Harding v. Transforce, Inc. et al
Filing
72
OPINION AND ORDER granting 62 motion to compel. Signed by Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King on 5/01/13. (rew)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
NORA HARDING,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil Action 2:11-CV-244
Judge Sargus
Magistrate Judge King
TRANSFORCE, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Motion of Yusen Logistics
(Americas), Inc. to Compel Discovery of a Settlement Agreement between
Plaintiff and Mars (“Motion to Compel”), Doc. No. 62.
Defendant Yusen
Logistics (Americas), Inc. (“NYK”) seeks discovery of the settlement
agreement between plaintiff Nora Harding and defendants Mars Petcare
US, Inc., and Kal Kan Foods, Inc.
Id. at p. 1.
The Court previously
granted defendant’s Motion to Compel as unopposed, see Order, Doc. No.
63, and plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider, seeking leave to file
a response out of rule.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and
Memorandum Contra to Defendant NYK’s Motion to Compel, Doc. No. 64.
On April 29, 2013, the Court granted plaintiff leave to file a
response to NYK’s Motion to Compel.
Opinion and Order, Doc. No. 70.
At the direction of the Court, plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration
has been filed as Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’
Motion to Compel (“Plaintiff’s Response”), Doc. No. 71.
reasons that follow, NYK’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED.
For the
I.
Background
This Court has previously set forth the background of this case:
Plaintiff Nora Harding filed this action individually and
as administrator of the estate of her husband, Mark A.
Harding, who was an employee of defendant Transforce, Inc.
when he was killed on February 12, 2009, in a tragic
accident
that
occurred
during
the
scope
of
his
employment. . . .
. . .
Transforce and Defendant NYK entered into a contractual
relationship in August 2007, for Transforce to provide
personnel to NYK for the “operation of transportation or
other equipment.”
(Service Agreement at 1; Doc. No. 522.) . . .
In February 2009, NYK was in a contractual relationship
with Defendant Mars Petcare.
In accordance with that
contract, NYK provided to Mars Petcare “spotting and
shuttle services,” i.e., moving semi tractor-trailers
around the warehouse yard, at the Mars Petcare facility
located in Columbus, Ohio. (Mars Petcare Rep. Melissa Muth
Dep. at 34; Doc. No. 49 at 12.)
NYK employed a Drop Lot
Coordinator whom it assigned to the Mars Petcare location.
The Drop Lot Coordinator would be informed by a Mars
Petcare dispatcher when a semi tractor-trailer was full and
the Coordinator then dispatched direction to the NYK and/or
Transforce yard truck operators to move that trailer.
On February 12, 2009, pursuant to the contract between
Transforce and NYK and the contract between NYK and Mars
Petcare, Mr. Harding and another Transforce employee,
Defendant Paul E. Lay, were working at the Columbus Mars
Petcare facility as yard truck operators. Mr. Harding had
completed his work shift and was walking across the yard to
his personal vehicle when he was struck and killed by the
yard truck driven by Mr. Lay. . . .
On February 11, 2011, Plaintiff filed the instant action in
the Franklin County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff
named as defendants Transforce, Mr. Lay, Kal Kan Foods,
Inc., Mars Petcare and NYK. On March 18, 2011, Defendants
jointly removed the action to this Court based upon
diversity jurisdiction.
Opinion and Order, Doc. No. 68, pp. 1-3.
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The claims against Mr. Lay were dismissed on February 27, 2012.
Opinion and Order, Doc. No. 35.
Plaintiff stipulated to the dismissal
of Transforce, Inc., on April 11, 2012, Doc. No. 40, and to the
dismissal of Mars Petcare US, Inc., and Kal Kan Foods, Inc., on July
25, 2012, Doc. No. 58.
The only claims remaining are those against
NYK – i.e., negligence, negligent hiring, training, and/or supervision
and business invitee liability.
The Court denied plaintiff’s and
NYK’s motions for summary judgment on these claims on March 26, 2013.
Opinion and Order, Doc. No. 68.
on July 8, 2013.
A trial by jury is scheduled to begin
Order Setting Trial Date and Settlement Conference,
Doc. No. 67.
II.
Standard
Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a
motion to compel discovery when a party fails to provide a proper
response to requests for production of documents under Rule 34.
R. Civ. Pro. 37(a)(3)(B).
Fed.
“The proponent of a motion to compel
discovery bears the initial burden of proving that the information
sought is relevant.”
Martin v. Select Portfolio Serving Holding
Corp., No. 1:05–cv–273, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68779, at *2 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 25, 2006) (citing Alexander v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 186
F.R.D. 154, 159 (D.D.C. 1999)).
Rule 26(b) provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s
claim or defense.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
purposes is extremely broad.
F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998).
Relevance for discovery
Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135
“The scope of examination permitted
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under Rule 26(b) is broader than that permitted at trial.
The test is
whether the line of interrogation is reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence.”
Mellon v. Cooper-Jarrett,
Inc., 424 F.2d 499, 500-01 (6th Cir. 1970).
However, “district courts
have discretion to limit the scope of discovery where the information
sought is overly broad or would prove unduly burdensome to produce.”
Surles ex rel. Johnson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d 288, 305
(6th Cir. 2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)).
See also Lewis,
135 F.3d at 402 (determining the proper scope of discovery falls
within the broad discretion of the trial court).
Finally, the party moving to compel discovery must certify that
it “has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person
or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to
obtain it without court action.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1).
See also
S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 37.2.
III. Discussion
NYK’s Motion to Compel is technically deficient because it does
not contain a certification that NYK has in good faith conferred or
attempted to confer with plaintiff in an effort to obtain the disputed
discovery without court action.
NYK’s Motion to Compel also fails to
establish that a formal discovery request was ever issued to plaintiff
or that the actual settlement agreement was ever requested.
See
Motion to Compel, p. 2 (“[NYK] has on three occasions requested from
Plaintiff the amount of the settlement, to no avail.
The first
happening was orally at the settlement conference held on June 19,
4
2012 and most recently via electronic messages sent on September 24,
2012 and November 1, 2012.”).
Cf. Plaintiff’s Response, p. 7 (“NYK
never issued any form of discovery requests to Plaintiff Harding.
It
did not seek interrogatories, requests for admissions and/or request
for production of documents.”).
Despite these technical deficiencies in NYK’s Motion to Compel,
the parties agree that the production of the actual settlement
agreement is at issue and it is clear to the Court that the parties
have reached impasse in their attempts to resolve their dispute.
Considering the impending trial date and the parties’ opposing
positions on the relevance of the settlement agreement, the Court
concludes that its discretion is better exercised in determining
whether the settlement agreement is discoverable.
NYK contends that the settlement agreement is relevant to the
“issue of damages” and that it “bear[s] on the apportionment of
damages should the case proceed to trial.”
Motion to Compel, pp. 1-3
Plaintiff responds, first, that NYK’s discovery request is untimely
because it was made after the conclusion of the discovery completion
deadline.
Plaintiff’s Response, p. 3.
The Preliminary Pretrial
Order, Doc. No. 20, required that all non-expert discovery be
completed by February 13, 2012; NYK did not request production of the
settlement agreement until September 24, 2012.
p. 2.
See Motion to Compel,
Because NYK did not seek discovery of the settlement agreement
during the discovery period, it must now demonstrate “good cause” and
obtain “the judge’s consent” to modify the Court’s scheduling order.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b).
Good cause exists here because, as NYK
5
argues and plaintiff does not dispute, the settlement agreement was
not executed until June 25, 2012 – i.e., more than four months after
the close of non-expert discovery.
See Motion to Compel, p. 2.
NYK’s
discovery request is therefore not fatally untimely.
Plaintiff next argues that, pursuant to the set-off requirements
of O.R.C. § 2307.28, the relevance of the settlement agreement is
contingent on a jury verdict against NYK at trial.
Response, pp. 4-5.
Plaintiff’s
Specifically, plaintiff argues that,
[b]ecause such a determination will not be made until after
trial, it follows that the settlement agreement cannot lead
to the production of evidence admissible at trial, as
required by Rule 26(b)(1). Because both the existence and
calculation of Defendant NYK’s potential set-off right
under §2307.28 are wholly dependent on a jury determination
of Defendant NYK’s liability, it would be premature to deem
the settlement agreement relevant to a right of set-off
that is entirely contingent, and will remain so [until]
after the conclusion of trial.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Discovery, however, is not limited to information likely to lead
to the discovery of only evidence admissible at trial.1
Rather, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit discovery “regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense
. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Information is relevant, for this
purpose, if it “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence.”
Id.
1
For example, Rule 26 requires the production at the outset of the case of
“any insurance agreement under which an insurance business may be liable to
satisfy all or part of a possible judgment in the action . . . .” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iv). This production requirement exists regardless of
the admissibility of that information at trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 411
(generally prohibiting evidence of liability insurance at trial). The
drafters of the rules recognize that discovery of such information “will
enable counsel for both sides to make the same realistic appraisal of the
case, so that settlement and litigation strategy are based on knowledge and
not speculation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee note (1970).
6
Plaintiff concedes that the settlement agreement will become
relevant if judgment is rendered against NYK and if Mars Petcare US,
Inc., is also determined to be liable in connection with Mr. Harding’s
death.
See Plaintiff’s Response, pp. 5-7.
In that event, plaintiff
acknowledges, NYK will have a right of set-off under O.R.C. § 2307.28.
Id. at 5.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be denied that the
settlement agreement is relevant to NYK’s claim or defense, see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), and is therefore discoverable.
Finally,2 plaintiff argues that disclosure of the settlement
agreement should not be required because the agreement contains a
confidentiality provision.
See id. at p. 4.
A confidentiality
privilege generally applies to the substance of communications made
during negotiations that result in a confidential settlement
agreement.
See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply,
Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 980–81 (6th Cir. 2003).
That privilege does not
apply here because the settlement agreement does not, presumably,
disclose the settling parties’ negotiations.
“̔Simply put, litigants
may not shield otherwise discoverable information from disclosure to
others merely by agreeing to maintain its confidentiality.’”
Gardiner
v. Kelowna Flightcraft, Ltd., No. 2:10-cv-947, 2011 WL 1990564, at *1
(S.D. Ohio May 23, 2011) (quoting Oberthaler v. Ameristep Corp., No.
5:08-cv-1613, 2010 WL 1506908, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 13, 2010)).
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, NYK’s Motion to Compel, Doc.
No. 62, is GRANTED.
2
Plaintiff also objected to production of the settlement agreement in light
of the pendency of the motions for summary judgment. Those motions have now
been resolved. Opinion and Order, Doc. No. 68.
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Plaintiff is ORDERED to produce to NYK, within seven (7) days,
the settlement agreement between her and defendants Mars Petcare US,
Inc., and Kal Kan Foods, Inc.
May 1, 2013
s/Norah McCann King_______
Norah McCann King
United States Magistrate Judge
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