HENRY v. CSX TRANSPORTATION INC.

Filing 57

ORDER denying 53 Motion in Limine. Signed by Judge James L Graham on 8/31/12. (ds)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Willard F. Henry,
Case No. 2:10-cv-1056
Plaintiff,
v.

Judge Graham

CSX Transportation, Inc.,

Magistrate Judge Abel

Defendant.
ORDER
Before the Court is defendant CSX Transportation, Inc.’s motion in limine regarding the
causation standard to be applied under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §
51 et seq. (Doc. 53.) Defendant argues that the proper causation standard under FELA is proximate
cause.
Remarkably absent from defendant’s motion is any reference to CSX Transportation, Inc. v.
McBride, 131 S.Ct. 2630 (2011), a case that goes directly against defendant’s argument and in which
defendant was a party. The Supreme Court in McBride was exceedingly clear:
In accord with the text and purpose of the Act, this Court’s decision in Rogers v.
Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957), and the
uniform view of federal appellate courts, we conclude that the Act does not
incorporate “proximate cause” standards developed in non-statutory common-law
tort actions. The charge proper in FELA cases, we hold, simply tracks the language
Congress employed, informing juries that a defendant railroad caused or contributed
to a plaintiff or employee’s injury if the railroad’s negligence played any part in
bringing about the injury.
131 S.Ct. at 2634.
Given the clarity of the Supreme Court’s holding, defendant’s argument that proximate cause is the
proper standard is not “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,
modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law . . . .” FED . R. CIV . PRO . 11(b)(2).
The motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ James L. Graham
JAMES L. GRAHAM
United States District Judge
DATE: August 31, 2012