Hillman v. Edwards

Filing 10

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS. Signed by Judge George C Smith on 9-6-11. (ga)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

ROBERT L. HILLMAN,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action 2:11-cv-00501
Judge George C. Smith
Magistrate Judge E.A. Preston Deavers

v.

WILLIAM JOSEPH EDWARDS,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court for consideration of the Magistrate Judge’s July 18, 2011
Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 4) as well as Plaintiff’s Objections (ECF Nos. 6, 7, 9).
For the reasons that follow, the Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED and Plaintiff’s
Objections are OVERRULED.
The Magistrate Judge issued the Report and Recommendation pursuant to an initial screen
of Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis Complaint. She recommended that the Court dismiss this action
without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Magistrate Judge specifically
concluded that because Plaintiff was attempting to appeal judicial rulings from his earlier statecourt action, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded jurisdiction.1
Plaintiff objected to the Report and Recommendation on July 27, 2011. With leave from
the Court, he also submitted supplemental briefing in support of his Objections. His primary
contention appears to be that he is not appealing the judgments of the state courts, but has instead

1

In his underlying state-court case, Plaintiff attempted to bring various claims, including
malpractice, against his former attorney, the named Defendant in this case.

brought an independent claim against the state courts of Ohio and Defendant.2 Plaintiff cites case
law, including decisions of this Court, for the general premise that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
does not bar claims that are independent from challenges to a state-court judgment, even if such
claims deny conclusions the state courts reached. See, e.g., Hines v. Franklin Savings & Loan,
No. 1:09-cv-914, 2011 WL 882976, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2011); Smith v. Encore Credit
Corp., 623 F. Supp.2d 910, 916 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
If a party objects within the allotted time to a report and recommendation, the Court “shall
make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Upon review, the Court
“may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from premise that “only the Supreme Court of the
United States has the jurisdiction to review state court decisions.” Coleman v. Governor of
Michigan, 413 F. App’x 866, 870 (6th Cir. 2011). As the United States Supreme Court has held,
the doctrine “is confined to . . . cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused
by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indust. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
In light of Exxon, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has emphasized
that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only to attacks on state-court judgments and not
independent claims. McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006). The Sixth
2

To the extent Plaintiff contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine itself is
unconstitutional, this objection is without merit.
2

Circuit set forth the following approach for differentiating between the two scenarios :
The inquiry then is the source of the injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal
complaint. If the source of the injury is the state court decision, then the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine would prevent the district court from asserting jurisdiction.
If there is some other source of injury, such as a third party’s actions, then the plaintiff
asserts an independent claim.
Id.
The Court finds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes the Court from exercising
jurisdiction in this case. Plaintiff is certainly correct that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not
apply to independent claims. Within his Complaint, however, he states no independent claims.
Even construing plaintiff’s pro se Complaint liberally, as the Court must, the only reasonable way
to interpret it is as a request for review of the state-court judgments in his underlying state-court
case. Plaintiff opens his Complaint by stating, “[t]his is an appeal from the Ohio Supreme Court’s
May 25, 2011 Judgment entered in the above captioned case . . . .” (Compl. 1, ECF No. 3.) He
then lays out seven “Assignments of Error.” (Id. at i–ii.) The concrete actions that form the basis
for these assignments of error are the various procedural and substantive rulings of the trial court,
the appellate court, and the Ohio Supreme Court in Plaintiff’s state-court action. Finally, Plaintiff
concludes his Complaint by attaching an “Appendix” consisting of various documents from the
state-court proceedings including the complaint, two decisions of the state appellate court, and
the entry of the Ohio Supreme Court declining jurisdiction.
Under these circumstances, the Court concludes that the sources of Plaintiff’s injury, as
laid out in his Complaint, are the state-court decisions themselves. The Court recognizes that
Plaintiff’s underlying state action was based on allegations that the named Defendant engaged in
misconduct. Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s Complaint makes no attempt to state an independent claim

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based on these actions. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s attempt at the objections stage to recast his
allegations as claims for conspiracy against the state courts is insufficient to avoid the RookerFeldman doctrine. See Wallis v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 11–1181, 2011 WL 4396973, at *2 (7th
Cir. Sept. 22, 2011) (“[The plaintiff”] cannot circumvent the Rooker–Feldman doctrine by
recasting a request for the district court to review state-court rulings as a complaint about civil
rights, due process, conspiracy, or RICO violations.”). Once again, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
applies because the actual actions Plaintiff alleges have caused him injury are the state-court
rulings. See Reguli v. Guffee, 371 F. App’x 590, 593 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that claim that a
juvenile court official “conspired” against plaintiff was insufficient to avoid dismissal under
Rooker-Feldman where “[t]he injury alleged . . . [was] a direct result of the judicial order”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objections (ECF Nos. 6, 7, 9) are OVERRULED and the Report
and Recommendation (ECF No. 4) is ADOPTED. This action is DISMISSED without prejudice
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.3 Additionally, the Court CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal of this action would not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ George C. Smith
GEORGE C. SMITH, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

3

Plaintiff implies that it is contradictory to conclude that the Court lacks jurisdiction
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but then dismiss the case without prejudice. Nevertheless,
“[d]ismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction should normally be without prejudice, since by
definition the court lacks power to reach the merits of the case.” Revere v. Wilmington Fin., 406
F. App’x 936, 937 (6th Cir. 2011).
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