Mathis v. Twin Valley Behavioral Healthcare et al

Filing 3

ORDER and INITIAL SCREEN REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION granting re 1 motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed by Michelle R. Mathis. It is ORDERED that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. It is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's purported federal causes of action for failure to state a claim. It is RECOMMENDED that the Court DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs remaining state-law claims and that the Court DISMISS these claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE. ( Objections to R&R due by 6/1/2012) Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Preston Deavers on 5/15/12. (rew)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

MICHELLE MATHIS,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action 2:12-cv-358
Judge George C. Smith
Magistrate Judge E.A. Preston Deavers

v.

DOCTOR’S HOSPITAL (WEST), et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER and INITIAL SCREEN REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Michelle Mathis, who is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, brings
this action against Doctor’s Hospital (West), Riverside Methodist Hospital, Ohio Health
Corporation, Twin Valley Behavioral Healthcare, and Franklin Township, asserting federal civil
rights and state-law tort claims arising out her involuntary commitment and treatment. This
matter is before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis, which is GRANTED. (ECF No. 1.) Accordingly, it is ORDERED that judicial
officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. This
matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or
any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s purported federal causes of action for

failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and DECLINE to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims, DISMISSING these
claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I.
Plaintiff filed the instant action on April 23, 2012. (ECF No. 1.) She brought a nearly
identical action on February 21, 2012, Mathis v. Doctor’s Hospital West, Case Number 2:12-cv156 (“156 Case”). Both actions arise from Plaintiff’s involuntary commitment and treatment in
January and February 2012.
In the 156 Case, the Magistrate Judge conducted an initial screen and set forth the factual
background as follows:
According to the Complaint, on January 14, 2012, Plaintiff believed that she
was having a seizure and asked that emergency transportation services be called.
When the emergency medical service team arrived, they restrained Plaintiff to a
gurney. They then proceeded to search her property, seizing a gun that Plaintiff had
carried in her purse. Plaintiff was transported against her will to Doctor’s Hospital.
Upon arrival to Doctor’s Hospital’s emergency room, medical personnel forcefully
removed her clothing before restraining her to a hospital bed. Plaintiff alleges that
she did not receive proper medical treatment for the symptoms she presented.
Doctor’s Hospital personnel restrained Plaintiff to the hospital bed for two or three
days. Throughout this time, Plaintiff was placed on intravenous therapy and forced
to use a catheter. After two or three days, Doctor’s Hospital removed the hospital
bed restraints.
On January 18, 2012, Doctor’s West transferred Plaintiff to Riverside
Methodist Hospital Behavior Health Center (“Riverside”). Plaintiff met with an
intake nurse. On January 19, 2012, a physician informed her that she was being
detained for “delusional or subtle signs of paranoia.” (Coml. 7, ECF No. 1-2.)
Riverside involuntarily committed her. Plaintiff appears to allege that the form
utilized to detain her and the affidavit submitted to the state probate court did not
comply with Ohio law and thus, her detainment beyond three days was unlawful.
(See id.) She alleges that she attended a probate court hearing on January 25, 2012,
but that the case was continued and that she did not receive notice of the next hearing
date. On January 27, 2012, Dr. Kovell, a physician providing services at Doctor’s
West, informed Plaintiff that a court hearing was in progress and that she did not
have the right to attend the hearing. As a result of that hearing, the probate court
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authorized Dr. Kovell to continue to detain and medicate Plaintiff. Riverside
released Plaintiff in February 2012.
In addition to asserting various state-law claims, Plaintiff asserts that
Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because their actions deprived her of
her constitutional rights. She seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as $20
million in statutory, compensatory, and punitive damages.
(156 Case, Mar. 22, 2012 Report & Rec. 2–3, ECF No. 2.) In the 156 Case, Plaintiff named
Doctor’s Hospital (West) and Riverside Methodist Hospital as defendants. The Court adopted
the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that Plaintiff’s purported federal causes of action be
dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and that the Court
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining state-law claims, dismissing
these claims without prejudice. (156 Case, ECF Nos. 2 and 5.)
In the instant case, Plaintiff makes nearly identical allegations to those she made in the
156 Case. The Court, therefore, adopts the factual background summary set forth above. In
addition to naming Doctor’s Hospital (West) and Riverside Methodist Hospital as Defendants,
Plaintiff also names Ohio Health Corporation, Twin Valley Behavioral Healthcare (“Twin
Valley”), and Franklin Township. Plaintiff asserts that Ohio Health Corporation is liable based
upon its ownership of Doctor’s Hospital (West) and Riverside Methodist Hospital. She alleges
that the facilities provided inadequate care to her because “Ohio Health Corporation [is a] world
wide stock exchange investor[] into the human trafficking on Plaintiff Michelle Mathis . . . .”
(Compl. 10, ECF No. 1-2.) She further alleges that the people committing the human trafficking
of her include “Shawn (Jay-Z) Carter and Sean (P. Diddy) Combs.”1 (Id. at 2.) Twin Valley is a
regional psychiatric hospital administered by the Ohio Department of Mental Health. The only

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Shawn Carter and Sean Combs are a well-known American rappers, songwriters, and
record producers.
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allegation Plaintiff makes concerning this Defendant is that her probate court hearings were held
there. (See id. at 9.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Franklin Township is liable based upon her
allegations that its emergency medical squad (“EMS”) restrained her to a gurney, searched her
property, and seized her gun.
II.
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to
“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992).
In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are
assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from
filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)2 as part of the
statute, which provides in pertinent part:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been
paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that-*

*

*

(B) the action or appeal-(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte
dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or
upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

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Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
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basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). See also Hill v. Lappin, 630
F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards
to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Although this pleading standard
does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a] pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,’” is insufficient.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). Furthermore, a complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’
devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Instead, to
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility
is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Further, when
considering a pro se plaintiff’s complaint, a Court “must read [the allegations] with less
stringency . . . and accept the pro se plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible.” Reynosa v. Schultz, 282 F. App’x 386, 389 (6th Cir. 2008)

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(citing Denton, 504 U.S. at 33 (internal citation omitted)).
III.
A.

Federal Claims
1.

Doctor’s Hospital (West) and Riverside Methodist Hospital

The undersigned concludes that the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion operates
to bar Plaintiff’s federal claims against Doctor’s Hospital (West) and Riverside Methodist
Hospital. Under the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion, “a final judgment on the merits
bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.” Montana v.
U.S., 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
instructed that res judicata requires proof of the following four elements: “(1) a final decision on
the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a subsequent action between the same parties
or their privies; (3) an issue in the subsequent action which was litigated or which should have
been litigated in the prior action; and (4) an identity of the causes of action.” Kane v. Magna
Mixer Co., 71 F.3d 555, 560 (6th Cir. 1995). “The purpose of res judicata is to promote the
finality of judgments, and thereby increase certainty, discourage multiple litigation, and conserve
judicial resources.” Westwood Chemical Co. v. Kulick, 656 F.2d 1224, 1227 (6th Cir. 1981).
In the instant action, with regard to his claims against Doctor’s Hospital (West) and
Riverside Methodist Hospital, Plaintiff simply reasserts the same claims, causes of action, and
injuries arising out of the same facts that she alleged in the 156 Case. In the 156 Case, the Court
dismissed Plaintiff’s purported federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A
court’s dismissal of a “complaint pursuant to the provisions of § 1915(e) . . . constitutes an
adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata.” Burton v. Cleveland Ohio
Empowerment Zone, 102 F. App’x 461, 463 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504
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U.S. 25, 34 (1992); Smith v. Morgan, 75 F. App’x 505, 507 (6th Cir. 2003)). Thus, the
undersigned concludes that the doctrine of res judicata operates to bar the federal claims
Plaintiff asserts against Doctor’s Hospital (West) and Riverside Methodist Hospital in the instant
action. Based upon this conclusion, the undersigned recommends dismissal of these claims.
2.

Ohio Health Corporation

It appears that Plaintiff is attempting to bring her federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for violation of her constitutional rights. Her Complaint, however, cannot support a
cause of action under § 1983 against Ohio Health Corporation, which is a private entity, for the
same reasons that her complaint in the 156 Case could not support a cause of action under §
1983 against Doctor’s Hospital (West) and Riverside Methodist Hospital. As the Magistrate
Judge explained in the 156 Case, “[i]n order to plead a cause of action under § 1983, Plaintiff
must plead two elements: ‘(1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution of laws of the
United States (2) caused by a person acting under color of state law.’” (156 Case, Mar. 22, 2012
Report & Rec. 5, ECF No. 2 (quoting Hunt v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 542 F.3d
529, 534 (6th Cir. 2008).) In this case, as in the 156 Case, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts
upon which this Court could conclude that Ohio Health Corporation acted under the color of
state law. In reaching this conclusion, the undersigned incorporates the analysis set forth in
March 22, 2012 Report and Recommendation in the 156 case. (See id. at 5–7.)
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to bring claims against Ohio Health Corporation relating
to her allegations that it is involved in a “world wide stock exchange investor[] into human
trafficking on Plaintiff,” in which Jay-Z and P. Diddy are involved, the undersigned likewise
recommends dismissal. Plaintiff’s allegations are “clearly irrational or wholly incredible.”
Reynosa, 282 F. App’x at 389. Thus, dismissal is appropriate. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
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319, 325 (1989) (explaining that dismissal of a complaint filed in forma pauperis is appropriate
where it lacks any arguable basis in law or fact); Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 923–24 (6th
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (noting that a complaint lacks an
arguable basis in fact “when it relies on fantastic or delusional allegations”).
Because Plaintiff has failed to state any valid federal claims against Ohio Health
Corporation, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS her federal claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
3.

Twin Valley

As set forth above, the only allegation Plaintiff makes concerning Twin Valley is that her
probate court hearings were held there. The undersigned cannot discern a cognizable claim
flowing from this allegation. The undersigned, therefore, recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s
claims against this Defendant.
4.

Franklin Township

Finally it is recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against
Franklin Township. “A municipality or other local government may be liable under [§ 1983] if
the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to
be subjected’ to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1358 (2011) (citing
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)). Put another way, local
governments are only liable for “their own illegal acts”; they are not vicariously liable for their
employees’ actions. Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (citing Monell, 436 U.S.
at 665–683). Thus, to hold a local government liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that “action pursuant to [an] official municipal policy” caused his or her injury. Monell, 436
U.S. at 694; Graham v. County of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a
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plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim on the basis of a municipal custom or policy must identify the
policy, connect the policy to the municipality itself, and show that the particular injury was
incurred because of the execution of that policy). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that a Franklin
Township policy caused her alleged injury. Instead, Plaintiff’s claims against Franklin
Township rest solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior. For these reasons, the undersigned
RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS her purported § 1983 claims against Franklin
Township.
B.

State-Law Claims
Because the undersigned recommends dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s federal claims, the

undersigned further recommends that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s state-law tort claims.
“The basic statutory grants of federal court subject-matter jurisdiction are contained in 28
U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for ‘[f]ederal-question’ jurisdiction, and § 1332, which provides
for ‘[d]iversity of citizenship’ jurisdiction.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501 (2006).
Federal-question jurisdiction is invoked when a plaintiff pleads a claim “arising under” the
federal laws or the Constitution. Id. (citation omitted). For a federal court to have diversity
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1332(a), there must be complete diversity, which means that
each plaintiff must be a citizen of a different state than each defendant, and the amount in
controversy must exceed $75,000. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996).
Plaintiff, on her Civil Cover Sheet, identified federal question jurisdiction as the only
basis for subject matter jurisdiction. (See ECF No. 1-1.) In her Complaint, however, she asserts
that jurisdiction is appropriate under both the general federal question jurisdiction statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1331, and the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Plaintiff cannot invoke
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diversity jurisdiction because she indicates on her Civil Cover Sheet that both she and
Defendants are citizens of Ohio. (Id.) Thus, jurisdiction is only appropriate under § 1331, the
federal question jurisdiction statute.
Dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal claims would not divest this Court of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Instead, when a federal court dismisses “all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction,” it must then exercise its discretion to determine whether to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit has held that “[i]f the federal claims are dismissed before trial, the state claims generally
should be dismissed as well.” Brooks v. Rothe, 577 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotations marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3).
IV.
In summary, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis is GRANTED.
(ECF No. 1.) Accordingly, it is ORDERED that judicial officers who render services in this
action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. In addition, for the reasons set forth above, it
is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff's purported federal causes of action for
failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Further, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Court DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims and that the Court DISMISS these claims WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.

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PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that
party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and
Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in
question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review of by the District Judge
and waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l
Latex Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the
magistrate judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [th defendant’s] ability to appeal the
district court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding
that defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely
object to magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed,
appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d
981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to
specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .” (citation
omitted))
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: May 15, 2012

/s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers
Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers
United States Magistrate Judge

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