Professional Investigating & Consulting Agency Inc v. Suzuki et al
Filing
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ORDER granting in part and denying in part 38 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction; granting in part and denying in part 38 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Gregory L Frost on 8/21/14. (kn)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
PROFESSIONAL INVESTIGATING &
CONSULTING AGENCY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:11-cv-01025
JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers
v.
DAVID SUZUKI, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for consideration of the following filings: Defendants
David Suzuki and Suzuki Reconnaissance Advisors Limited’s (“SRA”) motion to dismiss (ECF
No. 38), Plaintiff Professional Investigating & Consulting Agency’s (“PICA”) memorandum in
opposition (ECF No. 43), and Defendants’ reply memorandum (ECF No. 47). For the reasons
that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion.
I.
BACKGROUND
PICA is an Ohio company whose business involves private investigation and consulting
services. PICA operates worldwide; however, this lawsuit involves PICA’s agreement with SRA
for a joint venture in Hong Kong.
Effective April 1, 2009, Defendants and PICA entered into a Joint Marketing, Licensing,
and Services Agreement (“Agreement”) to jointly market, promote, and provide their services to
current and future Asian clients on a worldwide basis including joint branding of their services in
Asia. (ECF No. 10-1.) The Agreement contains the following “Governing Law and Venue”
provision:
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This Agreement shall be governed by, and its terms and conditions shall be
construed and enforced in accordance with the domestic laws of the State of Ohio
of the United States of America excluding its principle of conflicts of laws and the
parties hereto and hereby irrevocably submit to the jurisdiction and venue of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio to resolve any
disputes arising hereunder or related hereto.
(Id. at 14 ¶ 11, hereinafter “Forum Selection Clause”). The Agreement was to remain in full
force until either party terminated it, which Defendants did on October 24, 2011.
In the Agreement, Defendants and PICA promised, inter alia, that during the term of the
Agreement and for two years after the termination thereof, neither party would directly or
indirectly solicit any client introduced to it through the joint venture. (Id. at 11 ¶ 7.3.) PICA
alleges that Defendants violated the Agreement by soliciting its (PICA’s) Asian clients.
The Agreement also contains several references to the parties’ “Confidential and
Proprietary Information and Trade Secrets.” Specifically for purposes of this motion to dismiss,
the Agreement states that such information “shall be kept confidential” by both parties and “shall
be disclosed only upon the prior written consent of the Disclosing Party or upon such terms as
may be agreed upon in writing by the Parties.” (Id. at 10 – 11 ¶ 7.1.) The Agreement also states:
“Upon termination of this Agreement for any reason or no reason, the Parties hereto shall . . .
cease any and all use of the other Party’s Marks, Content, Confidential and Proprietary
Information and Trade Secret Information.” (Id. at 5–6 ¶ 3.6.) PICA alleges that Defendants
violated the Agreement by disclosing and misappropriating PICA’s confidential information.
PICA filed this lawsuit on November 15, 2011. In its Amended Complaint, PICA does
not clearly spell out the claims for relief it intends to assert. Recognizing, however, that filings
are to be construed by their substantive content and not by their labels, the Court construes the
Amended Complaint as asserting a breach of contract claim for soliciting PICA’s clients and
disclosing PICA’s confidential information in violation of the Agreement, for which PICA seeks
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injunctive relief and monetary damages. Due to the choice-of-law provision contained within the
Forum Selection Clause, Ohio law applies to this claim.
PICA also purports to assert a claim for wrongful interference with business relations but
does not indicate the state or country’s law under which it brings this claim. Defendants do not
challenge this claim in their motion to dismiss. As such, the Court will not address it in this
Opinion and Order.
Additionally, PICA asks in its Amended Complaint for a “preliminary and permanent
injunction.” Because requests for preliminary injunctions must be made in pleadings separate
from the complaint, however, PICA’s request for a preliminary injunction is not properly before
the Court. See S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 65.1(b). The Court therefore will not address PICA’s request
for a preliminary injunction.
Despite the fact that this lawsuit is almost three years old, this case is still in the
preliminary stages of litigation. Service issues have caused significant delays. Specifically,
PICA (a resident of Columbus, Ohio) attempted to serve Defendants (residents of Hong Kong,
People’s Republic of China (“PRC”)) for a period of nearly two years. During that period, a law
firm purporting to represent Defendants contacted PICA and initiated settlement negotiations,
but it refused to accept service on Defendants’ behalf.
Continued problems arose as PICA tried to perfect service through PRC’s Central
Authority, then through personal service, and then through email. Ultimately, after concluding
that Defendants “were clearly trying to evade” service, (ECF No. 34, at 2), the Magistrate Judge
ruled that service had been perfected over both Defendants as of January 10, 2014.
Defendants now move for dismissal of PICA’s Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6), in addition to the common law doctrine of forum
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non conveniens. Despite the Agreement’s Forum Selection Clause, Defendants argue that they
are not subject to personal jurisdiction in this Court and that Hong Kong is the appropriate venue
in which to adjudicate the parties’ dispute.
II.
ANALYSIS
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)
Rule 12(b)(2) provides that a defendant may move to dismiss a pleading for lack of
personal jurisdiction. For a court to properly exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant, doing so must comport with both state and federal law. Int’l Tech Consultants, Inc. v.
Euroglas S.A., 107 F.3d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 1997).
Defendants concede, as they must, that the right to contest jurisdiction is a waivable right.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 fn. 14 (1985). Agreeing to litigate in a
certain forum through a contractual provision (like the Forum Selection Clause) generally waives
the right to contest personal jurisdiction in that forum. See, e.g., M/S Bremen v. Zapata OffShore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972); Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Associates in Urology, 453 F.3d 718,
721 (6th Cir. 2006). As such, the sole jurisdictional issue in this case is whether the Court
should enforce the Forum Selection Clause.
A forum selection clause in a commercial contract will be enforced absent a strong
showing that it should be set aside. M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15. To determine whether a forum
selection clause should be set aside, courts consider the following three factors: (1) the
commercial nature of the contract; (2) the absence of fraud or overreaching; and (3) whether
enforcement of the forum selection clause would otherwise be unreasonable or unjust. Preferred
Capital, 453 F.3d at 721 (citing Info. Leasing Co. v. Jaskot, 151 Ohio App. 3d 546, 551 (Ohio
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Ct. App. 2003); see also Kennecorp Mort. Brokers, Inc. v. Country Club Convalescent Hosp.,
Inc., 66 Ohio St.3d 173, 610 N.E.2d 987, 988 (Ohio 1993)).1
Here, because the parties to the Agreement are sophisticated commercial entities, the
Forum Selection Clause is “prima facie valid.” Preferred Capital, 453 F.3d at 721. Such a
clause typically will be upheld unless the party opposing its enforcement proves that it was not
freely bargained for. See id.; see also M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15–17.
Regarding the second factor, although Defendants argue that PICA “overreached” by
including the Forum Selection Clause in the Agreement, they provided no evidence that would
call into question the integrity of the bargaining process. That Defendants now take issue with a
contractual provision to which they freely agreed is insufficient to invalidate that provision.
Defendants similarly fail to persuade the Court that enforcement of the Forum Selection
Clause would be unreasonable or unjust. The Forum Selection Clause clearly and
unambiguously states that all disputes relating to the Agreement shall be litigated in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. All of the concerns Defendants raise—
i.e., that they reside in Hong Kong and that all witnesses and evidence will be located there—
were foreseeable at the time the parties entered into the Agreement. See M/S Bremen, 407 U.S.
at 16 (discussing the third factor and stating, “[o]f course, where it can be said with reasonable
assurance that at the time they entered the contract, the parties to a freely negotiated private
international commercial agreement contemplated the claimed inconvenience, it is difficult to see
why any such claim of inconvenience should . . . render the forum clause unenforceable”).
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Because Ohio law and federal law treat forum selection clauses similarly, and because Defendants do not point to
any nuances between the two that would impact the analysis in this case, the Court need not determine whether to
apply state or federal law. See Preferred Capital, 453 F.3d at 721 (citing General Electric Co. v. G. Siempelkamp,
29 F.3d 1095, 1098 n. 3 (6th Cir.1994)).
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Accordingly, Defendants fail to make the strong showing required to set aside the Forum
Selection Clause.
Having found that the Forum Selection Clause is enforceable, the Court finds that
Defendants waived their right to contest personal jurisdiction in this Court. The Court therefore
DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2).
B. Forum Non Conveniens
In the alternative to their Rule 12(b)(2) argument, Defendants argue that the Court should
dismiss this case under the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. Pursuant to that
doctrine, a court may, in its discretion, dismiss an action in favor of another, more convenient
forum. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994).
The Supreme Court has held that the presence of a forum selection clause modifies the
proper application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15–18;
Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 219 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussing M/S Bremen). Where
the parties have entered into a valid forum selection clause, “the doctrine’s usual tilt in favor of
the plaintiff’s choice of forum gives way to a presumption in favor of the contractually-selected
forum.” Martinez, 740 F.3d at 219 (citing M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15, 18). In other words,
valid forum-selection clauses should be upheld in almost all situations to protect the parties’
legitimate expectations and uphold the interests of justice. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v.
U.S.D.C. for the W. D. of Tex., 134 S. Ct. 568, 583 (2013); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487
U.S. 22, 33 (1988). Effectively, where a forum selection clause meets the M/S Bremen test
discussed above and enforcement of the clause does not contravene a strong public policy of the
forum in which suit is brought, a federal court will not use the doctrine of forum non conveniens
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to disturb the parties’ selected forum. See M/S Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15–18; Martinez, 740 F.3d at
228–30.
Here, as stated above, Defendants freely agreed to litigate all disputes arising under or
related to the Agreement in this Court. That they will be inconvenienced by a trial in this forum
or that a trial in Hong Kong would be more convenient for both parties is insufficient to
invalidate that agreement. Defendants do not offer any persuasive arguments as to how
enforcement of the Forum Selection Clause would contravene a strong public policy of this
Court or of the State of Ohio. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss
on the ground of forum non conveniens.
C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
In addition to their jurisdictional arguments, Defendants argue that the Court should
dismiss certain claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper if the
complaint fails to state a claim for relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Even if accepted, Defendants’ arguments on this issue—that PICA mislabelled and failed
to clearly define its claims for relief2—have no substantive effect on this case. As stated earlier,
Defendants do not dispute that the Amended Complaint asserts claims for breach of contract and
wrongful interference with business relations. To the extent PICA intended to assert additional
claims for relief in “Count One” (which sets forth background facts) and “Count [Four]” (which
summarizes Plaintiffs’ damages request), the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss
those claims.
Defendants’ additional argument that the Court should dismiss PICA’s request for
injunctive relief is improper at this stage of the litigation. Defendants suggest that PICA’s
2
PICA erroneously included the label “Count Three” twice in its Amended Complaint. The parties refer to the
second Count Three as “Count [Four].”
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Amended Complaint fails to meet the pleading standards of Rule 8(a)(2) with respect to its
request for injunctive relief; however, PICA’s request “is not a free standing claim, it is a form of
relief that can be requested . . . As such, [PICA’s] request for an injunction must be pled
according to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3), which requires only a ‘demand for relief sought,’ not the
more stringent standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).” Velez v. Cuyahoga Met. Housing Auth., No.
1:13CV1022, 2014 WL 847406, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2014) (quoting Lewis v. Ceralvo
Holdings, LLC, 4:11–cv–00055–JHM, 2012 WL 32607 (W.D.Ky. Jan. 6, 2012)). PICA satisfied
Rule 8(a)(3) by requesting injunctive relief in its Amended Complaint. Id. The Court therefore
declines to opine as to the merits of the injunctive relief demand at this time. See id. The Court
similarly declines to address the parties’ arguments regarding PICA’s request for injunctive
relief, including PICA’s argument that it intended to assert a claim for tortious misappropriation
of trade secrets in addition to its breach of contract claim and wrongful interference with
business relations claim.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART
Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 38.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Gregory L. Frost
GREGORY L. FROST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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