Gascho v. Global Fitness Holdings, LLC

Filing 141

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS - It is RECOMMENDED that: (a) because the proposed settlement of the action on the terms and conditions set forth in the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interest of the Class and Subcla sses, the Settlement Agreement be finally approved by the Court; (b) the Class and Subclasses be finally certified for settlement purposes; (c) the Action be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement; (d) Settling Pla intiffs be bound by the release set forth in the Settlement Agreement;Objections to R&R due by 4/21/2014. (e) Class Counsel be awarded reasonable fees and reimbursement of expenses in the amount of $2,390,000, (f) Class Representatives be award ed the Class Representative Enhancement Payments in the amounts specified in the Settlement Agreement, and (g) Global Fitnesss Motion to Strike Objection of Joshua Blackman, Doc. No. 125, be denied. Signed by Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King on 4/4/14. (jr1)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

AMBER GASCHO, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil Action 2:11-cv-436
Judge Smith
Magistrate Judge King

GLOBAL FITNESS HOLDINGS, LLC,
Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I.

Background
A.

Procedural History and Third Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs initiated this class action in the Court of Common
Pleas for Franklin County, Ohio, on April 13, 2011, against defendant
Global Fitness Holdings, LLC, formerly doing business as Urban Active
(“Global Fitness” or “defendant”).

Defendant removed the action to

this Court on May 19, 2011, pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453.

Plaintiffs are residents of Ohio and

Kentucky who signed a gym membership contract and/or a personal
training, child care, and/or tanning contract with Global Fitness.
Third Amended Complaint, Doc. No. 100, ¶ 2.

Defendant is a Kentucky

limited liability corporation that operated fitness facilities in
Ohio, Kentucky, Georgia, Nebraska, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and
Tennessee until October 2012, when it sold all of its assets to
Fitness and Sports Clubs, LLC, doing business as LA Fitness.
3.

Id. at ¶

This action is one of five similar actions pending against Global
Fitness.

Class Counsel also represented the plaintiffs in an action

in Boone County Circuit Court, Commonwealth of Kentucky, titled
Tartalia v. Global Fitness Holdings, LLC, No. 11-CI-1121 (the
“Tartalia action”).

The claims asserted in the Tartalia action were

asserted in this action in the Third Amended Complaint, which was
filed on September 19, 2013.
The Third Amended Complaint alleges that Global Fitness engaged
in common practices of, inter alia, knowingly misrepresenting the
terms and conditions of contracts at the time of sale, making
unauthorized deductions from plaintiffs’ bank accounts, failing to
provide consumers with copies of contracts at the time of signing,
failing to provide consumers with a list of available plans, selling
membership plans that did not appear on required registration
statements, failing to orally inform consumers at the time of signing
of their right to cancel, failing to provide copies of “notice of
cancellation” forms, failing to honor contract cancellations, and
failing to perform in good faith its duties under the contracts.
e.g., Third Amended Complaint, ¶ 9.

See

Plaintiffs assert the following

claims: breach of contract (Count I), unjust enrichment (Count II),
and false, deceptive, and unconscionable consumer practices violative
of
the Ohio Consumer Sales Practice Act [CSPA] and Prepaid
Entertainment Contract Act [PECA], O.R.C. §§ 1345.02,
1345.03,
and
1345.41-1345.45;
the
Kentucky
Consumer
Protection Act and Kentucky Health Spa Act, KRS 367.170,
367.910-367.920; the Pennsylvania Health Club Act and
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law 73 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 2161 et seq., the North Carolina Prepaid
Entertainment Contract Act N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-118 et

2

seq.,
the
Tennessee
Health
Clubs
Act
and
Consumer
Protection Act Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-301 et seq., and the
Nebraska Consumer Protection Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-1601
Third Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 143-173 (footnote omitted) (Counts III and
IV).

The Third Amended Complaint seeks compensatory and equitable

relief, including rescission, as well as an award of costs and
attorneys’ fees.
On February 2, 2011, i.e., before this action was initiated,
Robert J. Zik, April N. Zik, and James Michael Hearon, acting on
behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated persons, filed
a complaint against Global Fitness in the Jefferson County Circuit
Court, Commonwealth of Kentucky. Zik v. Global Fitness Holdings, LLC,
No. 11-CI-7909 (the “Zik action”).

See Doc. Nos. 118-1 (docket

sheet), 118-2 (amended complaint).

The Zik action presented claims of

breach of contract, fraud, and violations of the Kentucky Consumer
Protection Act (“KCPA”), K.R.S. § 367.170, et seq., premised on the
alleged breach by Global Fitness of “its members’ membership
agreements by charging its members one extra month of membership dues
and a $10.00 cancellation fee when members terminate their membership
agreement.”

Doc. No. 118-2, pp. 1, 6.

The Zik action sought

“compensatory damages for unpaid dues and cancellation fees, interest,
and court costs, . . . punitive damages and their attorney’s fees.”
Id. at ¶ 37.
On April 15, 2011, i.e., two (2) days after this action was
filed, Phillip S. Robins, proceeding on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated, initiated an action against Global Fitness in the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, which action was thereafter

3

removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio.

Robins v. Global Fitness Holdings, LLC, No. 1:11-cv-1373

(N.D. Ohio) (“the Robins action”), Notice of Removal, Doc. No. 1.

The

complaint in the Robins action alleged
that, contrary to the express terms of Global's Membership
Contracts and Personal Training Contracts . . . Global has
(1) retained fees paid by members of its health clubs for
the period in which they were disabled, deceased, or
relocated, (2) collected from Plaintiffs’ credit, debit or
bank accounts additional fees not part of the agreed-upon
monthly fees, and (3) drafted form contracts containing
egregious, confusing and misleading cancellation provisions
that guarantee members will be charged for one or more
months beyond the date they cancel their memberships.
Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert the following
common-law claims against Global: breach of contract (Count
One), unjust enrichment (Count Two), and fraud (Count
Three).
Plaintiffs have also asserted claims against
Global for violation of the following state and federal
statutes: Ohio’s Consumer Sales Practices Act (Count Four),
Ohio’s Prepaid Entertainment Contracts Act, O.R.C. §§
1345.41 et seq. (Count Five), Ohio’s Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, O.R.C. §§ 4165.01 et seq. (Count Six),
Kentucky’s Consumer Protection Act–Health Spas (Count
Seven), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq. (“RICO”) (Count Eight),
Ohio’s version of RICO, O.R.C. §§ 2923.31 et seq. (Count
Nine), and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1693 et seq. (Count Ten).
Robins v. Global Fitness Holdings, LLC, 838 F.Supp. 2d 631, 637 (N.D.
Ohio 2012).

On January 18, 2012, all claims in the Robins action were

dismissed, some with prejudice and some without prejudice.
654.

Id. at

Plaintiffs’ appeal from that judgment remains pending.

Robins

v. Global Fitness Holdings, LLC, Case No. 12-3231 (6th Cir.).
The earliest of the five class actions against Global Fitness was
filed by David Seeger and fifteen other named plaintiffs, on behalf of
themselves and a class of similarly situated persons, in the Boone
County Circuit Court, Commonwealth of Kentucky. Seeger v. Global

4

Fitness Holdings, LLC, No. 11-CI-7909 (the “Seeger action”).

The

Seeger plaintiffs asserted claims of forgery, fraud, breach of
contract, concealment and non-disclosure, breach of good faith and
fair dealing, and violations of K.R.S. §§ 516.030 and 367.170.

See

Seeger Amended Complaint, Doc. No. 118-12.
The Seeger plaintiffs negotiated a class settlement with Global
Fitness and, on December 21, 2012, the Boone County Circuit Court held
a fairness hearing to determine whether the settlement was fair,
reasonable, and adequate.

Counsel for plaintiffs in this action (and

in the Tartaglia action) and counsel for plaintiffs in the Zik action
appeared at the hearing and objected to the proposed settlement.
Order, Doc. No. 118-10.
proposed settlement.

The court in Seeger declined to approve the

Id.

In “summarize[ing] the greatest reasons”

for rejecting the proposed settlement, the court in Seeger concluded
that the release sought by Global Fitness in that action was “overly
broad” because it was “unlimited to time or nature of the claims,”
“includes claims that do not share the identical factual predicate as
Plaintiff’s claims,” and class counsel “had not conducted meaningful
and adequate discovery on many of the claims sought to be released.”
Id. at p. 2.

The Seeger court also concluded that the notice of

settlement provided to the putative class members was deficient and
that the claims process was too cumbersome, resulting in an approval
rate of just 0.6 percent of the potential class.

Id.

Moreover, the

proposed settlement had a “lack of value:” it was a “coupon settlement
for the most part” and 90 percent of the cash refund claims had been
rejected.

Id. at pp. 2-3.

The Seeger court therefore concluded that

5

the settlement was unfair in that too large a group of people were
bound to an agreement for which little benefit was given.1

Id.

On September 12, 2013, the parties to this action executed a
settlement agreement, Settlement Agreement and Release (“Settlement
Agreement”), Doc. No. 97-1, and shortly thereafter applied to the
Court for preliminary approval of the settlement.

Joint Motion for an

Order Preliminarily Approving the Class Action Settlement, etc., Doc.
No. 97.

On September 30, 2013, the Court preliminarily approved the

proposed settlement, preliminarily certified a class and subclasses
for settlement purposes, appointed the named plaintiffs as Class
Representatives, appointed lead counsel for the class, approved and
directed the issuance of notice to the class, and referred the matter
to the undersigned for a fairness hearing
to determine (a) whether the proposed settlement of the
action on the terms and conditions set forth in the
Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and in the best
interest of the Classes and Subclasses and should be
finally approved by the Court; (b) whether the Class and
Subclasses should be finally certified for settlement
purposes; (c) whether the Action should be dismissed with
prejudice pursuant to the terms of the Settlement; (d)
whether Settling Plaintiffs should be bound by the release
set forth in the Settlement Agreement; (e) whether and in
what amount Class Counsel should be awarded fees and
reimbursement of expenses, (f) whether and in what amount
the Class Representatives shall be awarded the Class
Representative Enhancement Payments, (g) and to rule on any
other matters the Court may deem appropriate.
Preliminary Approval Order, Doc. No. 111, pp. 1, 5.

The Court also

established a procedure for the filing of written objections to the
proposed settlement.

Id. at p. 6.

1

Defendant represents that the plaintiffs in the Seeger action have taken no
substantive action since the proposed settlement was rejected in January
2013. Memorandum in Response to Objections (“Defendant’s Response”), Doc.
No. 126, p. 17.

6

The named plaintiffs in the Zik action, Robert J. Zik, April N.
Zik, and James Michael Hearon (the “Zik Objectors”), have filed
objections to the proposed settlement on behalf of themselves and a
class of similarly situated persons.

Objection to Proposed Class

Action Settlement (“Zik Objections”), Doc. No. 118.

The Zik Objectors

compare the proposed settlement in this action to the proposed
settlement in the Seeger action and argue that the proposed settlement
in this action should be rejected because the Class Representatives
and Class Counsel have failed to adequately protect the interests of
the class and because the proposed settlement is procedurally and
substantively unfair.
Joshua Blackman has also filed objections.
Blackman (“Blackman Objections”), Doc. No. 122.

Objection of Joshua
“[T]he gist of

Blackman’s objection” is the “[p]referential treatment to class
counsel;” “[h]is cardinal objection is that the settlement is unfair
because class counsel is appropriating an excessive 65% of the
settlement value for itself.”
omitted).

Id. at PAGEID 2083-84 (footnote

Blackman also challenges the claims process, the adequacy

of class representation given the requested incentive awards (or
enhancement payments), and the adequacy of the notice of Class
Counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees.

Id. at PAGEID 2089, 2094-99,

2107.
Plaintiffs have responded to the objections, Plaintiffs’ Response
to the Objection of Joshua Blackman and the Objection of Zik/Hearon
(“Plaintiffs’ Response”), Doc. No. 128, as has Global Fitness,
Defendants’ Response, Doc. No. 126.

The Zik Objectors have filed a

7

reply, Zik Objectors’ Reply, Doc. No. 135, as has Blackman, Blackman’s
Reply, Doc. No. 133.
The undersigned held a fairness hearing, conducted pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), on February 13, 2014. Counsel for plaintiffs,
for Global Fitness, for the Zik Objectors, and for Blackman all
appeared.

Jeffrey D. Dahl, President of the Court appointed Claims

Administrator Dahl Administration, LLC, also appeared and testified.
This matter is now ripe for consideration.
B.

Preliminarily Certified Class and Subclasses

The preliminarily certified Class and Subclasses of plaintiffs
consist of the following:
a. The “Class” includes all individuals who signed a gym
membership or personal training contract with Defendant
during the Class Period which is January 1, 2006, to
October
26,
2012.
At
the
time
of
preliminary
certification, the total number of Class Members is
estimated to be 606,246 persons.
b. The “FIF Subclass” includes all Class Members who paid a
$15 Facility Improvement Fee (“FIF”), Club Administrative
Fee (“CAF”), or any other biannual $15 fee charged by
Defendant during the FIF Subclass Period, which is April 1,
2009, to October 26, 2012.
At the time of preliminary
certification, the total number of FIF Subclass members is
estimated to be 316,721 persons.
c. The “Gym Cancel Subclass” includes all Class Members who
cancelled their gym membership contract.
At the time of
preliminary certification, the total number of Gym Cancel
Subclass members is estimated to be 387,177 persons.
d. The “Personal Training Cancel Subclass” includes all Class
Members who cancelled a Personal Training contract. At the
time of preliminary certification, the total number of
Personal Training Cancel Subclass members is estimated to
be 64,805 persons.
Preliminary Approval Order, p. 3.

Plaintiffs Amber Gascho, Ashley

Buckemeyer, Michael Hogan, Edward Lundberg, Terry Troutman, Anthony

8

Meyer, Rita Rose, Julia Cay (fka Julia Snyder), Albert Tartaglia,
Michael Bell, Matt Volkerding, and Patrick Cary have been appointed as
Class Representatives of the Class, FIF Subclass, and Gym Cancel
Subclass; Amber Gascho, Julia Cay, and Albert Tartaglia have been
appointed as Class Representatives of the Personal Training Cancel
Subclass.
C.

Id.
Settlement Agreement

The Settlement Agreement authorizes the payment of monetary
compensation to any Class or Subclass member who becomes an Allowed
Claimant2 by filing a timely and valid claim form with the Claims
Administrator and upon confirmation by the Claims Administrator.
Settlement Agreement, § 6.1.

Each Allowed Claimant is entitled to $5

for his or her membership in the Class, $20 if he or she is a member
of the FIF Subclass, $20 if he or she is a member of the Gym Cancel
Subclass, and $30 if he or she is a member of the Personal Training
Cancel Subclass.

Id. at §§ 6.1.1-6.1.4.

Claim awards are cumulative,

which means that an Allowed Claimant may recover for every Subclass
membership for which he or she qualifies.

Settlement Agreement, §

6.2.
The Settlement Agreement provides for a Minimum Class Payment of
$1,300,000, which includes payments to Allowed Claimants and incentive
awards totaling $40,000 to the Class Representatives.
8.1.

Id. at §§ 7.1,

Class Representatives Tartaglia and Bell are authorized to

receive incentive awards of $5,000; Class Representatives Gascho,
Buckemeyer, Hogan, Lundberg, Troutman, Meyer, Rose, and Cay are
2

Capitalized terms not otherwise defined have the meaning indicated in the
Settlement Agreement.

9

authorized to receive $3,500; and Class Representatives Volkerding and
Cary will each receive $1,000.

Id. at §§ 8.2.1, 8.2.2, 8.2.3.

The

incentive awards have been characterized as payment for services
rendered to the class members and Class Representatives will receive a
Form 1099 for the payments.

Id. at § 8.3.

The Settlement Agreement also provides that Global Fitness will
pay the reasonable attorneys’ fees and actual costs awarded by the
Court, not to exceed $2,390,000, and will not oppose Class Counsel’s
application for fees.

Id. at §§ 9.1, 9.2.

The agreement to pay Class

Counsel’s reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs has “no effect on, and
will not reduce, the Class Payment by Defendant.”

Id. at § 9.1.

According to the Settlement Agreement, the allocation of fees among
Class Counsel is “the sole responsibility of Class Counsel.”

Id. at §

9.3.
The Settlement Agreement requires Global Fitness to pay the
administration costs of the Claim Administrator.

Id. at § 10.1.

The

Claims Administrator is charged with the sole responsibility for
determining eligibility for, and the amount of, claims awards to be
paid, in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

Id.

at §§ 10.4, 10.5.
D.

Notice, Response, and Claims

Pursuant to the Court’s order granting preliminary approval,
Global Fitness provided Claims Administrator Dahl Administration, LLC,
data files related to potential class members.

Declaration of Jeffrey

D. Dahl with Respect to Notice and Claims Administration Tasks
Complete as of January 21, 2014 (“Dahl Declaration”), Doc. No. 126-1,

10

¶ 5.

The Claims Administrator reviewed the data for completeness and

duplication and processed the data through the United States Postal
Service National Change of Address database.

Id. at ¶¶ 6-8.

After

compiling a list of potential class members with the updated mailing
addresses, the Claims Administrator “sent a notice postcard in a form
and content substantially similar to the Summary Notice attached as
Exhibit 7 to the Settlement Agreement, on October 30, 2013” to 601,494
class members via First Class mail.

Id. at ¶¶ 10, 12.

See also

Transcript, PAGEID 2715-17 (Mr. Dahl’s testimony detailing the address
scrubbing and confirmation process).

Of the 601,494 Postcard Notices

mailed, 146,617 were initially returned as undeliverable.
Declaration, ¶ 14.

Dahl

Of these, 2,077 were re-mailed to a forwarding

address provided by the United States Postal Service and 89,198 were
re-mailed to new addresses obtained by an address search firm.

Id.

“After re-mailing the Notices, 90.8% of the Postcard Notices were
delivered.”

Id. at ¶ 14.

In addition to the Postcard Notice, 259,195 class members were
sent notice by email on October 30, 2013.

Id. at ¶ 15.

Of these,

154,216 were “bounced back” from invalid email addresses and 150,581
were delivered.

Id.

On November 29, 2013, “all potential Class

Members with valid email addresses who had not filed Claim Forms in
order to become Allowed Claimants or who had not Opted Out within
thirty (30) days after the original mailing of the Postcard Notice
were sent Supplemental Email Notice . . . of the settlement.”
¶ 18.

11

Id. at

Notice was also published on two consecutive days, with one of
the two days being the first Sunday after the Notice Postcards had
been mailed, in 13 different newspapers.

Id. at ¶¶ 16-17, Exhibit F.

The publication notice contained “content substantially similar to the
Summary Notice attached as Exhibit 7 to the Settlement Agreement,” id.
at ¶ 16, which had been approved by the Court.
The Claims Administrator established a settlement website,
www.UrbanActiveLawsuit.com, in accordance with the terms of § 12.2 of
the Settlement Agreement.

Id. at ¶ 27.

The website provides general

settlement information, contact information for the Claims
Administrator, a list of frequently asked questions and answers, a
list of important dates and deadlines, and certain settlement
documents in .pdf format, including the long-form legal notice, the
claim form, the Settlement Agreement, the Preliminary Approval Order,
the Scheduling Order (Doc. No. 113), and the Third Amended Complaint.
Dahl Declaration, ¶ 28; Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1.

The website also

provides a link that permits a claimant to file a claim online.
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1.

The website address was included in the

Postcard Notice, in the long-form notice, in the email and the
reminder email, and in the publication notice.

See Dahl Declaration,

Exhibits C-H.
The Claims Administrator also established a toll-free helpline to
assist individuals seeking information about the proposed settlement.
Like the website address, the toll-free number was included in the
Postcard Notice, in the long-form notice, in the email and reminder
email, and in the publication notice.

12

The toll-free helpline is also

posted on the settlement website.

Dahl Declaration, ¶¶ 21-22,

Exhibits C-H.
The long-form notice,3 the Postcard Notice, the email and
reminder email, and the publication notice all informed potential
class members that, in order to qualify for a cash settlement, the
claimant was required to submit a Claim Form by mail or online by
December 30, 2013.

All forms of notice also provided instructions for

opting out of the settlement and for objecting to the settlement at
the fairness hearing.

See Dahl Declaration, Exhibits C-H.

“As of November 29, 2013, the Notice reached at least 90.8% of
potential Class Members.”

Id. at ¶ 45.

The Claims Administrator

received 55,597 Claim Forms, 54,129 of which were filed online and
1,468 were filed by mail.

Id. at ¶ 31.

As of January 21, 2014, the

Claims Administrator had confirmed 49,457 claims from Allowed
Claimants, 3,965 claims were pending further review, 2,161 were
duplicates, and 14 were not timely filed.

Id. at ¶¶ 32-33.

As of

February 11, 2014, the Claims Administrator had validated and
calculated final award amounts for 29,341 Allowed Claimants, resulting
in a total Class Payment of $1,070,895.00.

Supplemental Declaration

of Jeffrey D. Dahl with Respect to Deficiency Notice and Claims
Administration Tasks Completed as of February 10, 2014 (“Supplemental
Dahl Declaration”), Doc. No. 138-1, ¶ 13.

For the remaining 20,469

Allowed Claimants, there was a disparity between the subclass awards
claimed by the Allowed Claimants and Global Fitness’ records, and the

3

The long-form notice is also posted on the settlement website. See
Transcript, PAGEID 2708.

13

Claims Administrator secured additional information in order to verify
the claims.

Id. at ¶ 15; Dahl Declaration, ¶ 38; Transcript, PAGEID

2724-27. The Claims Administrator “was able to validate additional
Class Payments to 2,284 Class Members.”

Second Supplemental

Declaration of Jeffrey D. Dahl with Respect to Claims Administration
Tasks and Final Class Payment Calculations Completed as of March 21,
2014 (“Second Supplemental Dahl Declaration”), Doc. No. 140-1, ¶ 5.
The Claims Administrator has now “validated claims and calculated
final award amounts for 49,808 Allowed Claimants, resulting in a total
final Class Payment of $1,593,240.00.

The average Class Payment is

$31.99 and the average Gym Cancel Subclass Payment is $41.28.”

Id. at

¶ 9.
II.

Motion to Strike Blackman’s Objection
Global Fitness has moved to strike Blackman’s objections on the

basis that Blackman lacks standing to file objections.
Strike Objection of Joshua Blackman, Doc. No. 125.

Motion to

Specifically,

Global Fitness argues that Blackman “signed a membership agreement on
August 16, 2011 at a Global Fitness club in Louisville, Kentucky,” but
rescinded the contract pursuant to a three-day cancellation provision.
Id. at pp. 2-3.

Because Blackman’s contract was rescinded ab initio,

Global Fitness argues, Blackman cannot be considered a former “member”
of Global Fitness and cannot qualify as a member of any Class or
Subclass.

Id.

The Settlement Agreement defines a “Class Member” as “each person
who is a member of the Class as defined in Section 6.”
Agreement, § 2.8.

Settlement

Section 6 defines the “Class” as “all individuals

14

who signed a gym membership or personal training contract with
Defendant during the Class Period,” id. at § 6.1.1, i.e., “January 1,
2006, to October 26, 2012.”

Id. at § 2.10.

Blackman meets the

literal definition of a “Class Member,” and therefore has standing to
object to the settlement, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(5); Tenn. Ass'n of
Health Maint. Orgs., Inc. v. Grier, 262 F.3d 559, 566 (6th Cir. 2001),
because he “signed a membership agreement on August 16, 2011 at a
Global Fitness club in Louisville, Kentucky.”
Objection of Joshua Blackman, pp. 2-3.

See Motion to Strike

Indeed, Global Fitness

effectively conceded this point at the fairness hearing.

See

Transcript, PAGEID 2747-48.
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that defendant’s motion to strike,
Doc. No. 125, be DENIED.
III. Class Certification
A.

Standard

A class action “may only be certified if the trial court is
satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule
23(a) have been satisfied.”
147, 161 (1982).
Cir. 2000).

Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S.

See also Stout v. J.D. Byrider, 228 F.3d 709 (6th

Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

establishes four prerequisites to class certification:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.

15

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).

“In addition to fulfilling the four

prerequisites of Rule 23(a), the proposed class must also meet at
least one of the three requirements listed in Rule 23(b).”

In re

Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d
838, 850 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, -U.S. --, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011)).

Plaintiffs in this action

seek class certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires a finding
“that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members” and that the
class action is “superior to other available methods” to adjudicate
the controversy fairly and efficiently.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

“The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to certify a
class, but that discretion must be exercised within the framework of
Rule 23.”
1996).

In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir.

This Court will consider each of the Rule 23 requirements for

certification.
B.

Numerosity

Rule 23(a)(1) requires the class to be “so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).

Although

“there is no strict numerical test, ‘substantial’ numbers usually
satisfy the numerosity requirement.”

Daffin v. Ford Motor Co., 458

F.3d 549, 552 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d at
1079).

The parties have established that the Class consists of

605,735 members, the FIF Subclass consists of 300,017 members, the Gym
Cancel Subclass consists of 323,518 members, and the Personal Training
Cancel Subclass consists of 50,038 members.

16

Supplemental Dahl

Declaration, ¶ 17.

Joinder of tens – or hundreds - of thousands of

class members across multiple states would be impracticable.

The

numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) is therefore satisfied.

See

e.g., In re Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d at 852; Adams v. Anheuser-Busch
Cos., Inc., No. 2:10-cv-826, 2012 WL 1058961, at *3-4 (S.D. Ohio Mar.
28, 2012) (finding a class of approximately 60 individuals
geographically dispersed over the country sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 23(a)(1)).
C.

Commonality

“Rule 23(a)(2) requires plaintiffs to prove that there are
questions of fact or law common to the class . . . .”

Young v.

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 542 (6th Cir. 2012).

“To

demonstrate commonality, plaintiffs must show that class members have
suffered the same injury.”

In re Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d at 852

(citing Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551).
common contention . . .

“Their claims must depend upon a

[which is] of such a nature that it is

capable of classwide resolution — which means that determination of
its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the
validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”
at 2551.

Dukes, 131 S. Ct.

“This inquiry focuses on whether a class action will

generate common answers that are likely to drive resolution of the
lawsuit.”

In re Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d at 852 (citing Dukes, 131

S.Ct at 2551).

See also Davis v. Cintas Corp., 717 F.3d 476, 487 (6th

Cir. 2013).
“The commonality test is qualitative rather than quantitative,
that is, there need be only a single issue common to all members of

17

the class.”
omitted).

In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d at 1083 (internal quotations
See also Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2541 (“We quite agree that

for purposes of Rule 23(a)(2) ‘[e]ven a single [common] question’ will
do[.]”) (internal quotations and citations omitted; alterations in
original); In re Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d at 853.

“̔[T]he mere fact

that questions peculiar to each individual member of the class action
remain after the common questions of the defendant's liability have
been resolved does not dictate the conclusion that a class action is
impermissible.’”

Powers v. Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Defender Comm’n, 501

F.3d 592, 619 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Sterling v. Velsicol Chem.
Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir. 1988)).
This case presents common issues of fact sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of Rule 23(a)(2).

The Third Amended Complaint

alleges that the policies and practices of Global Fitness resulted in
common injuries to all members of the class.

Specifically, plaintiffs

allege that Global Fitness engaged in a common policy and practice of,
inter alia, “knowingly misrepresenting and failing to disclose the
terms and conditions of its membership contracts and personal training
contracts;” “refusing to provide copies of membership contracts,
personal training contracts and other contracts for services at the
time they are signed;” “misrepresenting the terms, conditions, and
availability of its contracts; intentionally avoiding, making it
unduly burdensome and/or refusing to honor valid notices of
cancellation; and knowingly taking payment from Plaintiffs and other
Class members’ accounts without authorization.”
Complaint, ¶¶ 160-63.

Third Amended

As for the FIF Subclass, the alleged policy or

18

practice of failing to disclose the FIF or CAF at the time of sale is
a common question of fact.

The Class, the Gym Cancel Subclass, and

the Personal Training Cancel Subclass share common questions of fact,
i.e., whether Global Fitness failed to inform members of a right to
cancel, failed to provide notice of cancellation, failed to honor
notice of cancellations, failed to properly disclose cancellation
fees, and continued to bill members monthly dues after cancellation.
Accordingly, there are issues of fact common to all members of the
Class and Subclasses sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule
23(a)(2).
D.

Typicality and Fairness and Adequacy

“Rule 23(a)(3) requires proof that plaintiffs' claims are
typical of the class members' claims.”

Young, 693 F.3d at 542.

“Typicality is met if the class members' claims are ̔fairly
encompassed by the named plaintiffs' claims.’”

In re Whirlpool Corp.,

722 F.3d at 852 (quoting Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388,
399 (6th Cir. 1998)).

“This requirement insures that the

representatives' interests are aligned with the interests of the
represented class members so that, by pursuing their own interests,
the class representatives also advocate the interests of the class
members.”

Id. at 852-53 (citing Sprague, 133 F.3d at 399).

Rule 23(a)(4) requires that “the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”
Civ. P. 23(a)(4).

Fed. R.

“The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to

uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they
seek to represent.”

Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625

19

(1997).

“A class representative must be part of the class and possess

the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members.”
Id. (quotations omitted).

The determination of adequacy of

representation is grounded in two considerations: “̔1) the
representative must have common interests with unnamed members of the
class, and 2) it must appear that the representatives will vigorously
prosecute the interests of the class through qualified counsel.’”

In

re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d at 1083 (quoting Senter v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 525 (6th Cir. 1976)).
The requirements of commonality and typicality “̔tend to merge’”
because “̔[b]oth serve as guideposts for determining whether under the
particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical
and whether the named plaintiff's claim and the class claims are so
interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly
and adequately protected in their absence.’”

Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at

2551 n.5 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157-158 n.13).

Commonality and

typicality “̔also tend to merge with the adequacy-of-representation
requirement, although the latter requirement also raises concerns
about the competency of class counsel and conflicts of interest.’”
Id. (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157-158 n.13).

The adequate

representation requirement also “overlaps with the typicality
requirement because in the absence of typical claims, the class
representative has no incentive to pursue the claims of the other
class members.”

In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d at 1083.

Because of the

“intertwined nature” of these factors, the Court will consider
typicality and the adequacy of representation together.

20

See In re

Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d at 853 (considering commonality, typicality,
and adequate representation together).
The Zik Objectors challenge certification on the basis of
typicality and adequacy of class representation.

The Zik Objectors

argue, first, that plaintiffs’ claims are not typical of those of the
class and that the named plaintiffs cannot adequately represent the
class because no plaintiff “possess[es] the claims of the Ziks.”
Objectors’ Reply, PAGEID 2619.

Zik

The Zik Objectors argue that April and

Robert Zik’s “membership contracts include very different cancellation
language than Plaintiffs’ contracts.”

Id.

According to the Zik

Objectors, April and Robert Zik’s contracts and any membership
agreement entered into with Global Fitness before March 2008 “only
allow charging one additional month’s dues post cancellation,” whereas
plaintiffs’ contracts “purportedly allow charging two month’s dues
post cancellation.”

Id. (emphasis omitted).

The Zik Objectors

represent that Global Fitness changed the cancellation provision in
its form contract in March 2008 and that none of the named plaintiffs
signed a gym membership contract with the pre-March 2008 cancellation
provision.

Id. at PAGEID 2619-22.

Adequate representation of April

and Robert Zik’s claims is precluded, the Zik Objectors argue, because
“[n]ot one plaintiff had contractual language with the one-month
billing cycle.”

Transcript, PAGEID 2762-63.

This argument is not

well taken.
The plaintiffs in the Zik Action sought to certify a class of
members who cancelled their month-to-month memberships with Global
Fitness “from February 2, 1996 through the present, and after such

21

cancellation, were charged: (a) membership dues for the month that
started subsequent to 30 days after they provided notice of
cancellation of their membership to [Global Fitness]; and/or (b) a
$10.00 (or greater) administrative cancellation fee.”
p. 5.

Zik Objections,

The members of this purported class who signed membership

agreements with Global Fitness between January 1, 2006 and October 26,
2012 are members of the Gym Cancel Subclass because they are Class
Members who cancelled their gym membership contract.

See Settlement

Agreement, §§ 2.10 (defining “Class Period”), 6.1.1 (defining the
“Class”), 6.1.3 (defining the “Gym Cancel Subclass”).
Like objectors April and Robert Zik, plaintiff Lundberg entered
into a contract with Global Fitness prior to March 2008 and was
charged membership dues after he cancelled his contract.
Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 50-57.

See Third

To the extent that the March 2008 change

in the cancellation provision of Global Fitness’s form contact impacts
the claims of the class members,4 the claims of those members who
entered into a contract prior to March 2008 would nevertheless be
similar to plaintiff Lundberg’s claim; Lundberg possesses the same
interest and suffered the same injury as those class members.
Similarly, plaintiff Meyer, who allegedly signed a gym membership
contract after March 2008 and was charged a $10 cancellation fee and
monthly dues after cancellation, see Third Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 6673, suffered the same type of injury as did the class members who
entered into a contract with Global Fitness after March 2008.
4

Global Fitness contended at the fairness hearing that its form contracts
always permitted it to charge two months’ dues after cancellation.
Transcript, PAGEID 2785-86.

22

Furthermore, there is no indication that the interests of these (or
any other) Class Representatives conflict because, regardless of which
form contract the member signed, the Class Representatives allegedly
suffered the same type of injury, i.e., they were, pursuant to a
common policy or practice of defendant, allegedly improperly charged
monthly dues and a cancellation fee after cancellation of the
contract.
The Zik Objectors also argue that the named plaintiffs cannot
adequately represent the class because Robert Zik’s contract – like
all contracts executed before 2008 - did not contain a $10.00
cancellation fee, whereas all of the named plaintiffs’ contracts did
contain such a fee. Zik Objectors’ Reply, PAGEID 2620-21.

Citing to

De Leon v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 6:09-cv-1251, 2012 WL 2568142
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2012), the Zik Objectors argue that the named
plaintiffs cannot adequately represent the class because they are not
possessed of the precise breach of contract claim as are those class
members who executed their contracts before 2008.
Reply, PAGEID 2621-23.

Zik Objectors’

This argument is not well taken.

Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the named plaintiffs’ claims be
typical of the class members’ claims, not identical to those claims.
Prater v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n, No. C2-04-1077, 2008 WL 2566364, at *3
(S.D. Ohio June 26, 2008) (“The claims of the named plaintiffs and the
absent members must be typical, not identical or homogeneous.”);
Jenkins v. Hyundai Motor Fin. Co., C2-04-720, 2008 WL 781862, at *5
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2008) (same); Tomlinson v. Kroger Co., No. C2-03706, 2007 WL 1026349, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2007) (same); Tucker

23

v. Union Underwear Co., Inc., 144 F.R.D. 325, 329 (W.D. Ky. 1992)
(“Rule 23 does not require absolute homogeneity.”).

Although Robert

Zik’s contract claim may differ because his contract did not authorize
a $10.00 cancellation fee, the claims of the named and absent
plaintiffs are nevertheless based on strongly similar legal theories.
Whereas the plaintiffs in De Leon, 2012 WL 2568142, asserted a single
breach of contract claim on behalf of a nationwide class, see id. at
*5, the Third Amended Complaint asserts claims of breach of contract,
unjust enrichment, and false, deceptive, and unconscionable consumer
practices violative of state consumer protection laws based on a
business practice that is common to all class members.

The Class

Representatives suffered the same type of injury as, and have an
interest in common with, unnamed members because both were allegedly
improperly charged a $10.00 cancellation fee pursuant to Global
Fitness’s common policies and procedures.

Accordingly, in pursuing

their own interests and claims related to the allegedly improper
charge, the Class Representatives will also be advocating for the
interests of the absent class members.
The Zik Objectors also argue that certification is improper
because the damages due each class member could vary depending on the
amount of his or her monthly dues, the number of unauthorized charges,
and the amount of improper fees actually paid by each member.
Objections, PAGEID 1929-32.

Zik

However, and the Zik Objectors’ arguments

to the contrary notwithstanding, individual damages calculations do
not inevitably serve to preclude class certification.

See, e.g., In

re Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d at 861 (quoting Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,

24

133 S. Ct. 1426, 1437 (2013) (Ginsburg and Breyer, J.J., dissenting)
(“Recognition that individual damages calculations do not preclude
class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is well nigh universal.”)).
As noted supra, plaintiffs Gascho, Buckemeyer, Hogan, Lundberg,
Troutman, Meyer, Rose, Cay, Tartaglia, Bell, Volkerding, and Cary have
been appointed as Class Representatives of the Class, the FIF
Subclass, and the Gym Cancel Subclass, and Gascho, Cay, and Tartaglia
have been appointed as Class Representatives of the Personal Training
Cancel Subclass.

Preliminary Approval Order, p. 3.

The Class

Representatives all signed a gym membership or personal training
contract with Global Fitness, see Third Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 25
(Gascho), 34 (Buckemeyer), 45 (Hogan), 51 (Lundberg), 58 (Troutman),
67 (Meyer), 77 (Rose), 91 (Cay), 113 (Tartaglia), 118 (Bell), 126
(Volkerding), 134 (Cary), and paid a biannual $15 FIF or CAF charged
by defendant, id. at ¶¶ 73 (Meyer), 84 (Rose), 122 (Bell), 130
(Volkerding), 138 (Cary), cancelled their gym membership contract, id.
at ¶¶ 47 (Hogan), 55-57 (Lundberg), 72 (Meyer), 87 (Rose), 123 (Bell),
129 (Volkerding), and/or cancelled their personal training contract
with defendant, id at ¶¶ 30 (Gascho), 114-15 (Tartaglia).

The claims

of the Class Representatives arise from the same policies and
practices of defendant that give rise to the claims of other class
members and are based on the same legal theories.

In short, the

interests of the Class Representatives are sufficiently aligned so as
to ensure adequate representation of the class.

See, e.g., Beattie v.

CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554, 563 (6th Cir. 2007) (Because the
plaintiffs suffered the same type of injury as members of the class,

25

“there is every reason to believe that [the plaintiffs] will
vigorously prosecute the interests of the class.”).
The Class Representatives and Class Counsel have also
aggressively pursued the claims on behalf of the class.

Class Counsel

are experienced practitioners in both class action litigation and
consumer law and are qualified to handle this matter.

See Doc. Nos.

97-10, 114-1, 114-2 (declarations and résumés of plaintiffs’
attorneys).

Because the Class Representatives and Class Counsel have

demonstrated an ability to vigorously pursue the claims of the class,
and because there is no conflict of interest or antagonism among the
named plaintiffs, the classes and their counsel, the Court concludes
that the Class Representatives will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
E.

Rule 23(b)(3)

Having concluded that the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have
been met, the Court must now determine whether plaintiffs have
established that this litigation may properly be maintained as a class
action under one of the subdivisions of Rule 23(b).

Under Rule

23(b)(3), a class action is appropriate where “the court finds that
the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”

Rule 23(b)(3) thus has

both a predominance and superiority requirement.

See, e.g., Vassalle

v. Midland Funding LLC, 708 F.3d 747, 756 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Because
the district court certified the class under Rule 23(b)(3), the class

26

must satisfy the additional requirements of superiority and
predominance.”).
“The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed
classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
representation.”

Amchem, 521 U.S. at 632.

“̔To meet the predominance

requirement, a plaintiff must establish that issues subject to
generalized proof and applicable to the class as a whole predominate
over those issues that are subject to only individualized proof.’”
Young, 693 F.3d at 544 (quoting Randleman v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins.
Co., 646 F.3d 347, 352–53 (6th Cir. 2011)).

“Further, ̔the fact that

a defense may arise and may affect different class members differently
does not compel a finding that individual issues predominate over
common ones.’”

Id. (quoting Beattie, 511 F.3d at 564).

“While the

commonality element of Rule 23(a)(2) requires showing one question of
law or fact common to the class, a Rule 23(b)(3) class must show that
common questions will predominate over individual ones.”
(emphasis in original).

Id.

However, “Rule 23(b)(3) does not mandate that

a plaintiff seeking class certification prove that each element of the
claim is susceptible to classwide proof.”

In re Whirlpool Corp., 722

F.3d at 859 (citing Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133
S. Ct. 1184, 1196 (2012)).

“[C]ommon issues may predominate when

liability can be determined on a class-wide basis, even when there are
some individualized damage issues.”

Beattie, 511 F.3d at 564

(quotations and alterations omitted).
Plaintiffs’ claims are premised on the theory that defendant’s
common policies and practices caused common injuries to all class

27

members: every Gym Cancel Subclass member was allegedly “subject to
[Global Fitness’s] practices and policies which included charging
additional fees and refusing to honor, accept, and process gym
membership cancellations in accordance with its contracts and
applicable law[;]” every FIF Subclass member was allegedly “subject to
[Global Fitness’s] practice and policy of failing to properly disclose
[a $15 FIF or CAF;]” and every Personal Training Cancel Subclass
member was allegedly “subject to [Global Fitness’s] practices and
policies which included charging additional fees and refusing to
honor, accept, and process personal training cancellations in
accordance with its contracts and applicable law.”
Response, p. 21.
23.

Plaintiffs’

See also Third Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 9, 14-17, 20-

Evidence of Global Fitness’s common policies and practices and

Global Fitness’s uniform application of its policies to class members
unites the Class and Subclasses by a common interest in determining
whether Global Fitness’s course of conduct is actionable.

Evidence

would either prove or disprove, as to all members of the Subclasses,
whether Global Fitness’s alleged policies and practices resulted in,
inter alia, the improper nondisclosure of fees and the improper charge
of additional fees.

Likewise, evidence of Global Fitness’s practices

and the application of those common practices to class members will
minimize the need to examine each class member’s individual claims.
Although the class members’ claims are not governed by the same
state law, see Pilgrim v. Universal Health Card, LLC, 660 F.3d 943,
946-50 (6th Cir. 2011), this action is not, notably, presented as a
nationwide class action premised on conduct that differed in every

28

state.

See id. at 946-48 (affirming the district court’s finding of

no predominance where the plaintiffs’ claims were governed by the laws
of the various states and the defendants’ “program did not operate the
same way in every State and the plaintiffs suffered distinct injuries
as a result”).

Rather, as discussed supra, plaintiffs’ claims are

premised on defendant’s alleged misconduct and the effect of that
alleged misconduct on class members.

For example, plaintiffs’ breach

of contract claims arise from the interpretation of Global Fitness’
form contracts and the common policies and practices that allegedly
conflict with those contracts.
49.

See Third Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 143-

“[C]laims arising from the interpretation of a form contract are

particularly suited for class treatment, and breach of contract cases
are routinely certified as such.”

Cowit v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No.

1:12-cv-869, 2013 WL 940466, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 8, 2013).

The

issues of manageability, which often arise in the application of
different state laws to a class, see id., are in fact minimized by the
proposed settlement of this matter.

See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 619-20,

622 (“Confronted with a request for settlement-only class
certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if
tried, would present intractable management problems . . . for the
proposal is that there be no trial.”); In re Inter–Op Hip Prosthesis
Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. 330, 347 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (“[W]hen taking the
proposed settlement [] into consideration for purposes of determining
class certification, individual issues which are normally present in .
. . litigation become irrelevant, allowing the common issues to
predominate.”) (internal quotations omitted).

29

Under the

circumstances, the Court concludes that common issues predominate over
questions that affect only individual members.
Rule 23(b)(3) also requires that the class action vehicle be
superior to other methods of adjudication.

In determining the

superiority of a class action to other litigation options, a court
must consider
(A)
the
class
members'
interests
in
individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already begun by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
In the case presently before the Court, all of the factors weigh
in favor of a class action.

First, the potential recovery by any one

individual is relatively small; plaintiffs’ claims are premised on
having been improperly charged membership dues,5 a $10 cancellation
fee, and/or a biannual $15 FIF or CAF.

True, the Third Amended

Complaint seeks rescission; however, as discussed in greater detail
infra, the likelihood of actually obtaining that remedy on a classwide basis is questionable in light of the dearth – indeed, the
absence - of authority either interpreting or applying the rescission
statutes at issue.

Under these circumstances, individual class

members would be expected to have little interest in individually
5

“A review of the database produced by Urban Active’s third party vendor
Motionsoft for members in Ohio, Kentucky, Georgia, Tennessee, North Carolina,
and Pennsylvania indicates that the average monthly fee from 2009 until 2012
was approximately $26.76.” Declaration of Thomas McCormick (“January 2014
McCormick Declaration”), Doc. No. 128-4, ¶ 6.

30

controlling separate actions.

Second, although this is one of five

similar class-action lawsuits pending against Global Fitness, there
are no known actions pending by individual class members, nor is such
litigation likely given the costs of litigation relative to the
potential recovery on individual claims.

Third, concentration of

these claims in this Court will have the desirable benefit of
streamlining the resolution of the claims and conserving resources.
Finally, the Court is aware of no particular difficulties associated
with the management of this class action, especially given the current
stage of the litigation.

It is often the case, as here, that class

action litigation grows out of alleged systemic failures that result
in small monetary losses to large numbers of people.
F.3d at 540.

See Young, 693

The potential for only a small individual recovery

lessens the likelihood of individual lawsuits and supports the
conclusion that the class action is a superior mechanism for
adjudicating the dispute.

See Beattie, 511 F.3d at 567.

In this

regard, the Court also notes that any class member who wishes to
control his or her own litigation may opt out of the class under Rule
23(c)(2)(B)(v).

See In re Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d at 861.

In

short, the Court concludes that the class action vehicle is superior
to other methods of adjudication.
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that this action
should be certified pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3).
IV.

Approval of the Proposed Class Settlement
Rule 23(e) governs settlements of class actions and imposes the

following procedural safeguards:

31

(1) The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to
all class members who would be bound by the proposal.
(2) If the proposal would bind class members, the court may
approve it only after a hearing and on finding that it is
fair, reasonable, and adequate.
(3) The parties seeking approval must file a
identifying any agreement made in connection
proposal.

statement
with the

. . .
(5) Any class member may object to the proposal if it
requires court approval under this subdivision (e); the
objection may be withdrawn only with the court's approval.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).6
The parties submitted the terms of the settlement, which the
Court preliminarily approved.
111.

Preliminary Approval Order, Doc. No.

Notice provided to the class, as described supra, was effected

in conformity with the directions of the Court.

A fairness hearing

was conducted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) on February 13, 2014.
The Court must now consider whether the Settlement Agreement is “fair,
reasonable, and adequate.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).

In making this

determination, the Court considers several factors:
“(1) the risk of fraud or collusion; (2) the complexity,
expense and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the
amount of discovery engaged in by the parties; (4) the
likelihood of success on the merits; (5) the opinions of
class counsel and class representatives; (6) the reaction
of absent class members; and (7) the public interest.”
Poplar Creek Dev. Co. v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 636 F.3d 235,
244 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting UAW v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.3d 615,

6

Rule 23€(4), which is not applicable to this case, provides: “If the class
action was previously certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court may refuse to
approve a settlement unless it affords a new opportunity to request exclusion
to individual class members who had an earlier opportunity to request
exclusion but did not do so.”

32

631 (6th Cir. 2007)).

In considering these factors, the task of the

court “is not to decide whether one side is right or even whether one
side has the better of these arguments. . . .

The question rather is

whether the parties are using settlement to resolve a legitimate legal
and factual disagreement.”
A.

UAW, 497 F.3d at 632.

Risk of fraud or collusion

Having carefully examined the terms of the Settlement Agreement,
the Court now turns to the first factor of its inquiry, i.e., the risk
of fraud or collusion.

See Poplar Creek Dev. Co., 636 F.3d at 244.

The duration, complexity, and history of this litigation undermine any
suggestion of fraud or collusion in the Settlement Agreement.

This

action was initiated in April 2011 and has been highly contested since
its inception.

The parties litigated for two and one-half years; they

engaged in extensive, contested discovery before reaching a
settlement.

The Court fielded numerous contested pretrial motions,

including plaintiffs’ motion to remand, Doc. No. 11, defendant’s
motions for judgment on the pleadings, Doc. Nos. 16, 36, 61,
plaintiffs’ motion to strike defendant’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings, Doc. No. 62, and plaintiffs’ motion to certify a question
to the Supreme Court of Ohio, Doc. No. 73.

See Opinion and Order,

Doc. No. 69; Opinion and Order, Doc. No. 83. The parties also
exchanged in general settlement discussions over the course of several
months before proceeding to formal mediation on July 8, 2013;
settlement negotiations continued for a period of time after the
mediation before the parties were able to reach agreement.
Declaration of Thomas N. McCormick in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion

33

for Preliminary Approval of Settlement Agreement, Doc. No. 132-6, ¶¶
6-8.

Class Counsel characterizes these settlement negotiations as

“vigorous” and “hard fought,” and that characterization is entirely
consistent with nearly every aspect of this litigation.

It would be

difficult to take seriously a charge that this history was fabricated
in an effort to mask collusion between the parties.

See Moulton v.

U.S. Steel Corp., 581 F.3d 344, 351 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding no
collusion where the settlement agreement was entered into after four
years of complex and contested litigation and the agreement was the
product of supervised negotiations).
B.

The Amount of Discovery Engaged in by the Parties

Moreover, the parties have engaged in extensive discovery in this
case, including multiple sets of interrogatories, the production of
more than 400,000 documents, and more than 10 depositions.

The

parties have also engaged in extensive discovery of electronically
stored information related to, inter alia, defendant’s policies and
practices.

“[T]he enormity of that undertaking,” see Order, Doc. No.

75, p. 1, necessitated significant Court involvement in discovery
related matters, as well as several extensions of the pretrial
schedule.

See e.g., Doc. Nos. 56 (January 2012), 63 (February 2012),

68 (March 2012), 71 (April 2012), 72 (May 2012), 75 (June 2012), 77
(June 2012), 78 (August 2012), 79 (September 2012), 80 (October 2012),
87 (May 2013).

However, this substantial discovery gave the parties

the opportunity to assess the strengths and weaknesses of each other’s
litigation positions.

Consideration of this factor therefore weighs

34

in favor of finding the Settlement Agreement fair, adequate, and
reasonable.
C.

The likelihood of success on the merits

“The most important of the factors to be considered in
reviewing a settlement is the probability of success on the
merits. The likelihood of success, in turn, provides a
gauge from which the benefits of the settlement must be
measured.”
Poplar Creek Dev. Co., 636 F.3d at 245 (quoting In re Gen. Tire &
Rubber Co. Sec. Litig., 726 F.2d 1075, 1086 (6th Cir. 1984)).
The Third Amended Complaint asserts claims of breach of contract,
unjust enrichment, and false, deceptive, and unconscionable consumer
practices violative of state consumer protection statutes.

In

resolving defendant’s earlier motion for partial judgment on the
pleadings, and prior to the filing of the Third Amended Complaint, the
Court dismissed plaintiffs’ conversion and Deceptive Trade Practices
Act claims and limited plaintiffs’ claims under the CSPA and PECA.
See Opinion and Order, Doc. No. 69, p. 27.

Although this Court has

not considered the merits of plaintiffs’ remaining claims, see Opinion
and Order, Doc. No. 83, the viability of the bulk of plaintiffs’
claims is called into question by Judge Polster’s dismissal in the
Northern District of Ohio of class action claims in the Robins action.
See Robins v. Global Fitness Holdings, LLC, 838 F.Supp. 2d 631 (N.D.
Ohio 2012).

As this Court previously noted, the plaintiffs in the

Robins action alleged facts that “are the same or similar to the ones
alleged in the case at bar” and “present[ed] similar legal issues to
those in the case at bar.”

Opinion and Order, Doc. No. 69, pp. 14-15.

Although this Court previously distinguished Robins in addressing

35

plaintiffs’ CSPA and PECA claims, see id. at p. 27 n.5, this Court has
not expressly considered to what extent, if at all, the holding or
reasoning in Robins might apply to plaintiffs’ contract and KHSA
claims.

These claims are further clouded by the pendency of the

appeal in Robins, Robins v. Global Fitness Holdings, LLC, Case No. 123231 (6th Cir.), which was being briefed at the time of settlement.
There is also, as noted supra, a dearth of judicial authority related
to plaintiffs’ claims for rescission and damages under the KHSA and
PECA, making the likelihood of success on these claims less certain.
Furthermore, the Court notes that Global Fitness no longer operates
fitness centers and has no ongoing business, although it is not
entirely clear what impact that fact may have had on this litigation.
Beyond the legal obstacles facing plaintiffs in their pursuit of
their claims, Global Fitness has contested class certification and
asserted various defenses that present financial risks to the class.
Global Fitness is also represented by experienced and competent
counsel and has already mounted a zealous and thorough defense.
Under all of these circumstances, it cannot be said that the
likelihood of success on the merits of plaintiffs’ claims is certain.
This factor therefore weighs in favor of approval of the Settlement
Agreement.

D.

Complexity, Expense, and Likely Duration of the Litigation

“Generally speaking, ‘[m]ost class actions are inherently complex
and settlement avoids the costs, delays, and multitude of other
problems associated with them.’”

In re Telectronics Pacing Sys.,

36

Inc., 137 F.Supp. 2d 985, 1013 (S.D. Ohio 2001) decision clarified,
148 F.Supp. 2d 936 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (quoting In re Austrian & German
Bank Holocaust Litig., 80 F.Supp. 2d 164, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).

This

action is no exception to that general rule, as plaintiffs have
asserted a multitude of claims and defendant has posed a multitude of
defenses.

This action has also been pending for nearly three years,

plaintiffs have incurred over $2.7 million in attorneys’ fees, see
Transcript, PAGEID 2733 (Class Counsel’s representation that their
lodestar value is now “just shy of $2.8 million”), and the parties
have engaged in extensive motion practice and contested discovery.
Continued litigation would undoubtedly require years more of
litigation and would involve additional fact discovery, expert
discovery, class certification and other motion practice which, if the
history of this litigation serves as a predictor, will be both
extensive and costly.

Consideration of this factor therefore weighs

in favor of approving the Settlement Agreement.
E.

The Opinions of Class Counsel and Class Representatives

Experienced counsel on both sides of this case recommend that the
Court approve the Settlement Agreement and this recommendation is
entitled to deference.

See e.g., Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909,

922 (6th Cir. 1983) (“The court should defer to the judgment of
experienced counsel who has competently evaluated the strength of his
proofs[,]” and that deference “should correspond to the amount of
discovery completed and the character of the evidence uncovered.”).
Here, Thomas McCormick, Kenneth Rubin, Mark Troutman, and Greg
Travalio, the four attorneys for plaintiffs who have invested the most

37

time in this matter, have approximately 68 years of combined
professional experience.

See Doc. Nos. 114-1, 114-2 (declarations and

résumés of plaintiffs’ attorneys).

Class Counsel ask the Court to

approve the Settlement Agreement, which they represent is fair,
adequate, and reasonable.

Not insignificantly, the Class

Representatives have also approved the Settlement Agreement. See
Settlement Agreement, pp. 27-38.
F.

The Reaction of Absent Class Members

In determining whether a class action settlement is fair,
adequate and reasonable, a court must also consider the reaction of
absent class members.

Vassalle, 708 F.3d at 754.

Here, from a pool

of more than 605,000 absent class members, 90 opted out of the
settlement, see Dahl Declaration, ¶ 30, and two objections were filed.
“Although this is not clear evidence of class-wide approval of the
settlement, it does permit the inference that most of the class
members had no qualms with it.”

See Olden v. Gardner, 294 F. App’x

210, 217 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that 79 objections in a class of
nearly 11,000 members “tends to support a finding that the settlement
is fair”).

See also In re Delphi Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA”

Litig., 248 F.R.D. 483, 500 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (“If only a small number
[of opt outs or objections] are received, that fact can be viewed as
indicative of the adequacy of the settlement.”) (internal quotations
omitted; alteration in original); Hainey v. Parrott, 617 F.Supp. 2d
668, 675 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (“Generally, however, a small number of
objections, particularly in a class of this size, indicates that the
settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate.”).

38

Although the two

objections are vigorously presented and pursued, the Court
nevertheless concludes that the number of objectors and opt-outs in
relation to the size of the class supports a finding that the
Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.
G.

The Public Interest

The public interest also favors approval of the Settlement
Agreement.

First, “[t]here is a strong public interest in encouraging

settlement of complex litigation and class action suits because they
are ‘notoriously difficult and unpredictable’ and settlement conserves
judicial resources.”

In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D.

508, 530 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (quoting Granada Invs., Inc. v. DWG Corp.,
962 F.2d 1203, 1205 (6th Cir. 1992)).

Accord In re Nationwide Fin.

Servs. Litig., No. 2:08-cv-00249, 2009 WL 8747486, at *8 (S.D. Ohio
Aug. 18, 2009) (“[T]here is certainly a public interest in settlement
of disputed claims that require substantial federal judicial resources
to supervise and resolve.”).

Second, the Settlement Agreement ends

potentially long and protracted litigation and frees judicial
resources.

See In re Telectronics, 137 F.Supp. 2d at 1025.

More

importantly, the Settlement Agreement provides an immediate cash
settlement to the class for their compensable injuries in an amount
that, as discussed infra, is fair, reasonable, and adequate.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Settlement Agreement serves the
public interest.
H.

Preferential Treatment and Other Factors

“Although not included in the seven UAW factors, in evaluating
the fairness of a settlement [the United States Court of Appeals for

39

the Sixth Circuit] ha[s] also looked to whether the settlement ‘gives
preferential treatment to the named plaintiffs while only perfunctory
relief to unnamed class members.’”
Williams, 720 F.2d at 925 n.11).

Vassalle, 708 F.3d at 755 (quoting
The Sixth Circuit has “held that

such inequities in treatment make a settlement unfair.”

Id.

“The

same is true of a settlement that gives preferential treatment to
class counsel; for class counsel are no more entitled to disregard
their ‘fiduciary responsibilities’ than class representatives are.”
In re Dry Max Pampers Litig., 724 F.3d 713, 718 (6th Cir. 2013)
(quoting In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick–Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 788 (3rd Cir. 1995)).

The Sixth Circuit has

warned of the danger of attorneys “̔urg[ing] a class settlement at a
low figure or on a less-than-optimal basis in exchange for red-carpet
treatment on fees.’”

Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa

Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 524 (1st Cir. 1991)).

Accordingly, when

attorneys’ fees in a settlement class “̔are unreasonably high, the
likelihood is that the defendant obtained an economically beneficial
concession with regard to the merits provisions, in the form of lower
monetary payments to class members . . . than could otherwise have
[been] obtained.’”

Id. (alteration in original) (citing Staton v.

Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 964 (9th Cir. 2003)).

“Hence the ̔courts

must be particularly vigilant’ for ̔subtle signs that class counsel
have allowed pursuit of their own self-interests and that of certain
class members to infect the negotiations.’”

Id. (quoting Dennis v.

Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2012)).

40

The objectors argue that Class Counsel’s request for attorneys’
fees in relation to the compensation to the class and the requested
incentive awards to the Class Representatives are both suggestive of
an unfair settlement that gives preferential treatment to those Class
Counsel and Class Representatives.

The objectors also argue that the

claims process, notice, release, and settlement negotiations render
the Settlement Agreement unfair.

These arguments will be discussed in

turn.
1.

Attorneys’ Fees and Compensation to the Class

Blackman’s objections focus on the “[p]referential treatment to
class counsel;” Blackman’s “cardinal objection is that the settlement
is unfair because Class Counsel is appropriating an excessive 65% of
the settlement value for itself.”7
84.

Blackman Objections, PAGEID 2083-

Blackman argues that the Settlement Agreement should be treated

as a “constructive common fund,” consisting of the actual monetary
payout to the class and the requested attorneys’ fees, see id. at
PAGEID 2083-84, 2091.8

As so construed, Blackman contends, the

Settlement Agreement is unfair because Class Counsel’s $2.39 million
request for attorneys’ fees is disproportionately high.

Blackman

Objections, PAGEID 2089.

7

“The [65%] calculation is as follows: $2.39 million fee request/ (2.39
million fee request + 1.3 million class recovery) = 64.7% of the true
settlement value.” Blackman Objections, PAGEID 2084 n.3. At the fairness
hearing, Blackman represented that Class Counsel would “get more than 60
percent of the proceeds -- more than double a reasonable fee.” Transcript,
PAGEID 2758.
8
Blackman also contends that attorneys’ fees should be limited to 25

percent of that common fund. Blackman’s Reply, PAGEID 2597. The Court
addresses that contention infra.

41

Blackman’s contention in this regard relies on In re Dry Max
Pampers Litigation, 724 F.3d 713 (6th Cir. 2013), and In re Bluetooth
Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2011).9 In
Pampers, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed the trial court’s approval of a class settlement because the
settlement gave preferential treatment to class counsel but only
perfunctory relief to unnamed class members.
721.

See Pampers, 724 F.3d at

Although the settlement awarded class counsel a fee of $2.73

million, “counsel did not take a single deposition, serve a single
request for written discovery, or even file a response to [the
defendant’s] motion to dismiss.”

Id. at 718.

On the other hand, the

unnamed class members who were allegedly injured as a result of
purchasing Pampers brand diapers containing “Dry Max Technology,”
would have been awarded only injunctive relief in the form of a
reinstated diaper refund program, changes to the labels on Pampers’
boxes, and changes to the Pampers’ website.

Id. at 716-18.

The

defendant in that case also agreed to contribute $400,000 to an
undetermined pediatric resident training program and the American
Academy of Pediatrics.

Id. at 716.

Notably, in determining that the

settlement gave preferential treatment to class counsel, the Sixth
Circuit characterized as negligible the value of the injunctive relief
awarded to the class.
The refund program required consumers to have “retained their
original receipt and Pampers-box UPC code, in some instances for

Blackman’s counsel, the Center for Class Action Fairness, successfully
represented objectors in both Pampers and Bluetooth.
9

42

diapers purchased as long ago as August 2008” and it was “merely a
rerun of the very same program that [the defendant] had already
offered to its customers” in the past.

Id. at 718-719.

The defendant

was also unable to demonstrate the effectiveness of the program,
despite its earlier implementation.

Id.

The labeling change on

Pampers’ boxes “amount[ed] to little more than an advertisement for
Pampers” and the additional information to be included on the Pampers’
website was “common sense, within the ken of ordinary consumers, and
thus of limited value to them.”

Id. at 720.

The Sixth Circuit found

that the $2.73 million benefit to class counsel was “vastly” more than
the “illusory” benefit to class members.

Id. at 721.

This action is distinguishable from Pampers.

First, as discussed

supra, this action was vigorously litigated for two and one-half years
prior to settlement and involved extensive motion practice and
discovery.

Cf. id. at 718 (“[C]ounsel did not take a single

deposition, serve a single request for written discovery, or even file
a response to [the defendant’s] motion to dismiss.”).

Second, the

Settlement Agreement provides significant monetary relief to class
members in relation to the value of their claims and the risks of this
litigation.

In contrast to the class members in Pampers, who

“received nothing but illusory injunctive relief,” id. at 722, class
members in this case will receive monetary awards ranging from $5 to
$75, with the average class member receiving $31.99.

See Second

Supplemental Dahl Declaration, ¶ 9. This recovery is significant in
light of the estimated average injuries allegedly suffered by class
members, which are premised on the improper charge of an extra month’s

43

dues at an average rate of $26.76 per month (from January 2009 through
2012), January 2014 McCormick Declaration, ¶¶ 5-6, a $10 cancellation
fee, and/or a $15 FIF or CAF.

Notably, Blackman does not argue that

the Settlement Agreement provides inadequate compensation to members
of the Class or any Subclass in relation to their alleged injuries.
In fact, Blackman implicitly acknowledged at the fairness hearing that
the awards provided to the Class and Subclasses under the Settlement
Agreement are appropriate.

See Transcript, PAGEID 2753 (arguing that

the proportion of the fee award to the total actual pay-out by Global
Fitness is unfair, but that the monetary terms of settlement would
otherwise be fair if every class member were to receive the negotiated
settlement amount).
Unlike Blackman, the Zik Objectors argue that the Settlement
Agreement fails to provide adequate compensation to class members
because it fails to adequately account for differences in class
members’ claims and damages.

Specifically, the Zik Objectors argue

that April and Robert Zik and other class members who signed a
membership agreement with Global Fitness before March 2008 have much
stronger breach of contract claims than do those plaintiffs and class
members who entered into a contract after March 2008.

These claims

are so disparate, the Zik Objectors argue, that it is unfair to
combine the differing claims in the same subclass and to be settled
for the same amount.

See Zik Objectors’ Reply, PAGEID 2618-23;

Transcript, PAGEID 2766 (“What they needed to do was to settle and
negotiate additional compensation for people that have a clear breach
of contract claim, instead of the Ziks and people like them receiving

44

the same amount of money as people who have no breach of contract
claim, according to the Robins court, that was not done.
received the same amount of money.
fair.

Is that fair?

They

No, it can’t be

It cannot be fair.”).
The Zik Objectors’ argument proposes a division of the Gym Cancel

Subclass into two classes: (1) class members who entered into a gym
membership contract before March 2008 and cancelled their gym
membership contract within the Class Period, and (2) class members who
entered into a gym membership contract after March 2008 and cancelled
their gym membership contract within the Class Period.

The Court

concludes that this division is unnecessary because, as discussed
supra, both of these proposed classes are adequately represented by
Class Representatives and members of both proposed classes suffered a
common injury, i.e., each was improperly charged, pursuant to a common
policy or practice of defendant, monthly dues and a cancellation fee
after cancellation.
The Zik Objectors also argue that the settlement is unfair
because it does not award class members their actual damages; as a
consequence, they contend, many class members will be compensated in
an amount either greater or less than their actual damages.

The Zik

Objectors note that Blackman and Robert Zik are both members of the
Gym Cancel Subclass and will receive $25 each, yet Robert Zik is
“irrefutably” owed $75 and Blackman is owed less than $25 (and
possibly nothing).

See Transcript, PAGEID 2765-70.

Despite the purported variance in actual damages to class
members, the Court finds the amount awarded to the Gym Cancel Subclass

45

to be fair, reasonable, and adequate.

The Zik Objectors sought to

certify a class in the Zik action premised on a claim that Global
Fitness acted in breach of “its members’ membership agreements by
charging its members one extra month of membership dues and a $10.00
cancellation fee when members terminate their membership agreement.”
Doc. No. 118-2, pp. 1, 6.

As discussed supra, the claims asserted in

the Zik action are subsumed in the Gym Cancel Subclass, and an Allowed
Claimant who cancelled his or her gym membership contract with Global
Fitness during the Class Period is entitled to an award of $25.

See

Settlement Agreement, §§ 6.1, 6.1.3. The Claims Administrator has
validated claims and calculated final award amounts for the Allowed
Claimants: the average Class Payment is $31.99 and the average Gym
Cancel Subclass Payment will be $41.28.

Second Supplemental Dahl

Declaration, ¶ 9. This is a significant recovery because it exceeds
the $26.76 average monthly fee of a gym membership with Global Fitness
between January 1, 2009 and July 2012.
Declaration, ¶¶ 5-6.

See January 2014 McCormick

This recovery is also substantial considering

the bases of plaintiffs’ claims, i.e., improperly charged dues, a $10
cancellation fee, and/or a $15 FIF or CAF.
The Court also finds without merit the Zik Objectors’ argument
that the Settlement Agreement is unfair because it does not require an
individualized damages determination for each claimant.

As detailed

supra, the average award in the Gym Cancel Subclass will exceed the
average monthly gym membership cost from 2009 to 2012 and will
approach, if not exceed, the sum of the average monthly gym membership
and the alleged improperly charged $10 cancellation fee.

46

Considering

the risks of this litigation, the additional costs and delays that
would likely result from the need to calculate and verify individual
damage awards for each Allowed Claimant, and the difficulty in
calculating damages for the 343 Allowed Claimants for whom Global
Fitness has no record, see Second Supplemental Dahl Declaration, ¶ 4,
the Court finds that a flat award for membership in each Class or
Subclass is appropriate.

See Williams, 720 F.2d at 922-23 (“A court

may not withhold approval simply because the benefits accrued from the
decree are not what a successful plaintiff would have received in a
fully litigated case.

A decree is a compromise which has been reached

after the risks, expense, and delay of further litigation have been
assessed.

Class counsel and the class representatives may compromise

their demand for relief in order to obtain substantial assured relief
for the plaintiffs' class.”) (internal citations omitted).
“̔The fairness of the settlement must be evaluated primarily
based on how it compensates class members . . . .”

Pampers, 724 F.3d

at 720 (quoting Synfuel Techs., Inc. v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 463
F.3d 646, 654 (7th Cir. 2006)).

Here, the Settlement Agreement

provides an immediate and significant monetary benefit to class
members.

Moreover, although individual class members had the

opportunity to opt out of the settlement if they concluded that the
value of their individual claims exceeded the value of the immediate
relief provided by the Settlement Agreement, only 90 did so.

See In

re Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d at 861 (“As the district court observed,
any class member who wishes to control his or her own litigation may
opt out of the class under Rule 23(c)(2)(B)(v).”).

47

The Zik Objectors next argue that the settlement is unfair
because the Settlement Agreement fails to provide any “additional or
separate compensation to Kentucky class members for their KHSA claims
that are not available to class members in other states . . . [and]
would purportedly entitle Kentucky Plaintiffs . . . to rescission of
their current, illegal LA Fitness contracts[.]”
PAGEID 1932-35.

Zik Objections,

See also Transcript, PAGEID 2767-68.

This argument

is premised on the proposition that it is only the Kentucky plaintiffs
who are possessed of a claim for rescission, combined with the Zik
Objectors’ contention that the Class Representatives do not adequately
represent them.

The Zik Objectors’ first proposition is simply not

accurate; both the KHSA and PECA contemplate rescission as a potential
remedy.

See KRS 367.912(1); O.R.C. § 1345.44(C).

However, as noted

supra, there is no case law interpreting or applying either of these
statutory provisions.

The Court also rejects, for the reasons stated

supra, the Zik Objectors’ second proposition; the claims of the Class
Representatives are typical of the claims of the Class and Subclasses
and the Class Representatives will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.

It is significant, too, that the Zik

Objectors acknowledge that Class Counsel “devoted” “a large percentage
of [their time] to ESI discovery to be used for the purpose of proving
the KHSA claims.”

Zik Objections, PAGEID 1935.

This fact suggests

that the development of the KHSA claims was adequate and that Class
Representatives and Class Counsel considered, during the court of
settlement negotiations, the likelihood of success and the available
remedies in connection with this claim.

48

As noted supra, Blackman also relies on In re Bluetooth Headset
Products Liability Litigation, 654 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2011), in
arguing that Class Counsel’s requested $2.39 million attorneys’ fee
renders the Settlement Agreement unfair.

The plaintiffs in Bluetooth

alleged that the defendants in that case had failed to disclose the
potential risk of noise-induced hearing loss associated with extended
use of wireless Bluetooth headsets at high volumes.
F.3d at 938.

Bluetooth, 654

The settlement in Bluetooth, which was approved by the

district court, required the defendants to “post acoustic safety
information on their respective websites and in their product manuals
and/or packaging for new Bluetooth headsets” and pay a $100,000 cy
pres award, notice costs up to $1.2 million, attorneys’ fees and costs
up to $850,000, and incentive awards of $12,000.

Id. at 938-40.

The

Ninth Circuit remanded the action, without expressing an “opinion on
the ultimate fairness of what the parties have negotiated,” because
the district court had applied the wrong standard in approving the
settlement agreement and did not adequately explain its fee award.
See id. at 938 (“[T]he disparity between the value of the class
recovery and class counsel's compensation raises at least an inference
of unfairness, and . . .the current record does not adequately dispel
the possibility that class counsel bargained away a benefit to the
class in exchange for their own interests.”), 949-50.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that it “ha[d] no basis for affirming
the fee award as reasonable under the lodestar approach” because the
district court had not calculated a precise lodestar value nor had it
evaluated the degree of success of the settlement.

49

Id. at 944.

As to

the settlement agreement, the court found that, due to “indicia of
possible implicit collusion,” the district court was “required to
examine the negotiation process with even greater scrutiny than is
ordinarily demanded, and approval of the settlement had to be
supported by a clear explanation of why the disproportionate fee is
justified and does not betray the class's interests.”

Id. at 947-49.

Specifically, that greater scrutiny was necessary, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned, in light of three causes for concern: (1) “the settlement's
provision for attorneys' fees is apparently disproportionate to the
class reward, which includes no monetary distribution[;]” (2) “[t]he
settlement included a ‘clear sailing agreement’ in which defendants
agreed not to object to an award of attorneys' fees up to eight times
the monetary cy pres relief afforded the class[;]” and (3) “the
settlement also contained a ‘kicker’: all fees not awarded would
revert to defendants rather than be added to the cy pres fund or
otherwise benefit the class.”

Id. at 947.

Blackman argues before this Court that the Settlement Agreement
is unfair because, as did the settlement agreement in Bluetooth, the
Settlement Agreement contains a clear sailing provision and a kicker
provision, and provides for an award of attorneys’ fees that will
exceed the actual recovery to the Allowed Claimants.
Objections, PAGEID 2091-97.

See Blackman

According to Blackman, the Settlement

Agreement includes a “clear sailing” provision because Global Fitness
agreed not to contest plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees and
costs so long as the request did not exceed $2.39 million. See
Settlement Agreement, § 9.1.

See Gooch v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of

50

Am., 672 F.3d 402, 425 (6th Cir. 2012).

The Settlement Agreement

includes a “kicker,” Blackman contends, because all fees not awarded
revert to Global Fitness, rather than to the class. See Settlement
Agreement, § 9.2.

See Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 947.

Finally, it is

also now apparent that the Settlement Agreement will provide for an
award of attorneys’ fees and costs greater than the actual monetary
recovery to the Allowed Claimants.

Compare Second Supplemental Dahl

Declaration, ¶¶ 9-10 (calculating the final Class Payment as
$1,593,240.00), with Settlement Agreement, § 9.1 (“Defendant agrees to
pay Plaintiffs [sic] attorneys’ fees and litigation costs as Ordered
by the Court, provided that such payment does not exceed
[$2,390,000.00].”).
Blackman argues that the very presence of clear sailing and
kicker provisions render the Settlement Agreement unfair.
Blackman Objections, PAGEID 2094-97.

See

However, the United States Court

of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has recognized that “not every ‘clear
sailing’ provision demonstrates collusion.”

Gooch, 672 F.3d at 425.

It is true that a clear sailing provision could indicate that lawyers
urged “̔a class settlement at a low figure or on a less-than-optimal
basis in exchange for red-carpet treatment on fees.’”
Weinberger, 925 F.2d at 520).

Id. (quoting

However, a clear sailing provision

could just as easily be included for purposes of finality and risk
avoidance, i.e., “̔because the defendants want to know their total
maximum exposure and the plaintiffs do not want to be sandbagged.’”
Id. (internal quotations omitted).

In either event, the court in

Bluetooth made clear that the presence of clear sailing and kicker

51

provisions required the district court to more carefully scrutinize
the proposed settlement; the ultimate issue, however, is still whether
“the end product is a fair, adequate, and reasonable settlement
agreement.”

See id. at 947-49.

In the case presently before the Court, there is no suggestion
that relief to the class is perfunctory.

Unlike in Pampers, where the

value of class relief was “negligible” and “illusory,” see Pampers,
724 F.3d at 721, the settlement in this case provides for an immediate
and substantial cash payment to class members, considering the value
of the claims and the risks of protracted litigation.

Where, as here,

the value of the settlement to class members is reasonable, the risk
of collusion associated with a clear sailing provision — i.e., that
“lawyers might urge a class settlement at a low figure or on a lessthan-optimal basis in exchange for red-carpet treatment on fees,”
Weinberger, 925 F.2d at 524, — is diminished.
The risk of collusion is also lessened in this action because the
parties negotiated the payment of attorneys’ fees and costs after
having reached agreement on the relief to the Class and Subclasses.
See Declaration of Thomas McCormick in Support of Application for
Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursement of Costs (“December 2013 McCormick
Declaration”), Doc. No. 114-1, ¶ 4; Declaration of Mark H. Troutman in
Support of Application for Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursement of Costs
and Expenses (“Troutman Declaration”), Doc. No. 114-2, ¶ 4.

Although

there is no per se rule that separate negotiations will lessen the
likelihood of collusion, see Pampers, 724 F.3d at 717 (“̔[T]he
economic reality [is] that a settling defendant is concerned only with

52

its total liability[,]’ and thus a settlement’s ̔allocation between
the class payment and the attorneys’ fees is of little or no interest
to the defense.’”) (internal citations omitted), separate negotiations
suggest a lower risk of collusion where, as here, relief to the class
is fair, reasonable, and adequate.

The Court also notes that, despite

Blackman’s suggestion that a settlement cannot be fair if attorneys’
fees are negotiated prior to final settlement approval, see
Transcript, PAGEID 2756 (“The only apparent way to cure this problem
is to defer fee negotiations until the class settlement has been
signed, submitted and approved by the district court.

Or if the

defendant refuses to agree to any settlement that does not also
include attorney fees”) (citing In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 418 F.3d
277 (3rd Cir. 2005)), there is no such requirement in Rule 23.
Requiring the parties to postpone negotiations on attorneys’ fees
until after final approval of the settlement could also prove
detrimental to class recovery, as it would also require a second
notice to the class and could require a second fairness hearing, see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h), which would increase both the expenses and
risks associated with class settlement.
The Court also concludes that the inclusion of a kicker provision
in the Settlement Agreement is not improper in this case.

Notably,

the danger of collusion suggested by such a provision is essentially
eliminated when the parties have negotiated a reasonable attorneys’
fee.

See Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 949 (“If the defendant is willing to

pay a certain sum in attorneys' fees as part of the settlement
package, but the full fee award would be unreasonable, there is no

53

apparent reason the class should not benefit from the excess allotted
for fees.

The clear sailing provision reveals the defendant's

willingness to pay, but the kicker deprives the class of that full
potential benefit if class counsel negotiates too much for its
fees.”).

Because, as discussed infra, the Court concludes that the

parties have negotiated a reasonable attorneys’ fee, the class will
not be deprived of any benefit, either real or perceived, by the
inclusion of the kicker provision in the Settlement Agreement.
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the Settlement
Agreement does not accord preferential treatment to Class Counsel at
the expense of the class nor does it offer only perfunctory relief to
unnamed class members.
2.

Incentive awards

The Settlement Agreement provides for a Minimum Class Payment of
$1,300,000, which includes payments to Allowed Claimants and incentive
awards totaling $40,000 to the Class Representatives.
Agreement, § 7.1, 8.1.

Settlement

Class Representatives Tartaglia and Bell will

each receive an incentive award of $5,000; Class Representatives
Gascho, Buckemeyer, Hogan, Lundberg, Troutman, Meyer, Rose, and Cay
will each receive $3,500; and Class Representatives Volkerding and
Cary will each receive $1,000.

Id. at §§ 8.2.1, 8.2.2, 8.2.3.

Blackman objects to the provision for incentive awards and argues
that that adequacy of representation is undermined by the awards.
Blackman Objections, PAGEID 2097-99.

Specifically, Blackman argues

that the disparity between the incentive payments and what he
characterizes as the “minimal cash recovery” of class members raises

54

an issue as to whether the Class Representatives could be expected to
fairly evaluate the settlement agreement.

Id.

It is unfair, Blackman

argues, for Class Representatives to receive an incentive award equal
to “many times the plausible value of their claim.”

Transcript,

PAGEID 2758.
The Sixth Circuit has neither approved nor disapproved the
practice of incentive awards to class representatives.

Pampers, 724

F.3d at 722 (citing Vassalle, 708 F.3d at 756); Hadix v. Johnson, 322
F.3d 895, 897 (6th Cir. 2003) (“This court has never explicitly passed
judgment on the appropriateness of incentive awards.”) (citing In re
S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 24 F. App’x 520, 526 (6th Cir. 2001)).
However, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that “̔there may be
circumstances where incentive awards are appropriate,’” Vassalle, 708
F.3d at 756 (quoting Hadix, 322 F.3d at 897-98), and district courts
in this circuit have authorized incentive awards.

See

Johnson v. Midwest Logistics Sys., Ltd., No. 2:11-cv-1061, 2013 WL
2295880, at *5 (S.D. Ohio May 24, 2013) (approving an incentive award
of $12,500); Godec v. Bayer Corp., No. 1:10-cv-224, 2013 WL 1089549,
at *4 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2013) (approving an incentive award of
$2,500); Wess v. Storey, No. 2:08-cv-623, 2011 WL 1463609, at *12
(S.D. Ohio Apr. 14, 2011) (approving incentive awards “in a very
modest amount of $3,000”); Lonardo v. Travelers Indem. Co., 706
F.Supp. 2d 766, 787 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (approving an incentive award of
$5,000); Hainey v. Parrott, No. 1:02-cv-733, 2007 WL 3308027 (S.D.
Ohio Nov. 6, 2007) (approving an incentive award of $50,000 for each
class representative); In re Dun & Bradstreet Credit Servs. Customer

55

Litig., 130 F.R.D. 366, 373-74 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (approving incentive
awards ranging from $35,000 to $55,000).

Courts approving incentive

awards “have stressed that incentive awards are efficacious ways of
encouraging members of a class to become class representatives and
rewarding individual efforts taken on behalf of the class.”
322 F.3d at 897.

Hadix,

“Yet applications for incentive awards are

scrutinized carefully by courts who sensibly fear that incentive
awards may lead named plaintiffs to expect a bounty for bringing suit
or to compromise the interest of the class for personal gain.”

Id.

District courts in the Sixth Circuit have considered the
following factors in determining whether to approve incentive awards
for class representatives:
(1) the action taken by the Class Representatives to
protect the interests of Class Members and others and
whether these actions resulted in a substantial benefit to
Class Members; (2) whether the Class Representatives
assumed substantial direct and indirect financial risk; and
(3) the amount of time and effort spent by the Class
Representatives in pursuing the litigation.
Enterprise Energy Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 137 F.R.D.
240, 250 (S.D. Ohio 1991).

Although the Sixth Circuit has not had

occasion to “lay down a categorical rule one way or the other as to
whether incentive payments are permissible,” the court in Pampers
“made some observations” regarding the propriety of incentive awards:
The propriety of incentive payments is arguably at its
height when the award represents a fraction of a class
representative's likely damages; for in that case the class
representative is left to recover the remainder of his
damages by means of the same mechanisms that unnamed class
members must recover theirs. The members' incentives are
thus aligned. But we should be most dubious of incentive
payments when they make the class representatives whole, or
(as here) even more than whole; for in that case the class
representatives have no reason to care whether the

56

mechanisms available to unnamed class members can provide
adequate relief.
Pampers, 724 F.3d at 722.
In the case presently before the Court, the Settlement Agreement
provides for incentive awards ranging from $1,000 to $5,000.

The

awards will make the Class Representatives more than whole and are
worth many times the value of their claims.

However, the awards have

been tailored to compensate each Class Representative in proportion to
his or her actions, time, and effort in prosecuting this action.
Class Representatives Tartaglia and Bell have served as Class
Representatives since July 2011 and contributed to the drafting of the
Complaint and amended complaints, have responded to written discovery,
have assisted Class Counsel with requests for information, have
reviewed and provided input in settlement, and were subject to
depositions.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for an Award of Class

Representatives’ Enhancement Payments and Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees
and Costs (“Plaintiffs’ Motion for Fees”), Doc. No. 114, pp. 7-8.
Class Representatives Gascho, Buckemeyer, Hogan, Lundberg, Troutman,
Meyer, Rose, and Cay have served as Class Representatives since April
2011 and have made similar contributions, although they were not
subject to depositions.

Id.

Class Representatives Volkerding and

Cary have served as Class Representatives since June 2013 and have
contributed to the drafting of the amended complaints, have assisted
Class Counsel with requests for information, and have reviewed and
provided input regarding the settlement.

Id.

The Class

Representatives’ initiative, time, and effort were essential to the
prosecution of the case and resulted in a significant recovery for the

57

class.

Although the Sixth Circuit has warned that courts should be

“most dubious” of awards that make class representatives more than
whole, see Pampers, 724 F.3d at 722, this Court finds that the awards
in this case are fair, reasonable, and properly based on the benefits
to the class members generated by the litigation.

Accordingly, the

Court concludes that the Settlement Agreement does not give
preferential treatment to the Class Representatives.
3.

Claims Process

The Settlement Agreement provides monetary compensation to any
Class or Subclass member who becomes an Allowed Claimant by filing a
timely and valid claim form signed under penalty of perjury by the
Claim Period Deadline.

Settlement Agreement, § 12.5.

Claim forms

could be requested by telephone, by mail, or online, and could be
submitted online or via U.S. Mail.

Id.

Of the 55,597 Claim Forms

received by the Claims Administrator, 54,129 were submitted online and
1,468 were submitted by U.S. Mail.

Dahl Declaration, ¶ 31.

Both Blackman and the Zik Objectors challenge the claims process
and argue that use of a claims-made process was unfair in this case.
The Zik Objectors argue that the claims process is too cumbersome
because members are required to submit a claim and sign the form
“under penalty of perjury.”

Zik Objections, PAGEID 1945-46.

This is

unnecessary, the Zik Objectors argue, because Global Fitness has all
the information necessary to make payments without using a notice and
claims procedure.

Id.

Similarly, Blackman argues that “[there] is no

legitimate reason why this settlement does not issue direct payments
to known, eligible class members.”

Blackman Objections, PAGEID 2084.

58

According to Blackman, a claims-made settlement procedure is
unnecessary because “defendant’s records house the class members’
identifying information and the objective criteria upon which their
award value is based” and defendant has the information to pay at
least some claims automatically.

Id. at PAGEID 2085.

Blackman argues

that, because the Claims Administrator was able to verify and send
notice to 90.8 percent of the potential class members, at least 90.8
percent of the potential class members could have received payment if
the Settlement Agreement provided for direct payment after settlement
approval.
60.

Blackman Reply, PAGEID 2589; Transcript, PAGEID 2754, 2759-

The objectors also argue that a claims-made process served to

depress class recovery and is evidence of collusion.

See Blackman

Objections, PAGEID 2089; Transcript, PAGEID 2752-53, 2764.
The objectors’ arguments in this regard are contrary to the
testimony of Jeffrey Dahl at the fairness hearing and are therefore
not well taken.
Jeffrey Dahl testified at the fairness hearing that, acting on
behalf of Claims Administrator Dahl Administration, LLC., he oversaw,
and was actively involved in the claims administration process in this
case.

Transcript, PAGEID 2703.

Mr. Dahl has worked for Dahl

Administration, LLC, for approximately five-and-one-half years and was
a founding partner of Rust Consulting, the second largest class action
claims administrator in the nation, where he worked for fifteen years.
Id. at PAGEID 2702.

Mr. Dahl has been personally responsible for the

administration of more than 300 class action settlements and has been

59

involved with the administration of approximately 3,000 settlements.
Id. at PAGEID 2702-03, 2712.
Mr. Dahl testified that, in his experience with 3,000 class
action settlements, most settlements are claims-made and “relatively
few [of the settlements that he has been involved in] -- . . . maybe
less than ten or 20 – [provide for] direct payments[.]”
2712.

Id. at PAGEID

Of the 300 class action settlements handled by Dahl

Administration, LLC, in the past year, only “a handful,” including
three consumer cases, provided for checks to be sent without a claims
process.

Id. at PAGEID 2711.

The three consumer cases referred to

were “insurance cases” where there was “a high reliance on the
defendant data because it w[as] either current or former clients that
had . . . account relationships, and we had data that we knew was
reliable.”

Id.

Mr. Dahl also testified that, of approximately 100

employment cases handled by Dahl Administration, LLC, “maybe ten or
12” were direct payment without a claims process.

Id.

Blackman acknowledges that claims-made settlements are common and
not “inherently objectionable,” but he argues that a claims-made
process should be implemented only when “justified by a legitimate
reason beyond depressing class recovery while simultaneously creating
the illusion of class benefit.”

Blackman Reply, PAGEID 2589.

No

legitimate reason exists here, the objectors argue, because the Claims
Administrator was able to verify and send notice to 90.8 percent of
the potential class members, and thus, could have issued direct
payment to 90.8 percent of the potential class members.

See id.;

Transcript, PAGEID 2754, 2759-60; Zik Objectors’ Reply, PAGEID 2636-37

60

(“The process having fully run its course, the Claims Administrator
has represented to the Court that ‘90.8% of the Postcard Notices were
delivered.’

There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that checks

mailed to class members under the same regime would not have had the
same rate of receipt.”) (citations and emphasis omitted).
The objectors misconstrue the Dahl Declaration and Mr. Dahl’s
testimony.

The Dahl Declaration provides that, “[a]s of November 29,

2013, the Notice reached at least 90.8% of potential Class Members.”
Dahl Declaration, ¶ 45 (emphasis added).

Mr. Dahl clarified at the

fairness hearing that 90.8 percent of the Postcard Notices were
delivered, but there is no “way of definitively saying they actually
reached the class members.”

Transcript, PAGEID 2718.

Moreover, Mr.

Dahl testified that the direct payment cases in which he has been
involved have all “had some sort of current component to the data”
that was known to be reliable, and none had data as out-of-date as
Global Fitness’ data.

See id. at PAGEID 2711-12.

Here, the class includes any individual who signed a gym
membership or personal training contract with Global Fitness between
January 1, 2006, and October 26, 2012, when Global Fitness sold all of
its business assets.

Global Fitness’s data therefore spans a six year

time frame and, at best, is current only as of 2012.

Given the age of

Global Fitness’ data and in light of Mr. Dahl’s testimony, the Court
is satisfied that a claims-made process is appropriate in this case.
To the extent that the objectors challenge the effectiveness of
the claims-based process in this case, the Court notes that the
Settlement Agreement permits claim forms to be submitted online and by

61

mail.

Mr. Dahl testified that the use of such a claim system

typically results in a claim rate twice as high as that resulting from
a paper filing process.

See Transcript, PAGEID 2705-06.

Moreover,

the 8.2 percent10 claim rate in this case is well within the acceptable
range of responses in a consumer class action.

See id. at PAGEID

2721-22 (Mr. Dahl’s testimony that response rates in class actions
generally range from one to 12 percent with a median response rate,
and a normal consumer response rate, of approximately five to eight
percent).
4.

Settlement Negotiations

The Zik Objectors argue that the Settlement Agreement is
procedurally unfair because the Zik Objectors had no opportunity to
participate in settlement negotiations.

Zik Objections, pp. 25-27.

The Zik Objectors also argue that the settlement is unfair because
plaintiffs opposed the Zik Objectors’ motion to intervene.

Id. at p.

28.
The Zik Objectors filed a motion to intervene in this action on
September 25, 2013, see Doc. No. 102, and that motion was denied as
untimely on September 30, 2013.

See Opinion and Order, Doc. No. 110.

The Zik Objectors’ challenge to the Settlement Agreement premised on
an inability to intervene and participate in settlement negotiations
is essentially a challenge to the Court’s order denying the Zik
Objectors’ motion to intervene.

The Zik Objectors have not, however,

persuaded the Court that the previous order should be revisited.

The

Court also notes that the Zik Objectors’ interest in this action is
10

49,808 Allowed Claimants ÷ 605,735 Class members = 8.223% response rate

62

similar to that of every other unnamed class member.

Because the

unnamed class members are adequately represented by Class Counsel and
Class Representatives, the Court finds no procedural unfairness in
excluding the Zik Objectors’ from participation in settlement
negotiations.

See Bailey v. White, 320 F. App’x 364, 366-67 (6th Cir.

2009) (“The purpose for intervening - to investigate and evaluate the
proposed settlement - was satisfied by the opportunity to participate
in the fairness hearing . . . .”).
5.

Release

The Settlement Agreement provides that “each Class Representative
and each Settling Plaintiff shall be deemed to have fully, finally,
and forever jointly and severally released the Released Parties from
all Released Claims.”

Id. at § 15.1.

A Released Claim is defined as

any and all claims, demands, actions, causes of action,
rights, offsets, suits, damages (whether general, special,
punitive, or multiple), lawsuits, liens, costs, losses,
expenses, penalties, or liabilities of any kind whatsoever,
for any relief whatsoever, including monetary, injunctive,
or declaratory relief, or for reimbursement of attorneys’
fees, costs, or expenses, whether known or unknown, whether
direct or indirect (whether by assignment or otherwise),
whether under federal, state, or local law, whether alleged
or not alleged in the Action, whether suspected or
unsuspected, whether contingent or vested, which any of the
Class Representatives or Class Members have had, now have,
or may have in the future against the Released Parties, and
which were raised or which could have been raised in the
Action, and which arose during the Class Period and arise
out of or are related to the factual allegations or are
based on the same factual predicates as alleged in the
Action’s Third Amended Complaint.
This specifically
includes any and all claims for breach of contract, unjust
enrichment,
misrepresentation,
and/or
violations
of
consumer protection acts, health spa acts, or prepaid
entertainment contract statues resulting from Defendant’s
sales,
communications,
contracting,
billing,
and/or
cancellations of any gym or personal training contracts.

63

Settlement Agreement, § 2.23 (emphasis in original).

The Zik

Objectors argue that the release is overbroad because it releases
claims without an identical factual predicate to plaintiffs’ claims.
Transcript, PAGEID 2764-65.

Specifically, the Zik Objectors challenge

the provision releasing claims that “arise out of or are related to
the factual allegations . . . in the Action’s Third Amended
Complaint,” Settlement Agreement, § 2.23.
2764-65.

See Transcript, PAGEID

This objection is not well taken.

“Like any other settlement, this one requires the plaintiffs to
release their claims against the defendant.”
at 220.

See Olden, 294 F. App’x

The Settlement Agreement releases all claims that “arise out

of or are related to the factual allegations or are based on the same
factual predicates as alleged in the Action’s Third Amended
Complaint.”

Settlement Agreement, § 2.23.

The Zik Objectors

challenge the release because it releases claims that “arise out of or
are related to the factual allegations,” and is not expressly limited
to the release of claims with an identical factual predicate as the
settled conduct.

However, a release need not expressly state that it

is limited by “the identical factual predicate doctrine” in order to
be so limited.

See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 388 F.Supp. 2d

319, 342 n.36 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).

In any event, the Court finds that the

release in question is limited to claims that share the same factual
predicate as the settled claims, and therefore is not unfair to that
extent.

See Olden, 294 F. App’x at 220 (“Because such claims have an

identical factual predicate as the claims pled in the complaint, no
problem is posed by their release.”); N. Star Capital Acquisitions,

64

LLC v. Krig, Nos. 3:07–cv–264, 3:07–cv–265, 3:07–cv–266, 3:08–cv–1016,
2011 WL 65662, at *7-8 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2011) (approving the
release of claims “that are based upon, arise out of, or are related
to, or in any way connected with, directly or indirectly, in whole or
in part, [the claims in the lawsuit]”); Taft v. Ackermans, No.
02Civ.7951, 2007 WL 414493, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2007) (approving
the release of “all of the class plaintiffs' claims against the
defendants arising out of or related to the purchase of KPNQwest
securities during the class period,” on the basis that the “release is
. . . limited to claims that share the same factual predicate as the
settled claims”); Spann v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., No. 02Civ.8238, 2005
WL 1330937 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2005) (approving the release of “all
Class members’ claims against the defendants that arise out of or are
related to the claims in this lawsuit”); Levell v. Monsanto Research
Corp., 191 F.R.D. 543, 561-62, 561 n.32 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (approving a
release of claims under “any other federal or state law, regulation,
or rule of any kind and which relate in any way [to the defendant’s]
acts, omissions, disclosures, non-disclosures, or conduct concerning
its operation of the Mound facility, including but not limited to all
allegations set forth or which could have been set forth in the
action”).
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the Settlement
Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and that its approval is
in the best interest of the class.
V.

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

65

The Settlement Agreement provides that Global Fitness will pay
the reasonable attorneys’ fees and actual costs awarded by the Court,
not to exceed $2,390,000.

Settlement Agreement, § 9.1.

On December

9, 2013, Class Counsel filed Plaintiffs’ Motion for Fees, requesting
an award of attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $2,390,000.

In

accordance with the “clear sailing” provision of the settlement, see
Settlement Agreement, § 9.2, Global Fitness has not opposed the
application for fees.

The objectors argue that the fee request is

excessive and that the class was not given reasonable notice of the
fee request.

Specifically, the Zik Objectors argue that notice of the

fee request was not directed to the class in a reasonable manner
because the fee request was not disclosed on the Postcard Notice.
Zik Objections, PAGEID 1946-47.

See

Blackman argues that notice of the

fee request was not directed to class members in a reasonable manner
because the notice did not specify how an award of attorneys’ fees
will be divided among Class Counsel.

Blackman Objections, PAGEID

2107-10.
“In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable
attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by
the parties’ agreement.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h).

“A claim for an

award must be made by motion under Rule 54(d)(2) . . . .”
Civ. P. 23(h)(1).

Fed. R.

“Notice of the motion must be served on all parties

and, for motions by class counsel, directed to class members in a
reasonable manner.”

Id.

Rule 54(d)(2) requires those claiming

attorneys’ fees to timely file a motion specifying the grounds
entitling the movant to the award and stating the amount sought.

66

As discussed supra, notice was provided by postcard, email and
reminder email, publication, and via a settlement website.

Although,

as the Zik Objectors argue, the Postcard Notice does not advise
potential class members of Class Counsel’s fee request, notice of the
fee request was included on the long-form notice.

Specifically, the

long-form notice expressly advised that Global Fitness “has agreed to
pay . . . Class Counsel’s reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation
costs in an amount no greater than $2,390,000.”
attached to Dahl Declaration as Exhibit C, p. 3.

Long-Form Notice,
The long-form notice

also advised class members of the date, time, and location of the
fairness hearing, advised that the Court will “be asked to approve
Class Counsel’s request for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs” at the hearing,
and that “[a]ny Class or Subclass Member who does not file an Opt-Out
Request may object to the proposed settlement and/or the award of
attorneys’ fees and expenses” during the fairness hearing.
5.

Id. at p.

The long-form notice was posted on the settlement website, the

address of which is prominently posted on the Postcard Notice, longform notice, email and reminder email, and publication notice, and
similar information regarding attorneys’ fees and objections was
included in a “Frequently Asked Questions” section of the website.
The notice informed class members of the potential for an award of
attorneys’ fees and costs, the amount of fees and costs that Global
Fitness agreed to pay, that the award was subject to court approval at
the fairness hearing, and that class members would have the
opportunity to object to the award at the fairness hearing.

Class

Counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees and notice of intent to divide a

67

fee award in proportion to each firm’s lodestar value were also filed
well in advance of the fairness hearing.

The Court therefore finds

that notice of the request for attorneys’ fees and costs has been
“directed to class members in a reasonable manner.”
23(h)(1).

Fed. R. Civ. P.

See also Newberg on Class Actions § 8:25 (5th ed.) (“Yet

other than requiring that the notice be made ̔in a reasonable manner,’
Rule 23 does not dictate any specific content that the notice must
contain.

The fee notice's content is primarily dictated by Rule

23(h)(2)’s guarantee that class members have the right to object to
the fee motion.”); Bessey v. Packerland Plainwell, Inc., No. 4:06-cv95, 2007 WL 3173972, at *1-3 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 26, 2007) (approving
notice of class counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees where class
members were notified of the maximum amount of attorneys’ fees counsel
intended to seek and of the right to object, but were not notified of
the proposed apportionment of fees among class counsel).
“When awarding attorney’s fees in a class action, a court must
make sure that counsel is fairly compensated for the amount of work
done as well as for the results achieved.”

Rawlings v. Prudential-

Bache Props., Inc., 9 F.3d 513, 516 (6th Cir. 1993).

“In general,

there are two methods for calculating attorney's fees: the lodestar
and the percentage-of-the-fund.”

Van Horn v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas.

Ins. Co., 436 F. App’x 496, 498 (6th Cir. 2011).
The lodestar method better accounts for the amount of work
done, while the percentage of the fund method more
accurately
reflects
the
results
achieved.
For
these
reasons, it is necessary that district courts be permitted
to select the more appropriate method for calculating
attorney's fees in light of the unique characteristics of
class actions in general, and of the unique circumstances
of the actual cases before them.

68

Rawlings, 9 F.3d at 516 (internal citations omitted).
To determine the “lodestar” figure, a court multiplies the number
of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly
rate.

Bldg. Serv. Local 47 Cleaning Contractors Pension Plan v.

Grandview Raceway, 46 F.3d 1392, 1401 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).

The court “may then, within

limits, adjust the ‘lodestar’ to reflect relevant considerations
peculiar to the subject litigation.”

Adcock-Ladd v. Sec’y of

Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Reed v. Rhodes,
179 F.3d 453, 471-72 (6th Cir. 1999).

“̔In contrast, under the

percentage of the fund method, the court simply determines a
percentage of the settlement to award the class counsel.’”

Londardo,

706 F.Supp. 2d at 789 (quoting In re Sulzer Hip Prosthesis & Knee
Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 268 F.Supp. 2d 907, 922 (N.D. Ohio 2003))
(internal quotations and alterations omitted).

District courts have

discretion to select the particular method of calculation.
9 F.3d at 516.

Rawlings,

Even so, a district court must articulate the “reasons

for ‘adopting a particular methodology and the factors considered in
arriving at the fee.’”

Moulton, 581 F.3d at 352 (quoting Rawlings, 9

F.3d at 516)).
Often, but by no means invariably, the explanation will
address these factors: “(1) the value of the benefit
rendered to the plaintiff class; (2) the value of the
services on an hourly basis; (3) whether the services were
undertaken on a contingent fee basis; (4) society's stake
in rewarding attorneys who produce such benefits in order
to maintain an incentive to others; (5) the complexity of
the litigation; and (6) the professional skill and standing
of counsel involved on both sides.”

69

Moulton, 581 F.3d at 352 (quoting Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 102 F.3d
777, 780 (6th Cir. 1996)).

See also Ramey v. Cincinnati Enquirer,

Inc., 508 F.2d 1188, 1196 (6th Cir. 1974).
Class Counsel asks the Court to apply the lodestar method in
calculating the fee award.

See Transcript, PAGEID 2739, 2777.

In

contrast, Blackman argues that the lodestar method will result in an
unreasonable award of attorneys’ fees and permit Class Counsel to
retain a disproportionate amount of the settlement proceeds.
Blackman Objections, PAGEID 2099-2106.

See

In essence, Blackman argues

that it is improper for Class Counsel to receive an award of
attorneys’ fees that is greater than the total payments to the Class
and Subclasses and that any fee award should be limited to 25 percent
of the actual recovery by Allowed Claimants.

See id. at PAGEID 2092-

93, 2099-2103; Blackman’s Reply, PAGEID 2597-99.

Blackman’s arguments

to the contrary notwithstanding, the Court finds that the lodestar
method is appropriate in this case.
First, Class Counsel undertook the litigation on a contingent fee
basis and devoted substantial time and energy to the action despite
the risk of not being compensated.

The risk of Class Counsel’s

undertaking is significant; Class Counsel devoted approximately 8,684
hours in connection with the litigation, see December 2013 McCormick
Declaration, ¶¶ 6, 8-10; Troutman Declaration, ¶¶ 6, 8-11, without any
guarantee of receiving a benefit.

Second, many of plaintiffs’ claims

involve fee shifting statutes, see KRS 367.930(2); O.R.C. §
1345.09(F)(2), the purpose of which is to induce a capable attorney to
undertake representation in litigation that may not otherwise be

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economically viable.

See Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S.

542, 552 (2010); Einhorn v. Ford Motor Co., 48 Ohio St. 3d 27, 30
(Ohio 1990).

Given the purpose of fee shifting statutes and “the goal

of class actions — i.e., to provide a vehicle for collective action to
pursue redress for tortious conduct that it is not feasible for an
individual litigant to pursue,” Lonardo, 706 F.Supp. 2d at 795, there
is a substantial public interest in compensating Class Counsel for the
amount of work done in this action.

Similarly, Class Counsel should

be awarded for the risk of undertaking representation on a contingent
basis, especially considering the complexity of this action and the
professional skill of opposing counsel.

Further, limiting an award to

a percentage of the actual recovery by Allowed Claimants, as Blackman
suggests, could dissuade counsel from undertaking similar consumer
class actions in the future.
In general, the percentage of the fund method is preferred in
common fund cases.

See Rawlings, 9 F.3d at 515 (“We are aware of the

recent trend towards adoption of a percentage of the fund method in
such cases.”).

This is not, however, a common fund case because the

provision for attorneys’ fees in the Settlement Agreement is
independent of the award to the Class and Subclasses.

Where, as here,

the results achieved are substantial, the interest in fairly
compensating counsel for the amount of work done is great.

Under the

circumstances of this case, the lodestar method will best ensure that
Class Counsel is fairly compensated for their time, see id. at 516
(“The lodestar method better accounts for the amount of work done . .
. .”), and it will fairly account for the risk to Class Counsel and

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the policy underlying the fee shifting statutes.

See Perdue, 559 U.S.

at 552 (“First, a ̔reasonable̔ fee is a fee that is sufficient to
induce a capable attorney to undertake the representation of a
meritorious civil rights case. . . .

[T]he lodestar method yields a

fee that is presumptively sufficient to achieve this objective.”).
As noted supra, the lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying
the proven number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a
reasonable hourly rate.

See Grandview Raceway, 46 F.3d at 1401.

Class Counsel submits that, as of November 30, 2013, the Isaac Wiles
firm billed 2,466.18 hours in connection with the litigation and the
Vorys firm billed 6,218 hours in connection with the litigation, at
rates ranging from $180 per hour to $450 per hour.

December 2013

McCormick Declaration, ¶¶ 6, 8-10; Troutman Declaration, ¶¶ 6, 8-11.
Based on the standard hourly rates charged by each firm, the lodestar
value for the time is $2,452,010.

December 2013 McCormick

Declaration, ¶ 6; Troutman Declaration, ¶ 6.

Class Counsel also

submits that, as of November 30, 2013, $65,032.86 in necessary costs
and expenses have been incurred in connection with depositions,
mediation, outside professional services, mileage, lodging, copying,
and research and administrative services.

December 2013 McCormick

Declaration, ¶ 11; Troutman Declaration, ¶¶ 5, 12.
Although the best practice may have been to submit more detailed
records of the costs and time expended in the litigation, see e.g.,
Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 553 (6th Cir.
2008) (“The key requirement for an award of attorney fees is that
‘[t]he documentation offered in support of the hours charged must be

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of sufficient detail and probative value to enable the court to
determine with a high degree of certainty that such hours were
actually and reasonably expended in the prosecution of the
litigation.’ . . . Although counsel need not ‘record in great detail’
each minute he or she spent on an item, ‘the general subject matter
should be identified.’”) (internal citations omitted); Rawlings, 9
F.3d at 516-17 (“District courts must pore over time sheets . . . .”);
Lonardo, 706 F.Supp. 2d at 793 (detailing the time and rate for every
hour expended on the litigation), the Court is satisfied that the
number of hours billed and hourly rates of Class Counsel are
reasonable.

Class Counsel has averred under penalty of perjury that

the hours expended and costs incurred in the litigation were
reasonably necessary to prosecute the action.

December 2013 McCormick

Declaration, ¶ 12; Troutman Declaration, ¶¶ 11, 14.

Class Counsel’s

hourly rates are also consistent with those in the market and the
Court’s experience.

See e.g., In re Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc., 398

F.3d 778 (6th Cir. 2005); Johnson v. Midwest Logistics Sys., Ltd., No.
2:11-cv-1061, 2013 WL 2295880 (S.D. Ohio May 24, 2013); Lowther v. AK
Steel Corp., No. 1:11-cv-877, 2012 WL 6676131 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21,
2012).

Finally, the Court notes that Class Counsel has not billed for

a significant number of attorney hours expended after the date of
settlement, see Transcript, PAGEID 2733 (Class Counsel’s
representation that their lodestar value is now “just shy of $2.8
million.”), the fee request results in a lodestar multiplier of less
than one and, despite vigorous objections to other aspects of the
settlement, there has been no objection to the reasonableness of the

73

hourly rates or the hours expended on the litigation.

Considering the

relief obtained for the class, the risk undertaken by Class Counsel,
the skill of counsel for both side, society’s stake in rewarding
attorneys for benefits secured for the class, and the complexity and
duration of the litigation, all discussed supra, the Court finds that
an award of attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $2,390,000 is
reasonable.
Although “perfectly justified in awarding a fee based on the
lodestar analysis alone,” Van Horn, 436 F. App’x at 501, district
courts often employ both the lodestar and percentage of the fund
methods, using each as a cross-check against the other.

See e.g.,

Lonardo, 706 F.Supp. 2d at 796-97; In re Sulzer Hip Prosthesis, 268
F.Supp. 2d at 923.

“The first step in the percentage of the fund

method is to determine the total monetary value of the Settlement
Agreement to the Settlement Class — i.e., the “̔Total Class Benefit.’”
Londardo, 706 F.Supp. 2d at 797 (quoting In re Sulzer Hip Prosthesis,
268 F.Supp. 2d at 922).
The Settlement Agreement requires Global Fitness to pay
administration costs of the Claim Administrator estimated at $496,259,
attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $2.39 million, and monetary
compensation to any Class or Subclass member who becomes an Allowed
Claimant.

See Settlement Agreement, §§ 6.1, 9.1, 10.1; Long-Form

Notice, p. 3.

Global Fitness’s independent agreement to pay

administration costs and attorneys’ fees and costs is a benefit to the
class and is included in the Total Class Benefit.
F.Supp. 2d. at 802-03.

74

See Lonardo, 706

The Settlement Agreement provides for an available benefit to
Class and Subclass members of $15,500,430;11 however, the overall
payment to Allowed Claimants will be only $1,593,240.00.
Supplemental Dahl Declaration, ¶ 9.

Second

Blackman argues that the Court

should ignore the available benefit and “make the proper comparison
between the fee award and the amount actually claimed by the class
members.”

Blackman Objections, PAGEID 2093.

PAGEID 2755-56.

See also Transcript,

Plaintiffs argue that the entire available benefit

should be considered in determining a fee award or, alternatively,
that a fee award should be based on the midpoint between the available
benefit and the actual payments to class members.

Plaintiffs’ Motion

for Fees, p. 15.
In Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980), the United
States Supreme Court upheld an award of attorneys’ fees in a class
action where the award was based on the total fund available to the
class rather than the amount actually recovered.

Id. at 480 (“Their

right to share the harvest of the lawsuit upon proof of their
identity, whether or not they exercise it, is a benefit in the fund
created by the efforts of the class representatives and their
counsel.”).

Nevertheless, courts are “split regarding how the value

11

Plaintiffs represent in various contexts that the available benefit is
equal to $19 million, Motion for Preliminary Approval, Doc. No. 97, p. 6,
$17.5 million, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Fees, pp. 1, 15 n.8, or $17 million,
Plaintiffs’ Response, PAGEID 2255. Plaintiffs do not, however, provide their
method for calculating these numbers. The Court calculates the Available
Benefit as the total monetary compensation that Global Fitness is required to
pay to Class and Subclass members under the Settlement Agreement if every
potential class member becomes an Allowed Claimant: Available benefit =
(605,735 potential Class members x $5) + (300,017 potential FIF Subclass
members x $15) + (323,518 potential Gym Cancel Subclass members x $20) +
(50,038 potential Personal Training Cancel Subclass members x $30).

75

of the Benefit Fund should be calculated[;]” some courts “calculate[]
attorneys’ fees using the percentage of the fund method based only
upon the amount actually claimed” and others “use the Available
Benefit as the measure of the Benefit Fund.”
at 799 (collecting cases).

Londardo, 706 F.Supp. 2d

In addressing arguments similar to those

made here, the court in Lonardo devised a compromise to avoid
decoupling class counsel’s interest from those of the class while
adhering to the Boeing principle by incorporating the value of the
available benefit into the assessment of the benefit fund.
799-802.

Id. at

The compromise in Lonardo provided for the calculation of

attorneys’ fees based on the “mid-point between the Available Benefit
and the Actual Payment.”

Id.

In making this compromise, the court

recognized that it would be improper to calculate attorneys’ fees
based solely on actual payments to class members.

See id. at 801-02.

Specifically, the court noted that both the Second and Ninth Circuits
have found that it is an abuse of discretion for a district court to
award fees based solely on actual recovery and without regard to the
Boeing principle.

Id. (citing Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency,

Inc., 473 F.3d 423, 437 (2nd Cir. 2007); Williams v. MGM-Pathe
Commc’ns Co., 129 F.3d 1026, 1027 (9th Cir. 1997)).

The Court finds

the reasoning in Lonardo persuasive and therefore declines to
calculate attorneys’ fees based solely on actual recovery without
regard to available benefit.

The Court also finds that the mid-point

method adopted in Lonardo will sufficiently protect the interests of
the class against the risk of the actual distribution being
misallocated between attorneys’ fees and the class recovery, while at

76

the same time adhering to the principle of Boeing that the right to
share in the harvest of the lawsuit is a benefit to the class.
Boeing, 444 U.S. at 480.

See

Accordingly, the Court finds that, for

purposes of the percentage of the fund cross-check, the potential
monetary compensation to class members should be valued at $8,546,835,
i.e., the midpoint between the Available Benefit of $15,500,430 and
the actual payment of $1,593,240.
For purposes of the percentage of the fund cross-check, then, the
Settlement Agreement provides a benefit to the class totaling
$11,433,094.12

Class Counsel’s requested fee of $2,390,000 is equal to

approximately 21 percent of this class benefit.13

This percentage is

well within the acceptable range for a fee award in a class action.
See Lonardo, 706 F.Supp. 2d at 803 (26.4%); Kritzer v. Safelite
Solutions, LLC, No. 2:10-cv-0729, 2012 WL 1945144, at *9 (S.D. Ohio
May 30, 2012) (52%); In re Telectronics, 137 F.Supp. 2d at 1042
(“Generally, in common fund cases, the fee percentages range from 10
to 30 percent (10%-30%) of the common fund created.”).

Furthermore,

as discussed supra, $2.39 million is a reasonable fee award based on
the analysis of the six Ramey factors.

Accordingly, the percentage of

the fund cross-check confirms that an award of attorneys’ fees and
costs in the amount of $2,390,000 is reasonable.
The Zik Objectors also request a reasonable incentive payment and
attorneys’ fee for their efforts in pursuing the Zik Action.
Objections, PAGEID 1948-49.

Zik

“Fees and costs may be awarded to the

12

$8,546,835 + attorneys’ fees and costs of $2,390,000 + administration
costs of $496,259 = $11,433,094 Total Class Benefit
13
$2,390,000 ÷ $11,433,094 = 20.904 %

77

counsel for objectors to a class action settlement if the work of the
counsel produced a beneficial result for the class.”
App'x at 221.

Olden, 294 F.

See also Lonardo, 706 F.Supp. 2d at 803-04 (“Sixth

Circuit case law recognizes that awards of attorneys’ fees to
objectors may be appropriate where the objector provided a benefit to
the class by virtue of their objection.”).

However, the Court has not

found any objections meritorious, and the Zik Objectors have not
provided any legal justification for an award by this Court to an
unsuccessful objector or an attorney prosecuting a separation action.
Accordingly, the Zik Objectors’ request for attorneys’ fees is without
merit.
WHEREUPON, based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that
plaintiffs have met their burden of showing that the prerequisites for
the certification of a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and Rule
23(b)(3) have been satisfied in this case, that the Settlement
Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and that Class Counsel’s
requested award of fees and expenses is fair and reasonable.
Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that
(a) because the proposed settlement of the action on the
terms and conditions set forth in the Settlement Agreement
is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interest of
the Class and Subclasses, the Settlement Agreement be
finally approved by the Court;
(b) the Class and Subclasses be finally certified for
settlement purposes;
(c) the Action be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the
terms of the Settlement Agreement;
(d) Settling Plaintiffs be bound by the release set forth
in the Settlement Agreement;

78

(e) Class Counsel be awarded reasonable fees and
reimbursement of expenses in the amount of $2,390,000,
(f) Class Representatives be awarded the Class
Representative Enhancement Payments in the amounts
specified in the Settlement Agreement, and
(g) Global Fitness’s Motion to Strike Objection of Joshua
Blackman, Doc. No. 125, be denied.
If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report
and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file
and serve on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation,
specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part
thereof in question, as well as the basis for objection thereto.
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

28

Response to objections

must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy
thereof.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to
the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to
de novo review by the District Judge and of the right to appeal the
decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation.
See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of
Teachers, Local 231 etc., 829 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

April 4, 2014

s/Norah McCann King_______
Norah McCann King
United States Magistrate Judge

79