Chasteen v. Johnson et al

Filing 30

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION that re 28 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order filed by Adam Chasteen be DENIED. Objections to R&R due by 7/26/2012 Signed by Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King on 7/09/12. (rew)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

ADAM CHASTEEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil Action 2:12-cv-229
Judge Marbley
Magistrate Judge King

ROD JOHNSON, et al.,
Defendants.

REPORT and RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff,

a

state

inmate

currently

incarcerated

in

the

Madison Correctional Institution [“MaCI”], has filed another motion for
interim

injunctive

relief.

Plaintiff’s

Motion

for

a

Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction, Doc. No. 28.

Temporary
For the

reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the motion be denied.
Interim injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that
should be granted only after the Court has carefully considered the
following four factors:
(1) whether the movant has established a “strong” likelihood
of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would
otherwise suffer irreparable injury; (3) whether issuance of
a preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to
others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by
issuance of a preliminary injunction.
Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing McPherson
v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 119 F.3d 453, 459 (6th Cir. 1997)
(en banc), quoting Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 64 F.3d
1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 1995)).

When considering these factors, a district

court should balance each factor against the others to arrive at its
ultimate determination. Id.

These factors are not prerequisites to

injunctive relief; rather, they are factors that the Court must balance.
In re Delorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d at 1229; Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v.
Engler,

257

F.3d

587,

592

(6th

Cir.

2001)

(no

single

factor

is

determinative.); Monongahela Power Co. v. Schriber, 322 F. Supp.2d 902,
918 (S.D. Ohio 2004)(same). However, a preliminary injunction should not
issue where there is simply no likelihood of success on the merits.
Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1997).
In his current motion, plaintiff complains that officials at
MaCI have interfered with his constitutional right of access to the
courts.

Specifically, plaintiff alleges that a program on the computer

terminals in the MaCI law library, i.e., “snap shot,” “allows staff to
covertly read and monitor what inmates type and research on the computer
terminals,” Plaintiff’s Declaration in Support of Plaintiff’s Second
Motion for a TRO, ¶ 2, attached to Doc. No. 28; that the MaCI law library
has not been open for as many hours per week as state policy, i.e., DRC
Policy 59-LEG-01, requires; that law library computer terminals have
recently been restricted to “research only,” Doc. No. 28, p. 5, and
inmates are no longer permitted to use those terminals to type legal
documents and that plaintiff has experienced consequent increased delays
in accessing prison typewriters to prepare his legal documents; and that
plaintiff believes that these new policies were enacted in retaliation
for his efforts to pursue litigation.
The

First

Amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution

guarantees to inmates a right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Pilgrim v.
Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir.1996). Although the Constitution
assures “adequate, effective, and meaningful” access, Bounds, 430 U.S.
2

at

822,

the

right

is

nevertheless

not

unlimited.

For

example,

restrictions on the time, place and manner in which inmates may engage
in legal research and draft legal documents are permissible so long as
the restrictions do not unreasonably impede the right of access to the
courts.

Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 932 (6th Cir. 1985).

Moreover,

inmates have no independent constitutional right of access to computers,
see White-Bey v. Griggs, 43 F.App’x 792 (6th Cir. 2002); Lehn v. Hartwig,
13 F.App’x 389, 392 (7th Cir. 2001), nor do they have a First Amendment
right of access to typewriters, Mulazim v. Bailey, 107 F.3d 12 (Table),
1997 WL 48988, *1 (6th Cir. February 4, 1997).

Plaintiff does not allege

that

his

he

has

been

precluded

from

pursuing

litigation;

rather,

plaintiff alleges only that he has been inconvenienced in doing so.
Furthermore, absent an allegation that an inmate has suffered actual
prejudice in constitutionally protected litigation, the fact that a
prison law library is not open for as long as state policy allegedly
requires is immaterial to the constitutional analysis.

See Lewis, 518

U.S. at 351; Walker, 771 F.2d at 932
Plaintiff also alleges, curiously, that he has “observed” the
“covert[]” monitoring of his activity on the computer terminals through
the

use

of

“snap

shot”

software.

Even

assuming

the

accuracy

of

plaintiff’s suspicions in this regard, because MaCI inmates, including
plaintiff, will no longer be using prison computer terminals to draft
legal documents, injunctive relief will not be necessary to assure that
prison officials do not monitor the substance of plaintiff’s legal
writings.
Finally, plaintiff alleges that he has “been informed that
[he] personally had something to do with the reason why Defendants
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instituted the restriction on the computer terminals in the law library;
. . .”

Plaintiff’s Declaration in Support of Plaintiff’s Second Motion

for a TRO, ¶ 17.

A plaintiff asserting a claim of retaliation must show

that he engaged in protected conduct, that an adverse action was taken
against

him

that

would

deter

a

person

of

ordinary

firmness

from

continuing to engage in that conduct, and that the adverse action was
motivated at least in part by the protected conduct. Thaddeus-X v.
Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Plaintiff’s vague
and ambiguous allegations are, in the view of this Court, insufficient
to warrant the extraordinary remedy of interim injunctive relief.

Even

crediting plaintiff’s assertion, which appears to be based on hearsay,
plaintiff

offers

no

reason

why

this

Court

should

assume

that

a

restriction on the use of the limited number of computer terminals was
based on the substantive nature of plaintiff’s litigation activities –
as opposed to the amount of time that plaintiff spent on those limited
resources.
In short, the Court concludes that plaintiff has failed to
establish a strong likelihood of success on the merits of a claim that
he has been denied his constitutional right of access to the courts. The
Court also concludes that plaintiff has failed to establish that he would
suffer irreparable injury should the requested injunction not issue. It
is

therefore

RECOMMENDED

that

Plaintiff’s

Motion

for

a

Temporary

Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction, Doc. No. 28, be DENIED.

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report
and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and
serve on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation,
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specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part
thereof in question, as well as the basis for objection thereto.
U.S.C. §636(b)(1); F.R. Civ. P. 72(b).

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Response to objections must be

filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof.
F.R. Civ. P. 72(b).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to
the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de
novo review by the District Judge and of the right to appeal the decision
of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Smith v. Detroit Federation of Teachers,
Local 231 etc., 829 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Walters,
638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

s/Norah McCann King
Norah McCann King
United States Magistrate Judge
DATE: July 9, 2012

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