Family Service Association of Steubenville, Ohio v. Wells Township et al
Filing
68
OPINION AND ORDER denying 65 Motion to Stay Ruling on Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King on 3/12/2014. (pes1)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
FAMILY SERVICE ASSOCIATION OF
STEUBENVILLE, OHIO,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:12-cv-135
Judge Watson
Magistrate Judge King
v.
WELLS TOWNSHIP, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Wells Township Defendants’
Motion to Stay Ruling on Summary Judgment, ECF 65 (“Motion to Stay”).
For the reasons that follow, the Motion to Stay is DENIED.
I.
BACKGROUND
On December 25, 2011, defendant Officer Jeffrey “J.J.” Kamerer,
an employee of the Wells Township Police Department, approached James
W. Coil, II, and his friend, Barry Starcher, in Brilliant, Ohio.
Amended Complaint, ECF 34, ¶¶ 14, 16.
After denying that anything was
wrong, Mr. Coil and Mr. Starcher attempted to leave.
Id. at ¶¶ 16-17.
In response, defendant Kamerer parked his police vehicle on the side
of the road, without the emergency lights on, and exited the vehicle.
Id. at ¶ 18.
The encounter escalated, id. at ¶¶ 17-22; eventually,
defendant Kamerer left Mr. Coil, handcuffed, on the road.
24.
Id. at ¶
Defendant Kamerer turned to Mr. Starcher, who was standing on the
sidewalk.
Id.
At that point, a car driven by defendant Ronald
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Bradcovich approached.
Id. at ¶ 25.
Defendant Kamerer ran towards
defendant Bradcovich’s approaching car, which struck both defendant
Kamerer and Mr. Coil.
Id. at ¶ 26.
Mr. Coil allegedly suffered a
severe brain injury and has been hospitalized since that time.
Id. at
¶¶ 27-29.1
On February 13, 2012, plaintiff filed the initial Complaint, ECF
1, which was later amended.
See First Amended Complaint.
Named as
defendants are Officer Kamerer, Wells Township, which funds and
manages the Wells Township Police Department, and John Ingram, Chief
of Police of the Wells Township Police Department (collectively, “the
Wells Township defendants”), as well as Mr. Bradcovich.
The Amended
Complaint alleges the denial of Mr. Coil’s constitutional rights and
also asserts a state law claim of assault and battery against the
Wells Township defendants, a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress against defendant Kamerer and a claim of negligence
against defendant Bradcovich.
The Wells Township defendants assert a
cross claim against defendant Bradcovich for indemnification and
contribution, and defendant Bradcovich asserts a cross claim for
contribution against the Wells Township defendants.
On April 30, 2013, the Wells Township defendants moved for
summary judgment.
ECF 37.
With the filing of plaintiff’s sur-reply,
ECF 63, on July 2, 2013, the motion for summary judgment is ripe for
1
The Probate Court of Jefferson County, Ohio, appointed plaintiff, the Family
Service Association of Steubenville, Ohio, to serve as the guardian of Mr.
Coil’s person and estate. Amended Complaint, ¶ 7.
2
resolution.2
After the motion for summary judgment had been fully briefed,
plaintiff provided notice of a decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals
for the Seventh District in State v. Barry Starcher, Case No. 13 JE 1
(“the Seventh District decision”).3
Plaintiff’s Notice of Filing
Supplemental Authority, ECF 64 (“Notice”). In that criminal case, Mr.
Starcher is charged with two misdemeanors arising out of the events of
December 25, 2011:
(1) obstructing official business in violation of
O.R.C. § 2921.31, a second-degree misdemeanor; and (2) failure to
disclose personal information in violation of O.R.C. § 2921.29(A), a
fourth-degree misdemeanor.
Id. at PAGEID#:2328.
originally pled no contest to these charges.
Id.
Mr. Starcher
However, that plea
was later vacated and Mr. Starcher filed a motion to dismiss
(construed as a motion to suppress), which the trial court denied
after a hearing.
Id.
In denying that motion, the trial court
concluded that Officer Kamerer had reasonable suspicion to make an
initial investigative stop,
id. at PAGEID#:2329, and, further, that
Officer Kamerer had probable cause later to arrest Mr. Starcher.
Id.
Mr. Starcher appealed that ruling, id. at PAGEID#:2328-PAGEID#:2329,
and the state appellate court reversed, finding that, “[a]s a matter
of law, the initial encounter [between Mr. Starcher and Officer
Kamerer] was a consensual encounter; there is no evidence in the
record of a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to
2
Upon motion, ECF 59, plaintiff was granted leave to file a sur-reply. Order,
ECF 62. Although permitted to do so, id., the Wells Township defendants did
not file a response to plaintiff’s sur-reply.
3
The underlying state criminal action filed in Jefferson County Court 3
(Dillonvale County Court) is State v. Starcher, Case No. 11 CRB 347. Id.
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initiate the stop.”
Id. at PAGEID#:2332.
The matter was remanded
with instructions to the trial court to
first determine which facts it finds credible. Then in
applying those facts to the law, the [trial] court should
determine whether during the consensual encounter the
officer showed an exertion of authority that resulted in an
illegal seizure, or if the actions of Starcher and Coil
changed the encounter from consensual to investigatory.
Id. at PAGEID#:2334.
In bringing this decision to the Court’s attention, plaintiff
contended that the decision of the Ohio appellate court is “of
significant precedential value in this case” because it “arises out of
the very occurrence and facts at issue in this case[.]”
Notice, p. 1.
In particular, plaintiff points to the appellate court’s finding that
Officer Kamerer’s initial stop was a consensual encounter.
2.
Id. at 1-
Because the material facts surrounding the events that followed
that consensual encounter are in dispute, plaintiff contends that
summary judgment in this action is unwarranted.
Id. at 3.
The Wells Township defendants filed the Motion to Stay in
response to plaintiff’s Notice. The Wells Township defendants ask this
Court to stay consideration of their motion for summary judgment
pending final resolution of the state court criminal case against Mr.
Starcher, State v. Starcher, Case No. 11CRB347.
Motion to Stay.
Plaintiff opposes the
Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendants Wells
Township, John Ingram, and Jeffrey James Kamerer’s Motion to Stay
Ruling on Summary Judgment, ECF 66 (“Memo. in Opp.”).
memorandum has been filed.
II.
STANDARD
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No reply
A district court’s power to stay proceedings is “incidental to
the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the
causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel and for litigants.”
248, 254 (1936).
Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S.
The party seeking a stay of proceedings has the
burden of establishing both the “pressing need for delay” and “that
neither the other party nor the public will suffer harm from entry of
the order.”
Ohio Envtl. Council v. United States District Court,
Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, 565 F.2d 393, 396 (6th
Cir. 1977).
See also Landis, 299 U.S. at 255 (stating that the movant
“must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required
to go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for
which he prays will work damage to someone else”).
In determining whether or not to grant a stay of proceedings, a
court may consider the following factors:
“[1] the potentiality of
another case having a dispositive effect on the case to be stayed, [2]
the judicial economy to be saved by waiting on a dispositive decision,
[3] the public welfare, and [4] the hardship/prejudice to the party
opposing the stay, given its duration.”
Michael v. Ghee, 325 F.
Supp.2d 829, 831 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 255).
See also Ferrell v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., Inc., No. 1:01-cv-447, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25358, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 21, 2005) (“There is no
precise test in this Circuit for when a stay is appropriate. However,
district courts often consider the following factors: the need for a
stay, the balance of potential hardship to the parties and the public,
and the promotion of judicial economy.”).
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Finally, “a court must tread carefully in granting a stay of
proceedings, since a party has a right to a determination of its
rights and liabilities without undue delay.”
Ohio Envtl. Council, 565
F.2d at 396. See also Landis, 299 U.S. at 255 (noting that a stay of
proceedings occurs “[o]nly in rare circumstances”).
III. DISCUSSION
In requesting a stay, the Wells Township defendants first argue
that the state trial court’s determination “of the issue of whether
the actions of Starcher and Coil elevated the consensual encounter to
the level of an investigatory stop may be dispositive on key factual
determinations that resolve the constitutional issues before this
court on summary judgment.”
Motion to Stay, p. 4.
More specifically,
the moving defendants contend that, should the state court conclude
that the initial consensual encounter between defendant Kamerer,
plaintiff and Mr. Starcher later became an investigatory stop, this
Court “will have the factual and legal material necessary to grant
qualified immunity and summary judgment in favor of the Wells Township
defendants.”
Id. at 4-5.
This Court disagrees.
The Wells Township defendants cite to no
authority for the proposition that plaintiff in this action will be
bound to the state court’s determination on any matter, whether
factual or legal, in State v. Starcher, Case No. 11 CRB 347.
As
detailed supra, the state court action involves the alleged criminal
activity of Mr. Starcher.
Any final resolution of that action will be
based on the evidence and arguments presented in that action.
Mr.
Starcher is not a party to this case and neither plaintiff nor its
6
ward, Mr. Coil, is a party to the state criminal proceedings. This
Court is therefore not persuaded that an Ohio court’s determination in
a criminal case involving different parties can be dispositive of any
issue in the case sub judice.
It therefore cannot be said that a stay
of the motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claims in this case
will promote judicial economy.
The Wells Township defendants also argue that a stay in this case
serves the public interest “by allowing the Jefferson County Court 3
to proceed in the state case where the issues have been vetted by the
Seventh District Court of Appeals and a clear mandate for a very
specific and narrow determination has been made.”
5.
Motion to Stay, p.
It is not immediately clear to this Court what the moving
defendants intend by this argument.
Because, for the reasons stated
supra, the state court’s resolution of Mr. Starcher’s criminal case
cannot be determinative of the issues presented in this case, the
Court concludes that the requested stay will not serve the public
interest.
Finally, the Wells Township defendants argue that its requested
stay will not prejudice plaintiff because it was plaintiff who
initially brought the decision of the Ohio court of appeals to this
Court’s attention.
Id.
However, the Wells Township defendants offer
no insight into the anticipated length of the state court proceedings
or of the requested stay. The resulting prejudice to plaintiff, who is
entitled to a determination of its claims without undue delay, see
Ohio Envtl. Council, 565 F.2d at 396, is apparent.
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In short, the Court concludes that the Wells Township defendants
have pointed to no “rare circumstances” that would justify a stay of
proceedings on their motion for summary judgment.
WHEREUPON, the Wells Township Defendants’ Motion to Stay Ruling
on Summary Judgment, ECF 65, is DENIED.
March 12, 2014
s/Norah McCann King
Norah McCann King
United States Magistrate Judge
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