Bloodworth v. Timmerman-Cooper et al

Filing 153

ORDER REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION granting re 148 motion for extension of time. It is recommended that 134 motion for preliminary injunction be denied. Objections to R&R due by 6/28/2013 signed by Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King on 6/11/13. (rew)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

RONALD BLOODWORTH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil Action 2:10-CV-1121
Judge Marbley
Magistrate Judge King

WARDEN DEBORA A. TIMMERMAN-COOPER,
et al.,
Defendant.

ORDER AND
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff’s motion for interim
injunctive relief (“Plaintiff’s Motion”), Doc. No. 134.

Defendants

oppose Plaintiff’s Motion, Doc. No. 139, and plaintiff has filed a
reply, Plaintiff’s Reply, Doc. No. 151.
Plaintiff’s related motion for an extension of time to file a
reply in support of Plaintiff’s Motion, Doc. No. 148, is GRANTED
effective June 6, 2013, i.e., the date that plaintiff’s Reply, Doc.
No. 151, was actually filed.
This matter is now ripe for consideration.
I.

Standard
Interim injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that should

be granted only after the Court has carefully considered the following
four factors:
(1) whether the movant has a “strong” likelihood of success
on the merits; (2) whether the movant would otherwise
suffer irreparable injury; (3) whether issuance of a
preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to

others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served
by issuance of a preliminary injunction.

Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting
McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 459
(6th Cir. 1997)).

“These factors are to be balanced against one

another and should not be considered prerequisites to the grant of a
preliminary injunction.”

Id. (citing United Food & Commercial Workers

Union, Local 1099 v. Sw. Ohio Reg’l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 347
(6th Cir. 1998)).

See also Mich. State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d

1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Not all of these factors fully need be
established for an injunction to be proper.”).

However, a preliminary

injunction should not issue where there is simply no likelihood of
success on the merits.
II.

Id.

Discussion
Plaintiff Ronald Bloodworth, a state inmate currently

incarcerated in the Toledo Correctional Institution (“ToCI”) and
formerly incarcerated in the London Correctional Institution (“LoCI”),
seeks an order requiring defendants to transfer plaintiff back to
LoCI.

Plaintiff’s Motion, p. 10.

Plaintiff’s Motion is premised on

allegations related to “first amendment retaliation by Unit Manager,
Kelley E. Mason[] for her decision in effecting plaintiff’s transfer
from a security level two institution to a security level three prison
as punishment for plaintiff’s grievance activity against her.”
p. 2.

Id. at

Specifically, plaintiff argues that, in August 2010, he was

forcibly placed in his cell after refusing to enter the cell out of
fear for his safety.

Id. at pp. 2-4.

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Plaintiff was thereafter

charged with physical resistance to a direct order in contravention of
Rule 20 and disobedience of a direct order in contravention of Rule 21
in connection with that incident.

Id.

Plaintiff characterizes the

charges as false and based on the “unprovoked, unjustified and
unlawful attack against plaintiff and because plaintiff expressed his
fears of being placed in a cell with two other inmates.”

Id.

The

rules infraction board, chaired by defendant Carson, found plaintiff
guilty of the charges and recommended plaintiff’s placement in local
control.

Id.

In October 2010, defendant Mason and the local control

committee recommended that plaintiff’s security status be increased to
level 3.

Id.

According to plaintiff, defendant Mason’s

recommendation in this regard was based on plaintiff “fil[ing]
grievances against defendant Mason on August 4, 2010 and September 2,
2010.”

Id.

On March 14, 2011, plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary
restraining order that was premised on the same allegations and sought
the same relief as his current motion.

See Doc. No. 13.

That motion

was denied on August 17, 2011 on the basis that plaintiff had not
established a likelihood of success on the merits of his First
Amendment retaliation claim.

See Order, Doc. No. 61 (adopting and

affirming Report and Recommendation, Doc. No. 59, without objections).
Specifically, the Court found that, “[b]ecause plaintiff was in fact
guilty of the disciplinary charges against him, the consequent
increase in his security status and transfer to ToCI cannot form the
basis of a successful claim of retaliation in contravention of his

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rights under the First Amendment.”

Report and Recommendation, Doc.

No. 59, p. 5.
Plaintiff’s Motion is merely an attempt to reargue his March 2011
motion for a temporary restraining order.

Plaintiff’s Motion has not,

however, presented any new arguments to persuade the Court to revisit
its order denying the previous motion or which would warrant granting
plaintiff’s renewed request for interim injunctive relief.

The Court

further notes that plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims
against defendant Mason have been dismissed, see Order, Doc. No. 75;
Order, Doc. No. 105, p. 2, and, because plaintiff is currently
incarcerated at ToCI, a transfer to LoCI would not preserve the status
quo.

See United States v. Edward Rose & Sons, 384 F.3d 258, 261 (6th

Cir. 2004) (“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is simply to
preserve the status quo.”).
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons and for the reasons
articulated in Order, Doc. No. 61, and Report and Recommendation, Doc.
No. 59, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion, Doc. No. 134, be
DENIED.
If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report
and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file
and serve on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation,
specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part
thereof in question, as well as the basis for objection thereto.
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

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Response to objections

must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy
thereof.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

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The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to
the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to
de novo review by the District Judge and of the right to appeal the
decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation.
See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of
Teachers, Local 231 etc., 829 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

June 11, 2013

s/Norah McCann King_______
Norah McCann King
United States Magistrate Judge

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