Chasteen v. Johnson et al

Filing 9

INITIAL SCREEN OF THE COMPLAINT REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 6 Complaint, filed by Adam Chasteen. It is RECOMMENDED that the claims under state law, the claims against defendants Johnson, Mohr and Stanforth, the claims based on the dispositions of plaintiffs grievances, claims based on cell assignments by defendants McConnell and Gilliam and claims of denial of due process in connection with plaintiffs RIB conviction be DISMISSED. Objections to R&R due by 4/12/2012. Signed by Magistrate Judge Norah McCann King on 3/26/12. (rew)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

ADAM CHASTEEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil Action 2:12-cv-229
Judge Marbley
Magistrate Judge King

ROD JOHNSON, et al.,
Defendants.
INITIAL SCREEN OF THE COMPLAINT
REPORT and RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff,

a

state

inmate

currently

incarcerated

in

the

Madison Correctional Institution [“MaCI”], brings this civil rights
action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 seeking declaratory, injunctive and monetary
relief.

This matter is now before the Court for the initial screen of

the Complaint, Doc. No. 6, required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e), 1915A.
The Complaint names 18 employees of the Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction [“ODRC”] and of MaCI as defendants; also
included as defendants are a number of “Doe” defendants identified only
by their prison positions or alleged misconduct.

The claims asserted by

plaintiff are based on events that began in the early morning hours of
July 10, 2011 when plaintiff was ordered to “cuff up” for escort to the
infirmary to determine if he had consumed alcohol.

Complaint, ¶58.

Plaintiff alleges that he was thereafter subjected to excessive force,
was denied requested medical care, was convicted of a rules infraction
based on the false testimony of a corrections officer, and was retaliated
against in the form of cell assignments and the denial of his application
for early release.

Plaintiff also complains that his grievances were

improperly handled.

Finally, the Complaint also asserts various tort

claims under Ohio law.
Claims under State Law
Plaintiff asserts state law claims of assault, battery and
negligence against all defendants.

Complaint, ¶¶ 155, 179. State

employees may not be sued on state law claims unless and until the Ohio
Court of Claims has determined that the employees are not entitled to
immunity under Ohio law, O.R.C. §9.86. Haynes v. Marshall, 887 F.2d 700,
704 (6th Cir. 1989); Grooms v. Marshall, 142 F.Supp. 2d 927, 932 (S.D.
Ohio 2001). Plaintiff’s state law claims cannot proceed.
Supervisory Defendants
Plaintiff alleges that defendants Rod Johnson, MaCI warden,
and Gary Mohr, ODRC director, failed to enforce or promulgate policies
to ensure inmate safety and, in the case of defendant Johnson, failed to
train subordinates and failed to properly investigate and dispose of
plaintiff’s grievances. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Karen
Stanforth, MaCI health care administrator, failed to properly train and
supervise medical personnel and failed to discipline her subordinates for
their failure to properly care for plaintiff.
A supervisory official may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C.
§1983 for the alleged misconduct of subordinates unless “the plaintiff
demonstrates that ‘the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of
misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.’” Combs v.
Wilkinson, 315 F.3f 548, 554 (6th Cir. 2002) quoting Bellamy v. Bradley,
729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). “‘At a minimum a plaintiff must show
that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly
acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.’”
Id., quoting Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982).
2

Liability

on

the

part

of

a

supervisor

must

be

based

on

“active

unconstitutional behavior.” Id., citing Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041,
1048 (6th Cir. 1999).
The Complaint does not allege facts that identify applicable
policies or which support any alleged failure to train or to supervise.
Moreover, as discussed infra, alleged failures in inmate grievance
procedures

and

dispositions

of

grievances

do

not

give

rise

to

a

constitutional claim.
In short, plaintiff’s claims against defendants Johnson, Mohr
and Stanforth cannot proceed.1
Claims Based on Disposition of Grievances
Plaintiff claims that defendants Gary Croft, ODRC’s Chief
Inspector, Mona Parks, ODRC’s Assistant Chief Inspector, and Jondrea
Parrish, MaCI’s Institutional Inspector, failed to adequately investigate
and dispose of plaintiff’s various grievances, thereby denying plaintiff
due process and subjecting plaintiff to cruel and unusual punishment.
Plaintiff

also

alleges

that

defendant

Parrish

retaliated

against

plaintiff for having utilized the inmate grievance procedure.
It is well-established that the due process clause does not
confer upon prison inmates a right to an effective prison grievance
procedure.

Walker v. Michigan Dept. Of Corrections, 128 Fed. Appx. 441,

2005 WL 742743, **3 (6th Cir. April 1, 2005).

Furthermore, the alleged

unavailability of an effective prison grievance procedure or allegedly
flawed dispositions of grievances simply does not involve the wanton

1

Plaintiff also alleges that two unidentified supervisors, “Captain John
Doe of Second Shift” and “Captain John Doe of Third Shift,” Complaint, ¶¶ 16364, also failed to properly supervise their subordinates. For the same
reasons, these allegations are insufficient.

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infliction of pain prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.

See Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). Finally, plaintiff’s conclusory allegation
of retaliation by defendant Parrish is supported by no facts whatsoever
and is therefore insufficient.

See Adams v. Jones, 52 Fed. Appx. 744,

746, 2002 WL 31780933, *2 (6th Cir. 2002)(“Bare allegations of malice do
not suffice to establish a constitutional claim.”), citing Crawford-El
v. Britton, 523 U.s. 574, 588 (1998); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d
378, 399 (6th Cir. 1999)(en banc).

Moreover, it is apparent from

plaintiff’s own allegations that the alleged retaliation had no deterrent
effect on plaintiff.

See Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 398 (“[A]n adverse

action is one that would ‘deter a person of ordinary firmness’ from the
exercise of the right at stake”).
In short, plaintiff’s claims based on the dispositions of his
grievances cannot proceed.
Claims Based on Cell Assignment
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Tyrone McConnell, MaCI unit
manager, and defendant L. Gilliam, a sergeant at MaCI, failed to reverse
a cell change to which plaintiff objected. Complaint, ¶¶ 161, 166.
Plaintiff specifically alleges that the cell change was based on a false
bunk restriction and resulted in plaintiff’s placement in a “potentially
hazardous situation.”

Id. ¶ 52.

Plaintiff has no liberty interest in placement in a particular
cell.

See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); Bruggemman v. Paxton,

15 Fed. Appx. 202,

205 (6th Cir. 2001).

Moreover, plaintiff does not

allege that his placement in the cell posed a risk to his safety; he
merely alleges that his cell mate “may cause disciplinary action against
Plaintiff for any further misconduct from” him.
4

Complaint, ¶ 52.

Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Gilliam made a cell
placement decision “out of her dislike of Plaintiff.”

Id. ¶ 122. See

also ¶ 133. Of course, such an allegation fails to state a claim of
retaliation for the exercise of protected activities.
The claims against defendant McConnell and Gilliam cannot
proceed.
Claims of Denial of Due Process in Connection with RIB Conviction
Plaintiff alleges that his Rules Infraction Board conviction
by defendant Lambert, a Lieutenant at MaCI, and defendant Rodgers, an
MaCI corrections officer, was based on insufficient evident “and also the
known existence of exculpatory evidence” in violation of plaintiff’s
right to due process. Complaint, ¶¶ 165, 172. These claims are not
cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A prison disciplinary proceeding does
not give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest unless it
affects the duration of the prisoner’s confinement, or unless the
restrictions impose an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.

Sandin v. Conner,

supra, at 484. Plaintiff does not allege conditions in segregation that
would give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest.2
In any event, however, the Complaint fails to state a claim
based

on

a

denial

of

procedural

due

process

plaintiff’s conviction of a rules infraction.

in

connection

with

Plaintiff complains that

he was convicted based on “a lack of sufficient evidence and also the
known existence of exculpatory evidence. . . .”

2

Id. ¶ 172.

However,

Plaintiff’s allegation that the temperature in segregation “was
consistently between 83-86 degrees Fahrenheit during Plaintiff’s stay in
segregation,” Complaint, ¶ 121, does not suggest a different conclusion.

5

“the requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports
the decision by the prison disciplinary board. . . .”

Superintendent,

Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,
455 (1985)(emphasis added).

“[T]he relevant question is whether there

is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached
by the disciplinary board.”

Id.

Plaintiff’s own allegations concede

that his rules infraction conviction was based on some evidence.

The

fact that he disagrees with that evidence is of no constitutional import.
The claims based on a denial of due process in connection with
plaintiff’s RIB proceedings cannot proceed.
Claims Based on Excessive Force, Denial of Medical Care and Retaliation
At this juncture of the action, the Court concludes that
plaintiff’s claims based on excessive force, denial of medical care and
dietary requirements and retaliation for having invoked the prison
grievance procedure may proceed.

If plaintiff submits a copy of the

Complaint, a summons and a Marshal service form for each defendant, the
United States Marshal Service will effect service of process. Defendants
may have forty-five days from the date of service of process to respond
to the Complaint.
It is RECOMMENDED that the claims under state law, the claims
against defendants Johnson, Mohr and Stanforth, the claims based on the
dispositions of plaintiff’s grievances, claims based on cell assignments
by defendants McConnell and Gilliam and claims of denial of due process
in connection with plaintiff’s RIB conviction be DISMISSED.

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and

6

Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve
on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation, specifically
designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part thereof in
question, as well as the basis for objection thereto.
§636(b)(1); F.R. Civ. P. 72(b).

28 U.S.C.

Response to objections must be filed

within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof.

F.R.

Civ. P. 72(b).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to
the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de
novo review by the District Judge and of the right to appeal the decision
of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Smith v. Detroit Federation of Teachers,
Local 231 etc., 829 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Walters,
638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

s/Norah McCann King
Norah McCann King
United States Magistrate Judge
DATE: March 26, 2012

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