Catudal v. Browne

Filing 7

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS. Signed by Judge Gregory L Frost on 4/24/12. (kn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
CHANCE CATUDAL,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action 2:12-cv-00197
Judge GREGORY L. FROST
Magistrate Judge E.A. Preston Deavers

v.

KIM A. BROWNE, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action alleging that Defendants violated
his due process and equal protection rights during state-court divorce and child custody
proceedings. This matter is before the Court for consideration of the March 29, 2012 Report and
Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court
dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Ohio Common Pleas Court (Domestic Relations Division)
Magistrate William Sieloff, Ohio Common Pleas Court Judge (Domestic Relations Division)
Kim A. Browne, and Supreme Court of Ohio Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor (hereinafter the
“judicial Defendants”) for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In the
alternative, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court abstain from exercising
jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine. Finally, the
Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of Defendants Christopher E. Heckert and Bryan
Bowen for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff filed his Objections to the dismissal of the judicial
Defendants on April 9, 2012.1 For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Objections (ECF No. 6) are

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Plaintiff does not object to dismissal of Defendants Heckert and Bowen.

OVERRULED and the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 5) is ADOPTED. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s action is DISMISSED.
If a party objects within the allotted time to a report and recommendation, the Court
“shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
To the extent Plaintiff objects to the standards the Magistrate Judge applied in reviewing
his Complaint, such objections are unavailing. Plaintiff brought this action in forma pauperis,
and, therefore, his Complaint was subject to an initial screen under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). In
conducting the initial screen, the Court considers whether Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous or fail
to state claims for relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Frivolous, in this context, includes a review of
whether, from the face of the Complaint, the Court lacks jurisdiction. See Williams v. Cincy
Urban Apts., No. 1:10-cv-153, 2010 WL 883846, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2010) (“Where
there is no basis for federal jurisdiction apparent on the face of the complaint, a court may
dismiss the action as frivolous . . . under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) . . . .”). Furthermore, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that in performing an initial screen,
the Court should apply general pleading standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Finally, the Magistrate Judge
correctly noted that the Court construes pro se claims liberally. In applying such a standard, the
Court recognizes that pro se filers lack formal legal trailing and may tend to be less clear than

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their lawyer counterparts.2
In this case, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that it lacks jurisdiction, pursuant
to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, with regard to Plaintiff’s claims against the judicial Defendants.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “prohibits district courts from conducting appellate review of
state court decisions.” Coleman v. Governor of Michigan, 413 F. App’x. 866, 870 (6th Cir.
2011); see also Danforth v. Celebrezze, 76 F. App’x. 615, 616 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[F]ederal courts
lack jurisdiction where the action is a mere pretense and the suit is actually concerned with
domestic relations issues.”). “The pertinent question in determining whether a federal district
court is precluded under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine from exercising subject-matter
jurisdiction over a claim is whether the source of the injury upon which plaintiff bases his federal
claim is the state court judgment.” In re Squire, 617 F.3d 461, 465 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotations omitted).
Within his Objections, Plaintiff maintains that his claims against the judicial Defendants
are not a mere pretense for challenging the underlying state court judgment. The Court
disagrees. As the Magistrate Judge recognized:
A fair reading of Plaintiff’s Complaint . . . reveals that he is actually challenging the
various rulings of the judicial Defendants, which ultimately resulted in the October
19, 2011 divorce decree denying him legal custody over his daughter. Tellingly, the
injunctive relief Plaintiff ultimately seeks is another divorce trial. In other terms, the
sources of Plaintiff's injuries are the rulings and divorce decree judgment of the state
court. Because Plaintiff's claims against the judicial Defendants seek the Court to
review the state court decisions in his divorce and child custody proceedings, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies. Accordingly, the Court lacks jurisdiction over
these claims.
(Report & Recommendation 5, ECF No. 5.) Furthermore, Plaintiff’s attempts to challenge the

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Plaintiff contends, incorrectly, that the Magistrate Judge used this standard as
justification for not taking his claims seriously.
3

judicial Defendants’ various state court rulings on constitutional grounds do not give the Court
jurisdiction. See In re Squire, 617 F.3d 461, 465 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the RookerFeldman doctrine still applies when “the party challenges the validity of the state court judgment
on constitutional grounds”) (internal quotations omitted).
For the above reasons, Plaintiff’s Objections are OVERRULED and the Report and
Recommendation is ADOPTED as to the Rooker-Feldman analysis.3 Plaintiff’s action is
DISMISSED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to remove this action from the Court’ pending case
list.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Gregory L. Frost
GREGORY L. FROST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3

As an alternative basis for her recommendation of dismissal, the Magistrate Judge
found that Younger abstention would bar jurisdiction in this case even if the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine did not apply. (Report & Recommendation 5-6, ECF No. 5.) Because the Court finds
its jurisdiction precluded under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court finds it unnecessary to
address this alternative ground.
4