Hightower v. City of Columbus, Ohio et al

Filing 110

ORDER denying 99 Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to Exclude at Trial the testimony of Defendants' expert, Sergeant Matthew Weekely. Signed by Judge Gregory L Frost on 11/4/13. (sem1)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
JASON A. HIGHTOWER,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:12-cv-437
Judge Gregory L. Frost
Magistrate Judge Kemp

v.
CITY OF COLUMBUS, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion in limine to exclude at trial the
testimony of Defendants’ expert, Sergeant Matthew Weekely. (ECF No. 99.) The Court
DENIES Plaintiff’s motion.
Although neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
explicitly authorize a court to rule on an evidentiary motion in limine, the United States Supreme
Court has noted that the practice of ruling on such motions “has developed pursuant to the
district court’s inherent authority to manage the course of trials.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S.
38, 41 n.4 (1984). The purpose of a motion in limine is to allow a court to rule on issues
pertaining to evidence in advance of trial in order to avoid delay and ensure an even-handed and
expeditious trial. See Ind. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004)
(citing Jonasson v. Lutheran Child & Family Servs., 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1997)). Courts,
however, are generally reluctant to grant broad exclusions of evidence in limine, because “a
court is almost always better situated during the actual trial to assess the value and utility of
evidence.” Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 2 F. Supp.2d 1385, 1388 (D. Kan 1998); accord Sperberg
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975).

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To obtain the exclusion of evidence under such a motion, a party must prove that the
evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds. See Ind. Ins. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d at
846; Koch, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1388; cf. Luce, 469 U.S. at 41. “Unless evidence meets this high
standard, evidentiary rulings should be deferred until trial so that questions of foundation,
relevancy and potential prejudice may be resolved in proper context.” Ind. Ins. Co., 326 F.
Supp.2d at 846. Denial of a motion in limine does not necessarily mean that all evidence
contemplated by the motion will be admitted at trial. Denial merely means that without the
context of trial, the court is unable to determine whether the evidence in question should be
excluded. Id. The court will entertain objections on individual proffers as they arise at trial, even
though the proffer falls within the scope of a denied motion in limine. Id. (citing United States v.
Connelly, 874 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1989)).
This is case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant police officers used
excessive force in their apprehension of Plaintiff. Defendants have offered Columbus police
Sergeant Matthew Weekley as an expert witness. Sgt. Weekley has opined in his expert report
and in his deposition testimony that the individual Defendants did not utilize unreasonable force.
Plaintiff asks the Court to exclude this testimony as unreliable under Fed. R. Evid. 702 because,
in reaching it, Sgt. Weekley “accepted as fact everything the individual defendants said
occurred.” (Pl.’s Mot. In Limine, ECF NO. 99 at PageID# 2174.) Plaintiff complains that Sgt.
Weekley did not take into account the testimony of a third-party witness that Plaintiff “was not
resisting arrest” (id. at PageID# 2173) and that Sgt. Weekley’s expert report relied on definitions
of terms that were not his own and “were prepared with some assistance by the City of
Columbus attorney” (id. at PageID# 2175).

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Fed. R. Evid. 702 requires that (1) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact, (2) the testimony is based on sufficient facts and data, (3)
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (4) the witness has applied
the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Ross v. Am. Red Cross, No. 2:09-cv905, 2012 WL 1656995, at *5 (S.D. Ohio May 10, 2012). Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s arguments
that Sgt. Weekley’s opinion does not satisfy these prerequisites, the Court finds no basis to issue
an order in limine that would preclude Sgt. Weekley from testifying.
Plaintiff’s gripe with Sgt. Weekley’s opinion as that they are not based on valid
assumptions as to the facts. But his assumptions are supported by evidence in the record,
namely, the individual officers’ firsthand accounts of the incident at issue. The question of the
credibility of the expert assumptions goes to the weight of the evidence, not its reliability or
admissibility. Aetna Inc. v. Express Scripts, Inc ., 261 F.R.D. 72, 82 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (“[T]o the
extent that there are facts in dispute which [the expert] should or should not have relied upon…a
jury will be given the opportunity…[to assess] each of the parties’ respective expert damages
witnesses.”) Plaintiff’s issues with Sgt. Weekley’s opinion go to the weight of Sgt. Weekley’s
testimony, not its admissibility.
For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion in limine (ECF No. 99).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Gregory L. Frost
GREGORY L. FROST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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