Ogle et al v. Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC et al

Filing 136

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 131 the Ogles' Motion to Compel; granting in part and denying in part 131 the Ogles' Motion to Produce; granting in part and denying in part 132 Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Terence P Kemp on 12/3/14. (sem1)(This document has been sent by the Clerks Office by regular mail to the party(ies) listed in the NEF that did not receive electronic notification.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Charles R. Ogle, et al.,

:

Plaintiffs,

:

v.

:

Case No. 2:10-cv-1059

:

JUDGE PETER C. ECONOMUS
Magistrate Judge Kemp

Columbia Gas Transmission,
LLC, fka Columbia Gas
Transmission Corp., et al.,

:

Defendants.

:
OPINION AND ORDER
I.

Background

This case involves, as the Court of Appeals has put it,
Plaintiffs Charles and Melanie Ogle’s claim for “damages and
injunctive relief relating to the expansion of natural-gas
facilities on their land ....”

See Ogle v. Columbia Gas

Transmission Co., LLC, Case No. 11-4155 (6th Cir. January 31,
2013), slip op. at 2.

More particularly, Columbia Gas

Transmission asked, in 2008, for permission from the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission to place a second storage well and
an access road on the Ogles’ property.

Permission was granted,

and the Court has dismissed all of the Ogles’ claims for
injunctive relief, so the remaining issue in the case is damages.
Those damages are limited to the effect that Columbia’s actions
had on the property prior to November 5, 2009, when the property
was transferred to Ogleshill Farm, LLC.

See Opinion and Order of

August 9, 2013 (dismissing all other claims for lack of standing)
(Doc. 84).

Specifically, these damages are limited to

construction, crop, and diminution damages, criminal trespass and
theft damages, and well rental payment and pipeline payment
required in advance of construction.
2013 (Doc. 93).

See Order of October 10,

The following claims set forth in the Ogles’

second amended complaint (Doc. 85) were specifically dismissed by

the Court: a claim for damage which occurred in 2012 (¶41);
various claims labeled “False, Fictitious, Perjured and
Fraudulent Documents” (¶¶42-49); various claims labeled “Surface
Owner Rights and Good Faith and Fair Dealing” (¶¶55-59); and
various claims labeled “Civil Rights Violations and Conspiracy
and Complicity to Commit Civil Rights Violations, False Report,
Perjury, Libel, Slander, Abduction and Conspiracy and Complicity
to Commit False Report, Perjury, Libel, Slander and Abduction”
(¶¶60-64).

See Order of December 12, 2013 (Doc. 98).
II.

Pending Motions

Currently before the Court are the Ogles’ motion to compel
and a corresponding motion for a protective order filed by
defendants Columbia Gas Transmission, Fredric George, and Beth
Minear.
In their motion to compel, the Ogles contend that Jason
Martin and Columbia Gas Transmission have failed to respond to
interrogatories, produce documents or answer deposition questions
which the Ogles believe could lead to admissible evidence
relating to damages for criminal trespass and theft.

The extent

of their argument, unaccompanied by evidentiary support, is set
forth in one paragraph which states:
Defendants have intentionally caused delay of the
discovery process to the prejudice of Plaintiffs by
refusing to divulge to the Columbia Gas Transmission,
LLC employees who instructed Jason Martin to take
actions that prove part of the criminal trespass and
theft committed upon Plaintiffs’ property. Defendants’
attorney, James Doerfler, has also interfered with
Plaintiffs’ rights by advising his clients not to
answer questions related to the criminal trespass and
theft upon Plaintiffs’ property.
The Ogles also argue that Columbia has refused to produce
defendants Beth Minear and Fredric George for deposition.

They

contend that these defendants are not exempt from the discovery
process simply because they are employed as in-house counsel by
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Columbia.
In response, these defendants filed a motion for a
protective order relating to the proposed depositions of Ms.
Minear and Mr. George.

As they explain, these defendants are

both in-house counsel and the allegations against them are
limited.

According to defendants, the Ogles allege that these

defendants were complicit in criminally trespassing on the Ogles’
property in connection with well installation activities and that
these defendants submitted false and fraudulent filing with
regulatory agencies.

Defendants cite to the Court’s previous

orders dismissing any fraudulent filing claims and argue that,
notwithstanding these orders, the deposition notices directed to
Mr. George and Ms. Minear contain ten topics, most of which
relate to regulatory filing issues.

They contend that the

remaining deposition topics have either been addressed previously
in the deposition testimony of non-attorney witnesses or involve
the Ogles’ attempt to make inquiries about construction
activities on the properties of hundreds of other landowners.
Given the attorney-client privilege implications, defendants
assert that they have asked for an explanation of the need to
depose in-house counsel, but the Ogles have declined to provide
one.
The deposition notice attached to the motion for a
protective order as Exhibit B indicates that the proposed topics
for Mr. George’s deposition include:
1. Knowledge of the intended and actual construction
activities and/or damages on Plaintiffs’ property as
specified in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint;
2. Communications with other defendants and/or other
persons or agencies, including the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, regarding the intended and
actual construction activities and/or construction
damages on Plaintiffs’ property during the time
specified in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint;
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3. Knowledge regarding Plaintiffs’ wood products as
referenced in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint;
4. Knowlege pertaining to any documents regarding
Plaintiffs’ property submitted by Fredric J. George to
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and/or any
other agency;
5. Knowledge of the intended and actual construction
activities and/or damages on each and all other
properties in FERC docket CP08-431;
6. Communications with other defendants and/or other
persons or agencies, including the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, regarding the intended and
actual construction activities and/or damages on each
and all other properties in FERC docket CP08-431;
7. Knowledge regarding wood products on each and all
other properties in FERC docket CP08-431;
8. Knowledge pertaining to any documents regarding
each and all other properties in FERC docket CP08-431
submitted by Fredric J. George to the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission and/or any other agency;
9. Communications with any other defendant and/or
person or agency regarding security on Plaintiff’s
property;
10. Communications with any other defendant and/or
person or agency regarding security on each and all
other properties in FERC docket CP08-431.
The proposed deposition topics for Ms. Minear are identical with
the exception of topic 4.

In Ms. Minear’s deposition notice,

attached to the motion as Exhibit C, topic 4 is not limited to
submissions by Mr. George but encompasses submissions by any
defendant.
The defendants rely on the three-part test set out in
Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1986),
and adopted by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in support of
their position that a protective order prohibiting the

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depositions of Ms. Minear and Mr. George is required here.
According to defendants, because Shelton applies, the Ogles must
demonstrate that they have no other means of obtaining the
desired information and the information sought is relevant, nonprivileged, and crucial to their preparation of their case.
Defendants contend that the Ogles have not met their burden on
any of these issues.
Alternatively, defendants request that the Court enter an
interim protective order and require the Ogles to complete
depositions of other, non-attorney defendants and the corporate
representative.

If, after the completion of these depositions,

the Ogles remain unsatisfied, defendants ask that the Ogles be
required to seek leave of Court to issue deposition notices
specifying “(1) the relevant information that is uniquely in
possession of the proposed attorney deponents; (2) why that
information is necessary to Plaintiffs’ affirmative case; and (3)
describing how that questioning can be pursued without revealing
attorney-client privileged information or protected litigation
strategies.”

According to defendants, the depositions of Mr.

George and Ms. Minear will not elicit information relevant to any
remaining claims or damages but would certainly result in
“annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense” of the type generally sought to be prevented by
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26.

Defendants argue that the primary risk

associated with the proposed depositions is that the questioning
may infringe on attorney-client communications or reveal
litigation strategies.

Because FERC filings are not at issue

here, they assert that Mr. George has no relevant information to
offer but his deposition may result in the disclosure of
privileged information or mental strategies.

They argue that the

risk is even greater with respect to Ms. Minear in light of her
involvement in extensive state court litigation adverse to the
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Ogles, much of which involved substantive issues relating to the
interpretation of the lease at issue in this case.

They state,

without elaboration, that state court litigation over lease
interpretation issues, remains ongoing.
The Ogles have not filed a response to the motion for a
protective order.
In addition to the motion for a protective order, defendants
filed a response to the motion to compel.

In the response,

defendants assert that the Ogles have been afforded a complete
opportunity to obtain relevant evidence in support of their
claims of theft and criminal trespass.

Specifically, they

explain that the Ogles have been able to depose Jason Martin and
Keith Hedges, two individuals who oversaw the construction work
on the Ogles’ property on behalf of Columbia.

According to

defendants, during their depositions Mr. Hedges and Mr. Martin
answered questions regarding the physical construction activities
on site, including how the construction work was performed, who
performed it, and how the remediation of the property was
performed.

Additionally, defendants state that the Ogles took

the depositions of Rebekah Hovermale and Scott Burnsworth, two
Columbia environmental specialists.

Defendants explain that the

Ogles were able to question these witnesses regarding any
environmental conditions relating to construction activities on
their property and FERC filings.
Defendants also note that, because the Ogles have not
provided a copy of Mr. Martin’s deposition transcript or
otherwise explained what information relating to claims of
trespass or theft they still need to explore, Columbia has
fulfilled its discovery obligations.

By way of explanation, they

state that Mr. Martin’s deposition testimony was restricted only
with respect to a line of inquiry directed to a driveway
application made to a state regulatory agency and to FERC
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filings.

The remainder of the response primarily incorporates by

reference the arguments raised in its motion for a protective
order.
III.

Analysis

Turning first to the issue relating to Mr. Martin,
defendants are correct that the Ogles have failed to identify
with any specificity an interrogatory, document production
request, or line of deposition questioning addressed to
information the Ogles maintain they have been unable to obtain.
Further, the Ogles did not respond in any way to the defendants’
representations so the Court has no record from which to conclude
that any discovery from Mr. Martin remains outstanding.
Consequently, the motion to compel will be denied as moot as it
relates to Mr. Martin.
Turning to the issue of the depositions, Mr. George and Ms.
Minear are parties, they have not been deposed, and their
depositions were properly noticed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b).
These facts are not in dispute.

In this situation, the general

rule to be applied is that “[u]nder the liberal discovery
principles of the Federal Rules” a party is “required to carry a
heavy burden” to show why a properly-noticed deposition should
not go forward.

See Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418,

429 (9th Cir. 1975).

The Court recently addressed the issue of a

party’s burden in this circumstance in Libertarian Party of Ohio
v. Husted, –- F.R.D. –, 2014 WL 3456835, *3 (S.D. Ohio July 11,
2014):
Although difficult to do, a party may meet that
burden in a number of different ways. For example, the
party may prove that he or she has already been deposed
in the case or that the deposition would exceed the
ten-deposition limit. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(a)(2). The
party might also show that the deposition has been
noticed too early (before the Rule 26(f) conference) or
too late (after the discovery cutoff date); or that he
or she falls into a category of witnesses, like heads
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of agencies, CEOs of large corporations, or the
opposing party’s attorney, who are easy targets for
harassment, and for whom the burden of showing the
appropriateness of the deposition may shift to the
requesting party. See, e.g., Salter v. Upjohn Co., 593
F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Shelton v. American
Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1987).
It is also possible, but much more difficult, to
obtain an order precluding a party’s deposition from
taking place on grounds that the party has no relevant
knowledge, or that, despite the fact that the party has
not been deposed even once, the deposition would be
“unreasonably cumulative or duplicative” or “the burden
or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its
likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and
the importance of the discovery in resolving the
issues.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(I), (iii). However,
granting such orders absent a specific and persuasive
showing of good cause would cut against the fact that,
under Rule 30(a), “[a] party may ... depose any person,
including a party, without leave of court....” The
fact that depositions “relate to [a party’s] trial
preparation and defense .... [which] are important
interests, and great care must be taken to avoid their
unnecessary infringement,” Farnsworth v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985),
explains why the courts impose a heavy burden on the
movant in these circumstances. As the court in EEOC v.
Freeman, 2012 WL 2370122, *1 (D. Md. June 21, 2012)
aptly observed,
In general, motions for protective orders “seeking
to prevent the taking of a deposition [are]
regarded unfavorably by the courts.” Minter v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 258 F.R.D. 118, 125 (D.
Md. 2009). Such orders “should be rarely granted
absent extraordinary circumstances;” therefore,
the moving party bears a “heavy burden.” Id.
(quoting Static Control Components, Inc. v.
Darkprint Imaging, 201 F.R.D. 431, 434 (M.D.N.C.
2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The defendants’ motion to preclude the depositions of Mr. George
and Ms. Minear, despite the fact that they are parties to this
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case, must be judged under these principles.
A.

Necessity for a Shelton Analysis

Defendants’ primary argument is that Shelton applies here,
placing the burden on the Ogles to prove the necessity of the
depositions.

In recognition of the fact that Mr. George and Ms.

Minear are also named as defendants here, defendants assert that
“when an attorney is named as a party to the action, that
attorney may only be deposed under limited circumstances.”

They

contend that this Court has previously prohibited the depositions
of other attorneys named as defendants and cites as support to
United States v. Thirty-six (36) 300CC On Road Scooters, 2013 WL
5487297 (Sept. 30, 2013)(Abel, J.), adopted and affirmed 2013 WL
6710893 (Dec. 18, 2013)(Sargus, J.).

Beyond this particular

case, they cite no authority to support the suggestion that a
Shelton analysis is generally undertaken to determine the
appropriateness of a deposition of a party who also happens to be
in-house counsel.
Initially, the Court notes that the defendants are correct
that this Court has applied the Shelton rule to preclude the
deposition of in-house counsel under various circumstances.
Further, they are correct that, under the Shelton rule, the
burden shifts to the party seeking to take the deposition of inhouse counsel to demonstrate that the deposition is necessary.
However, the Court is not persuaded that Shelton is intended to
be read so expansively as to apply to the situation presented
here.
Notably, the defendants have provided no authority
suggesting such an automatic application of Shelton.

To the

extent that they rely on the Road Scooters case as support for
their reading of Shelton, the Court notes that in that particular
case, the counsel at issue was not a named party, although he had
been named as a defendant in related litigation.
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Further, the

Court in that case did not rely on Shelton as a basis for
prohibiting the deposition.
Further, defendants have not seriously contended, let alone
provided any evidence, that the Ogles are seeking to depose Mr.
George and Ms. Minear solely for purposes of harassment.

Rather,

the crux of defendants’ position is that the status of Ms. Minear
and Mr. George as in-house counsel triggers a Shelton analysis.
As this Court has discussed previously, however, this fact alone
is not determinative of Shelton’s applicability:
The issue is not quite that simple. As this Court
explained in Williams v. Wellston City Sch. Dist., 2010 WL
4513818 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 2, 2010), the primary rationale
behind Shelton’s imposition of a burden on a requesting
party to show why it is entitled to take a deposition - a
reversal of the usual procedure which places the burden of
persuasion on the party seeking protection - is to protect
against the discovery of trial or litigation strategy.
Consequently,
[w]hen the attorney whose deposition is requested
is not litigation counsel, is not in-house counsel
who is involved to some extent in directing
litigation, or is not an attorney who has advised
the client concerning the same or similar
litigation or has helped develop its defense
strategy, the reasons for applying Shelton are
much less compelling because there is little or no
risk that the attorney's testimony might reveal
any litigation strategy, or that the purpose of
the deposition is to drive a wedge between the
opposing party and its current counsel.
Id. at *5. See also Ellipsis, Inc. v. Color Works,
Inc., 227 F.R.D. 496, 497 (W.D. Tenn. 2005)(“the
Shelton test should be limited to those instances where
the attorney to be deposed is either trial/litigation
counsel or the subject matter of the deposition may
elicit litigation strategy”); Cheesemore v. Alliance
Holdings, Inc., 2011 WL 4458782 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 23
2011)(declining to apply Shelton to proposed deposition
of opposing counsel to the extent that the questioning
related to their prior role as transactional counsel
and not their current role as litigation counsel). Of
course, it also makes sense that the burden of
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producing evidence to show what role counsel actually
plays in a case - assuming that the answer to this
question is not obvious, as it would be for outside
litigation counsel and perhaps for in-house counsel who
have entered an appearance in the case - should be on
the party asserting that Shelton applies, since that
party is in the best position to know exactly what
counsel’s role was or is.
Libertarian Party v. Husted, –- F.Supp.2d –-, 2014 WL 3509749,
*10 (S.D. Ohio July 14, 2014).
Beyond relying on Ms. Minear’s and Mr. George’s in-house
counsel status, defendants have presented no evidence detailing
the extent of their involvement in this case.

At most, they have

stated in passing that some facet of the state court litigation
in which Ms. Minear is involved remains pending and they refer to
these parties without explanation, in a phrase buried on page 10
of their supporting memorandum, as “attorney-advisors to other
defendants.”

Further, the Ogles have not expressed any intent to

question these defendants about those matters, but rather to
depose them on issues relating to knowledge of wood products,
construction activities, and damages.

Given this factual record,

there is no basis for applying Shelton, and the question then
becomes whether the defendants have advanced other persuasive
reasons in support of their position that Ms. Minear and Mr.
George should not be deposed.
B.

Undue Harm, Burden, and Expense

The defendants’ secondary argument is that allowing the
depositions of Mr. George and Ms. Minear to go forward would
cause undue harm, burden and expense justifying the entry of a
protective order.

In support of this position, the defendants

claim that Mr. George and Ms. Minear have no relevant information
relating to any remaining claims or damages.

Further, they argue

that their positions as in-house counsel present a significant
risk of infringement on privileged information.
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They do not

offer these arguments in support of the complete preclusion of
the depositions, however, but propose the entry of an interim
protective order designed to minimize what they perceive as the
inherent risks associated with the depositions.
Specifically, the defendants propose that the Court require
the Ogles to complete the depositions of other, non-attorney
defendants and corporate representatives.

When those depositions

are completed, they propose that the Ogles be required to move
the Court for leave to issue deposition notices specifying “(1)
the relevant information that is uniquely in the possession of
the proposed attorney deponents; (2) why that information is
necessary to Plaintiffs’ affirmative case; and (3) describing how
that questioning can be pursued without revealing attorney-client
privileged information or protected litigation strategies.”
One problem with the defendants’ proposal is that they are
attempting to require the Ogles to describe, in advance, the
subjects to be covered, when a party ordinarily has no such
obligation.

The only time that, by Rule, a party must specify

the subjects about which it wishes to depose a witness is when
noticing a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition.
need not contain that information.

Other deposition notices

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(1),

(3); see also Bennett v. The Westover, Inc., 27 F.Supp. 10, 11
(S.D.N.Y. 1938)(“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
require that the ‘notice to take deposition’ state the matters
upon which the examination is sought”).
As this Court has previously explained:
The noticing party may be required to explain its
purposes in taking a deposition, however, if the facts
suggest that those purposes are improper. That concept
underlies the “apex deposition” rule applied in some
jurisdictions, see Salter v. Upjohn, supra, where the
identity of the deponent itself indicates an intent to
harass rather than an intent to engage in legitimate
discovery. It also explains the restriction on a
second deposition of the same witness; once the
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deposing party has had a full opportunity to question a
witness, doing that for a second time is presumptively
duplicative and it is appropriate to ask the requesting
party to explain what else might be asked that has not
already been covered adequately in the first
proceeding. Cf. Powell v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,
2011 WL 124600, * (S.D. Ind. Jan. 13, 2011)(in order to
grant leave to take a second deposition of the same
witness, the Court’s order must be “consistent with
Rule 26(b)(2), which provides that discovery must be
limited when it is unreasonably duplicative...”).
Otherwise, however, the courts should be reluctant to
permit a party who wishes not to be deposed to use a
procedural device such as a motion for a protective
order to force the requesting party to specify, in
advance, the subject of the deposition as a
precondition to proceeding.
Libertarian Party, 2014 WL 3456835, at *4.
The more obvious problem with the defendants’ position is
that the Ogles already have disclosed in advance the subject
matter of the proposed depositions.

With respect to Mr. George,

defendants’ position, aside from arguing that he has no relevant
information to provide, is that the majority of the identified
topics concern matters about regulatory submissions to FERC or
state agencies - issues dismissed from this case.

With respect

to Ms. Minear, Columbia’s position is focused less on the issue
of relevance and more on a concern that privileged communications
and mental impressions may be revealed.
The Court notes that the defendants do not raise an
extensive argument on the issue of relevance, either in their
Shelton analyis or independently.

Further, neither Mr. George

nor Ms. Minear have submitted an affidavit swearing that they
have no information relevant to the issues remaining in this
case.

Moreover, defendants have a heavy burden of showing that

Mr. George or Ms. Minear could not be asked a single relevant
question such that their depositions should be precluded in their
entirety.

Libertarian Party, 2014 WL 3509749, *11, citing
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Naftchi v. New York University Medical Center, 172 F.R.D. 130,
132 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Rather, to the extent defendants make an argument directed
to relevance, it revolves around their interpretation of the
deposition topics outlined by the Ogles.

However, defendants

raise their objections in general terms and do not raise
objections to identified topics in any specific detail.

The

Court is not convinced that the outlined topics relate to
dismissed claims regarding fraudulent regulatory filings to the
extent defendants contend.

Rather, some of the outlined topics

appear to be intended to elicit information relating to damages
arising from construction on the Ogles’ property.

At the same

time, however, some of the topics do appear to go beyond the
issue of damages to the Ogles’ property as a result of Columbia’s
actions on the property prior to November 5, 2009.

For example,

as defendants point out, several of the deposition topics involve
inquiries regarding the construction activities on the properties
of other landowners.
10.

These deposition topics are 5, 6, 7, and

Further, topics 4 and 8 appear to relate to documents filed

with FERC or other agencies.
This issue is easily addressed by the Court’s granting of a
more limited protective order designed to forbid inquiry into
these matters as contemplated by Rule 26(c)(1)(D) rather than
precluding the depositions of Ms. Minear and Mr. George outright.
Consequently, the Court will grant the defendants’ motion for a
protective order to the limited extent that questions relating to
topics 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10 will not be allowed.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court is mindful of the
concerns regarding privileged information and fully recognizes
the potential that the pro se plaintiffs’ questioning of these
defendants, even within the limitations established here, may
cross into areas where the attorney-client or work product
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privileges might apply.

This order is not intended to either

suggest that these defendants can be questioned without proper
regard for these privileges or that defendants may not properly
invoke them if a question calls for the disclosure of privileged
information.

This order merely permits plaintiffs to convene the

depositions of these defendants on the topics identified as Nos.
1, 2, 3, and 9.

All of the other rules relating to discovery and

depositions still apply.
IV.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Ogles’ motion to compel
discovery and to produce defendants for deposition (Doc. 131) is
denied in part and granted in part as set forth above.

The

motion for a protective order (Doc. 132) is denied in part and
granted in part as set forth above.

The depositions shall be

convened within 30 days of the date of this order.
V.

Motion for Reconsideration

Any party may, within fourteen days after this Order is
filed, file and serve on the opposing party a motion for
reconsideration by a District Judge.

28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A),

Rule 72(a), Fed. R. Civ. P.; Eastern Division Order No. 14-01,
pt. IV(C)(3)(a).

The motion must specifically designate the

order or part in question and the basis for any objection.
Responses to objections are due fourteen days after objections
are filed and replies by the objecting party are due seven days
thereafter.

The District Judge, upon consideration of the

motion, shall set aside any part of this Order found to be
clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
This order is in full force and effect even if a motion for
reconsideration has been filed unless it is stayed by either the
Magistrate Judge or District Judge.

S.D. Ohio L.R. 72.3.
/s/ Terence P. Kemp

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United States Magistrate Judge

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