Worcester v. Lambes et al

Filing 31

OPINION AND ORDER denying 26 Defendants Spain and MVP's Motion to Stay. Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Preston Deavers on 1/4/2012. (er1)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
WILLIAM WORCESTER,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action 2:11-cv-548
Judge Algenon L. Marbley
Magistrate Judge E.A. Preston Deavers

v.

AMY LAMBES, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for consideration of Defendants Jim Spain and
Muskingum Valley Presbytery’s Motion to Stay Discovery Pending Resolution of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction. (ECF No. 26.) For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion to Stay is
DENIED.
I.
On June 21, 2011, Plaintiff, William Worcester, filed this action against Defendants Amy
E. Lambes, Just-A-Click, Inc., Jim Spain, and the Muskingum Valley Presbytery (“MVP”).
According to Plaintiff, Defendants Lambes and Just-A-Click, Inc. unlawfully accessed and/or
intercepted his personal emails. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lambes then disclosed those
emails to Defendant Spain, an agent of Plaintiff’s employer, Defendant MVP. Plaintiff further
alleges that Defendant Spain directed Lambes to retrieve hard copies of the emails so that he
could further disclose the emails to other MVP agents. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that as a result
of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, he suffered emotional distress and MVP terminated his
employment as a pastor. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts causes of action arising

under provisions of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., and the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq., as well various state-law claims.
During the Court’s November 30, 2011 Preliminary Pretrial Conference, Defendants
Spain and MVP indicated that they would be filing a motion to dismiss based upon the
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, also know as the church autonomy doctrine or ministerial
exception. On December 13, 2011, Defendants Spain and MVP filed the subject Motion to Stay.
(ECF No. 26.) Defendants Spain and MVP assert that a stay of discovery is appropriate because
their forthcoming motion to dismiss will be dispositive of whether or not this Court has subject
matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against them. Plaintiff opposes the Motion to Stay,
asserting that the presence of a dispositive motion is generally insufficient to justify staying
discovery.
II.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “permit[] a district court to issue a protective order
staying discovery during the pendency of a motion for ‘good cause shown.’” Bowens v.
Columbus Metro. Library Bd. of Trs., No. 2:10-cv-00219, 2010 WL 3719245, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 16, 2010) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)). To determine whether a stay is appropriate, “a
court weighs the burden of proceeding with discovery upon the party from whom discovery is
sought against the hardship which would be worked by a denial of discovery.” Id. at *1. “When
a stay, rather than a prohibition, of discovery is sought, the burden upon the party requesting the
stay is less than if he were requesting a total freedom from discovery.” Williamson v. Recovery
Ltd. P’ship, No. 2:06-CV-0292, 2010 WL 546349, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2010) (citing
Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, 706 F.2d 1488, 1493 (7th Cir. 1983)). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has recognized that “[l]imitations on pretrial
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discovery are appropriate where claims may be dismissed ‘based on legal determinations that
could not have been altered by any further discovery.’” Gettings v. Bldg. Laborers Local 310
Fringe Benefits Fund, 349 F.3d 300, 304 (6th Cir. 2003). This Court, however, retains broad
discretion in determining whether to “stay discovery until preliminary questions which may
dispose of the case are answered.” Bangas v. Potter, 145 F. App’x 139, 141 (6th Cir. 2005)
(citing Hahn v. Star Bank, 190 F.3d 708, 719 (6th Cir. 1999)).
In exercising its discretion in this area, the Court has frequently found that “the fact that a
party has filed a case-dispositive motion is usually deemed insufficient to support a stay of
discovery.” Bowens, 2010 WL 3719245 at *2 (citing Ohio Bell Telephone Co., Inc. v. Global
NAPs Ohio, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-0549, 2008 WL 641252, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 4, 2008)) (denying
the defendants’ motion to stay discovery despite their pending summary judgment motion); see
also Williams v. New Day Farms, LLC, No. 2:10-cv-0394, 2010 WL 3522397, at *1–2 (S.D Ohio
Sept. 7, 2010) (“unless the motion raises an issue such as immunity from suit . . . or unless it is
patent that the case lacks merit and will almost certainly be dismissed, a stay should not
ordinarily be granted to a party who has filed a garden-variety Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”) The
Court has noted various reasons for this general approach:
The intention of a party to move for judgment on the pleadings is not ordinarily
sufficient to justify a stay of discovery. 4 J. Moore, Federal Practice § 26.70[2],
at 461. Had the Federal Rules contemplated that a motion to dismiss under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) would stay discovery, the Rules would contain a provision to
that effect. In fact, such a notion is directly at odds with the need for expeditious
resolution of litigation. . . . Since motions to dismiss are a frequent part of federal
practice, this provision only makes sense if discovery is not to be stayed pending
resolution of such motions. Furthermore, a stay of the type requested by
defendants, where a party asserts that dismissal is likely, would require the court
to make a preliminary finding of the likelihood of success on the motion to
dismiss. This would circumvent the procedures for resolution of such a motion.
Although it is conceivable that a stay might be appropriate where the complaint
was utterly frivolous, or filed merely in order to conduct a “fishing expedition” or
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for settlement value, cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
741, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 1928, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975), this is not such a case.
Williams, 2010 WL 3522397 at *2 (quoting Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 133 F.R.D. 39, 40
(N.D. Cal. 1990)).
III.
The Court concludes that Defendants Spain and MVP have failed to demonstrate that a
stay of discovery is justified. First, as detailed above, the Court generally requires more than the
mere presence or plan to file a case-dispositive motion to stay discovery. Second, even if the
Court were to grant Defendant Spain and MVP’s forthcoming motion to dismiss, it would not
dispose of the entire case; Defendants Lambes and Just-A-Click, Inc. will remain.
Finally, the Court cannot conclude that it is highly likely that the forthcoming motion to
dismiss will be granted.1 See Ohio Bell Telelphone, 2008 WL 641252 at *2 (refusing to stay
discovery during the pendency of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
where the jurisdictional issue raised was “fairly debatable,” but noting that the court “might be
persuaded to grant a stay of discovery if the issues were “clear-cut” such that “the likelihood of a
jurisdictional dismissal were high”). Certainly, where it is clear that the Court lacks the
authority to hear a case, requiring a party to participate in discovery is problematic. Here,
however, the viability of the forthcoming motion is at least debatable. The expressed basis for
Defendants Spain and MVP’s forthcoming motion to dismiss is the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine, also known as the ministerial exception. “The ministerial exception is rooted in the
First Amendment’s guarantees of religious freedom.” EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical

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To be clear, the Court is not opining on the merits of Defendant Spain and MVP’s
forthcoming motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769, 776 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). The Sixth Circuit
has explained that as applied, “the doctrine precludes subject matter jurisdiction over claims
involving the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministerial
employees, based on the institution’s constitutional right to be free from judicial interference in
the selection of those employees.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In this
case, without deciding whether the doctrine applies, the Court finds that Plaintiff has advanced
colorable arguments that the claims he asserts against Defendants fall outside the purview of the
ministerial exception. Plaintiff emphasizes that the claims he asserts against Defendants do not
implicate matters of faith, doctrine, church governance, or polity because they are premised upon
“purely secular” allegations concerning Defendants’ purported interception and disclosure of his
emails. (See Pl.’s Mem. in Opp. 6, ECF No. 30.) In doing so, he acknowledges that MVP’s
decision to terminate him may be a matter of internal church autonomy, but points out that he
does not allege a claim for wrongful discharge or otherwise challenge MVP’s authority to fire
him.
IV.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Defendants Spain and MVP,
like most defendants, should not be excused from discovery simply because they intend to raise
an issue that may ultimately lead to their dismissal from this action. Consequently, their Motion
to Stay is DENIED. (ECF No. 26.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: January 4, 2012

/s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers
Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers
United States Magistrate Judge

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