Williams v. Franklin County Municipal Court et al

Filing 74

OPINION AND ORDER denying 38 Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Preston Deavers on 3/8/2012. (er1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
BRENDA WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action 2:10-cv-01155
Judge Algenon L. Marbley
Magistrate Judge E.A. Preston Deavers

v.
FRANKLIN COUNTY MUNICIPAL
COURT, et al.,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration of Order Granting Motion to Quash Filed by Jonathan Coughlan. (ECF No. 38.)
For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.
I.
Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants as her former joint employers. Plaintiff
claims, in part, that Defendants created a hostile work environment and retaliated against her
after she complained about the conduct of Judge Harland Hale. The instant Motion arises out of
a discovery dispute between Plaintiff and Jonathan Coughlan, Ohio Disciplinary Counsel, a nonparty movant in this action. Plaintiff issued a subpoena to Mr. Coughlan as counsel for the Ohio
Disciplinary Counsel to testify at a deposition and to produce documents regarding any
disciplinary complaint naming, or disciplinary investigation involving, Judge Hale.1 Mr.
Coughlan moved to quash this subpoena, asserting that due to the confidential nature of the
Disciplinary Counsel’s investigations such documents were “protected matter” within the

1

Plaintiff has since determined that she does not require Mr. Coughlan’s deposition and
now only seeks the production of documents.

meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 or otherwise privileged.
On December 5, 2011, following a conference with the parties, Magistrate Judge Norah
M. King issued an Order granting the Motion to Quash.2 (ECF No. 37.) Judge King reasoned
that to the extent Plaintiff sought information through her subpoena relevant to the substance of
her claims, this information was available from other sources. To the extent Plaintiff was
concerned about an adverse inference to the credibility of herself or other witnesses, Judge King
found this concern insufficient, at that time, to justify the discovery request.
On December 12, 2011, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of Judge King’s Order.
Plaintiff cites the December 8, 2011 deposition of Keith Bartlett, Administrator of the Franklin
County Municipal Court, as justification for reconsideration. According to Plaintiff, this
deposition makes clear that Defendants will assert that any allegations to the Ohio Disciplinary
Counsel regarding Judge Hale were untrue because the Ohio Disciplinary Counsel ultimately
chose not to publicize a finding of probable cause. The Ohio Disciplinary Counsel has
responded in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, maintaining that the Ohio
Disciplinary Counsel’s decision as to Judge Harland is not probative of the merits of Plaintiff’s
action and that Plaintiff’s subpoena imposes an undue burden on the Ohio Disciplinary Counsel.
II.
“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly address motions for
reconsideration of interlocutory orders.” Rodriguez v. Tennessee Laborers Health & Welfare
Fund, 89 F. App’x 949, 959 (6th Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, “[d]istrict courts have authority both

2

The undersigned was assigned to this case following Magistrate Judge King’s January
20, 2012 recusal.
2

under common law and Rule 54(b) to reconsider interlocutory orders and to reopen any part of a
case before entry of final judgment.” Id. Traditionally, “courts will find justification for
reconsidering interlocutory orders whe[re] there is (1) an intervening change of controlling law;
(2) new evidence available; or (3) a need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”
Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t v. Hotels.com, L.P., 590 F.3d 381, 389 (6th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotations omitted). “However, a motion for reconsideration should not be used to
re-litigate issues previously considered.” Stanich v. Hissong Grp., Inc., No. 2:09-cv-0143, 2010
WL 3732129, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2010) (internal quotations omitted).
III.
As a preliminary matter, the Court questions whether Plaintiff has provided sufficient
justification for reconsideration. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration cites, and attaches,
deposition testimony taken after Judge King’s December 5, 2011 Order. This evidence provides
a somewhat clearer framework regarding the issue of the credibility inference Plaintiff is
concerned Defendants will exploit. At the same time, however, Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration appears to largely revisit issues and arguments Judge King already considered.
As to the merits of the underlying discovery issue, the Court agrees with the Ohio
Disciplinary Counsel that requiring disclosure would result in an undue burden given the
circumstances of this case.3 “The scope of discovery is, of course, within the broad discretion of
the trial court.” Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998). Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45, the Court “must quash or modify a subpoena that . . .

3

Accordingly, the Court finds it unnecessary to decide whether the documents Plaintiff
seeks are “protected matter” within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 or
otherwise privileged.
3

subjects a person to undue burden.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3). “In determining whether a
subpoena imposes an undue burden, a court considers such factors as relevance, the need of the
[requesting] party for the documents, the breadth of the document request, the time period
covered by it, the particularity with which the documents are described and the burden imposed.”
Kilroy v. Husted, No. 2:11–cv–145, 2011 WL 5827229, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 18, 2011)
(internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, “[c]ourts are required to balance the need for
discovery against the burden imposed on the person ordered to produce documents, and the
status of a person as a non-party is a factor that weighs against disclosure.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
Under the unique circumstances of this case, the Court concludes that the burden
disclosure would place on the Ohio Disciplinary Counsel strongly outweighs Plaintiff’s need for
the discovery in question. Requiring the Ohio Disciplinary Counsel, a non-party in this case, to
produce the documents in question would be highly burdensome. The Ohio Disciplinary
Counsel is obligated under the Ohio Supreme Court Rules for the Government Bar to maintain
“proceedings and documents relating to review and investigation of grievances” confidential.
Ohio Gov. Bar R. V(11)(E). The Ohio Disciplinary Counsel and all employees of the Office of
the Disciplinary Counsel, are required to take an oath to uphold this confidentiality requirement.
As the Ohio Disciplinary Counsel has provided, the confidential nature of investigatory
proceedings serves a variety of policy interests, including promotion of the free exchange of
information and protection of accused lawyers as well as witnesses during the investigative
process. Accordingly, forcing the disclosure of document relating to any disciplinary
investigation of Judge Hale would require the Ohio Disciplinary Counsel to violate

4

confidentiality requirements central to the disciplinary investigation process.
Additionally, the Court finds Plaintiff’s need for the documents in question to be limited.
Although the documents in question are likely relevant within the broad confines of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26, the Court finds that such documents are not central to Plaintiff’s case.
Notably, Plaintiff has asserted claims against her former employers, based on their reactions to
her reports of misconduct, rather than against Judge Hale directly. The undersigned agrees with
Judge King that to the extent Plaintiff seeks information relevant to the underlying facts of her
claims, this information is available to Plaintiff from other sources including her own
recollections. Plaintiff’s primary concern in seeking the documents appears to be a potentially
adverse inference from the circumstances. Specifically, Plaintiff is concerned that the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel’s decision not to take action against Judge Hale leads to the inference that
Plaintiff and other witnesses’ allegations to the Disciplinary Counsel were unreliable.
Nevertheless, as the Office of Disciplinary Counsel describes, Plaintiff has available to her a
number of ways to refute, or at the very least diminish, such an inference without forcing
disclosure of the documents in question.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting
Motion to Quash Filed by Jonathan Coughlan is DENIED. (ECF No. 38.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: March 8, 2012

/s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers
Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers
United States Magistrate Judge

5