Quinn v. Warden, Chillicothe Correctional Institution

Filing 55

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS re 12 Amended Complaint: The Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the Court sua sponte DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief. Objections to R&R due within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Report. If Plaintiff intends to proceed with this action, he is DIRECTED to supply the Court with an updated address WITHIN SEVEN (7) DAYS. Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Preston Deavers on 6/12/2013. (er1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

RICHARD L. QUINN, JR.,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action 2:11-cv-268
Judge James L. Graham
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

v.

ROBIN KNAB, WARDEN, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Richard L. Quinn, Jr., who is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, filed
this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants, alleging that Defendants
impeded his ability to exercise his religion in violation of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Chillicothe
Correctional Institution (“CCI”) when he commenced this action. The Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction Prison, however, released Plaintiff from prison on March 24,
2013. (ECF No. 54-1.) As explained below, Plaintiff’s intervening release renders his claims
for injunctive relief moot. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court sua sponte
DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief.
In addition, the docket reflects that Plaintiff has failed to comply with his affirmative
duty to provide the Court with a valid address and to notify the Court of any change in address.

See Barber v. Runyon, No. 93-6318, 1994 WL 163765, at *1 (6th Cir. May 2, 1994) (“If [pro se
Plaintiff's] address changed, she had an affirmative duty to supply the court with notice of any
and all changes in her address.”); see also Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 109 (6th Cir. 1991)
(“[W]hile pro se litigants may be entitled to some latitude when dealing with sophisticated legal
issues . . . there is no cause for extending this margin to straightforward procedural requirements
that a layperson can comprehend.”); Walker v. Cognis Oleo Chem., LLC, No. 1:07cv289, 2010
WL 717275, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2010) (“By failing to keep the Court apprised of his
current address, Plaintiff demonstrates a lack of prosecution of his action.”). Accordingly, if
Plaintiff intends to proceed with this action, he is DIRECTED to supply with Court with an
updated address WITHIN SEVEN (7) DAYS. Plaintiff is specifically cautioned that failure to
comply with this Order will result in dismissal of this action with prejudice for failure to
prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
I.
Plaintiff’s claims arise from Defendants’ denial of his requests for a religious
accommodation. In his Complaint and Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims under
RLUIPA and § 1983 for retaliation, violation of his equal protection rights, and violation of his
right to exercise his religion. He seeks injunctive relief as well as compensatory and nominal
damages. On July 27, 2012, the Court adopted the June 28, 2012 Report and Recommendation,
granting Defendants judgment on Plaintiff’s equal protection and retaliation claims and
dismissing Defendant Free from this action. (ECF No. 42.) The Court permitted Plaintiff to
proceed with his RLUIPA and First Amendment free exercise of religion claims. (Id.) On May
3, 2013, Defendants their Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 54.) Within their Motion,
Defendants offer evidence demonstrating that Plaintiff was released from prison on March 24,
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2013. (ECF No. 54-1.)
II.
The Court properly raises the jurisdictional issue of mootness sua sponte. See North
Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (“Mootness is a jurisdictional question because the
Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions . . . .” (internal
quotations marks and citations omitted)); Berger v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Bar Ass’n, 983 F.2d 718,
721 (6th Cir. 1993) (“Questions of jurisdiction are fundamental matters which [a court] may
review sua sponte.”).
Article III of the United States Constitution limits a federal court’s exercise of judicial
power to actual, ongoing “Cases” or “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Article III’s
case-or-controversy requirement subsists throughout all stages of the litigation. United States v.
Juvenile Male, 131 S.Ct. 2860, 2864 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“It
is a basic principle of Article III that a justiciable case or controversy must remain extant at all
stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.”). The doctrine of mootness is a
corollary of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement. “The mootness doctrine provides that
although there may be an actual and justiciable controversy at the time the litigation is
commenced, once that controversy ceases to exist, the federal court must dismiss the action for
want of jurisdiction.” 15 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 101.9, at 101–238
(3d ed. 2011).
When an inmate files suit against prison officials at the institution of his incarceration
based upon those officials’ wrongful conduct seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and that
inmate is subsequently transferred or released, courts routinely dismiss the declaratory and
injunctive relief claims as moot. Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 1669–70 (2011) (citations
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omitted) (“A number of . . . suits seeking injunctive relief have been dismissed as moot because
the plaintiff was transferred from the institution where the alleged violation took place prior to
adjudication on the merits.”); see, e.g., Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that inmate’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were rendered moot upon
inmate’s transfer from the prison about which he complained); Abdur-Rahman v. Michigan
Dep’t of Corr., 65 F.3d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 1995) (inmate’s request for injunctive relief mooted
upon transfer from relevant prison); Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1993) (same).
This is because an inmate’s transfer or release ends the alleged violations of his or her
constitutional rights, which “render[s] the court unable to grant the requested relief.” Berger,
983 F.2d at 724; Fredette v. Hemingway, 65 F. A’ppx 929, 931 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding that
an inmate’s request for injunctive relief to prevent his transfer to another prison became moot
upon the inmate’s subsequent transfer because “the district court was unable to grant the relief
requested”).
“There is . . . an exception to the mootness doctrine for claims that are capable of
repetition, yet evade review.” Fredette, 65 F. A’ppx at 931 (citation omitted). This narrow,
capable-of-repetition exception is limited to situations in which “the challenged action was in its
duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration” and “there was a
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action
again.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

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III.
Applying the foregoing principles to the instant case, the Undersigned concludes that
Plaintiff’s injunctive relief claims are moot. Given that Plaintiff has been released, an entry of
equitable relief would accomplish nothing. This Court does not have jurisdiction to accord
Plaintiff with prospective relief that has no effect or impact on Defendants. In addition, because
Plaintiff has no reasonable expectation that he will again be incarcerated at CCI, the capable-ofrepetition exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply. Accordingly, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief without
prejudice as moot. This includes dismissal of Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim given that he may only
obtain injunctive relief with regard to this claim. See Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 1663
(2011) (“We conclude that States, in accepting federal funding, do not consent to waive their
sovereign immunity to private suits for money damages under RLUIPA because no statute
expressly and unequivocally includes such a waiver.”); Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 289 (6th
Cir. 2010) (“[M]onetary damages are not available under RLUIPA.”); Grayson v. Schuler, 666
F.3d 450, 451 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that the plaintiff’s attempt to seek damages against the
defendant in his personal capacity “cannot be based on [RLUIPA] because the Act does not
create a cause of action against state employees in their personal capacity”).
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court sua sponte
DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief,
including his RLUIPA claim. Further, if Plaintiff intends to proceed with this action, he is
DIRECTED to supply with Court with an updated address. Plaintiff is specifically cautioned
that failure to comply with this Order will result in dismissal of this action with prejudice for
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failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that
party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and
Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in
question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and
waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l Latex
Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the magistrate
judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant’s] ability to appeal the district
court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that
defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed, appellate
review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994
(6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to specify the
issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .”) (citation omitted)).

Date: June 12, 2013

/s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers
Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers
United States Magistrate Judge

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