26(a)(2) in
connection with these claimed experts and his failure to do so was
neither harmless nor substantially justified.

Cf. Roberts, 325 F.3d

at 783 (affirming the district court’s decision to allow an expert to
testify, despite the party’s failure to disclose the expert’s report,
when the opposing party knew the expert’s identity and the substance
of his testimony).

Defendant is therefore precluded from offering

defendant Leon Hill, Captain Lee Stewart, Mohammed Yakabu, James
Woods, Steven Justice, Carl Brown, Ralph Ard or Don Coble as expert
witnesses at trial.
Plaintiff also seeks to exclude defendant’s use of documents that
were not produced during the discovery completion period.

Plaintiff

expressly requested the production of all documents that defendant
intended to use in any proceeding in this case.

Plaintiff’s Motion in

Limine, p. 3; Defendant Leon Hill’s Supplemental Response to Plaintiff
Lawrence E. Wilson’s Supplemental Set of Interrogatories and Document
Requests, at p. 5.

Defendant does not dispute that the following

exhibits listed by him in the Final Pretrial Order were not produced
during the discovery period: segregation sheets (bates labeled 000806000809), telephone log (bates labeled 000810-000831), transcript of
the January 8, 2008 Rules Infraction Board hearing (Doc. No. 158-1),
photographs and diagrams of the institutional area in question, and
documents verifying bunk assignments on January 3, 2008.

Compare

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine, pp. 7-9; Corwin Declaration, ¶¶ 10-13;
and Plaintiff’s Supplement to his Motion in Limine, p. 1, with
Defendant’s Response, pp. 5-8.

Defendant also does not argue that his

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failure to produce those documents in a timely fashion was either
harmless or substantially justified.

Defendant is therefore

prohibited from using these documents as exhibits at trial.

See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).
Plaintiff also seeks to preclude the use of the transcript of
plaintiff’s deposition taken in this case, the transcript of
plaintiff’s criminal trial, and a deposition transcript, complaint,
and ruling on a motion for summary judgment in an unrelated case
involving plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine, pp. 8, 10.

Defendant seems to argue that these documents will not, as he
previously represented, see Final Pretrial Order, pp. 8-9, be offered
as exhibits at trial except for impeachment purposes.
Response, pp. 6-8.

See Defendant’s

Because it is presently unclear how defendant

intends to use these documents at trial, the Court will not preclude
their use for impeachment purposes at this time.
Finally, plaintiff seeks to exclude “documents of felony
convictions/sentences for [p]laintiff Wilson as well as [p]laintiff’s
witnesses – Taylor, Day and Wilson.”

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine,

pp. 11-12. As noted supra, Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
addresses the use of a prior criminal conviction to impeach a witness
at trial.

As the rule relates to this branch of plaintiff’s motion,

Rule 609 provides in pertinent part:
(a) In General. The following rules apply to attacking a
witness's character for truthfulness by evidence of a
criminal conviction:
(1) for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was
punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one
year, the evidence:

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(A) must be
case . . . .

admitted,

subject

to

Rule

403,

in

a

civil

Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that a “court may
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”

Fed. R.

Evid. 403.
As to plaintiff’s prior conviction, this Court has already
determined that “Defendant will . . . be permitted to introduce into
evidence the fact that plaintiff was convicted of rape. . . .
Court will . . .

The

not permit defendant to introduce into evidence the

details of the facts underlying plaintiff’s rape conviction.”

Opinion

and Order, Doc. No. 185, p. 4.
As to witnesses Thorton Taylor, Doug Day and Danny Wilson,
plaintiff has provided no evidence of their criminal convictions or of
the sentences imposed in connection with those convictions.
Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine, pp. 11-12.

See

It would be improvident, in

this Court’s opinion, to weigh the factors contemplated by Rule 403
without such information.

Plaintiff’s request to exclude evidence of

the prior felony convictions of Thorton Taylor, Doug Day and Danny
Wilson’s is therefore DENIED without prejudice to renewal in the
context of the trial.
WHEREUPON, Defendant’s Motion in Limine, Doc. No. 179, is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff is PRECLUDED from using evidence
of Dr. Taylor’s 1978 felony criminal convictions to impeach him at
trial. In all other respects, Defendant’s Motion in Limine is DENIED.

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Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine, Doc. No. 199, is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part.

Defendant is PROHIBITED from offering the

testimony of Timothy Destafano, Carl Brown, James Woods, Steven
Justice and Don Coble at trial.

Defendant is also PROHIBITED from

offering defendant Leon Hill, Captain Lee Stewart, Mohammed Yakabu,
James Woods, Steven Justice, Carl Brown, Ralph Ard, and Don Coble as
expert witnesses at trial.

Defendant is PROHIBITED from offering the

following documents as exhibits at trial: segregation sheets (bates
labeled 000806-000809), telephone log (bates labeled 000810-000831),
transcript of the January 8, 2008 Rules Infraction Board hearing (Doc.
No. 158-1), photographs and diagrams of the institutional area in
question, and documents verifying bunk assignments on January 3, 2008.
To the extent that plaintiff seeks to preclude defendant’s use of
plaintiff’s deposition transcript, the transcript of plaintiff’s
criminal trial, the deposition transcript, complaint and ruling on a
motion for summary judgment in an unrelated case involving plaintiff,
and evidence of the felony convictions and sentences of plaintiff’s
witnesses Taylor, Day and Wilson, Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine is
DENIED without prejudice to renewal in the actual context of the
trial.

January 18, 2013

s/Norah McCann King_______
Norah McCann King
United States Magistrate Judge

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