Bradford v. US Bank National Assn. et al
Filing
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ORDER granting 7 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Gregory L Frost on 12/27/11. (sem1)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL BRADFORD,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:11-cv-825
JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST
Magistrate Judge Mark R. Abel
v.
US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 7) and
Plaintiff’s memorandum in opposition to Defendants’ motion (ECF No. 16). For the reasons the
follow, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion.
I. Background
The facts in this section are taken from the complaint (ECF No. 4) and the state court
record in the foreclosure action US Bank National Association, etc. v. Michael H. Bradford, et
al., Case No. 07-CV-E-12-1513 (“State Court Action”) decided by the Common Please Court of
Delaware Ohio, of which this Court takes judicial notice. See Walburn v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 972 n.5 (6th Cir. 2005); Buck v. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, 597 F.3d
812, 816 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Although typically courts are limited to the pleadings when faced
with a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may take judicial notice of other court proceedings
without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.”).
On December 1, 2004, Plaintiff Michael Bradford purchased a residential dwelling
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located at 6893 South Section Line Road, Delaware, Ohio 43015. Bradford’s purchase of the
property was financed by a loan from Aegis Funding Corporation, evidenced by a note in the
amount of $320,800.00. Repayment of the loan was secured by a mortgage against the property
in the amount of $320,800.00. In the State Court Action, the Delaware County Court of
Common Pleas found that Defendant US Bank is the current holder of the note and mortgage and
a judgment was entered in its favor.
US Bank filed the State Court Action on December 14, 2007 and filed an amended
complaint on November 4, 2008. Mr. Bradford filed an answer, denying the allegations
contained in the foreclosure complaint and asserting various counterclaims against US Bank. On
April 2, 2010, the state court granted US Bank’s motion for summary judgment, finding that
funds were due to US Bank on the promissory note and that US Bank was entitled to enforce the
mortgage as the current holder/owner of the note and mortgage. The state court also dismissed
Bradford’s counterclaims, finding that he had released the claims by accepting a loan
modification.
After issuance of the decision on summary judgment, and also on April 2, 2010, the state
court issued a final judgment entry. In that entry, the court found that Mr. Bradford owed US
Bank$356,423.56 plus interest at an annual rate of 10.18% from April 1, 2008. The court
provided Bradford three days to pay the amount in full or the property would be foreclosed and
sold by the Sheriff of Delaware County pursuant to specific instructions given in the judgment
entry.
On April 13, 2011, Mr. Bradford filed a motion for leave to file a delayed appeal on this
decree of foreclosure in favor of US Bank in the State Court Action. On May 25, 2011, the Fifth
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District Court of Appeals of Ohio denied Bradford’s motion to file a delayed appeal and assessed
costs to him.
On June 27, 2011, the state court approved and confirmed the Sheriff’s sale of the
property for the amount of $191,000.00. No appeal was taken from this final, appealable order.
On August 16, 2011, Mr. Bradford, represented by counsel, filed the current action in the
Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, requesting a temporary restraining order to delay the
pending eviction and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. On August 22, 2011, the
state court issued a “Judgment Entry” on “Count 1 of [Bradford’s] complaint for “Emergency
Temporary and Permanent Injunctive Relief” because he failed to comply with Ohio Civil Rule
65. On the same day, the state court also issued a “Judgment Entry” denying Bradford’s
“Request for a Temporary Restraining Order to Stay Eviction.”
II. Standards
A. Pro Se Litigants
In this case, as in the State Court Action, Plaintiff has at times had counsel and at times
has not. Plaintiff had counsel at the time he filed this action, but is currently proceeding without
the assistance of counsel. A pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a
less stringent standard than are formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-21(1972); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A court should make a
reasonable attempt to read the pleadings of a pro se litigant to state a valid claim on which the
plaintiff could prevail, despite any failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of various
legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading
requirements. Ashiegbu v. Purviance, 74 F. Supp. 2d 740, 749 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (citing Hall v.
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Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991)). “This standard does not mean, however, that
pro se plaintiffs are entitled to take every case to trial.” Id. (citing Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d
413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996)). “Indeed, courts should not assume the role of advocate for the pro se
litigant.” Id. (citing Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110). See also Derrick v. Dana Driveshaft Mfg., LLC,
No. 3:09CV793, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91243, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 2, 2010) (a plaintiff’s pro
se status “does not relieve him of the bar imposed by res judicata”)
B. Failure to State A Claim
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (clarifying the plausibility
standard articulated in Twombly). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. The factual allegations of a pleading
“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. “The court must ‘accept all the . . . factual allegations as true and construe the complaint in
the light most favorable to the Plaintiff[].’ ” Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Gov't v.
Hotels.com, L.P., 590 F.3d 381, 384 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461,
466 (6th Cir. 2009)).
III. Discussion
US Bank argues that Mr. Bradford’s case is barred by the doctrine of res judicata and
collateral estoppel because “Bradford’s entire Complaint is based on issues that were, or could
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have been, raised in the State Court Action.” (ECF No. 7 at 3.) In the State Court Action,
Bradford filed several counterclaims. US Bank moved for summary judgment on those
counterclaims and the state court held:
[Mr. Bradford]’s “Counterclaims” filed on December 5, 2008 are:
“Breach of contract and failure to disclose certain facts about the note to [Mr.
Bradford] related to said note[.]”
“[US Bank’s] certain mortgage deed, securing the payment of said promissory note
[US Bank]’s Exhibit ‘B’ is not valid and is null and void due to breach of contract
and unfair business practices by [US Bank].”
“[Mr. Bradford] says that the condition in said mortgage have [sic] been broken by
reason of breach of contract, failing to credit payments received in a timely fashion;
failing to provide [Bradford] with clear information about timing and amount of
payments owed; overcharging [Bradford] service and other fees, increasing and
decreasing [Bradford’s] interest rates without proper notice and in violation of
[Bradford’s] original mortgage note:”
“[Mr. Bradford] never received a signed duplicate or copy of said promissory note
[US Bank’s] Exhibit ‘A’ or mortgage, [US Bank’s] Exhibit ‘B’ and words and marks
shown on [US Bank’s] Exhibit ‘B’ were not made by or initialed by [Bradford].”
“[Mr. Bradford] says that [US Bank’s] Exhibit ‘C’ mortgage modification was
coerced, that there was no proper follow up, and lack o f communication. Undo
pressure are some [sic] of the reasons the modification is null and void and
[Bradford] questions the legality of [US Bank’s] actions relating to [US Bank’s]
Exhibit ‘C’.”
....
[Mr. Bradford’s] counterclaims fail to properly plead the elements of any cause of
action. [Bradford] has failed to establish, either in his counterclaim or in his affidavit
in support of his memorandum contra to [US Bank’s] motion for summary judgment,
any facts which support his counterclaims. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to judgment
as a matter of law upon [Bradford’s] Counterclaims.
The Counterclaim1 of Defendant Michael H. Bradford filed on December 5,
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The Court notes that the opinion here-quoted refers throughout to several counterclaims
and then concludes by referring to the conglomerate of counterclaims as a single counterclaim.
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2008 is hereby DISMISSED.
(ECF No. 7-1 at 3.)
In the instant action, Mr. Bradford filed a complaint with the assistance of counsel that
alleges the following eleven claims for relief: (1) emergency temporary and injunctive relief
against eviction, (2) breach of contract, (3) promissory estoppel, (4) Ohio Consumer Sales
Practices Act violations, (5) fraud, (6) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (7)
bad faith, (8) abuse of process, (9) negligent supervision, (10) declaratory judgment, and (11)
recision.
“Federal courts must give the same effect to a state court judgment that would be given
by a court of the state in which the judgment was rendered.” Abbott v. Michigan, 474 F.3d 324,
330 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738). Therefore, when asked to give preclusive effect to
a prior state court judgment, a federal court must look to the law of the rendering state to
determine whether and to what extent that prior judgment should receive preclusive effect in a
federal action. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984).
Consequently, this Court looks to Ohio law to determine the preclusive effect of the prior state
court judgment against plaintiff. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Maynard, 766 F.2d 236, 237-38
(6th Cir. 1985).
“Under Ohio law, the doctrine of res judicata consists of ‘the two related concepts of
claim preclusion, also known as res judicata or estoppel by judgment, and issue preclusion, also
known as collateral estoppel.’ ” Doe ex rel. Doe v. Jackson Local Schs. Sch. Dist., No. 10-3272,
422 Fed. Appx. 497, 499 (6th Cir. May 11, 2011) (quoting O’Nesti v. DeBartolo Realty Corp.,
113 Ohio St. 3d 59 (2007)). “ ‘Claim preclusion prevents subsequent actions, by the same
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parties or their privies, based upon any claim arising out of a transaction that was the subject of a
previous action.’ ” Id. (citations omitted). The doctrine also “bars subsequent actions whose
claims ‘could have been litigated in the previous suit[.]’ ” Id. (alteration in original and citation
omitted). Issue preclusion or collateral estoppel, on the other hand, “prevents the ‘relitigation of
any fact or point that was determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a previous action
between the same parties or their privies[,]’ even if the causes of action differ.” Id. (alteration in
original and citations omitted). Defendants provide no specific analysis of either doctrine,
making only the general statement that Mr. Bradford’s claims were or could have been litigated
in the State Court Action. Defendants appear then to be arguing that Bradford’s claims are
barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. With that argument, this Court agrees.
The Sixth Circuit has interpreted Ohio’s doctrine of claim preclusion as having four
elements:
(1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2)
a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second
action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4)
a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject
matter of the previous action.
Hapgood v. City of Warren, 127 F.3d 490, 493 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Felder v. Cmty. Mut. Ins.
Co., No. 96-3320, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6622, 1997 WL 160373, at *3-4 (6th Cir. April 4,
1997)). The party asserting claim preclusion bears the burden of proof. Abbott, 474 F.3d at
331.
In the instant action, the first element is met because the state court granted US Bank
summary judgment on Mr. Bradford’s counterclaims in the State Court Action. Ohio courts
have held that the grant of summary judgment terminates a party’s claims on the merits. See,
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e.g., A-1 Nursing Care of Cleveland, Inc. v. Florence Nightingale Nursing, Inc., 97 Ohio App. 3d
623 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). Bradford filed an untimely appeal of this final judgment, which was
dismissed. Also, there is no dispute that this action involves the same parties as did the State
Court Action, which satisfies the second element.
The fourth element is met because Mr. Bradford’s claims in the instant action arose out
of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the State Court Action. “The
Ohio Supreme Court has defined ‘transaction’ as a ‘common nucleus of operative facts.’ ”
Hapgood, 127 F.3d at 494 (quoting Grava v. Parkman Township, 73 Ohio St.3d 379 (1995)). In
Grava, the Ohio Supreme Court explained:
“That a number of different legal theories casting liability on an actor may apply to
a given episode does not create multiple transactions and hence multiple claims.
This remains true although the several legal theories depend on different shadings
of the facts, or would emphasize different elements of the facts, or would call for
different measures of liability or different kinds of relief.”
Grava, 73 Ohio St.3d at 382-83 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. c
(1982)). “It is irrelevant that the plaintiff, in the second action, is prepared to present evidence
or theories of the case not offered in the first action, or that the plaintiff seeks remedies not
previously demanded.” Hapgood, 127 F.3d at 494 (citation omitted).
The third element of the claim preclusion analysis is also satisfied because Mr. Bradford
did file or could have filed the claims presented to this Court as counterclaims in the State Court
Action. Claim preclusion applies equally to mandatory counterclaims that were required to have
been filed in the previous litigation between the parties. Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 13(A)
provides, in pertinent part, that:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the
pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction
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or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction.
Here, Mr. Bradford’s claims all arise from the same transaction or occurrence and he
was, therefore, required to assert them in the State Court Action. In an apparent attempt to evade
preclusion of the instant action, Bradford indicates in the complaint that he “seeks money
damages and injunctive relief as the result of the collective fraud of Defendants before, during,
and after the prosecution of the [State Court Action], and in other respects including [US
Bank’s] faulty enforcement of a promissory note.” (ECF No. 4 at 2) (emphasis in original). If
the complaint did allege facts related to activity that occurred after the prosecution of the State
Court Action, those facts certainly could not have been alleged in the State Court Action. The
Court, however, has carefully reviewed each paragraph of the 91-paragraph complaint, prepared
by Bradford’s previous attorney, and nowhere in the complaint does Bradford assert any factual
allegation relating to actions taken by US Bank, or any named defendant, after the prosecution of
the State Court Action and/or entry of judgment in that action. Instead, each and every
allegation pertains to activities that occurred before and during the prosecution of the State Court
Action and specifically asks this Court to undo the judgment entered in that action. (ECF No. 4
at ¶ 88) (“Should this Court determine that [US Bank] is not the holder and owner of the note
and mortgage, then this Court should declare the entire Foreclosure Action null and void and
should set aside the judgment entered against [Bradford].” Of course, this Court cannot provide
Bradford the relief he seeks.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
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(ECF No. 7.) The Clerk is DIRECTED to ENTER JUDGMENT in accordance with this
Opinion and Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Gregory L. Frost
GREGORY L. FROST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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